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ABSTRACT 
One of the most profound social scientific questions pertains to social order – the 
stability, change, and functioning of human societies. Two prongs to this question 
inform the background to operationalising any institutional theory: how a society 
can simultaneously maintain its integration and co-ordination (e.g., division of 
labour) and whether a society can be understood as more than the sum of its parts. 
The most influential contemporary tradition of institutionalism, known as 
neo-institutionalism, is no exception with regard to these interconnected questions. 
Celebrating a new era for institutionalism in the 1990s, some members of that school 
declared a ‘reconciliation agenda’ aimed at overcoming the vast gulf between ‘system’ 
and ‘lifeworld’ thinking in the social sciences, a chasm that separates between 
traditions on the basis of their perspective on the problem of order. Moreover, the 
neo-institutionalist pursuit, as a more nuanced exercise, was intended to offer a 
foundation for social studies that consider society to be structured but still changing, 
in all its richness and variety, without being unnecessarily formalistic. While neo-
institutionalism today shows greater variety than ever, this reconciliation has not yet 
come about. 
In-depth study pinpoints this failure is rooted in neo-institutionalism’s theoretical 
premises and in the need for academic demarcation. That conclusion is based on 
critical reconstruction of two branches of neo-institutionalism: historical 
institutionalism (HI), which represents ‘system’ thinking, and so-called ideational 
scholarship (IS), representing the ‘lifeworld’ approach. The main problem with 
theoretical underpinnings is related to their background ontologies’ connection, on 
one hand, with dichotomies such as agent–structure and material–ideal and, on the 
other, with linear causal reasoning. For example, IS tends to create theoretical causal 
objects as tools for empirical enquiry (‘causal’ because science is based on causal 
reasoning and ‘objects’ since only ‘real’ things may possess causal powers). The task 
of explaining empirical cases entails giving these abstractions an ontological status, 
making them ‘things’ with inherent properties. This objectifying leads to ambiguous 
conceptions of how the social world operates, though. Imaginary causal objects may 
detach actors from their concrete conditions, or the entirety of institutional reality 
may be derived from individual cognitions. In general, the essence of institutions for 
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neo-institutionalists typically involves a weird combination of mental states with 
unexplained ‘materialism’ or, alternatively, a mixture that includes rules, norms, 
cognitive frames, and other manifestations of the social relations behind institutions. 
Although neo-institutionalists’ adoption of a more fine-grained and empirically 
based approach to institutions has addressed some shortcomings of earlier work, the 
‘social’ denominator of the equation still appears to be neglected. Research into the 
highly debated issue of how to explain the institutional nature of society in a manner 
beyond the system–lifeworld dichotomy seems to suggest that the common 
denominator involves proceeding from social relations. A project was undertaken to 
revitalise the reconciliation agenda through reconstruction of further theoretical 
approaches. The selection used these three criteria: 1) having a direct or indirect 
connection with neo-institutionalism; 2) tackling the problem of order as a concrete 
issue as it serves as a point of reference for all the approaches; and 3) applying 
relevant neo-institutionalists’ development aspirations, such as Paul Pierson’s 
research agenda, according to which HI should address ideology theories. Among 
the traditions investigated were the social system theory of Talcott Parsons, Peter L. 
Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s social constructionism, and the critical ideology 
theory of Projekt Ideologietheorie (PIT). Both HI and IS were considered in light of 
these traditions and, thereby, supplemented, complemented, and challenged by 
them. In addition, independent consideration of the various traditions and original 
readings were carried out. 
The social system theory reconstructed in the project complements HI with a 
coherent structure to the theory. The perspective formed by a new reading of 
Parsons as a relational theorist offers a detailed description of institutional 
integration mechanisms also. The reconstruction of social constructionism, in turn, 
spotlights the problems of cognition-based lifeworld theories. Rather than describe 
institutionalisation, accounts in this tradition seem to focus on the (historical) 
formation of actors’ experiences. That formation is a key issue in all the traditions 
examined. One element of departure, in contrast, is that all the ones mentioned 
above assume people’s equilibrium-seeking behaviour, while PIT turns this around. 
It asks how modern capitalist societies have held together notwithstanding their 
internal contradictions (where these contradictions stem primarily from capitalist 
competition relations that, while beyond individuals’ control, form very real 
conditions for each individual acting in market relations). Accordingly, PIT presents 
capitalist society as a contradiction-rich whole, where various groups, with differing 
interests, must come together to sufficient extent to maintain or challenge the 
prevailing order. Ideology theory describes the contradictory nature of society and 
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explains how social relations produce disorder as an unintended consequence of 
mundane, institutionalised practices. To synthesise the findings on all of these 
traditions and their underpinnings, the dissertation project’s outputs include a 
synthesis of social relations that extends beyond the system–lifeworld division in 
examining how a society may operate as more than the sum of its parts. 
  
 x 
 
 xi 
TIIVISTELMÄ 
Yhteiskunnallista ja sosiaalista vakautta ja muutosta sekä yhteiskuntien toimivuutta 
koskeva järjestyksen ongelma on yksi yhteiskuntatieteiden keskeisimpiä perus-
kysymyksiä. Järjestyksen ongelma esimerkiksi kysyy, kuinka yhteiskunnallinen 
järjestys voi pysyä yllä rinnakkain yhteiskunnallisen koordinaation (esim. työnjako) 
kanssa, ja voiko yhteiskunnan ymmärtää enemmän kuin osiensa summaksi. Tämän 
hetken vaikutusvaltaisin institutionalismitutkimuksen suuntaus, uusinstitutionalismi, 
on myös pyrkinyt vastaamaan näihin kysymyksiin. Suuntauksen noustua laajempaan 
tietoisuuteen 1990-luvulla jotkut sen kannattajat pyrkivät ’yhteensovitusagendallaan’ 
ylittämään juovan ’järjestelmiin’ ja ’elämismaailmoihin’ perustuvien ajattelutapojen 
välillä – juovan, joka erottaa erilaisia järjestyksen ongelmaan kiinnittyviä 
teoriatraditioita. Uusinstitutionalismin toivottiin myös tarjoavan aiempaa 
rikkaamman ja monisyisemmän perustan inhimillisen toiminnan tulkinnalle 
formalismin rasittamissa yhteiskuntatieteissä sekä silti mahdollistavan laajan 
yhteiskunnallisten rakenteiden ja muutosten tarkastelun. Vaikka nykyinen uus-
institutionalismi on moninaisempaa kuin koskaan, odotettua yhteensovittamista ei 
ole tapahtunut. 
Yhteensovituksen epäonnistuminen johtuu tutkimukseni mukaan 
uusinstitutionalismin teoreettisista lähtökohdista ja tarkoitushakuisesta oppiala-
rajojen vetämisestä. Johtopäätökset perustuvat kahden uusinstitutionalismin haaran 
– järjestelmäajattelua edustavan historiallisen institutionalismin ja elämismaailma-
ajattelua edustavan ideationaalisen opin – seikkaperäiseen tarkasteluun. Niiden 
keskeisimmät teoreettiset ongelmat liittyvät erilaisiin ontologisiin kahtiajakoihin, 
kuten toimija–rakenne ja materiaalinen–ideaalinen, sekä toisaalta lineaariseen 
kausaalipäättelyyn. Esimerkiksi ideationaalisella opilla on taipumuksena tuottaa 
teoreettisia kausaaliobjekteja empiirisen analyysin työkaluiksi (’kausaalisia’, koska tiede 
perustuu kausaalipäättelyyn, ja ’objekteja’, koska vain ’oikeilla’ asioilla voi olla 
kausaalivoimaa). Tästä seuraa, että nämä abstraktiot saavat tapaustutkimuksissa 
ontologisen statuksen ja ne nähdään näin ollen ’asioina’, joilla on ominaisuuksia 
itsessään. Tämä esineellistäminen johtaa ongelmallisiin käsityksiin yhteiskunnan 
luonteesta ja sosiaalisesta toiminnasta, kuten ihmisten eristämiseen heidän 
konkreettisista olosuhteistaan tai koko institutionaalisen todellisuuden johtamiseen 
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yksilöiden mielentiloista. Uusinstitutionalistien instituutiokäsitykset ovat 
yleisemminkin outo yhdistelmä mielentiloja ja selittämätöntä ’materialismia’. 
Toisaalta he ymmärtävät instituutiot tyypillisesti sääntöinä, normeina, kognitiivisina 
kehikkoina ja muina instituutioiden taustalla olevina yhteiskunnallisten suhteiden 
ilmentyminä. 
Uusinstitutionalistien aiempaa hienojakoisempi ja empiirisempi lähestymistapa on 
selkeästi paikannut joitain aiempia instituutiotutkimuksen puutteita. Tästä huolimatta 
heiltä puuttuu edelleen teoreettinen ’sosiaalinen’ tai ’yhteiskunnallinen’ yleisnimittäjä. 
Yhteiskuntateoreettisen kentän valtavasta moniaineksisuudesta huolimatta voidaan 
sanoa, että järjestelmä–elämismaailma-jaon ylittävät lähestymistavat, jotka selittävät 
yhteiskunnan institutionaalista luonnetta, löytävät yhteisen nimittäjän yhteis-
kunnallista suhteista. Yhteensovitusagendan elvyttämiseksi olikin tutkittava ja 
sovellettava täydentäviä teoriaperinteitä, jotka valikoituivat kolmella perusteella: 1) 
selkeä yhteys uusinstitutionalismiin; 2) järjestyksen ongelma konkreettisena teoria-
premissinä; ja 3) uusinstitutionalistien omien kehityssuuntien hyödyntäminen, kuten 
Paul Piersonin ideologiateoreettinen tutkimusagenda historialliselle institutiona-
lismille. Historiallista institutionalismia ja ideationaalista oppia täydentäviä ja 
haastavia teoriaperinteitä olivat Talcott Parsonsin järjestelmäteoria, Peter L. Bergerin 
ja Thomas Luckmannin sosiaalinen konstruktionismi, ja Projekt Ideologietheorien 
kriittinen ideologiateoria, joista kaikista myös tehtiin itsenäiset uudelleenjäsennykset 
ja -luennat. 
Historialliselle institutionalismille oli mahdollista muodostaa johdonmukainen 
teoreettinen rakenne soveltamalla sosiaalisten järjestelmien teoriaa. Parsonsin teorian 
uudelleenluenta tarjoaa myös täsmällisen kuvauksen instituutioiden integraatio-
mekanismeista. Sosiaalisen konstruktionismin uudelleenjäsennys taas valottaa 
kognitioperustaisten elämismaailma-teorioiden ongelmia. Institutionalisaatio-
prosessien kuvaamisen sijaan ne tuntuisivatkin keskittyvän toimijoiden kokemusten 
(historialliseen) muodostumiseen, joka on keskeinen tekijä kaikissa tutkituissa 
teorioissa. Toisaalta, siinä missä muut perinteet ottavat inhimillisen toiminnan 
tasapainohakuisen luonteen lähtökohdakseen, kriittinen ideologiateoria kääntää 
asetelman ylösalaisin. Se kysyy, kuinka nykyaikaisten kapitalististen yhteiskuntien 
järjestykset ovat pysyneet yllä niiden sisäisistä ristiriidoista huolimatta. Nämä 
ristiriidat juontuvat pääsääntöisesti yksittäisten ihmisten ulottumattomissa olevista 
kilpailullisista suhteista, jotka he kohtaavat markkinoilla toimiessaan konkreettisina 
olosuhteina. Kriittinen ideologiateoria käsittääkin kapitalistisen yhteiskunnan 
ristiriitojen läpäisemänä kokonaisuutena, jossa ryhmät joutuvat sovittelemaan 
kilpailevia intressejään riittävässä määrin yhteen haastaakseen vallitsevan järjestyksen 
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tai pitääkseen sitä yllä. Teoria kuvaa yhteiskunnan ristiriitaista luonnetta ja sitä kuinka 
yhteiskunnalliset suhteet tuottavat epäjärjestystä arkisten, institutionalisoituneiden 
käytäntöjen tahattomana seurauksena. Väitöskirjan johtopäätöksissä ehdotetaan 
tutkittuihin teoriaperinteisiin perustuvaa yhteiskunnallisia suhteita jäsentävää 
synteesiä, joka ylittää järjestelmä–elämismaailma-jaon ja kuvaa kuinka yhteiskunta voi 
olla enemmän kuin osiensa summa. 
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1 INTRODUCTION: IN SEARCH OF SOCIAL ORDER 
One of the most profound social scientific questions pertains to ‘social order’, or the 
stability, change, and functioning of human societies. Social scientists ask how 
people who have vastly different needs, desires, and understandings of how things 
should be managed and done can keep complex societies functioning without 
anyone controlling or planning the larger entity, the society as a whole. In other 
words, how can people form collective entities that, while no-one actually controls 
them, function nonetheless? Resources and various (joint) operations, with their 
respective necessary social functions, must be constantly distributed and 
co-ordinated among individual actors and across group boundaries so that these (co-
)operations are sufficiently synchronised and integrated. As they simply go about 
their life, the people still fulfil their purpose in this highly specialised division of 
labour. The most striking question is how all these seemingly free, autonomous 
individuals who are capable of decision-making could possibly come to all the right 
decisions simultaneously in such a way that the whole system works. 
This issue of simultaneous integration and co-ordination is far from trivial, since 
multitudes of operations overlap, entwine, and interleave on so many levels, in 
numerous layers, that their conscious governing is next to impossible – and not 
necessarily even desirable. This intermeshing and overlapping causes contradictions 
and even crises that are not under anyone’s control and whose interpretation may be 
difficult since their reasons are invisible to the naked eye. On the other hand, 
societies are sustained because people have historically created accumulated sets of 
rules, laws, and socialising institutions, whose deeper constitutive principles and 
logics are not immediately observable. They are made manifest only as perceived 
conduct. Thus, as history unfolds, people tend to create formal and informal 
arrangements that operate behind and beyond immediate perception, with these 
bringing tight integration between people but also contradictions and interpersonal 
conflict. 
As development establishes greater formal and informal governance of social 
order, that order becomes more and more institutionalised. What do we mean by 
this? While the etymology of the word ‘institution’ refers to arrangements, 
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foundation, and establishment in a juridical sense, the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy’s entry on social institutions (Miller 2019) specifies that these are ‘complex 
social forms that reproduce themselves such as governments, the family, human 
languages, universities, hospitals, business corporations, and legal systems’ 
(interestingly, this is the encyclopaedia’s only entry on institutions – one might 
consider whether there are any other kinds of institution than social ones). This 
underscores a distinction from other social forms, such as social structures or social 
norms, while simultaneously delineating a connection under the rubric of ‘social’ 
(ibid.)1. The latter is understandable, since there have been attempts to derive 
institutions from individuals alone, as we will see later. Hence, the prominence of 
the word in the title of this dissertation: the question of interest here revolves around 
the ‘social’, which belongs to the field of social theory. Social institutions are the 
subject of study, while the problem of order serves as a background condition. 
One central reason for the existence of social theory is that only a few individual 
actions make sense as isolated incidents: without understanding the context of the 
observed action, one cannot explain it meaningfully. We act in relation to other 
people and/or some kind of (social) conditions. Since our actions are fundamentally 
relative, a reasonable question with regard to almost any situation is ‘in relation(s) to 
what?’ – change becomes understandable only in relation to stability, etc. In my 
reading, the stuff of social theory is relations between people that co-ordinate, are 
constitutive of, and integrate people’s lives in collective, social surroundings. Those 
relations lead at the same time to contradictions, and the contradictions, in turn, 
cause disorder, which may readily exist alongside order. Regardless of this, some 
branches of the social sciences still take individuals and their decision-making as the 
starting point and build the institutions from there. In this thinking, which usually 
has utilitarian underpinnings, human societies may be understood as pure aggregates 
of individual actions wherein each person individually has voluntarily chosen, in a 
rational decision, to give up some autonomy for the sake of the collective order. 
I find individualistic premises insufficient to explain social phenomena, and this 
dissertation represents and defends ‘structural thinking’ – which addresses more 
specific (dis)ordering standards, of which an institution is an empirical manifestation. 
One could peer deeply into an individual and try to find, for example, some gene 
 
1 From this point onward, I use the term ‘social’ in its broadest, most general meaning, which also 
covers phenomena that could be described as societal in nature. English, unlike Finnish or German, 
usually does not differentiate between these two meanings, while the social in, for example, the Finnish 
language involves closer or more immediate/intimate relationship than does the societal. For the sake 
of clarity, I will use ‘social’ to encompass both unless stating otherwise. The same goes for 
‘socialisation’. 
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that, as a building block of our biological heritage, explains the order, but upper-level 
phenomena tend to have emergent properties that transcend the properties of genes 
or whatever other building blocks there might be. While one still may explain the 
social order through genes, or pin the order to individuals’ decision-making, I find it 
more intellectually satisfying to speak of social institutions that constitute the social 
order. Furthermore, considering institutional behaviour structural has the advantage 
of representing a social-theory idea wherein social phenomena cannot be derived 
from micro-foundations. Accordingly, and to differentiate further, I specify that the 
relations-based institutional order is at stake here. 
What good does it do, then, for most of us to know how institutions hold? Why 
should one go down to the shore and peer into the murky waters of social theory? 
Precisely because even our common sense is theoretical. Every time we interpret 
phenomena that extend beyond our sensory perception, we make theoretical 
judgements. If we are to understand our existence as social beings, we must first 
understand the ties that bind us together. In my understanding, for example, the 
contemporary decay of social explaining of social issues stems largely from the 
notion of abstract individuals, a phenomenon I find to be ideological and, 
paradoxically, a social one. Our belief in our individuality is collectively produced 
and confirmed, and this holds us back from building a more stable, fair, and generally 
humane society. Understanding the nature of social institutions is an essential 
building block of effective social science and, therefore, something worthy of study. 
Hence, I want to contribute to the project of building a theory that helps us to 
understand the society as a whole. 
To address the above-mentioned institutional order, I begin the dissertation by 
presenting an investigation of the most influential contemporary tradition of 
institutional scholarship: neo-institutionalism. The reasoning is as follows. In the early 
years of its existence, neo-institutionalists set a ‘reconciliation agenda’, according to 
which it should bring together all the various social scientists who take questions 
centred on social stability and change – and hence order – seriously. Moreover, they 
thereby sought to overcome the profound gulf between ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ 
thinking, with its sharp boundaries based on the thinker’s perspective on the 
institutionalisation of society. The new form of institutionalism was supposed to 
offer a foundation for social scientists who wanted to view society simultaneously as 
structured and changing, in all its richness and variety, without imposing unnecessary 
formalism (Ethington & McDonagh 1995). As our discussion progresses and more 
about such divisions emerges, it becomes clear too that this reconciliation has not 
yet been achieved – quite the contrary (see Blyth et al. 2016, for instance). I trace this 
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problem back to the theoretical premises related to institutions and to the need for 
(un)conscious academic demarcation. For reconciliation to take place, then, there 
should be some kind of shared understanding about the subject of study, which 
ultimately is a theoretical issue. Toward this end, I aim at reviving the agenda, 
through careful reflection on the corpus of neo-institutionalist theory and the 
following suggestions for at least partial resolution. I find reviving the reconciliation 
agenda to be the most effective way of implementing my idea of comprehensive 
institutional theory that addresses society as a whole. 
I began my research with the hypothesis that, while neo-institutionalists took a 
more fine-grained and empirically based approach to institutions because of the 
prediction failures and other shortcomings of their predecessors’ efforts (Blyth 
2002b, 296–299), they forgot the ‘social’ denominator of the equation. For reasons 
of history, it is understandable that neo-institutionalism is usually considered to be 
political science: institutionalism has usually been about studying political institutions 
(March & Olsen 2006). I suggest that finding a common social denominator behind 
the institutions breathes new life into the reconciliation agenda and bridges the gap 
between system and lifeworld thinking that today divides neo-institutionalists more 
than ever. The following research questions were at the core of my study: What is the 
‘social’ that unites different institutions? What common denominators or fundamental divisions can 
be found in neo-institutionalism’s institutions? What are the institutions under neo-institutionalism, 
and what kind of social institutions are they? Since my investigation was not limited strictly 
to neo-institutionalism but extended to other institutional theory as well, I asked 
secondary questions also: How do the other theories answer the above questions 
and tie in with neo-institutionalism in that sense? At the same time, how do they 
supplement, complement, comment upon, and relate to each other? These questions 
become tractable in relation to the problem of order, since it offers a point of reference 
for all the theories in the form of a concrete issue they (must) address. 
I start the discussion with the more general and traditional social scientific 
approach to the question of social order and institutions. More specifically, I 
introduce the classic question that Émile Durkheim posed for sociology as a 
discipline: is society more than its constituent individuals? According to Durkheim 
(1982 [1895], 127), social phenomena should not be reduced to individuals’ 
consciousness, because institutions ‘exert outside pressure on individual 
consciousnesses’ (emphasis added2). Hence, ‘societies cannot exist if there are only 
individuals’ (Durkheim 2005 [1897], xxxvi). A bit of enquiry into Durkheim’s main 
 
2 Unless otherwise mentioned, all emphasis in the quoted material comes from the original text. When 
I have added emphasis, this is indicated in brackets.  
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methodologically oriented works serves as a basis for the relational-structural 
approach that I suggest. After this, I reconstruct the premises behind neo-
institutionalist theory to investigate how its main branches, following the 
system/lifeworld division, understand the social world and what precipitates 
demarcation between them. The main theoretical divide between these approaches 
is related to how they address institutional stability and change. As I find it important 
for neo-institutionalism to reach beyond its own theory corpus and in seeking to 
offer my relational-structural resolution in pursuit of the above-mentioned 
reconciliation agenda, I perform further reconstructions, of several social-theory 
traditions, selected for their substantive basis and their relationship with neo-
institutionalism. 
Firstly, I challenge neo-institutionalism’s typical stance to the structural-
functionalism of Talcott Parsons. Reconstruction of his ‘system theory’ lays bare 
what he himself characterised as its ‘wholly and fundamentally relational’ premises 
(Parsons 1991 [1951], 541), alongside similarities with so-called historical 
institutionalism. His theory provides a general description of those mechanisms 
supporting institutional integration that are not fully addressed by neo-
institutionalists. Next, I reconstruct the social constructionist institutionalisation 
theory of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1991 [1966]), whose lifeworld-
oriented approach was developed as an alternative to Parsons’ system theory and 
provided the basis for the second main branch of neo-institutionalism, known as 
ideational scholarship. The lifeworld theories seem to maintain some distance from 
system theories by dint of their emphasis on the cognitive aspect of collective human 
action. While I identify this as a problem to be overcome, I go further, suggesting an 
alternative way to utilise social constructionism in institutional theory. By that point 
in the discussion, it will be clear to the reader that all the above-mentioned theories 
ultimately regard collective human behaviour as equilibrium-seeking. Therefore, and 
because of the explanatory category of ‘ideas’ in neo-institutionalism, the last 
tradition reconstructed is Marxist critical ideology theory (Rehmann 2013, 2014), 
which turns this equilibrium-related premise around and offers a relational-structural 
view on the interconnection of system and lifeworld. The chapter devoted to this 
final stream of theory also responds to general neo-institutionalist critique of Marxist 
theory and speaks to the ideology-theory agenda that historical institutionalist Paul 
Pierson (2016) has set. 
My primary aim with this work is to illustrate how the neo-institutionalist 
understanding of institutional order and change, along with the reconciliation 
agenda, would benefit greatly from a relational-structural approach. This, again, takes 
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place through critical reconstructions of several theoretical approaches. At the same 
time, my research agenda extends to the other reconstructed traditions as well, since 
they all are also investigated as independent theories through original readings. These 
reconstructions lead to further, secondary output of my research, a 
relational-structural synthesis. This too ties back in with the reconciliation agenda, 
since neo-institutionalism should offer a conjunctive theoretical view on institutions. 
Without this, it has no common denominator, offers no basis for shared operation, 
and hence has no reason to exist. Moreover, reconstructing the other theories 
enables one to position neo-institutionalism along the historical continuum of social 
theory and thereby sheds some light on discontinuities on general theory 
development in the social sciences. In summary, all the traditions are treated and 
commented on as independent though interrelated work; through this approach, the 
dissertation connects with wider social-theoretical discussion, especially that 
pertaining to social relations and structures. 
1.1 The Research Agenda and Setting 
With regard to social phenomena in general, I consider concepts such as social order, 
structures, and institutions to refer to the same thing (albeit in descending order by 
abstraction) insofar as they denote collectively co-ordinated and ordered behaviour 
that is mostly beyond the individual’s control3. In this sense, I also position my study 
within the wider field of contemporary social theory, although it is obvious that I 
cannot introduce all known theoretical perspectives or bring out everything that 
could be said about phenomena that are social or institutional in nature. There 
already exist sensitive, elegant readings and reconstructions of various canons of 
social theory (e.g., Therborn 1976; Giddens 1979; Alexander 1987; Heiskala 2003; 
Joas & Knöbl 2009; Rehmann 2013) and ample debate about questions such as ‘what 
 
3 While I am aware of how troubling this kind of bundling of concepts may appear, further 
differentiation is performed only when needed. Of course, one may find an entire school of thought 
focused on each concept. This is related to the historical use and development of these concepts. As 
François Dosse brings out in his History of Structuralism (1997 [1991], xxii), it is very hard to define the 
limits of a concept or an -ism. Yet we know that ‘[t]he term “structure” – nowhere to be found in Hegel 
and only infrequently in Marx, with the exception of the preface to the Critique of Political Economy (I859) 
– was established in 1895 by Durkheim, in The Rules of Sociological Method’ (ibid.). The key problem in more 
recent years has been variation in usage between branches of the social sciences (Sewell 1992, 3), including 
various definitions of ‘institution’ (see, among others, North 1991; Hodgson 2006; Lawson 2015; Miller 
2019), an issue that has prompted several proposed solutions (in addition to Sewell, see, for example, 
Mayhew 1980; Haslanger 2016). 
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is social theory?’ (e.g., Heiskala 2014) and ‘what kinds of social theories are there?’ 
(e.g., Abend 2008; Selg 2013). The originality of my presentation is instead in its 
focus on the essence of social order and the structures and institutions that follow, 
whereas the typical approaches differentiate between particular kinds of institutions 
and orders: I consider institutions and structures relational in essence. 
I recognise also that there has been a very recent ‘turn’ to social relations (Latour 
2005; Pyyhtinen 2016; Dépelteau 2018a; Vandenberghe 2018). My contribution in 
this regard lies in coupling a relational-structural point of view, which shows parallels 
with, for example, Sally Haslanger’s (2016) recent account, with use of the classics 
of social theory to point out how ‘relational thinking has always been with us’ 
(Dépelteau 2018b, 3). However, the interest in relational theorising is not limited to 
scholars taking part in the contemporary relational turn and the theorists whose work 
they have drawn in. Rather, there is a movement of young scholars emphasising the 
relational nature of the whole of society. Moreover, whereas they criticise the 
discursive and linguistic ‘turns’ preceding them, they dig all the way down to the 
most fundamental premises of the social sciences with the aim of connecting critical 
structural theory to its relational premises and illuminating why society still exists 
(see, among others, Kortesoja 2016; Torssonen 2019). With my dissertation, I engage 
in this enterprise. 
Moreover, I offer novel readings of classic theorists such as Parsons, whose 
standing as a relational theorist has not been recognised in recent accounts 
addressing general social-theoretical questions (for example, see Watts 2014)4, just 
as his movement toward a relational point of view usually gets connected with only 
his later work (Emirbayer 1997). At the same time, I recognise a problem emphasised 
by some prominent theorists, such as William H. Sewell (1992) and Bruno Latour 
(2005): the ‘social’ denominator and ‘structures’ operating in the social sciences tend 
to be approached in such a way that, in general, they far too often remain 
unexplained themselves; these are the ‘stuff’ that explains things just by its essence, 
with no further elaboration on that essence seeming to be needed5. As I offer a 
supplement to the neo-institutional theory corpus and, through this, tools for the 
reconciliation agenda, I shed light on the classic traditions devoted to seeing society 
 
4 Deeper analysis of the article by Watts or his general comments on social theory would not go amiss. 
Before this, one would be wise to see the critique of Watts by Turco and Zuckerman (2017) and his response 
(Watts 2017). 
5 For Latour (2005), the same goes for ‘structural’, ‘context’, ‘conditions’, and similar concepts 
describing the social ‘circumstances’ in question. 
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as a whole, and I suggest relations to be the ‘stuff’ that holds between and divides 
things. 
1.1.1 Methodology and Data 
My investigation provides cross-illumination between contemporary institutionalist 
theory and classic social thinking. The abstraction level is high, because this is a 
theoretical contribution and theories are abstractions of reality. Moreover, all 
scientific investigation is, at base, theoretical. A body of research data does not speak 
for itself, so we need theory for scientific reasoning. The premises of the theory 
reveal its ontology, how it fundamentally conceives of the world. If we are to call 
any theory institutional, it should be grounded on some premises that explain the 
institutional nature of a relevant phenomenon. In the course of the theoretical 
investigation of neo-institutionalism here, as I situate each premise, I also point out 
some of its problematic relations with other traditions I consider. This is to 
illuminate that separate traditions may be astonishingly similar in their premises but 
be unaware of this, or even actively deny those premises. 
According to Charles Camic (1992, 422–423), there are two main ways of 
identifying one’s intellectual predecessors in social theory development. Camic’s 
approach is mostly concerned with the history of theoretical ideas, but I can apply it 
to my theory-building and reconstruction, choosing to call the two options 
‘historical’ and ‘pragmatic’, in line with his general division. According to Camic 
(ibid., 422), ‘predecessor selection is the act through which the social theorist delimits 
the universe of existing work, circumscribing what may then be incorporated, 
transmitted to, and read by his or her students and colleagues and by those exposed 
to his or her writings’. To put it bluntly, in historical selection, any chosen intellectual 
is the ‘next entry in the series’ of descendants, whereas the process of pragmatist 
selection starts with ‘identifying the problems and issues that provided the 
intellectual starting point for the thinker under study’ (ibid.). Once the problem is 
identified, all the material at hand will be used to solve the problem. While 
recognising that the historical and pragmatic approaches usually overlap, I choose to 
call my approach pragmatic with regard to the problem of order. 
The texts dealt with below are used for pointing out the everlasting problems of 
social order and institutions, and how theoretical traditions (must) address them. 
Methodologically, these shared problems and the views taken by the various 
traditions on them form the common thread of my work. In the dissertation, I distil 
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their theoretical premises in their contexts and pinpoint differences and similarities. 
This, of course, entails ignoring a host of problems and issues related to these 
theories. Neither an uncritical attitude nor indifference is intended; my intention is 
to point out something that can loosely be called an ontological fingerprint: how 
these questions continue to leave their mark in social scientific treatments of the real-
world problems tackled. This also is an essential motivational factor for the present 
work, since theories inform all empirical social research. Deciding between theories 
in empirical science entails deciding between ontological worldviews, and thereby 
these decisions trickle all the way down to the conclusions. 
The body of research data has a twofold nature. On one hand, it features 
individual pieces of neo-institutionalism literature, since there is no clearly defined 
corpus of neo-institutionalism theory as such. In fact, the central problem for this 
investigation is the fragmented nature of the neo-institutional theory corpus and 
varying views about the core problems addressed. On the plus side for this enquiry 
is that the basic story of the development of (the branches of) neo-institutionalism 
is replicated in highly similar fashion between historical and descriptive volumes and 
texts (e.g., Blyth 2002b; Rhodes et al. 2006; Schmidt 2008, 2010a; Gofas & Hay 
2010a; Béland & Cox 2011a; Peters 2012; Scott 2014; Fioretos et al. 2016a). My study 
supplemented those volumes with a set of other works, most of them independent 
theoretical works – books, chapters in edited works, articles, and essays – but also 
including some presentations of empirical testing and commenting on these theories 
with the aim of extending, verifying, or falsifying them or parts thereof. While the 
total number of neo-institutionalism writings is huge – after all, neo-institutionalist 
literature has been produced for decades – the number of texts that can be addressed 
here is very limited. Hence, the focus on theoretical texts. 
At the same time, my research data represent classic social-theory texts and some 
selected commentary on them (e.g., Marx 2010 [1867]; Durkheim 1982 [1895]; 2005 
[1897]; Parsons 1991 [1951]; Berger & Luckmann 1991 [1966]). This is because these 
classics contribute to contextualisation of neo-institutionalism and its reconciliation 
agenda but also, simultaneously, to general debate on social relations and social 
theory. In addition to commenting on neo-institutionalism, my reconstructions of 
these classic texts are independent readings, but without an attempt to comment on 
the theorists’ overall bodies of work. As I lay out my major original findings on the 
writings, some reflections on pertinent secondary sources are presented, with a few 
secondary comments found in footnotes also. Now that the agenda, position, 
methodology, and data have been introduced, we may begin our search for social 
order, by compassing the problems that Durkheim set for social science. 
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1.2 An Introduction to Social Institutions As a Research Object 
One of Durkheim’s significant contributions as a founding figure of the social 
sciences was to introduce the research subject for the entire field of sociology. It has 
even been said that ‘[b]efore Durkheim sociology was a provocative idea; by his 
professional endeavors it became an established social fact’ (Tiryakian 1978, 187). 
Durkheim was the one behind the world’s first full professorship in the social 
sciences, a chair in Social Science established at France’s University of Bordeaux in 
1896. In the following year, he taught the first university course in social sciences at 
the same university, from which he moved to the Sorbonne to hold the Science of 
Education chair in 1906. There, the title for his chair title changed to ‘Science of 
Education and Sociology’ in 1913, in a highly significant move for sociology that was 
aptly reflected on by Dominick LaCapra (1985, 35) in his intellectual biography of 
Durkheim: 
Comte’s6 neologism, barbarically combining Greek logos and Latin societas, finally 
gained official recognition in the University of France through the instrumentality of 
a thinker who questioned the preponderant role of the classics in traditional French 
education. 
This would be the start to institutionalised social science, which brought institutional 
recognition of the question surrounding social phenomena. It would also mean the 
beginning of a new discipline that set itself apart from moral philosophy and found 
its place alongside (political) economic science and other social sciences, eventually. 
Along with many other classic social theorists’, Durkheim’s thinking was firmly 
grounded in the soil of a political economy, which has served as a point of departure 
for many specialist social scientific fields (Therborn 1976, 244–262). This also 
explains in its part why so many theorists, Durkheim among them, have expressed 
commitment to ideas such as states of equilibrium of a society. Of course, Durkheim 
was not responsible for the birth of the social sciences, whose roots may be identified 
as far back as classical antiquity, but his contribution toward the demarcation of this 
branch of science is hard to exaggerate. His The Rules of Sociological Method laid a 
cornerstone for the social sciences and social research that even today defines the 
sociological question’s framing: ‘[O]ne may term an institution all the beliefs and 
modes of behavior instituted by the collectivity; sociology can then be defined as the 
science of institutions, their genesis and their functioning’ (1982 [1895], 45). 
 
6 LaCapra refers to French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1857), the first to present the word 
‘sociology’. 
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In his quest for sociology to become a science, Durkheim created methodological 
rules that would be expected to support its move onto the objective scientific stage. 
In the finest positivist spirit, he saw that ‘social phenomena are things and should be 
treated as such’ (ibid., 69)7. In Durkheim’s vocabulary, these ‘things’ are known 
among sociologists as social facts. At this point, it is worth recalling that this is, 
indeed, a methodological rule, involving a strict scientific attitude toward social 
phenomena such as family, property, and crime. Durkheim emphasised this because 
of his observation that enquiries into the social basis of morals are often clouded by 
human sentiment (ibid., 73). 
By the same token, social objects should not be confused with logical necessities 
either, in abstract speculation about things that might appear to be natural laws but 
really ‘are mere counsels of practical wisdom’ (ibid., 69). He saw this extreme as 
evident with ‘the celebrated law of supply and demand [that] has never been 
established inductively as an expression of economic reality. Never has any 
experiment or methodical comparison been instituted to establish whether, in fact, it 
is according to this law that economic relations are regulated’ (ibid., 68). This nicely 
demonstrates Durkheim’s attitude: treating phenomena as things means treating 
them ‘as data [which constitutes] the starting point for science’ (ibid., 69). He 
expressed his fundamental position on the social, or social facts, thus: 
Since [the] essential characteristic [of sociological phenomena] is the power they 
possess to exert outside pressure on individual consciousnesses, this shows that they 
do not derive from these consciousnesses and that consequently sociology is not a 
corollary of psychology. (Ibid., 127) 
Did Durkheim go too far in seeing a society as a ‘thing’, to ‘reifying the social and 
situating it in an indeterminate zone between actors’ consciousness and positive 
facts’ (Bloch 2015, 285)? This would be one of the central criticisms levelled against 
him (see also LaCapra 1985; Pope 1998). For Durkheim (1982 [1895], 128), the 
authority that society has over us – and ‘the distinctive sign of social fact’ – is the 
pressure ‘which all exert upon each individual’. Since we all exert pressure upon all, 
we all are involved. Therefore, the associations between people bring the necessity for 
individuals to act and think in ways that are ‘consecrated by [societies] authority’ 
 
7 The term ‘positivism’ usually refers to an idea wherein the scientific disciplines have a hierarchical 
and evolutionary order with respect to each other. The science of man completes this positive 
evolution among the disciplines. The historical order also refers to a logical order in which the methods 
and concepts of the natural sciences can be applied to the human sciences. Durkheim’s predecessor 
who coined the term ‘sociology’, Auguste Comte is considered the father of positivism. For a short 
introduction of positivism, see Giddens (1974). 
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(ibid.), and Durkheim builds his case against psychology on the basis of the principle 
of associations (which he discusses in more depth on pages 128–136). Nonetheless, 
with his ‘social facts’, Durkheim cannot skirt the problem with which I began this 
introductory chapter: 
[Durkheim], like Marx, emphasizes social structure. Durkheim helped to create 
classical sociology because he located social forces outside [the] individual actor. But 
at this point the serious theoretical problems really begin. The problem for Durkheim, 
as for Marx, is what structure means: How does structure hold within its limits? Of 
what are these limits composed? If structure exists, somehow, outside of the 
individual, can it act only in opposition to freedom? (Alexander 1982, 75)  
For an answer to this question, we must dig into the case Durkheim built in Suicide 
(2005 [1897]), which is the fundamental work justifying sociology’s existence as a 
discipline in its own right and will be scrutinised in the next part of the chapter in its 
relevant parts. 
1.3 Social Facts as Institutions 
Durkheim’s classic investigation of suicide as a social phenomenon is based on the 
sociological methodology he created, present in brief above8. Therefore, it ‘rests 
wholly on the basic principle that social facts must be studied as things, that is, as 
realities external to the individual […]. But if no reality exists outside of individual 
consciousness, it wholly lacks any material of its own. In that case, the only possible 
subject of observation is the mental states of the individual, since nothing else exists’ 
(Durkheim 2005 [1897], xxxvi). According to Durkheim, if the essence of 
institutions such as marriage or religion ‘consists of individual needs […] [t]hese 
institutions themselves, with their varied and complex historical forms, become 
 
8 The most commonly mentioned classic works by Durkheim in addition to The Rules of Sociological 
Method and Suicide are The Division of Labour in Society (originally published in 1893) and The Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life (originally published in 1912). For purely practical reasons, we do not address 
these here but take it as a given that the necessary theoretical formulations put forward in the former 
are present in his later work discussed here. Furthermore, the theory of religion presented in the other 
of these works is not needed for purposes of proceeding to the next generation of theorising on social 
institutions – namely, the theory of social systems presented by Parsons, who took the religious 
function of a society into account. I do refer to several of the many texts on Durkheim’s overall 
thinking (for a comprehensive biography, see Lukes 1985 [1973], while a shorter one and an 
introduction to his general sociological and philosophical conceptions are provided by, among others, 
LaCapra 1985; a more in-depth theoretical review is provided by, for instance, Alexander 1982 and a 
briefer one by, for example, Pope 1998 or Tiryakian 1978). Therborn provides a general critical reading 
of Durkheim’s theory (1976, 244–270). 
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negligible and of little significance. Being superficial, contingent expressions of the 
general characteristics of the nature of the individual, they are but one of its aspects 
and call for no special investigation’ (ibid.). Of course, Durkheim did not accept this 
‘if’. 
Durkheim’s key insight is twofold. Firstly, for him, the social world should be 
seen as an extraneous factor in relation to any given person. The social world consists 
of institutions that are of a historical nature; therefore, he calls the object of his 
investigation a social fact, an institution. Secondly, if reality exists only within the 
consciousness of an individual, all institutions could be studied through examination 
of mental states. Since we are usually incapable of changing the state of an institution 
by changing our individual-level mental states, we should take the idea of an external 
element seriously. In other words, if one denies the existence of the social, we have 
nowhere else from which to derive the effects of the collective than mental states. 
Durkheim’s Suicide is a fitting jumping-off point for my introduction to 
sociological and social theorising since it is regarded as a theoretical milestone for 
the social sciences, in that it ‘permitted him [Durkheim] to meet psychology on its 
own ground [and] [t]o prove that this [suicide] was nonetheless a social phenomenon 
with social causes [and, therefore,] would be a powerful demonstration of the 
importance of the social factors’ (Pope 1998, 47). In Suicide, Durkheim sets forth 
his major thesis pertaining to the social nature of what is regarded as the most private 
of decisions, that to commit suicide – to pursue the most individual-based solution 
of them all. I elect not to enter into very broad discussion of the general picture of 
such a famous and widely debated theorist’s thinking but to pick a text that directly 
addresses the problem at hand, of the nature of institution. Description of the 
process of the formation of social institutions is my starting point and remains my 
emphasis throughout. 
1.3.1 The Social Institution As an Emergent Altered State 
The key feature of Durkheim’s work was that he ‘sought to differentiate sociology 
[from the other disciplines] by eliminating their shortcomings’ (Pope 1998, 47). In 
his scientific worldview, each discipline should have distinctive subject matter, with 
the respective sets of subject matter set in a hierarchy in accordance with the levels 
of reality: ‘The interaction, organization, structural relations, and interconnectedness 
of phenomena at one level of reality give rise to new, emergent phenomena at the 
next higher level: most importantly, the physical to the chemical, chemical to 
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biological, biological to psychological, and psychological to sociological’ (ibid., 47–
48). In this sense, Durkheim’s effort was to institutionalise the discipline of sociology 
with its own subject matter, as a social science wherein the social is understood as a 
higher-level emergent phenomenon in comparison to psychology. Theoretically, his study 
was founded on an empirical premise according to which ‘[t]he existence of societal 
suicide rates had been firmly established by moral statisticians […]. His objective was 
to provide a sociological theory explaining these rates of suicide’ (Therborn 1976, 
260). In other words, the phenomenon of statistical consistency of suicides was 
already known, and this was a phenomenon for which Durkheim suggested a 
theoretical interpretation. 
The various levels in the hierarchy of reality exist in organic relation to each other, 
but a phenomenon at one level cannot be reduced to a lower level, since the 
phenomena are emergent in nature. This emergence, again, means that a society 
should be seen as a whole. Therefore, the society is fruitfully investigated through 
studying not individuals but systematic relations, associations, and parts of that 
society in functional relationships to each other. Analogies to nature offered a 
baseline for Durkheim’s enquiries that were to reveal ‘definite [social] relations called 
laws’ (LaCapra 1985, 14). The properties of a society cannot be derived from the 
characteristics of its individuals, just as the properties of life cannot be derived solely 
from the characteristics of oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and nitrogen. According to 
Durkheim (2005 [1897], 274–275), 
collective tendencies and thoughts are of a different nature from individual tendencies 
and thoughts, that the former have characteristics which the latter lack. How can this 
be, it is objected, since there are only individuals in society? But, reasoning thus, we 
should have to say that there is nothing more in animate nature than inorganic matter, 
since the cell is made exclusively of inanimate atoms. To be sure, it is likewise true 
that society has no other active forces than individuals; but individuals by combining 
form a psychical existence of a new species, which consequently has its own manner 
of thinking and feeling. 
In the extract above, Durkheim makes another comparison to the natural sciences 
and points to the everyday perception according to which there is nothing but 
individuals and hence no such thing as society can exist. Just as cells composed of 
inanimate atoms form life when organised into a whole, human beings as a collective 
bring life to a new form of being, a social being whose characteristics are not found 
as such by considering its constituent individuals: 
Of course the elementary qualities of which the social fact consists are present in germ 
in individual minds. But the social fact emerges from them only when they have been 
transformed by association since it is only then that it appears. Association itself is 
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also an active factor productive of special effects. In itself it is therefore something 
new. When the consciousness of individuals, instead of remaining isolated, becomes 
grouped and combined, something in the world has been altered. Naturally this 
change produces others, this novelty engenders other novelties, phenomena appear 
whose characteristic qualities are not found in the elements composing them. (Ibid., 
274–275) 
Here, Durkheim suggests that social facts emerge when individual minds associate 
and transform into something new. Simultaneously, he acknowledges that there are 
no forces acting in society other than individuals. Nevertheless, after association of 
individuals takes place, ‘something in the world has been altered’ and phenomena 
appear ‘whose characteristic qualities are not found in the elements composing them’ 
(ibid., 275). Clearly, this new, altered world is the ‘thing’ we encounter when we face 
social facts. What is this thing, then, and what is at stake here? 
In The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim largely focuses on proving that there 
is an actual need for social research by defining the method and the object, but he 
skips the question of what the process is in which the social is developed. In that 
work, he says that ‘society is not the mere sum of individuals [and] no collective 
entity can be produced if there are no individual consciousnesses [so] these 
consciousnesses must be associated and combined, but combined in a certain way. 
By aggregating together, by interpenetrating, by fusing together, individuals give 
birth to a being, psychical if you will, but one which constitutes a psychical 
individuality of a new kind’ (Durkheim 1982 [1895], 129). This somewhat vague 
description recognises how individuals must come together in a certain way. That 
way is identified as ‘associations’ whose origin is in the social environment, which 
consists of things and persons, such as the law and established customs, literary 
works, and artistic monuments, all this in the active human environment (ibid., 135–
136). However, only Suicide provides a more detailed account of the process wherein 
associations produce the altered state that is needed for society to exist. What takes 
place is ‘a sort of levelling [that] occurs in the consciousness’ within the same social 
group ‘which undergo[es] the action of a single cause or number of similar causes, 
[…] which leads everyone to think or feel in unison’ (Durkheim 2005 [1897], 75). 
After stating this, Durkheim proceeds to dissect the process: 
A number of men in assembly are similarly affected by the same occurrence and 
perceive this at least partial unanimity by the identical signs through which each 
individual feeling is expressed. What happens then? Each one imperfectly imagines 
the state of those about him. Images expressing the various manifestations emanating, 
with their different shades, from all parts of the crowd, are formed in the minds of all 
[…]. Once aroused in my consciousness, these various representations combine with 
one another and with my own feeling. A new state is thus formed, less my own than 
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its predecessor, less tainted with individuality and more and more freed, by a series of 
repeated elaborations analogous to the foregoing, from all excessive particularity. 
(Ibid., 76–77) 
When assembled into a crowd, people expose themselves to signs and (mental) 
images that express individual feelings and are distributed by the same occurrence. 
When imagining the state around the self, one starts to combine it with one’s own 
feelings, creating a combination of states: partly one’s own and partly of the crowd. 
This state appeals to others by its likeness, its resemblance to the other person’s own 
feeling. It is a state wherein everyone involved gives a part of the self, absorbs 
another part, and merges into the crowd. Then one begins to serve the crowd’s 
function while giving an individual part of the self for it, thus transforming its 
composition. In other words, the crowd starts to speak via the individual with its 
language that is absorbed after entry in unison into the state of the existing feeling, 
and the crowd itself simultaneously transforms in proportion to said individual’s 
contribution. Through this event of fusion, a collective state is created: a levelling of 
consciousness. 
This is the first of the two differentiations that Durkheim makes in contrast 
against the psychological explanation for people acting in a uniform manner – 
namely, imitation. According to Durkheim (ibid., 74), an imitation as purely 
psychological phenomenon is often confused for ‘the origin of social facts in general 
and of suicide in particular’. To understand the social, one must make a clear 
distinction between these, since it is the collective influence that we are interested in 
here. Whereas the levelling of consciousness as thinking and feeling in unison 
represents a stark contrast to imitation – because of this fusion wherein a new, 
collective state is formed – the second differentiation implies imitative reproduction, 
or at least ‘[t]he same name has been given the impulse which drives us to seek 
harmony with the society to which we belong’ (ibid., 76). 
When conforming to adopted manners and customs such as legal and moral 
practices, we usually follow ‘ways of thought or action that surround us […]. 
Whenever we are ignorant of the reasons for the moral maxim we obey, we conform 
solely because it possesses social authority’ (ibid.). This is because we are drawn by 
the likeness that we recognise in other people. It is based on sympathy, which 
constrains us from wounding our fellows’ feelings and, on the other hand, on respect 
‘we feel for collective ways of acting and thinking and the direct or indirect pressure 
exerted on us by this collectivity to avoid dissension and maintain in us this sense of 
respect’ (ibid., 78). In other words, what unites us with others is the sympathy and 
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respect that we recognise in them as likeness9. Yet this is not to be confused with 
imitation, since ‘the reasons making us consent are the determining causes of our 
action, not the example before our eyes. We are its authors, even though not its 
inventors’ (ibid., 79). 
On the same page, Durkheim points out that between the representation and the 
execution of the act there is ‘an intellectual operation’, something that separates the 
social cause from the mere imitation. Therefore, it is not an act of imitation for one 
to ‘share a common feeling [or] yield to the authority of opinion [because] [n]o 
reproduction [imitation] occurs in the first case; in the second it results only from 
logical operations, judgments and reasonings, implicit or explicit, but themselves the 
essence of the phenomenon; and thus reproduction cannot be the definition’ (ibid., 
80). The imitation exists only when there is ‘no explicit or implicit mental operation 
which bears upon the intrinsic nature of the act reproduced intervening between 
representation and execution’ (ibid.). 
This account is an illustration of the relationship between the individual and the 
collective. In my understanding, this description can be extended beyond the 
immediate meeting of people (i.e., the crowd). Durkheim’s examples range from 
public reports to newspapers. He thus describes how the altered state, an institution, 
comes into existence and, at the same time, how the social authority appeals to us. 
However, while Durkheim sees the production of this dominant state as ‘too 
complex to be solved solely by introspection’, he remains puzzled by questions of 
how ‘the combinations occur[,] resulting in the collective state, what are its 
constituent elements’ (ibid., 81). If these questions are to be answered properly, 
according to Durkheim’s own methodological tenets (1982 [1895], 147–158), it is 
comparative empirical examination of social conditions that should be conducted. 
This is why Durkheim builds an empirical case based on statistics of voluntary 
deaths. 
 
9 In Durkheim’s prior work, the term ‘likeness’ was used to refer to ‘the ancient mechanical societies, 
[where] social life and solidarity were derived from the similarity between the members of each society’ 
(Therborn 1976, 249); although this may be ‘a very poor analysis of the social organization’ with regard 
to many societies, Durkheim seems to refer to special mechanisms present in forming (lack of) 
solidarity and binding relations within groups that influence such outcomes as people’s decision to 
end their life for social reasons. These people need not even acknowledge it themselves: ‘Durkheim 
was concerned [with] how the solidarity function[s within] the division of labor in general, not to 
analyze different specific forms of this division of labor’ (ibid.). Maybe it is not that we recognise 
likeness in all groups so much as we see it in the groups or other associations that matter to us – the 
groups or relations that are responsible for the norms that may weaken and become absent in some 
circumstances.  
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Empirically we may observe ‘that suicides do not form, as might be thought, a 
wholly distinct group, an isolated class of monstrous phenomena, unrelated to other 
forms of conduct, but rather are related to them by a continuous series of 
intermediate cases. They are merely the exaggerated form of common practices’ 
(Durkheim 2005 [1897], xliii). As preposterous this may sound, there are volumes of 
contemporary statistical data showing that suicide rates remain relatively constant; 
because of this constant nature, they cannot be explained purely as a series of 
independent decisions10. On the basis of his data review, Durkheim discriminates 
among three main classes of independent social variable affecting suicide rates: 
religious, domestic, and political (ibid., 167). All these come together in the degree of 
integration as the central factor regulating the quantity of suicides and on which basis 
he formulated his famous law: ‘suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration 
of the social groups of which the individual forms a part’ (ibid.). 
To explain suicide as a social phenomenon, he further formulates four theoretical 
explanatory categories in relation to the general law presented above: suicides as 
social phenomena are altruistic, fatalistic, egoistic, and anomic in nature. Altruistic 
and fatalistic suicides, which are not of particular interest for our purposes, follow 
from over-regulation of one’s life, from a situation wherein the social integration is 
too strong (ibid., 175; 239). From our point of view, the other two types are more 
interesting. Egoism refers to excessive individuality, meaning incapability of 
attachment to any common cause and excessive emphasis on private interests. Thus, 
 
10 Criticism has been levelled against Durkheim’s empirical work. It has been suggested that the 
empirical investigation he conducted does not fulfil the requirements of modern statistics (Alexander 
1982, 76) and that the relations he defined do not necessarily operate so unequivocally, with one 
example cited being the correlation between change in prosperity and suicide rates (LaCapra 1985, 
161). In the most recent critique, Töttö (2012) indicates that he was unable to replicate Durkheim’s 
empirical research when applying modern statistical methods to Durkheim’s own data. However, I 
still consider Durkheim’s general theory and insights valid (as does Töttö, according to personal 
correspondence). For instance, one finds in Official Statistics of Finland material (2017) a clear trend 
wherein there is very little variation between years. Since the early 1970s, there has been a slight, 
continuous increase in the number of suicides. The differences within a 10-year radius amount to less 
than 10 cases, except when recession hit Finland in the early 1990s. Although the variation at that time 
was still not large, the quantity of suicides started to fall soon after this brief peak – in a steady 
downward-sloping curve – which might seem to go against common sense, in that they ‘should’ go up 
during financial crisis. Still, the downward trend is exactly in line with what Durkheim (2005 [1897], 
206) said about the consequences of a depression: ‘Poverty may even be considered a protection.’ The 
simple explanation is that the depression rouses the people’s co-operative spirit, as they concentrate 
on working for the society and its growth. On the other hand, economic turmoil most definitely 
exacerbates the tendency toward suicide, as he indicates, but in the short term. The point, made on 
page 203 of Suicide, is that ‘if voluntary deaths increased because life was becoming more difficult, they 
should diminish perceptibly as comfort increases’. Since this is not the case, the reason must be the 
turmoil itself. 
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the moral support for people’s life disappears, and they grow exhausted to a point 
where they see no other option than to give up their life (ibid., 167–168). Suicide of 
a highly successful person caused by burnout might be one example. 
Anomic suicide would be the flipside of this11, since it refers to the disappearance 
and absence of social regulation of people’s conduct, alongside the consequent 
suffering: ‘Those who have only empty space above them are almost inevitably lost 
in it, if no force restrains them. Anomy, therefore, is a regular and specific factor in 
suicide in our modern societies; one of the springs from which the annual contingent 
feeds’ (ibid., 219). This makes egoistic and anomic suicides parallel phenomena: they 
both result from the absence of society in the individual’s life. Examples are relatively 
easy to come by: divorce, financial ruin, being abandoned by a highly relevant 
ideological community, anything causing the social regulation to vanish from one’s 
life. The central conclusion from egoistic and anomic suicides could be formulated 
thus: 
If […] industrial or financial crises increase suicides, this is not because they cause 
poverty, since crises of prosperity have the same result; it is because they are crises, 
that is, disturbances of the collective order. (Ibid., 206) 
It is the collective order that matters. In other words, one does not find the 
precipitating element behind these types of suicide by looking at the phenomenon 
itself; it stems from the underlying common variable of the two phenomena. The 
situation is similar to that in substance-abuse treatment and mental-health care. Too 
often, for people to get help for their mental-health problems, they are told to treat 
the substance problem first. Also, there is a common denominator to the specific 
types of suicide, in that ‘the conditions of life are changed, the standard according to 
which needs were regulated can no longer remain the same […]. The scale is upset; 
but a new scale cannot be immediately improvised. Time is required for the public 
conscience to reclassify men and things’ (ibid., 213). Durkheim continues by stating 
that if the social forces are unregulated, and their respective values are unknown, 
society cannot return to equilibrium. 
 
 
11 Durkheim saw egoistic and altruistic suicides as opposites, but I have chosen instead to present the 
contrast between egoistic and anomic suicides, since these represent the suicide types usually found in 
the modern condition. Anomie is one of the Durkheimian concepts elaborated upon further, especially 
by Merton (e.g., Merton 1938). 
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1.4 Preliminary Conclusions on Social Institutions and Order 
The purpose of this chapter has been to position the question related to social 
institutions and so lay the foundations for the rest of the work. I have pointed out 
that the question requires theoretical treatment since the causes of social phenomena 
are beyond the reach of the naked eye. The fundamental issue for social theory is 
this: if we cannot construct the logic of social life from the individuals alone, where 
should we construct it from? Usually, social scientists speak a lot about social order, 
structures, and institutions, but the social itself all too often remains unexplained. 
The previous sections of this chapter remind us that people in particular 
circumstances are willing to give up even their life voluntarily because of the 
contradictions and suffering caused by the absence or overemphasised presence of 
certain kinds of social regulation. In my interpretation, we find a useful starting point 
in Durkheim’s suggestion that it is the ‘associations’ that regulate our collective 
behaviour and form the basis for the institutional social life. 
Since the foregoing questions are all closely linked to the themes and subjects I 
tackle here, I will consider Durkheim’s ‘associations’ – which I find to be equivalent 
to social relations, the primary explanatory category I aim to advance – in light of 
Jeffrey Alexander’s influential commentary (1982). This offers the further advantage 
that the dividing line between Alexander’s and my interpretation represents in itself 
the deep-rooted question that Durkheim posed as to whether the social phenomena 
have a status of their own. 
According to Alexander (ibid., 229–230), Durkheim refers to associations in The 
Rules of Sociological Method when he discusses the social forces that are external to 
individuals; however, while Alexander understands the term to refer to an extra-
individual factor in Durkheim’s theory, he ultimately sees them as subjective feelings, 
from which it follows that ‘[t]he [social] order therefore is subjective’. He draws this 
conclusion from a more general position, from which he finds Durkheim’s social 
structures to be a result of human emotions; he sees them having the same 
ontological status (ibid., 218–219). All this is based on the first chapter of 
Durkheim’s book, a brief section after which, according to Alexander (ibid., 217), 
nothing very interesting is said. In a stark contrast with Alexander’s interpretation, I 
find it quite clear that Durkheim is talking about the social relations in their own 
right as the source of the social structures that cannot be derived from subjective 
emotions. 
Firstly, in addition to beliefs, Durkheim refers to the modes of behaviour as a 
basis for the institutionalisation of the social world, on page 45. This idea is further 
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developed near the end of the book, where he articulates that the pressure ‘which all 
exert upon each individual’ is what operates as the social environment where the 
things, such as laws and customs, are historically institutionalised (1982 [1895], 135–
136). It is a somewhat dubious claim that these practices and the peer pressure 
holding up historically created laws and customs could be traced back to the human 
emotions alone. This is because the external factor in relation to the individual seems 
to be the common behaviour, wherein – unlike in the Hobbesian ‘war of all against 
all’ – all control all at the same time: a process very clearly outside the control of any 
given individual’s emotions. 
Secondly, it is true that Durkheim refers to collective sentiments as the basis of 
morality (ibid., 101), and if transformations of the prevailing conditions should be 
possible, the morals should not mitigate against this. However, what is stated very 
generally about associations in the latter work is further developed in Suicide. There, 
Durkheim says that we avoid hurting our fellows’ feelings and act out of respect for 
one another, which causes yielding to the social authority (2005 [1897], 76–79). Yet, 
while these emotions boil down to the likeness that inscribes us in other people – a 
recognition – this is only part of the description Durkheim gives of the mechanisms 
by which we integrate with the collective. He describes the associations as an active 
productive factor in themselves, and the emergence taking place when these 
associations transform into a new state of existence, something that we face when 
entering the social reality (ibid., 274–275)12. Thus, when people merge into a crowd, 
something new is created, resulting from interdependencies between people. In a 
situation wherein our emotions would not lead to respect toward others, it would be 
this altered state as the ‘thing’ existing outside us that we must face as a consequence. 
The relation between the social and the (reasoning) individual is not merely a 
group of imitative impulses but a metamorphosis, a levelling of consciousness and a 
combination of evaluated acts merged together through signs and images 
representing common opinions, practices, or beliefs / individuals creating their 
active relationship with those common opinions, practices, or beliefs. The continuity 
has a historical form as some of these practices and beliefs get institutionalised and 
affect people again as an external force. In any case, one always is in an 
interdependence relationship to the common and is forced to position oneself in 
 
12 One potential reason Alexander and I disagree about the ontological status of the human emotions 
in associations lies in the connotations of the term. Whereas ‘association’ may refer to relation, it refers 
also to a mental picture or idea. The difference in interpretation may result from how Durkheim is 
seen in general: for Alexander, he represents the essence of the idealist tradition, whereas I read him 
from the perspective of materialist social relations. 
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relation to it. Also, we may find in this the roots for social change, an idea formulated 
loosely by Durkheim and subject to more extensive discussion in the next chapter. 
When speaking about the levelling of consciousness, Durkheim states that people 
are exposed to identical signs and images that represent the society. In my 
interpretation, this means that the collective representations are images of the shared 
rules and values that later get described, in a situation wherein the collective order is 
shaken – i.e., when the regulating standard, the scale, is upset (ibid., 213). This has 
two kinds of implications. Firstly, people might have difficulties in adjusting their 
views to the picture presented of the functioning of the society by the social 
authority. This may lead to contradictions or reconciliation moves in which 
individuals actively seek solutions that fit their purposes or restore peace of mind, or 
at least produce a compromise they can live with. It is possible that a person in a 
case of unresolved contradiction may strive to change the prevailing situation. 
According to Durkheim (ibid., 212), ‘discipline can be useful only if considered just 
by the peoples subject to it. When it is maintained only by custom and force, peace 
and harmony are illusory; the spirit of unrest and discontent are latent; appetites 
superficially restrained are ready to revolt’. 
Secondly, if the standard that regulates people’s behaviour vanishes or breaks 
down for one reason or another, there are courses of action other than suicide that 
may appear. People may seek each other out for new solutions or ideas for alternative 
actions. For Durkheim, the regulating standard clearly represents the kind of 
equilibrium toward which the collective action is directed if not interrupted. LaCapra 
(1985, 72) has characterised Durkheim’s general idea of society’s normal state as ‘a 
primary quality of the normal state of society was the existence of solidarity’. In this, 
Durkheim commits to the notion of social equilibrium as the usual state of society, 
and he sees the collective behaviour as heading toward spontaneous equilibrium 
because of the normalising forces – collective representations operating as a scale, a 
regulating standard – that makes us respect our fellows. If we do not find this respect 
intrinsically, this social control transforms into social pressure. 
Durkheim compared the subject of the new discipline to the natural sciences’ by 
pointing out the phenomenon of emergence: just as the liquid form of water cannot 
be derived only from ‘the two gasses of which it is composed’ (1982 [1895], 39), 
society cannot be derived from its constituent individuals alone. Society is an altered, 
emergent state resulting from the associations between people that are governed by 
rules and norms (Durkheim 2005 [1987]). In a contrast to Alexander’s portrayal, I 
find the Durkheim’s methodological works paint a seamless continuum between 
human lifeworld and the objective forces encountered in the social world. 
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I have taken Durkheim as a springboard for undertaking my investigation of 
institutional order. As a founding institutional scholar, he brought out how 
institutions must be something other than a mere aggregate of individuals’ 
consciousness. Durkheim set the stage through his problem setting, with the idea of 
emergence and associations, and via his preliminary description of the mechanisms 
through which these associations work. However, he was aware of limitations in his 
theoretical description: it was not sufficient to explain the phenomenon, so empirical 
research would be required. Moreover, seeing conflicts as undesired and ‘normal’ 
progression as the desired way to continue, Durkheim did not admit ways of thinking 
and acting outside the given set of circumstances. Still, he presented the dividing 
lines between structures, individuals, and their lifeworlds, which continue to puzzle 
theorists today. 
With this groundwork laid, our investigation takes us next to neo-institutional 
theory of institutions. With the following chapter, my reconstruction of the neo-
institutionalist theory is aimed at locating its theoretical premises, which will be 
compared with the ideas presented above. All this work is directed, more generally, 
toward seeking answers to the question of how institutions and the order that ensues 
are understood in contemporary theorisation. 
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2 INSTITUTIONS AND IDEAS 
Institutionalism research in the Anglophone world is divided into at least two major, 
partly overlapping branches today: institutional economics and varieties of new 
institutionalism (or neo-institutionalism). This division has a strong historical 
background that reflects the division of labour within the social sciences that persists 
in the form of economics on one hand and the rest of the social sciences on the 
other. Notwithstanding the differences, there has been strong interconnectedness 
among institutionalism studies throughout their history, and this is reflected in their 
central problems and concepts. Neo-institutionalism represents the latest phase in 
institutionalist studies, which, in addition to achieving popularity, has been relatively 
successful in bridging the gap between economics and other social sciences. For 
example, one of the most prominent contemporary economists, Harvard professor 
Dani Rodrik, has applied neo-institutionalist ideas from political science in his recent 
economic theory development (Rodrik 2014; Mukand & Rodrik 2018). This is a 
significant result when one considers the antagonistic relationship that economics 
and other social sciences have been set in throughout their history. 
Historically, the new institutionalist movement’s reconciliation agenda has its 
roots in discussion found in the journal Polity in 1995, when potential was identified 
for this new movement to bring together institutionalists from all traditions and eras, 
even transcending the profound division between system- and lifeworld-based 
thinking (Ethington & McDonagh 1995). New institutionalism was supposed to 
offer an umbrella for social scientists who wanted to see society holistically but still 
in its full richness and variety and without unnecessary formalisation getting in the 
way (ibid.). As this has not come about, my investigation of its theoretical premises 
in the following chapters is focused on pinpointing the problem and offering an 
alternative approach. In this chapter, I introduce neo-institutionalism theory, 
especially its two key variants, historical institutionalism and ideational scholarship. 
My aim is to reconstruct the theoretical premises of these two variants since they 
represent neo-institutionalist theory in its most general terms with regard to social 
order. The reason for this parallel reconstruction is to uncover how both, on one 
hand, understand the institutions and social order and, on the other, produce 
understanding of the social world. The former task is undertaken for understanding 
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how society and the social world are understood within this theory, and the latter – 
following from the former – is aimed at understanding what kind of reasoning these 
premises inform and, thereby, how they influence the evaluation of real-world 
phenomena. This should provide the necessary grounding for locating the obstacle 
to the reconciliation agenda. 
Neo-institutionalism calls for this treatment since I have identified it as the most 
influential tradition in contemporary social science that takes the so-called structural 
questions seriously and therefore aims at more general and comprehensive 
understanding of society. While it has spread and divided into many branches and 
fields13, it still operates upon a common denominator, institutions, and addresses the 
classic problems of social theory. In his neo-institutionalism textbook, B. Guy Peters 
(2012, 175) has associated the term ‘institution’ with ‘classic problem in social 
analysis – the relative importance of structure and agency’. He also highlighted the 
question of change and stability (i.e., the problem of order) throughout the book, 
where he tackles it not as separate from but as a dimension of the structure–agency 
dichotomy. This is because ‘one of the common ways of thinking about structure–
agency debate in social theory is to ascribe stability to structure, and hence to 
institutions’ (ibid., 182). In other words, the entire concept of an institution stands 
in fundamental relation with classic social theory. 
Hence, neo-institutionalism seeks answers to general questions about societies 
and the social sciences. In this sense, it is interesting that neo-institutionalism studies 
seems to build its own, self-sufficient theory corpus, which is usually evaluated in its 
own terms. This will be elaborated upon further on in the analysis. One explanation 
might be that neo-institutionalists usually consider themselves to be political 
scientists so see their theory as ‘a general approach to the study of political 
institutions, a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses as to the relations between 
institutional characteristics and political agency, performance, and change’ (March & 
Olsen 2006, 4). I conclude, however, that, as theory striving for answers to general 
social scientific questions, it can be evaluated in terms of general social theory not 
confined to political institutions alone. Furthermore, by positioning neo-
institutionalist theory in relation to classic social theory, I can clarify and supplement 
it via systematic theory-building that has taken place in other traditions. The 
following introduction to neo-institutionalist theory and critical reconstruction of it 
from the above-mentioned foundations is aimed at pinpointing its theoretical 
 
13 In his textbook Institutional Theory in Political Science (2012), Peters distinguishes among eight distinct 
branches: normative, rational choice, historical, empirical, discursive, constructivist, sociological, and 
international institutionalism. 
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premises that can be evaluated in terms of other theories, addressing the same 
questions. 
In institutionalism studies, institutions lack any single definition; there are many 
kinds of institutions. While no singular definition for an institution has emerged, 
there have been aspirations to develop one. It has usually been philosophers who 
have been interested in this kind of effort (e.g., Searle 2005; Lawson 2016; Miller 
2019), but some institutionalists themselves have offered suggestions for the 
fundamental definition (e.g., North 1991; Hodgson 2006; March & Olsen 2006). 
That said, most (neo-)institutionalist literature and work by social philosophers alike 
identifies (systems of) rules as the most basic element of institutions (ibid.), and the 
consensus usually ends about here. Accordingly, there are several institutionalisms 
and several neo-institutionalisms, between which a division is drawn in accordance 
with their fundamental understanding and definition of an institution and its role in 
human life. Thus, neo-institutionalisms identify institutions not only with the rules 
but also with norms, values, cognitive frames, etc. This obviously leads to the 
following question: 
Why not say that rules are the operative element rather than some superordinate entity 
– the institution – composed from those rules? […] In short, what is the utility of 
using the label institution, or ‘new institutionalism’ for empirical analysis rather than 
simply looking at rule-based behavior, or the impact of particular rules of norms? 
(Peters 2012, 91–92) 
While the institution could be considered an overarching concept for various 
definitions, rules, norms, values, etc., it far too easily ends up transferring the burden 
of proof from one abstract concept to another. Saying that institutions are rules or 
values will not tell us much about the thing we are dealing with as such or, even 
worse, associates it with a common-sense understanding of the phenomenon. This 
kind of ‘chaining’ of concepts (institutions are rules, rules are norms, and norms are 
cognitive frames), in which the actual explaining of the effective mechanisms is 
neglected, happens too often. Equally, understanding rules through the behavioural 
manifestation falls short of explaining the underlying cause, just as Peters (ibid.) 
suggests. It just transforms the immediate perception into theory of an abstract 
phenomenon. What we need, instead, is a plausible theory for explanation of the 
empirical observations, so that they make sense as social phenomena. This was 
already made apparent by Durkheim, who did not simply insist that ‘social facts’ exist 
but provided preliminary theoretical explanation with his ‘associations’, which 
expanded into empirical enquiry into those general laws that regulate self-destructive 
behaviour, with the description of mechanisms that operate therein. 
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Until very recent years, three main neo-institutionalisms dominated the field: 
historical institutionalism (HI), rational choice institutionalism (RCI), and sociological 
institutionalism (SI). Several variations have appeared since, but the focus in addressing 
these will be on so-called ideational scholarship (IS), which grew out of HI and ended 
up entering a contradictory relationship with its original host. The distinctive feature 
of IS is that it brings together various sorts of approaches that identify themselves 
through one key concept, the ‘idea’, which itself serves as a key justification for this 
wholly new tradition within neo-institutionalism. It denotes a lifeworld in general 
and, at the same time, a counter-movement against the ‘system thinking’ of HI, 
which had originally represented the main solution for the reconciliation problem. 
Hence the word ‘scholarship’ (note that ideational institutionalism is only one branch 
of IS). The development, in the form of specialisation and demarcation, did not end 
here but produced another distinctive branch of investigation as an outgrowth of the 
general field of IS: discursive institutionalism (DI) Its founder, Vivien A. Schmidt (2008, 
2010a), has called it the fourth new institutionalism because of its attempt to bring 
all ‘idea’ studies under the same discursive umbrella. Therefore, I see it as falling 
along the development continuum illustrated below. The structure of the analysis in 
this chapter also follows the timeline presented below. 
Figure 1.  A timeline of the appearance of the forms of new institutionalism and the structure of 
analysis here. 
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Schmidt’s aspiration to bring the concept of discourse to institutional analysis is 
interesting in two, interconnected ways: it represents juxtaposition between the 
structural and lifeworld theories, and, thus, makes an attempt to bring the structures 
back into discussion – but in terms of socially constructed meanings. Neo-
institutionalism draws all these topics together in a somewhat contradictory manner. 
On one hand, one of its great benefits is that it thematically covers a wide range of 
topics of social theory and social science in general. This can be seen in the names 
of the neo-institutionalisms, coined in response to the need for academic 
demarcation. On the other hand, the demarcation in question is problematic since it 
may build artificial borders between the disciplines. I will let Mark Blyth (1997, 244–
245) elaborate on the neo-institutionalist division of academic labour, the above-
mentioned juxtapositions, and the position of the classic agent–structure dichotomy 
and the problem of order in these discussions: 
[H]istorical institutionalism derives from sociology, and rationalist institutionalism 
from economics. Irrespective of their different lineages, all institutionalist arguments 
are ultimately concerned with two sides of the same problem: how order is created 
and maintained and how change is possible. Structural sociology traditionally 
conceived of agents not as individuals pursuing self-interest, but as passive ‘bearers’ 
of class or values responding to external structures and internalized norms. Critiques 
of the functionalist logic of such models and of their lack of microfoundations 
popularized alternative economic perspectives. Whereas classical sociology operated 
with an ‘oversocialized’ conception of man, neoclassical economics operated with a 
highly ‘undersocialized’ one. Whereas sociology ‘solved’ the problem of order by 
making agents ‘automatons’ of external social forces, economics ‘solved’ the problem 
by eliminating social relations from the intellectual agenda and separating the 
economy from other aspects of social life. 
This very illuminating quotation brings out the confrontations that serve as 
justifications for developing such somewhat mutually independent but historically 
interconnected traditions as HI and IS, which cling to these stereotypical 
descriptions from classic social theory. While DI aims somewhere in between, it is 
still clearly a descendent of IS. I treat HI, IS, and DI as independent traditions whose 
interconnections are mediated through the problem of order and the dichotomies 
produced in response to it, such as agent–structure. Thus, the disposition of this 
chapter. With the above quotation, Blyth sets the scene for this enquiry and my 
‘intervention’ for neo-institutionalism. What follows next is a very brief historical 
overview of the most canonised neo-institutionalisms, which begins with some 
general history. Then, we will be ready to look at each of HI, IS, and DI. 
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2.1 From Old to New: The Origin and Branches of Neo-
Institutionalism  
When it comes to the label ‘neo-institutionalism’, the clear implication is that there 
have been some previous institutionalisms but now the enterprise is back, in new 
and improved form. Textbooks and other introductions to neo-institutionalism 
indeed make a distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ (see, among others, Blyth 2002b; 
Rhodes et al. 2006; Peters 2012; Scott 2014)14; however, the common denominator 
of all institutionalisms is that they have always been dissenters, opposing mainstream 
social sciences, according to historian of the American social sciences Dorothy Ross. 
Ross (1995, 117) states that 
what is most striking about institutionalism is its recurrence. In the United States 
institutionalism has been repeatedly invented, first in economics15, then in political 
science and sociology. Each time it develops as an opposition movement, a dissenter 
from mainstream social science paradigms. Having waxed and waned, it is reinvented 
again some decades later. 
 
14 For further discussion of old institutionalism, see, among others, Rhodes (2006). 
15 The first economics school under institutionalism dates back to the late 19th and early 20th century, 
with the classics of modern economics and the so-called German historical school, investigating the 
historical background of economies and economics. The historical component mostly involved 
articulating that, if one understands the development of (American) capitalism and its institutions, one 
should see that no artificial or rigid categories separating between areas of life were needed – these 
could even be harmful. While many of the influential early American institutional economists shared 
these premises, it was the evolutionary thinking that left its lasting mark on the new economic 
institutionalisms that followed: The institutional logic of figures such as Thorstein Veblen (1857–
1929), one of the most notable individuals in the field, displayed certain general historical traits, but 
the strongest inspiration came from Darwin’s evolutionary thinking. At the same time, the concept of 
‘habit’ that Veblen introduced in an influential article (1898) has been widely used in social theory. 
Usually, it is associated with Max Weber (1978, 31), who understood habit as crucial for understanding 
the prevailing order: ‘An order which is adhered to from motives of pure expediency is generally much 
less stable than one upheld on a purely customary basis through the fact that the corresponding 
behavior has become habitual.’ However, Camic (1986, 1076), in an extensive article combing through 
the theoretical history of the concept, highlights that it was ‘progressively discarded from the language 
of the sociology’ over many years. Interestingly, the main idea behind the concept has surfaced in 
contemporary behavioural economics (Kahneman 2011) and also in neo-institutionalism (Finlayson 
2004) but without reference to Weber or other sociologists. This tells us something about the manner 
of development of these demarcated social scientific fields. For further elaboration on institutional 
economics and its evolutionary background, see authors such as Hodgson (1998, 2007, 2008, 2015). 
For comparison between evolutionary thinking in institutional and Marxist economics, see Dugger 
and Sherman (2000). 
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As the quotation suggests, there might not be much new in neo-institutionalism, but 
there seems to be a recurring need for it16. According to Ross, its continuous 
resurgence occurs because American social scientists seem to soar repeatedly ‘into 
excessive abstraction, formalism, [and] reductionism’ (ibid.). The institutional 
schools have tried to get the social sciences to land on their feet every time, back on 
the firm ground of ‘historical contingency, the agency of historical actors, and the 
contextually based continuities of social relations, ideas, and values that shape their 
fields of study’ (ibid.). History with its contingencies, apparently, is a key aspect of 
institutionalism, and its own history has seen it serve as a shared breeding ground 
and meeting place for thinkers from separate disciplines. While the return of 
institutionalism most definitely represents advantageous and progressive motion in 
the development of social science, one could ask whether it is victim to its own 
diversity, which may hinder its development. 
Delving a little further into the past, one sees that what gathered social scientists 
together under the flag of institutionalism in the 1880s and 1890s was the view that 
the state, economy, and society were not mere reflections of human nature; they 
‘were constructed according to historically evolved patterns, which they called 
institutions, that are open to modifications through wise legislation. The old 
institutionalists who flourished between 1880 and 1920 emphasized the state as the 
guiding institution among all social institutions’ (Ethington & McDonagh 1995, 88). 
The first institutional intervention, then, was to bring the social institutions under 
discussion instead of accepting human nature as the ultimate explanatory category 
with regard to social evolution. The attitude of early-20th-century political 
institutionalism toward state institutions, in particular, and the ensuing discussion 
could be summarised as follows: 
[T]he institutional school that developed at the turn of the 20th century exhibited 
several defining features. First, it was preoccupied with formal structures and legal 
systems […]. Second, the approach emphasized detailed accounts of particular 
political systems, resulting in ‘configurative description’ – intricate descriptive 
accounts of interlinked rules, rights, and procedures […]. Third, the approach was 
conservative in the sense that it emphasized origins but not ongoing change […]. 
They were regarded as completed products. Fourth, the work was largely 
nontheoretical, primary attention being given to historical reconstruction of specific 
institutional forms. Finally, the tone of these studies was more that associated with 
moral philosophy and less that of empirical science. (Scott 2014, 8) 
 
16 Even the founders of the new institutionalism do not claim it to be something completely new but 
understand the problematic nature of such a claim. 
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According to Peters also (2012, 3–11), the old institutionalism was about structured 
and legalistic political systems that are holistic and historical in nature yet in the sense 
displayed in the above quotation: institutions are heavily structured, determining, 
bureaucratic systems of rules that leave very little room for individuals’ manoeuvring. 
This was probably because old institutionalism ‘took much of its inspiration from 
the Prussian state as the model of good governance and proper public administration’ 
(Blyth 2006, 493). This one static case provided general lessons for political scientists, 
which eventually turned out to be a doomed strategy, when World War I began. 
Blyth (ibid.) regarded this as proof of the field’s ‘misplaced foci as much as predictive 
failures’ arising from an incapability of understanding political realities that stemmed 
from its one-sided focus on ‘study of constitutions, laws, parliamentary procedures 
and so on’ (Blyth 2002b, 296). Thus, one could characterise ‘old’ institutionalism as 
mostly about formal institutions aiming for a good administration model. 
Between the eras of old and new institutionalism was a time of so-called 
behavioural revolution (sometimes called behaviouralist but not to be confused with 
the school of psychology). It emphasised empirical science and orientation to 
political behaviour instead of governmental structures. Another distinguishable 
feature of behaviouralism was that its theory put emphasis on the intangible research 
objects and introduced ‘relations’ instead of formal institutions as an object of 
enquiry (Ethington & McDonagh 1995, 88). Still, relations were clearly a heavily 
undertheorised object, and the behaviour of groups and individuals in various 
situations was elevated to be the primary unit of analysis accordingly (ibid.). 
Methodological individualism was brought into the picture with a strong rationalist 
influence, since the relations only imply ways in which one person’s actions may 
affect others’. The main point was that the emphasis was moved from rules and 
structures to utilitarian-orientation behaviour in pursuit of a political scientific theory 
the discipline could call its own (Scott 2014, 8–9; see also Peters 2012, 12–23.). 
Simultaneously, 
a number of candidates for general theories were developed and ‘tested’. For example, 
in comparative politics – the area most akin to the old institutionalism – 
structural-functionalism […] was a major candidate for theoretical domination. This 
system approach argued that all political systems must perform certain requisite 
functions […]. (Peters 2014, 12) 
Structural-functionalist ideas have had a foothold in institutionalism, but – unlike in 
the social system theory of Parsons (introduced in the next chapter) – the 
functionalism stemmed from the utilitarian-individualistic presuppositions, while the 
connection with the problem of order was still maintained. For example, one key 
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functional theorist of the day, James Coleman (1986, 16), stated that ‘sociologists 
have characteristically taken as their starting-point a social system in which norms 
exist, and individuals are largely governed by those norms’. What appealed to 
political scientists, in Coleman’s phrasing of the question, is the sentiment that 
‘sociological theory has little to say about how […] collective decisions are made’ 
(ibid.). This crystallises one of the major divisions addressed in the dissertation, 
which manifests itself repeatedly since the lifeworld theorists suggest that the 
(structural) system theorists cannot provide satisfactory explanation for the origins 
of society or for the diverse actions within institutions that cannot be derived solely 
from structures. 
After the experiences of the Great Depression and the Second World War, these 
still relatively stable and static institutional understandings faced the problem ‘that 
the real world events of the 1960s, both domestically [from a US perspective] and 
internationally, simply overwhelmed them’ (Blyth 2002b, 297). As the stable, ready-
made institutional structures were challenged by utilitarian-individualistic 
explanations, a quite different question that demanded an answer started to emerge: 
‘why it was that in moments of great economic distress it was the state […] which 
attempted to resolve such crises’ (ibid., 298; see also Blyth 2006). By the early 1980s 
at the latest, the state was brought back in with a vengeance, though with greater 
sensitivity to changing historical situations than the old institutionalism had shown. 
‘[I]f one wanted to explain why it was that certain trade union movements were 
stronger than others, or why national pension systems differed in their systems of 
delivery, one had to deal with the lower level of abstraction’, stated Blyth (2002b, 
299). A shift toward finer-grained, more empirically grounded analysis of historical 
institutions took place with the aspiration for a new institutionalist movement. 
Indeed, it had become widely accepted no later than the early 1990s that a 
simultaneous historical and institutional turn had taken place in the social sciences 
that would meet the above-mentioned requirements (Ethington & McDonagh 1995; 
Blyth 1997). The widespread recognition of the former turn, closely related to the 
‘renewed debate about institutions as objects of inquiry and institutionalism as a 
method of inquiry’ (Ethington & McDonagh 1995, 85), led to a roundtable 
discussion at the Annual Meeting of the Social Science History Association in 1993. 
The output of this discussion, which involved prominent members of the 
institutionalism field, was nine short articles in Polity in 1995. The ensuing debate 
deserves some attention since it could be considered a sort of ‘interim report’ on 
neo-institutionalism’s issues early in its radical upswing. It also represents the stage 
in its theoretical development in which all the phases from old to new 
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institutionalism seemed to be topically present. This discussion set the agenda for 
the neo-institutionalist movement. 
The 1995 Polity debate was about defining an institution and new institutionalism. 
The roundtable topics reflected pressing issues that still sound familiar today, with 
titles such as ‘Order and Change’ (Skowronek 1995), ‘Ideas and Institutions’ (Orren 
1995), and ‘Institutionalism, Rational Choice, and Historical Analysis’ (Kloppenberg 
1995). The proceedings were edited by Philip J. Ethington and Eileen L. McDonagh 
(1995), whose title for their introduction is itself revealing: ‘The Common Space for 
Social Science Inquiry’. The idea was to bring the various branches of social science 
and generations of institutionalism together by offering them a peer group of 
scholars from several fields that share a common denominator. The harmonisation 
agenda went as far as seeing the new institutionalism overcoming the seemingly 
everlasting disagreement about system vs. lifeworld and reconciling the differences 
among old institutionalism, new institutionalism, and behaviouralism (ibid.). After 
the pages of this debate were printed, it gets much harder to find the optimistic, 
unifying tone across several fields of social science, making it a sort of a watershed. 
Of course, not even all the roundtable contributors were convinced about the 
agenda. For example, Morris Fiorina (1995, 107) told of how he was ‘not completely 
persuaded that the “new institutionalism” amounts to much beyond the normal 
progression of the social science stimulated by the normal desire of young scholars 
to distinguish themselves from the generation ahead of them’. 
While not everyone fully agreed as to the novelty of this rising movement, 
Ethington and McDonagh approached the reconciliation agenda from two 
perspectives as editors of the volume: on one hand, they aimed at bridging the gap 
between formal (state) and informal (societal pressures) institutions, while, on the 
other, they wanted to draw multiple definitions, theories, and methodological 
approaches together. When it came to formal old institutionalism, the object of 
enquiry was written documents, laws, presidency materials, court systems, and other 
visible outputs or manifestations of the institutions. Correspondingly, the informal 
side entailed an interest in the intangible and therefore unobservable – objects such 
as ideas, beliefs, and meanings. From the standpoint of the new institutionalist 
agenda, the problem on both sides was obvious: the concept of institution was 
useless since the object of investigation was either a visible institution itself or, in the 
case of an intangible research object, an attitude, a process, a belief, or some 
equivalent. 
Still, Ethington and McDonagh (1995, 86) were optimistic with regard to bringing 
various orientations together, since they concluded that ‘the common term […] 
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applies to the full spectrum of social science objects of inquiry’. To offer a common 
term, they defined an institution in line with the thinking of S.J. Gould (1987), as 
regularised principles of conduct, action, or behaviour that governs social life and 
endure over time. They continued: ‘Scholars too often confuse debate about 
“institutional” versus “non-institutional” analysis with what is really a debate about 
proper definition of an institution in terms of how tangible or intangible it may be’ 
(Ethington & McDonagh 1995, 86–87). This would be their agenda setting: to 
approach institutions not as ‘ontologically’ separate objects in accordance with their 
immediate observability but also in line with their underlying principles, such as 
regularities of relatively enduring principles of collective human conduct. 
Moreover, Stephen Skowronek (1995, 94–95) suggested further distinguishing 
criteria to apply in place of seeing institutions just as channelling or constraining 
individual actions through rules: 1) investigation of how institutions historically 
construct persistent motives, prescribe actions, and assert legitimacy; 2) taking into 
account that the individual institutions in complex societies are likely to have 
distinctive histories, resulting in a ‘multiple order thesis’; and 3) recognising that 
political institutions are directed at controlling individuals or other institutions even 
outside their declared sphere. The implication of the last suggestion is that politics is 
not necessarily about the order of things, or even multiple orders, but about coercive 
ambitions with a sustaining asymmetry of power, incongruities, and frictions. Thus, 
politics means a stubborn ‘intercurrence of different standards of legitimate action’ 
(ibid., 95). The more general suggestion emerging from these further criteria is that 
the new institutionalism should be something ‘more than another formulation of the 
traditional study of system, order, and regularity’ (ibid., 96). 
One of the most profound embodiments of this suggestion is the appearance of 
the explanatory category of ‘ideas’, which would be one of the key novel elements. 
Tackling the intangible object of enquiry, this also represents several aims that were 
set for new institutionalism, among them bridging the system/lifeworld gap 
(Ethington & McDonagh 1995). It led to new questions too, such as these: Do ‘ideas 
or ideologies have significant political life of their own, even as the institutions or 
practices that once reinforced them have become weakened? […] How loosely 
attached can ideas be to institutional developments and remain politically viable?’ 
(Orren 1995, 98). These efforts notwithstanding, the gap materialised immediately, 
in the contribution of Theda Skocpol (1995b, 105), who declared herself to be a 
historical institutionalist17 who believes ‘that causal analysis and hypothesis testing 
 
17 Skocpol was one of the first to use the term ‘historical institutionalism’ and has made several key 
contributions to the field. Though her work had a significant influence, we will not consider it in depth 
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about variations are the way to proceed methodologically. It is not enough just to 
explore how people talk or think. We must also find patterns in what they do. I do 
not think that institutions are simply or primarily systems of meaning or normative 
frameworks’. This marks out the division that, having not been transcended to this 
day, remains in focus for the remainder of the present work on neo-institutionalism. 
So far, we have located three new items on the institutionalist agenda: Firstly, new 
institutionalism sought primarily to unify the fields of social science in a theoretical 
sense by offering a common denominator with which to operate. Secondly, in 
aspirations related to this effort, the unifying definition for an institution should go 
beyond the fundamental problems of previous institutionalisms, and even the whole 
of social theory with its two camps. Now the real challenge reveals itself: at the same 
time, under the third objective, new institutionalists should aim for more detailed 
accounts of institutions than previously: they should be able to think in a more 
broad-based and fine-grained way at the same time. 
Clearly, the contributors believed that institutionalisms need more fine-grained 
analyses, not just because the theoretical-methodological apparatus has been 
insufficient but also because things have changed. For example, according to Karen 
Orren (1995, 100), what can be observed is ‘the parallel devolution of institutions 
and ideas, of encompassing institutions of control and of meaning, over time’. The 
widely shared view in this is that the world itself is more fragmented and dispersed 
than ever (see also Skowronek 1995; Smith 1995). As ‘idea’ was set as a key vehicle 
for promoting this new institutionalist agenda, the following question could be 
asked: is there specific call – in relation to past theory or to the situation that prevails 
in today’s world – for putting such an explanatory category as ‘idea’ forward in its 
own right? After all, as Terrence McDonald (1995, 130) brings out, ‘every shift in 
the paradigms of social sciences brings costs and benefits’. In light of the above 
question, it is worthwhile to assess the weight of these costs and benefits. However, 
before venturing into the world of historical institutions and ideas wherein this 
problem setting manifests itself, let us consider the main branches of neo-
institutionalism in their context. 
 
here, because of her ‘organizational realist approach to institutions, viewing them as actual patterns of 
communication and activity’, which I interpret as a result of her orientation as an empirical scientist 
‘primarily interested in political processes and outcomes’ (Skocpol 1995a [1992], 105). Her 
sophisticated definition of an institution as a set of relationships that persists, albeit in an inherently 
conflictual and tension-filled manner, is equivalent to the standard HI definition, which will be dealt 
with in connection with HI in the next part of the chapter. 
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2.1.1 The Main Forms of Neo-Institutionalism  
The differences between old and new institutionalism could be summarised thus: in 
relation to the old form, new institutionalism is ‘characterized by an explicit concern 
with theory development and by the use of quantitative analysis. […] [The] analysis 
looks at actual behavior rather than only the formal, structural aspects of institutions 
[and focuses on] outcomes in the form of public policies and other decisions. 
[Moreover, it talks] about institutions in more genuinely comparative ways’ (Peters 
1996, 206–207). The canonical tradition-establishing texts are from the late 1970s 
(e.g., Mayer & Rowan 1977; Shepsle 1979), from the early 1980s (e.g., DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983; March & Olsen 1984), or even from the 1990s (e.g., Steinmo et al. 1992; 
Hall 1993; Blyth 1997), depending on which thread one wants to follow. The project 
of discovering and addressing the diversity of research subjects and the subtlety of 
social and political life brought with it a growing number of theoretical advances, 
with the earliest and most central of these being sociological institutionalism, rational 
choice institutionalism, and historical institutionalism (Blyth 2002b). 
The table below sets the main branches of neo-institutionalism side by side to 
illustrate their differences in relation to their central questions, revolving mostly 
around the problem of order. In addition, I have included what I interpret to be their 
objects of explanations, primary explanatory categories, etc., paraphrasing part of 
Schmidt’s similar table (2010a, 5). The branches that are at the centre of my 
investigation are presented in shaded cells. 
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Table 1.  The main branches of neo-institutionalism 
 Sociological 
institution-
alism 
Rational choice 
institutionalism 
Historical 
institutionalism 
Ideational 
scholarship 
Discursive 
institution-
alism 
Theoretical 
descendent 
of ... 
Organisational 
sociology, social 
constructionism 
Economics, 
economic history, 
positive (positivist) 
political theory 
Structural 
sociology 
Social 
constructionism 
Social 
constructionism 
Object of 
explanation 
The norms and 
culture of the 
agents, 
isomorphism 
Behaviour of rational 
agents 
Structures and 
change of 
historical 
institutions 
The ideas of 
agents in an 
institutional 
environment 
The ideas and 
discourse of 
agents 
Major 
categories 
of 
explanation 
Cognitive 
frames, norms, 
values, scripts 
Maximisation of 
utility, rational 
individuals’ decision-
making 
History, 
structures, 
common 
expectations 
Ideas, 
communication 
Ideas, 
discourses, 
communication 
Definition of 
institutions 
Organisational 
structures 
maintained via 
shared 
meanings 
Collections of rules 
and incentives 
Historically 
developed rules, 
norms, and 
practices 
(Structures 
formed of) 
shared ideas, 
which are 
manifested as 
rules, norms, 
beliefs, etc. 
The discursive 
environment of 
ideas – i.e., 
structures and 
constructs 
Approach 
to stability 
As maintained 
through rituals, 
myths, and the 
like 
Equilibrium-seeking 
behaviour, chosen 
structures 
Structured 
choices that 
meet the shared 
expectations 
Sustaining 
ideas  
Agents’ 
background 
ideational and 
foreground 
discursive 
conformism 
both 
Approach 
to change 
Evolution of 
organisational 
meanings and 
practices, 
emulation 
Changing 
preferences 
Shocks, crises, 
power-
distribution 
conflicts, 
contradictions 
between rules 
General 
contingency of 
human action, 
changing ideas 
Agents’ abilities 
– both 
background 
ideational and 
foreground 
discursive 
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As the table suggests, while sociology is usually considered the general social science, 
sociological institutionalism in its present sense is only one of the directions that 
institutionalism studies took, one usually associated with organisational studies. 
Accordingly, in SI it could be hard to draw a clear distinction between organisations 
and institutions (e.g., Peters 2012, 127; Schmidt 2010a, 13). One indication of this is 
that SI has also been called organisational institutionalism (e.g., Campbell 1998)18. 
The beginnings of this tradition go back at least to the 1970s and are usually 
associated with the name John W. Meyer (Jeppersson 2002). In one of the most 
influential texts of the SI field, John Mayer and Brian Rowan (1977) suggest that 
organisational structures that have remained rational and efficient are, in fact, 
products of socially constructed myths. This went against the grain of surrounding 
scholarship in that they saw the organisational ‘formal structure [as] a blueprint for 
activities’ (ibid., 341–342), which does not go through the type of process of constant 
rationalisation that had been assumed to be at play. According to Mayer and Rowan 
(ibid., 343), 
[w]hen norms do play causal roles in theories of bureaucratization, it is because they 
are thought to be built into modern societies and personalities as very general values, 
which are thought to facilitate formal organization. But norms of rationality are not 
simply general values. They exist in much more specific and powerful ways in the 
rules, understandings, and meanings attached to institutionalized social rules, 
understandings, and meanings attached to institutionalized social structures. The 
causal importance of such institutions in the process of bureaucratization has been 
neglected. 
This challenged the common sense pertaining to the rationality of bureaucratic 
structures, since the rationality identified by Mayer and Rowan was not consistent 
with the archetypal efficiency criteria of their time. For them, the above-mentioned 
meanings were sustained in myths in ceremonial rituals in which these meanings, 
rules, and norms were shared and upheld. It seemed that, rather than commit to 
some economic efficiency rule, in the organisational environment it is more 
important to follow the shared rules based on shared meanings. Interestingly, Mayer 
and Rowan viewed ‘[i]nstitutionalized rules [as] classifications built into society as 
reciprocated typifications or interpretations’ (ibid., 341) in the social constructionist 
sense proposed by Berger and Luckmann (1991 [1966])19. This raises the social rules 
as cognitive frames to the fore as a primary explanatory factor in the institutional 
 
18 There is also institutional economic sociology. For an introduction, see Nee (2005). 
19 Berger and Luckmann (1991 [1966], 73) found it ‘theoretically important that the institutionalizing 
process of reciprocal typification would occur even if two individuals began to interact de novo’. 
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environment, rendering institutions an ultimately cognitive phenomenon – a 
phenomenon of consciousness. 
In further echoes of the spirit of Berger and Luckmann, the pair’s theory 
emphasised the organisational structures’ nature as highly institutionalised rules 
functioning as myths that get rationalised afterward. This does not necessarily have 
anything to do with efficiency criteria, but the myths are criteria that appear rational. 
The ritually legitimated structures are bound up with ‘the evolution of organizational 
language’ (Meyer & Rowan 1977, 353). Most importantly, these findings served an 
attempt to explain the isomorphism spanning various kinds of organisations even 
between countries, while the purposes and needs for the existence of the 
organisations may vary greatly20. These findings were a game-changer and, without 
doubt, represented important insights, especially in the field of organisational 
studies. They were so vital that the tradition in SI is known as the Stanford School21, 
and Meyer’s name can be found in almost any paper dealing with SI and in writings 
from many other fields of neo-institutionalism. Its basic presuppositions are still 
based on Berger and Luckmann’s social constructionism – scrutinised in the next 
chapter – with its emphasis on meaning construction and ‘recipe knowledge’ 
(Jeppersson 2002, 232). For the most part, it brings the cognitive frames and socially 
constructed norms and rules into the theoretical foreground. This is the general 
framework that operates in SI in general; that is, 
the sociological [institutionalist] literature emphasizes the cognitive elements of 
organizational theory. That is, the sociological literature has become more concerned 
with how members of an institution perceive situation within their structure and the 
‘frames’ that they bring to bear on those situations in order to make decisions about 
them. (Peters 2012, 133–134) 
In addition, there have been attempts to build marriages of theory wherein the 
organisational-institutional cognitive framework is combined with HI’s ideas of 
institutionally determined material interests (Campbell 1998). However, those 
attempts falls into the category of ideational scholarship so will be dealt with later in 
its more theoretically substantial parts. Therefore, I consider SI to belong to 
organisational studies in the main and treat it as a branch of classical social 
constructionism with all the attendant properties (see Section 3.2) specified in the 
analysis by Berger and Luckmann (1991 [1966]). On the other hand, its concepts, 
 
20 This idea of isomorphism has been fleshed out significantly since Meyer and Rowan’s 1977 paper. 
Its further development has produced more articles that are considered classics of the field (e.g., 
DiMaggio & Powell 1983). 
21 For an introduction to the Stanford School, see Buhari-Gulmez (2010). 
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such as the cognitive framework, are the core elements of IS, so I consider the SI 
field covered for the purposes of this dissertation with regard to these too, as far as 
is useful. A notable exception would be the ‘logic of appropriateness’, a term coined 
by James March and Johan P. Olsen in 1989 with a very Parsonian tone, in 
accordance with which institutions’ order and predictability is cast as based on the 
intersubjective rules for what is considered appropriate action (March & Olsen 
2006). 
Rational choice institutionalism could be seen as a link between economics and 
the other social science in neo-institutionalism. This is because of its roots in the 
economic theory of the firm, economic history, and positivist political theory, 
alongside its emphasis on individuals with well-defined preferences maximising the 
utility they gain (Weingast 1996; Peters 2012). According to Schmidt (2010b, 191), 
this is the only approach within neo-institutionalism that remains ‘caught up in the 
pretence of being “science”, and is still focused on lawlike explanation through 
causes and the “logic” of rational action, with assumptions about the existence of an 
“objective” material reality that makes it possible to attribute interests to actors’.22 
While this separates it from the other branches, RCI has an important role in the 
neo-institutionalist division of labour, as RCI furnishes many of the core concepts. 
RCI sees institutions, whether as exogenous constraints (or exogenously given 
game form) or in a subtler version, as ‘the rules of the game [that] are provided by 
the players themselves; they are simply the ways in which the players want to play’ 
(Shepsle 2006, 25). Whatever direction one wishes to take from here, the important 
thing is that the institutions ‘are simply equilibrium ways of doing things’ (ibid., 26). 
They ‘are modeled via their effects on the set of actions available to each individual, 
on the sequence of actions, and on the structure of information available to each 
decision-maker’ (Weingast 1996, 169). In short, in RCI, ‘institutions are 
conceptualized as collections of rules and incentives that establish the parameters on 
the behavior of individuals’ (Peters 2012, 48). Thus, it is the actors’ evaluations of 
the outcomes of their choices in relation to constraints and the available information 
that constitute the key factor from the RCI perspective. What matters is the preferences 
stemming from the inner reality of an actor, whose origin is not to be questioned. 
The rationality component is people’s ability to shape these preferences, based on 
which they are capable of making choices in which they take other people’s 
preferences into account. 
 
22 Though Schmidt was critical of RCI (2011, 59), her discursive institutionalism is similarly based on 
‘micro-foundational logic’, albeit ‘another kind of’ it. This will be scrutinised further in Section 2.4, 
which addresses DI. 
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Another way of situating RCI in the field of neo-institutionalism is by seeing it as 
‘interested in […] a deeper understanding of some theoretical principle of logic that 
might be operating in the specific institutional and/or historical context. [An RCI 
scholar] may be quite satisfied with a partial understanding – an understanding of 
those parts of the phenomenon that illuminate the operation of the theoretical 
principle of interest’ (Fiorina 1995, 110). This illustrates that RCI is guided by its 
theoretical principles in such a way that its scholars aim at finding the institutional 
setting that corresponds to different environments rather than pursue 
‘comprehensive understanding of some real institutions or historical phenomenon’ 
(ibid.). In this sense, Fiorina found RCI to be complementary to other 
institutionalisms rather than a competing line of research. 
Blyth (2002b, 298) stressed that RCI and HI were, at base, products of the same 
modernisation theory, in response to the same kinds of real-world events that could 
not be explained by prior theories23. When the state as an institution was brought to 
the foreground on account of apparently being the source of intervention in all the 
major crises, RCI made a counter-movement with its proposals about the nature of 
the state. These usefully illuminate the differences between HI and RCI. According 
to RCI, 1) public servants came to be seen as ‘budget-maximisers’ with self-interest, 
rather than faithful public servants; 2) the question of low public participation on 
the political front became a matter of free riding, as in ‘why bother?’; and 3) game 
theory seemed to offer a way of conceptualising social change that meshed well with 
the self-interest perspective (ibid., 299). 
As these insights illuminated the ‘darker’ side of the state, the inconvenient aspect 
that emerged with regard to RCI’s explanation was that in a purely self-interest-
dominated world, the problem of order inevitably rears its head. This prompted the 
question of whether institutions can be seen ‘as instrumental products that agents use 
to “structure choices”, rather than the historical consequences of prior “structured 
choices” as they are for historical institutionalists. Such instrumental, “chosen 
structures”, it was argued, produced the stability for which their theory needs to 
account’ (ibid., 300). The institutions were supposed to be results of a rational, 
individual-level choice, and people should be able to trust each other to make the 
same choices at the same time. However, ‘[i]n rational choice terms, agents will 
always prefer someone else to supply the institutions that would stabilize [any 
empirical situation] than do it themselves, and, if everyone else thinks the same way, 
then no such institutions will be supplied’ (ibid., 303). Correspondingly, HI scholars 
 
23 For further theoretical elaboration on the relationship of RCI and HI, see, for instance, Blyth (1997). 
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had a hard time explaining change in an environment wherein all choices are 
institutionally (structurally) dictated. 
One can see the fundamental problem associated with order, and a question that 
we too will examine: should the social structures be treated as a precondition for 
agents’ action, or should their origin be explained instead? This was cause for 
disagreement between proponents of Parsons’ social system theory and Berger and 
Luckmann’s social constructionism. Rather than get ahead of myself (after all, both 
are addressed in the next chapter), I will proceed to examine HI, with its premises 
that led to the discontent within IS, then consider IS, in turn. Indeed, this is the only 
way to answer the question of whether there is specific call for the explanatory 
category of ‘idea’, in relation to past theory or to the prevailing situation in the world. 
As I will bring out below, idea scholars were not satisfied with ideas being purely 
supplemental in HI theory; they demanded treating them as ‘an object of 
investigation in their own right’ (Blyth 1997, 246). 
2.2 Historical Institutions 
Historical institutionalism is the terrain from which ideational scholarship grew 
before turning against its host. Blyth et al. (2016, 142) refer to IS’s odd relationship 
with HI as ‘unconscious uncoupling’ and provide their own explanation for it, but, 
on account of what Blyth and colleagues characterise as an insistence that ‘ideas need 
to be there’ (ibid., 158), I perform my own reconstruction of both HI and IS to find 
out why and, thereby, especially in later chapters, place ideas in their context and 
suggest an alternative approach for tackling the problem of order. As I investigate 
the premises behind its handling of institutions and the main bone of contention via 
reconstruction, I also examine what kind of social theory it is and, so, how it explains 
social phenomena in general. Thus revealing the theoretical terrain lays bare how the 
problem of order is understood in neo-institutionalism. If the institutions’ static 
nature was the problem in all previous historical institutionalisms, while problems 
related to institutions were seen only as problems of ‘good governance’, this should 
be the starting point of our enquiry: what is the novelty in the latest HI, and what is 
the role of history in this branch of new institutionalism? 
Material for this enquiry is relatively easy to find. The advantage for an HI scholar 
is the existence of The Handbook of Historical Institutionalism (Fioretos et al. 2016a), 
whose pages address all the key theorists and other researchers in the field. Through 
this handbook, one may locate the main strands of theory and the field’s core 
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concepts. Moreover, HI studies has established concepts such as path-dependence 
and gradual change such that the debates revolve around them, so the key theoretical 
texts are relatively easy to identify (e.g., Pierson 2004; Streeck & Thelen 2005; 
Mahoney & Thelen 2010). The nature of my investigation dictates that I will focus 
on the latest understanding of the theoretical premises of the field. My respective 
use of the handbook as a central textual source is, of course, supplemented with 
attention to other key texts. 
While, as noted above, HI has a special role in neo-institutionalism for connecting 
it with the old institutionalism tradition through an emphasis on history and a 
structural perspective, new institutionalism differed from previous historical turns in 
institutionalism studies greatly, in bringing history to the centre of social processes 
through unprecedented theoretical frameworks, provide the idea of historical-
institutional contingencies, and draw questions of power into the foreground of 
historical enquiries. In the early 1990s, one publication in particular, Structuring 
Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective (Steinmo et al. 1992), had a 
major influence on standardising the HI label. In their contribution to this volume, 
Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo state that ‘in general, [historical] institutionalists 
are interested in the whole range of state and societal institutions that shape how 
political actors define their interests and that structure their relations of power to 
other groups’ (1992, 2). This added power, interests, political struggles, and class 
structures to the scope of historical institutionalism studies. A particularly important 
link between institutions and power was the observation that institutions ‘are the 
source of the structural power’ (Fioretos et al. 2016b, 19). 
Two contributors to the discussion in Polity, Orren and Skowronek, had already 
suggested that only the relation between order and time in the institutional context 
provides ‘the foundation for an institutionalism genuinely worthy of the appellation 
“new”’ (1994, 312). Their reasoning continued with description of temporality as no 
longer understood to be one clear-cut historical underpinning for all the institutional 
processes. Rather, institutions are based on differing ordering logics that follow 
varying rates of temporal development: 
[I]nstitutions, both individually and collectively, juxtapose different logics of political 
order, each with their own temporal underpinnings. Separate institutions and 
institutional arrangements, operating according to distinctive ordering principles, 
structure the passage of time – the sequences and cycles, the changes and lulls – at 
varying rates […]. The single presumption abandoned is that institutions are 
synchronized in their operations or synthetic in their effects; the more basic idea, that 
institutions structure change in time, is retained. But this strategy reverses the 
direction of analysis, which now moves no longer from history to order, but from 
orders (plural) back to history. (Ibid., 320–321) 
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Pierson (2004, 2–5) likewise found the novelty of the ‘new’ HI to lie in its 
understanding of history as various temporally unfolding processes of social life that 
take place in differing circumstances, as opposed to seeing history only as a 
methodological data source, a store of past events and processes, or illustrative 
material. However, he went on to state: ‘We largely lack a clear outline of why the 
intensive investigation of issues of temporality is critical to an understanding of social 
process. The declaration that “history matters” is often invoked but rarely unpacked’ 
(ibid., 5). Pierson’s suggestion is that, instead of serving as mere data or 
methodological guidance for enquiry, history should be theorised upon through 
historical causation mechanisms (ibid., 6–7); HI should go beyond single events and 
unique cases, to ‘provide stronger theoretical grounds for emphasizing the 
“stickiness” of inherited social arrangements, for questioning functional 
explanations […], for concentrating on issues of timing and sequence, and for 
investigating long-term processes of social change’ (ibid., 8). Even more broadly, HI 
should address ‘macrolevel social phenomena [and] develop broad generalizations 
about social processes that apply across sweeping stretches of time and space’ (ibid., 
8–9). In a later work, Pierson (2016, 134) added that ‘the most important contribu-
tion of historical institutionalism to social science is its commitment to 
understanding the ways in which inequalities of power are built deeply into the 
subterranean structures of modern societies’. 
It is clear that HI’s general research agenda somewhat matches Blyth’s (1997, 
244–245) earlier depiction of structural sociology. That is, HI grapples with big social 
questions, about the stability that operates in the background of smaller, more 
distinctive events, which are visible only through theoretical understanding. Also, it 
remains cautious with regard to functionalist reasoning, ‘in which institutional 
arrangements are explained by their consequences’ (Pierson 2004, 14; see also such 
sources as Conran & Thelen 2016, 53). After articulating his research agenda, Pierson 
(2004) provides an account of various kinds of unfolding causal processes of history 
in human life, addressing the nature of historical institutions by highlighting the idea 
of context. Whereas Pierson dealt with context and the stickiness of historical 
processes via concepts such as path-dependency, Wolfgang Streeck and Thelen’s 
(2005) general theoretical handling of institutional change and Mahoney and 
Thelen’s (2010) more specific theory of gradual institutional change added such 
notions as critical junctures and gradual change itself to HI’s conceptual toolbox. 
The ‘historical causation’ that Pierson (2004, 7) emphasised connects through these 
concepts (see also Mahoney et al. 2016, 87). This causation is usually manifested in 
both stability and the various modes of change, speaking to how both are possible, 
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in what conditions, and in what kind of relation to each other (after all, it is the order 
as a function of time-related processes that may remain, wither, or just break). These 
above-mentioned categories presented in HI describe this relation. 
Firstly, path dependencies are self-enforcing sequences wherein ‘each step in [a] 
particular direction makes it more likely that a unit will continue to follow that same 
direction’ (Mahoney et al. 2016, 82). The institutions adopt specific, constantly 
developing logics that structure the behaviour of individuals, who, in turn, adopt 
these logics themselves, since it would be costly to reverse course from the chosen 
path. Moreover, in these conditions, it may be hard even to imagine any other mode 
of operation (for an extensive account of path-dependency, see Pierson 2004, Ch. 
1). Under the concept of gradual change, the change and stability are regarded as two 
sides of the same coin since institutions are constantly, slowly, and incrementally 
evolving creatures. The motion exists because people may have adopted or be 
simultaneously following different/multiple sets of rules. The contradictions that 
hence arise show a tendency to move or break the rules while institutions try to 
maintain order (Mahoney & Thelen 2010). Finally, there may be critical junctures as 
events take place in a ‘short period of time during which an event or a set of events 
occurs that [have] a large and enduring subsequent impact’ (Mahoney et al. 2016, 77; 
see also Capoccia 2016). Some kind of shock or crisis may serve as an example. 
The concepts presented above involve mainly the logics of stability or change. As 
for the concept of causality itself, ‘HI researchers often understand causes as 
conditions that are necessary for specific outcomes […] and/or conditions that 
combine together with other conditions to create packages of causes that are 
sufficient for specific outcomes’ (Mahoney et al. 2016, 72). Another important 
feature of historical causation is that it may have ‘dynamics triggered by an event or 
process at one point in time [capable of reproducing] themselves, even in the absence 
of the recurrence of the original event or process’ (Pierson 2004, 11). In sum, it is 
the (social) conditions that evolve as a function of time, such that various kinds of 
(institutional) processes come together to strengthen or collide in a particular 
(chosen) path. As these historical paths evolve, their origins may become shrouded 
by time, for they have become self-sufficient (just as neo-institutionalist theory itself 
has). Moreover, according to Steinmo (2016, 108), historical causality and actors’ 
experiences are inherently linked together: 
[H]istory matters not just because it provides different contexts in which rational 
actors made choices, but because history affects actors’ beliefs, values, and 
preferences. History matters for our understanding of politics because history 
provides experience and experience can change the beliefs and preferences of citizens 
and their elites. 
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In this account, causality is related to experiences, so the actor’s experience is always 
a historical one. However, one problem remains, that of locating ‘where in [the] 
sequence of events the cause is located’ (Fioretos et al. 2016b, 17). This points to 
another unresolved question, of whether the history should be seen as a causal factor 
in itself, since the stability and changes through history are explained not through 
causality per se but by multi-factor constitutive conditions that temporally come to 
prevail and change. 
At this juncture, some further observations are warranted. Firstly, concepts such 
as path-dependence and gradual change explain theoretically why stability and/or 
change occurs, but they lack more detailed description of the underlying mechanisms 
that operate in the social environment. Secondly, in spite of its ‘anti-functionalism’, 
HI (however unintentionally) points to or calls for functionalist explanation, since it 
speaks of ‘necessary conditions for specific outcomes’ (Mahoney et al. 2016, 72). For 
stability to continue, some conditional functions must be fulfilled, but these 
functions should be explained such that the outcomes do not end up serving as 
explanations. This is clearly connected with the fact that HI and its perception of 
causality has much to do with explaining social conditions in which people must act 
– in other words, historical institutions (the HI understanding of institutions is 
described on this basis in the next part of the chapter). Thirdly, as people are not 
machines, history matters in providing varied experiences for people. That is a 
valuable insight in relation to HI’s representation of historical agents. We return to 
all of these topics later. 
The above definitions and characterisations of HI can be found in all the key 
volumes describing the field. The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism’s editors, 
Orfeo Fioretos et al. (2016b), define it in largely similar fashion but mostly in terms 
of political science. They have described the central distinguishing feature of HI as 
its focus on the examination of ‘how temporal processes and events influence the 
origin and transformation of institutions that govern political and economic 
relations’ (ibid., 3). This makes HI ‘distinguished by a conceptual toolbox that draws 
attention to the role of temporal phenomena [and to] the causal impact of history 
and institutions on political life’ (ibid., 5). While ‘rules, norms, and practices that 
organize and constitute social relations’ are deployed as theoretical concepts for 
historical institutional research, ‘institutions [are] examined for their role in creating 
constraints and opportunities for political action, in distributing political power, and 
shaping political preferences over time’ (ibid., 7; see also, for instance, Pierson 1993). 
Overall, these features in the study of historical institutions can be pinned down 
to the era following the latest historical turn: the multiplication of institutional 
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(power) orders and logics in relation to time and individuals, accompanied by some 
turnarounds in the related causal logics. Before finer-grained accounts accordingly 
entered the scene, institutional politics was ‘normal’, ‘in equilibrium’, or ‘politics as 
usual’, while change or normative breakdown was something extraordinary leading 
straight back to shaping of a new equilibrium (Orren & Skowronek 1994, 312; 316). 
After the latest ‘historical turn’, simplistic and monolithically oriented assumptions 
about the nature of institutions were consigned to history, and history itself was 
deemed best understood as developing as institutions, representing a broad 
spectrum, with their individual logics operate to move it. In other words, 
[t]hrough the 1990’s […] historical institutionalists emphasized how configurations 
of institutions in the past structure politics in the present and in ways that often run 
counter to the interests or preferences of individuals. At the same time, influential 
scholars within the historical institutionalism downplayed (or in some cases rejected 
outright) the cognitive dimension of institutions. They argued that institutions reflect 
distributions of material resources and that once established, institutions may 
continue to structure political affairs and distribute governing authority long after 
initial conditions do not hold […] [M]uch of the early work placed an emphasis on 
structural and materialist features. (Fioretos et al. 2016b, 8–9) 
The above account raises several interesting questions related to the nature of 
institutions themselves. It suggests that institutional arrangements may have effects 
on people’s preferences and motives, even to such a degree that they do not benefit 
themselves. Immediately after this, the ‘cognition’ domain is identified in opposition 
to ‘structural’ and ‘materialist’ factors. When one recalls that these authors spoke one 
page earlier about ‘rules, norms, and practices that organize and constitute social 
relations’, it appears that social relations are understood in their common-sense 
meaning within HI, or at least that there is no integrated base of theory in this regard. 
Moreover, Fioretos et al.’s book provides a figure in which three main 
institutionalisms are identified and positioned on two axes: micro–macro and 
interests–ideas. Ideas are set against interests because interests are understood as 
material (and/or resources), as opposed to ideal (and/or cognitive), a division that poses an 
especially thorny issue for ideational scholarship (see, for example, Schmidt 2008, 
2010a, 2010b; Gofas & Hay 2010c; Tønder 2010; Mehta 2011; Hay 2011), as will be 
clearer further on in the discussion. This constitutes one of the basic dichotomies of 
HI, alongside exogenous–endogenous and agency–structure. These are of course 
interrelated, since, for example, HI puts ‘emphasis on the endogenous (institutional) 
origins of preferences by offering more structural rendering of the world’ (Fioretos 
et al. 2016b, 7). 
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In other words, the institutional causal force in HI comes from the ‘inside’ and is 
considered structural, whereas the more agentially oriented approaches take 
institutions as an ‘outside’ force in relation to the self. The important point here is 
that the neo-institutional tradition is in many ways rooted in dichotomies, with the 
world revolving around somewhat clear-cut distinctions between inside and outside, 
material and ideal, agents and structures. One result is that, from the HI standpoint, 
institutions shape individual goals rather than vice versa, since in neo-institutionalism 
it has to be either/or. Another result of employing these dichotomies is that the 
separate branches of neo-institutionalism may regard each other to be treating 
people as ‘dopes’: HI sees sociological institutionalists’ cognitive norms and routines 
rendering actors as ‘cultural dopes’ (ibid., 8), whereas ideational scholars accuse HI 
of seeing actors as ‘structural dopes’ (e.g., Blyth 2003; Blyth et al. 2016)24. I consider 
this to be because social relations are not taken seriously as constitutive, a matter 
that is addressed throughout the rest of the dissertation. However, the novelty of HI 
could be summarised otherwise also: 
[HI] crystallized around a set of claims about the ontological status of institutions and 
the influence of temporal processes. […] [I]nstitutions were not merely effects of the 
redistribution of preferences or the structure of political constellations at a given 
moment in time, but […] over time institutions also became potential causes behind 
preferences and patterns of political contestation. (Fioretos et al. 2016b, 9) 
Again, the institutions people form over the course of history may end up being the 
source of their preferences and logics. There is no clear distinction between 
institution and individual, since an institution that people build get reflected straight 
back into them as it develops to the point where it reaches beyond the individual’s 
control. While institutional logics may vary and do not adhere to neat typologies and 
timelines, it remains clear that they may end up going against individuals’ preferences 
or interests, since the surroundings carry accumulated historical baggage. Hence, to 
understand the organised nature of human (political) societies, we should pay 
attention to the organisation of historical institutions that govern human life in 
differing surroundings as a function of time. From the standpoint of research, the 
historicity can be summarised as follows: ‘[F]or historical institutionalists, one [will] 
 
24 The assertion of classical structural sociology’s tendency to render actors over-socialised dopes – or 
‘automatons’, as Blyth (1997, 245) expressed it – seems far-fetched in light of Durkheim’s explanation 
(2005 [1897], 79) of an ‘intellectual operation’ performed between the social representation and the 
execution of the act. This was to point out that social causes should not be confused for pure imitation 
of action between people: people make judgement calls. 
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really have to “go back and look” if one wants to explain the character of 
contemporary institutions’ (Conran & Thelen 2016, 60). 
The following definitions for HI have been proffered thus far: Firstly, there is no 
single order or politics as usual; neither is there extraordinary politics. Rather, there 
exist layers of structure-based institutional action in differing sequences of timing. 
Exit singular-system thinking and enter the temporal logic with different institutions 
with individual logics. In the second definitional articulation, power, classes, 
interests, and control are brought into the picture. People or institutions do not 
automatically work together for a common goal but have individual objectives and 
ambitions, which may not be consistent with benefiting the whole. Still, the 
institutions and/or structures offer the basis for the power-use, individual interests, 
and preference-shaping. Thirdly, HI operates through dichotomies such as material–
ideal, which simultaneously underscores the division between lifeworld and systemic 
thinking whereas the underlying institutional problem of order gets manifested in 
agent–structure dichotomy. That said, subtler definitions exist, such as the account 
in which Stuart Hall (2016, 35) depicts ‘political actors as relational actors [which] 
implies, ipso facto, that their actions cannot be explained without reference to 
multiple dimensions of the relations in which they are embedded’. 
Because of these parallel definitions and theoretical descriptions, it becomes hard 
to distinguish what constitutes ‘structures’, and especially in relation to ‘agents’, who 
simultaneously are the individuals creators and carriers of these structures, which 
operate upon them from ‘outside’. To grasp the premises that, on one hand, explains 
the essence of these institutions and, on the other, explain why HI could not serve 
the reconciliation agenda, we must proceed to more nuanced consideration of the 
theoretical underpinning of institutions. 
2.2.1 Institutions from the Perspective of Historical Institutionalism 
The most typical way of defining institutions within the HI tradition is to see them 
as formal and informal rules, routines, practices, procedures, and norms that are 
treated as ‘relatively enduring features of political and social life […] that structure 
behavior and that cannot be changed easily or instantaneously’ (Mahoney & Thelen 
2010, 4). As organisations, institutionalised rules and procedures usually appeal to 
features codified by law and/or deployed by the states or state-like bureaucracies, in 
which various kinds of contending social forces and groups meet each other and use 
them as tools. Definitions of historical institutions vary greatly but usually refer back 
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to relatively stable rules and procedures (see, for example, Thelen & Steinmo 1992; 
Hall & Taylor 1996; Campbell 1998; Streeck & Thelen 2005; Mahoney & Thelen 
2010; Schmidt 2011; Conran & Thelen 2016; Fioretos et al. 2016b). As distinct from 
formal ones, informal institutions usually have unwritten form so are created and 
followed outside official lines – ‘informal institutions may be complementary, 
accommodating, competing, or substitutive vis-à-vis formal ones’ (Tsai 2016, 275; for an 
early institutionalist account of the distinction between informal constraints and 
formal rules, see North 1991). Defined in relation to formal ones, they operate in 
environments where, for example, corruptive, patrimonial institutions undermine 
‘the intended functions of formal institutions’ (Tsai 2016, 276). 
As brought out in previous sections, institutions structure people’s interests, 
preferences, and constraints, while also serving as the sources of power through their 
structural development over time. The general criticism raised with regard to HI’s 
concept of structure, elaborated upon by Schmidt (2008, 314), is that they are 
exogenous, meaning ‘external to the actors collectively. Institutional rules about 
acting in the world serve mainly as constraints’. For this reason, the theoretically 
sound entry point for defining an institution entails understanding it through its 
structural properties that illuminate the processes whereby the institutions is 
structured. This is because the rules etc. only represent the structures in question as 
observable structural logics in a given context. As we have seen, people’s actions 
seem to be structured within the institutions, which implies that it is the relative 
stability of the collective behaviour that must be explained. The rules cannot be the 
cause for the relative stability, since they are merely visible manifestation of the 
underlying structures. Instead of seeing structures as external to people in the 
dichotomist sense, we may fruitfully aim to reconstruct the kind of structural formula 
proceeding from HI literature that enables addressing the question of stability and 
change in terms that explain the structural mechanisms. 
Hall, whose approach presented just above this subsection seems to hint at a 
more relational stance, implies that it is the ‘multiple dimensions of the relations’ that 
constitute the structural connections between the actors (Hall 2016, 35). He 
continues by describing actors as relational beings whose doings cannot be explained 
without reference to three structurally constitutive elements: institutional practices, 
shared cognitive frameworks, and network relations. He defines the first of these as 
‘regularized routines with rule-like quality in the sense that the actors expect the 
practices to be observed […]. Institutions connect actors because they reflect and 
depend on mutual expectations. […] [T]his category encompasses a wide variety of 
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institutions, ranging from those associated with marriage to those regulating wage 
bargaining. The core point is that actors do not wander aimlessly in the world’ (ibid.). 
The shared cognitive frameworks, in turn, are identified as ‘sets of ideas with 
implications for action’, which, according to Hall, may be normative or cognitive – 
they either carry prescriptive power or describe how the world works25 (ibid., 35–
36). They can be grouped also into worldviews, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs, 
while they are ‘reflected in symbolic representations and shared narratives as well as 
other forms of discourse’ (ibid.; for a similar typology, see authors such as John 
Campbell 1998). This can be interpreted as an attempt to bring the ‘ideational’ 
element along into the HI structural schema (in fact, Hall is identified as one of the 
first HI scholars to bring the idea of ‘idea’ into institutional studies as an independent 
explanatory variable; e.g., see Hall 1993). The last constitutive element, that of 
network relations, involves both relatively informal networks, such as regular 
contact/communications with other people, and rule-based regular organisations. 
Hall stressed that these three elements, although conceptually separate, has ‘social 
force often derive[d] from how they operate in tandem. Network relations are often 
consequential because of the cognitive frameworks they promote’ (2016, 35–36). 
This is important: all three elements structure people’s interactions with each other, 
creating order out of behaviour that could otherwise be ‘shapeless or chaotic’. With 
this conceptualisation, Hall sought to combine the structural logic of institutions 
with ideas as symbolic representations of the world and with network connections 
including more loosely defined organisations and informal institutions. Clearly, some 
kind of institutional logic must prevail, since we do not encounter chaos when 
entering the world, and the concepts describing the world make sense only in some 
reasonable relation to each other. This understanding emphasises the interrelated 
institutional elements that usually are also empirically observable in the social world. 
This core idea is found among other historical institutionalists as well. For 
example, Streeck and Thelen (2005, 9) referred to institutions as ‘building blocks of 
social order: they represent socially sanctioned, that is, collectively enforced 
expectations with respect to the behavior of the specific categories of actors or to 
the performance of certain activities’. These encompass rights and obligations and, 
at the same time, distinguish ‘between appropriate and inappropriate […] actions 
 
25 Campbell and Schmidt were among the others to draw a substantive division between the normative 
and cognitive as the most fundamental categories of ideas. For Schmidt (2010a, 3), normative ideas 
‘appeal to values and appropriateness’ whereas cognitive ideas justify the ‘interest-based logics and 
necessity’. This fundamental distinction is found also in Berger and Luckmann’s social 
constructionism, as will be brought out in the next chapter. None of these authors – Hall, Campbell, 
and Schmidt – refer to Berger and Luckmann in making this distinction. 
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and thereby [organize] behavior into predictable and reliable patterns’ (ibid.). 
Institutions may be categorised as either formal or informal ones, where ‘formalized 
rules […] may be enforced by calling upon a third party. [This possibility] indicates 
whether a rule has legitimacy’ (ibid., 10–11). The reliability and predictability of the 
third-party manifestation – as in the state monopoly on violence – is predicated on 
the authority and obligations of said parties. Their appearance is not a matter of their 
good will but one of the expectations held by the public. 
The exceptionality in this definition is the understanding by which ‘collectively 
enforced expectations’ (which go by the name ‘mutual expectations’ in Hall’s (2016, 
35) account) bring the relational element into the picture. It exhibits a parting of 
ways from definitions wherein preferences are emphasised as something that 
institutions ‘structure’ as exogenous to the actor. In these accounts, agents are in 
sequential order with structures and may compete with them for the opportunity to 
change the prevailing order. One detects the difference immediately: expectations 
refer to (inter)relations such that they remove the need to operate with such a 
dichotomy. 
When parties aim at fulfilling common expectations, they act in a complementary 
manner. As Parsons suggested – and as I too will suggest – complementary 
expectations are directed to following the rules that are usually given to all parties, 
since they are products of history and learned through historical experiences (1991 
[1951]). Expectations are always directed at others26, just as their fulfilment meets 
the expectations of others. After these expectations become institutionalised, they 
come to be enforceable by a third party. For example, it is not solely a matter of 
personal preferences whether to honour one’s duty to serve on a jury or perform 
national service. In addition to getting paid for these duties, one is expected by the 
rest to perform them, and the rule-following is thereby rendered a relational-
institutional matter. In this sense, rules, structures, and institutions are based on 
common expectations in accordance with which parties must perform in certain 
ways. This yields a tentative description of the cause behind institutions by 
conceiving of them not as exogenous to the actor but external in relation to the actor 
and still internalised. 
In general, Hall (2016) and Streeck and Thelen (2005) seem to point to a similar 
approach to understanding the relationship between institutions and empirical 
 
26 As I bring out in the next chapter, Parsons also recognised ways in which we may be objects of our 
own orientation (i.e., one may form a relation to oneself). There is no paradox here: we may have 
expectations for our own behaviour and achievements (and, simultaneously and more generally, 
identity can be defined as one’s relation to oneself), yet we could hardly have any expectations of 
ourselves without prevailing social norms and rules, or a culture to identify with. 
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phenomena: expectation-based structural patterns that underlie diverse kinds of 
institutions, from marriage to wage bargaining, such that, as Hall put it, actors do 
not wander aimlessly in the world but serve some more general purpose. There are 
no structures qua structures internal to actors any more than outside them; these are 
found only in relation to any given individual actor. This leads us, however, to the 
question of how these expectation-based rules come to be, or in relation to what. So 
far, we have worked with a very broad, structurally based (relational) definition for 
an institution, but the conditions of an institution are met with a more specific and 
detailed account in many cases. While indeed a strict, empiria-based definition of an 
institution is sometimes relevant, when approaching the definition from the 
empirical side of the equation we might face the common-denominator-related 
problems that Pierson (2004) pointed out. Therefore, we should come back to 
approaching the matter in relational terms. To illustrate what the problem might be 
at base, we return to Streeck and Thelen (2005, 12): 
[T]he word institution is sometimes used for a specific category of actors, usually 
corporate actors or organizations, rather than legitimate rules of behavior […]. We 
suggest that organizations come to be regarded as institutions to the extent that their 
existence and operation become in a specific way publicly guaranteed and privileged, 
by becoming backed up by societal norms and the enforcement capacities related to 
them. A central bank is considered an institution because its existence is an outflow 
of the strongly sanctioned state monopoly on issuing legal tender. 
Central banks could be defined as organisations or institutions for reason of their 
concrete empirical properties: actor groups etc. However, as Streeck and Thelen 
suggest above, it is more fruitful to consider what function central banks serve in 
general. While any given central bank is most definitely a concrete organisation, the 
function of most of them is to issue legal tender, and, while sometimes it is not27, ‘in 
any case, relations and interactions between the two [rule-makers and rule-takers] are 
crucial for the content and the evolution of the [institution] as such’ (ibid., 13). This 
dimension of rules’ making and taking underscores the hierarchy among rules (in 
this case, with such aspects as the state monopoly over violence that secures the 
rules) but also the prevailing conflict and competition over defining the rules. These 
 
27 In this sense, the euro area is a unique exception. Only the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed 
to issue currency for this set of 19 European countries, which leaves little function for their national 
central banks. On the other hand, all the ‘Eurozone’ central banks used to issue currency, and the title 
‘central bank’ has remained, irrespective of the change in functions. Does this mean that the central 
banks in the euro-area countries are no longer actually central banks? I do not know. The ECB, its 
peculiarities, related discontents, and its relationship to the euro area are discussed well elsewhere (e.g., 
Lapavitsas & Kouvélakis 2012; Blyth 2015; Mitchell 2015). 
 74 
rules as institutions are based, in the end, on the expectations, which – since 
interactive rule-based systems are beyond the control of any single actor – are 
defined through their functions aimed at maintaining the prevailing social order 
(ibid., 16). Since institutions cannot be perceived as such, their operations and 
functions are not in the hands of any single actor. That makes them open to differing 
interpretations. 
As brought out earlier in the chapter, HI’s idea of historical causality enables it to 
function as theory by suggesting that some necessary institutional conditions must 
prevail for certain outcomes to occur (Mahoney et al. 2016, 72). If any institutional 
conditions are to be maintained, certain function-related needs must be met, while 
change takes place in relation to these conditions. Now, Streeck and Thelen (2005) 
suggest a functionalist explanation for defining an institution: it must serve some 
specific purpose. Actors operate collectively to fulfil the objective for some specific 
institution that is related to some more generally defined social function. People 
connected with the central-bank institution work to issue legal tender, but the legal 
tender, in turn, has a function. If we want to avoid the commonly acknowledged 
functionalist trap of explaining the existence of functional institutions via their 
outcomes, we have to take these more general conditions as a reference point for 
the operation of various social institutions. They must explain why this function must 
be fulfilled without referring to the outcome of the social processes. Only then can 
the social institutions be understandable in relation to how they operate. In other 
words, we need a theoretical fundament that describes the social conditions wherein 
institutions operate. 
This issue is pointed up in Mahoney and Thelen’s discussion of the question of 
gradual change. They identify the problem of ‘rule interpretation and enforcement’ 
that is visible in institutionalised environments in relation to power-distribution 
(2010, 4). When institutions are understood as distributional instruments in relation to 
‘resource allocation’, these tense institutional environments impose concrete 
conditions for the conflict-beset actors: ‘struggles over the meaning, application, and 
enforcement of institutional rules are inextricably intertwined with the resource 
allocation they entail’ (ibid., 11). Here, institutions are environments where the 
resources are distributed and where the struggle over interpretation and enforcement 
of the distributional rules is therefore ongoing, making contradictions constantly 
present and exposing institutions to constant, gradual change. With this definition, 
Mahoney and Thelen connect the definitional problem surrounding institutions to 
the concept by which the field of economics is delineated: scarcity. 
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When presenting their understanding of historical institutions as multi-
dimensional dynamic environments, Mahoney and Thelen painted stability and 
change as two sides of the same coin. In addition, they subscribe to the expectation-
based definition of institutions: 
[I]n much of [the earlier] work, compliance is built into the definition of the institution 
under consideration. In other words, what institutions do is stabilize expectations 
(among other ways, by providing information about the probable behavior of others), 
and thus enforcement is endogenous in the sense that the expected costs and extent 
of noncompliance are factored into the strategic behavior of the actors in a particular 
institutional equilibrium. (Ibid., 10) 
While taking the expectation-based formulation as their starting point in the above 
account, Mahoney and Thelen start to break away from the sort of definition wherein 
institutions equal stabilising expectations. They emphasise, instead, the distributional 
facet of institutions, an angle from which stability and change are functions of 
resource allocation: 
If, instead, we break with a view of institutions as self-reinforcing (through whatever 
mechanism) and put distributional issues front and center, compliance emerges as a 
variable, and a variable that is crucially important to the analysis of both stability and 
change. The need to enforce institutions carries its own dynamic of potential change, 
emanating not just from the politically contested nature of institutional rules but also, 
importantly, from a degree of openness in the interpretation and implementation of 
these rules. (Ibid.) 
For these authors, ambiguity hence is a permanent feature of institutions, with 
several implications: Firstly, ‘compliance is inherently complicated’, since rules 
cannot cover all the real-world complexities. Secondly, in relation to incomplete 
rulesets and complex situations, actors suffer from cognitive limits. Also, actors 
apply many implicit assumptions about institutions, and, finally, change often occurs 
in the course of implementation or enactment of the rules. It is the 
power-distributional aspect of institutions that animates change, that emerges 
incrementally ‘in the “gaps” or “soft spots” between the rule and its interpretation 
or the rule and enforcement’ (ibid., 11–14). While those espousing gradual change 
theory have long seen stability and change as two sides of the same coin, it was not 
until Mahoney and Thelen’s contribution that HI literature started to address the 
question of concrete social conditions in terms of resource allocation, or scarcity. 
Mahoney and Thelen’s explanation of how resource allocation constantly opens 
space for new opportunities and struggles for re-negotiating or rearranging the rules 
and values in question continues thus: It is empirical research that can resolve the 
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issue of the modes of changes in relation to the opportunities the political context 
offers and, simultaneously, how the conservative or change agents relate to the 
openings (2010, 18–31). Therein lie the social conditions for HI theory that explain 
the functioning of institutions without deriving them from outcomes of institutional 
behaviour. Rather, they are situated in an environment where resources must be 
allocated between the parties involved. However, when highlighting the allocation 
component, the authors did so at the expense of the notion of stability: whatever the 
contradictory conditions described above, change may only take place in relation to 
the stability they characterise as inherently complex. Nevertheless, people entering 
the social world do encounter somewhat stable and predictable circumstances. 
Moreover, separating these out tends to produce dualistic explanation models, of the 
sort seen in Mahoney and Thelen’s actor-based emphasis. Doing this and not 
considering the mechanisms that sustain the stability within institutions, one might 
end up with an institutional construct a little too unstable. 
Fundamentally, HI sees the institutions as expectation-based sets of rules that 
operate in conditions of scarcity, with specific social functions. This approach 
provides explanations as to how and why the institutions operate in relation to their 
respective functions. Thus, whilst HI is said to be ‘a reaction against […] the various 
forms of structural-functionalism’ (Conran & Thelen 2016, 52), the theoretical 
reconstruction of HI shows a picture of somewhat functionalist leanings. Also, while 
addressing social relations, it does so in ambiguous terms. By many accounts in HI, 
institutions are ultimately based on expectations, but the use of agent–structure and 
exogenous–endogenous dichotomies reveals that the relational logic implied by the 
expectations is not fully formed. Instead, HI scholars usually turn to descriptions of 
interrelated elements of the social reality that present themselves – in such forms as 
multiple dimensions of practices, ideas, and networks (Hall 2016). Most theoretical 
literature in the HI tradition addresses several kinds of structures, stabilities, and 
modes of change (e.g., Pierson 2004; Streeck & Thelen 2005; Mahoney & Thelen 
2010, Fioretos et al. 2016a). These are rather slanted toward empirically observable 
structural variables. Moreover, though addressing the expectations as the relational 
element that could lead one beyond basic dichotomies such as agent–structure, HI 
lacks descriptions of how the mechanisms of expectation-based institutions come 
into being and are maintained. 
HI’s institutional theory still emphasises social relations as made up of several 
dimension that are present in each situation and focuses on how institutional 
practices always interconnect with ideas, networks, etc., but not as all-encompassing, 
determining structures. On this basis, we find that institutions should be defined not 
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merely through their observable qualities but also in relation to their functions that 
serve some underlying purpose and are consistent with some prevailing social 
conditions. For example, the police appear on the scene nearly every time a crime 
has been committed, and money is regularly accepted as a means of payment. In 
simple terms, the structures are always present, but they do not determine everything. 
And the closer we look, the messier institutions get. 
2.2.2 Interim Conclusions on Historical Institutionalism 
When considering historical institutions with their functions in social reality, one 
could say, following Hall (2016), that the whole point of institutional theory is to 
clarify why actors do not wander the world aimlessly. However, appealing only to 
functions or to the institutions’ appearances may not be enough to position either 
institutions and their concrete existence or change in the world. One also needs some 
concrete conditions from which the order or change can be derived. 
I began the reconstruction of HI by bringing out that the relation between time 
and order justifies the appellation ‘new’ for this institutionalism (Orren & Skowronek 
1994). The tradition approaches history as multiplication of orders and powers in 
relation to different layers of structure-based institutional rules in differing sequences 
of timing (ibid.; Pierson 2004). Another key innovation of HI scholars was to subject 
interests, political struggles, class structures, and (especially) power to the analysis 
(Thelen & Steinmo 1992; Fioretos et al. 2016b; Pierson 2016). Furthermore, in its 
action as a causal operator in the world, history is understood in terms of social 
conditions that develop as a function of time in tandem with actors’ accumulating 
experiences of this development. It may be self-enforcing and/or tension-producing 
in nature (Pierson 2004; Mahoney et al. 2016; Steinmo 2016). The HI take on history 
as a causal operator brings us to the matter of causal chains and locating the cause 
from the time sequence. Investigation of causal effects is usually seen as attesting to 
research’s scientific validity. However, when phenomena such as institutional 
stability and change are filtered through a cause-oriented vocabulary, the elements 
present are usually forced into ontological categories – they get transformed into 
objects. In traditions such as HI, there is also support for the kind of sequential 
thinking wherein these objects must follow some order of precedence, as would be 
the case in the agent–structure or exogenous–endogenous dichotomy. 
If ‘history’ denotes the temporality of the evolving social conditions, ‘institutions’ 
refers to rules, norms, values, etc. – standards of behaviour that have observable 
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manifestations in empirical reality. They consist of interrelated elements such as 
practices, ideas, and networks. In addition to this empirical observability, institutions 
may be identified by their functions, as in the example of central banks. However, 
institutions do not only represent their formal functions; they have more general, 
informal functions as well. Prevailing scarcity provides a very concrete basis for 
institutions’ action, since resource allocation is one of the most vital functions of a 
healthy society. This also connects institutions concretely to power struggles. Since 
the allocation is based on institutional rules, it is no wonder that most political 
struggles take place in interpreting and enforcing the rules, which, by being 
imperfect, always offer some room for action by imperfect creatures, people 
(Mahoney & Thelen 2010). At the same time, the enforcement side affords insight 
into the reality of power use in advanced institutionalised societies, in that there is 
always a ‘third party’ that can be called upon to enforce the rules, even to the point 
of resorting to organised violence. 
While there has been considerable discussion about the structural power 
positions in HI, it is far too often unclear how these influence the analysis and 
whether the society is imagined as an equal field of opportunities, where the 
imbalances are always exceptions stemming from imperfect equilibrium (arising 
from some disturbance in the equilibrating mechanism). For example, Mahoney and 
Thelen positioned themselves in relation to several kinds of institutionalist 
equilibrium model and ended up reiterating the implicit premise of equal starting 
positions even between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ they address (ibid., 14). Moreover, 
the description of HI theory is half-formed with respect to the structural properties 
in terms of which the processes structuring the institutions could be illuminated. In 
the main, HI contents itself with describing the modes of stability-maintenance and 
change. Even when its vocabulary applies relational terms for explaining institutions, 
the scholarship falls back on unnecessary dichotomies that seems to act as a breeding 
ground for retreading arguments as to agents and structures in relation to the 
problem of order. 
There has always been dissatisfaction with structural premises in social enquiry. 
For example, in a very recent article, Blyth (2016, 466) stated that HI’s main problem 
is connected with explaining where the ‘change agents’ get their desire to change the 
institutions. In his interpretation, the institutions are seen primarily as ‘material’ in 
HI, while it is the ‘ideational’ agents who reinterpret the rules (this is a reference to 
Mahoney and Thelen’s theory of gradual change). According to Blyth, leaving the 
agents’ desires unexplained ‘strongly suggests a large ideational elephant being 
smuggled into HI’s materialist tent to solve this problem’ (ibid.). In addition, Blyth 
 79 
asks whether bringing causal logic into the historical explaining in the manner they 
and other key theorists (e.g., Pierson 2004) suggest might not make the institutions, 
if anything, too contingent. He wonders whether ‘the desire to bring history back in 
as temporality’ comes with a risk of ‘making history redundant’ (Blyth 2016, 465). 
As one recalls from the discussion of the Polity debate above, ‘ideas’ was suggested 
as another byword for ‘new’ for the latest institutionalist movement. This concept 
were even supposed to offer a bridge over the gap between system and lifeworld 
theories. In this connection, Orren (1995, 98) considered how loose their connection 
to institutional developments can be without them losing their political viability. Just 
as earlier in the social sciences’ development, questions were raised about the ability 
of structural explanations to provide sufficiently fine-grained explanations for 
contingent and more specific historical situations and events (this history is laid out 
more in the next chapter). And exactly as before, an opposition movement rose to 
challenge the theory in power by reversing its phrasing of a central question related 
to societies: can their existence be taken as a given, or ought it be explained? 
2.3 Bringing Ideas into the Picture 
Irrespective of the word employed for them, ideas have been at the centre of 
Western thinking since philosophers such as Plato wrestled with the question of 
whether they can exist by themselves. As is well known, ideas for Plato were ‘eternal, 
changeless, and in some sense paradigmatic for the structure and character of the 
world presented to our senses’ (Kraut 2017). The word ‘idea’ was not used for 
anything apart from an archetype until the beginning of the 17th century, when it 
started to refer to a mental image, a picture, or an act of thinking of something. 
Etymologically, ideas are something general, common, shared, or (at the other end 
of the continuum) subjective and mind-dependent, and therefore they at least 
implicitly present a question about form and content. While the neo-institutionalists 
rendering holds ideas to be something closer to the contents of the mind, some 
features of Plato’s transcendentalism still figure there. In general, in neo-
institutionalism, ‘ideas’ is an important and independent explanatory category that is 
used to explain, paradoxically, both stability and change in institutional conditions 
(see, for instance, Blyth 1997, 2001, 2002b, 2003; Béland 2005, 2009). 
What is often called ideational scholarship arose as a counter-movement to HI in 
the 1990s. This is comparable to the mid-20th-century system–constructionism 
debate introduced in the next chapter. Although the notion of ‘ideas’ had its origins 
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as a supplement to HI enquiry, IS began taking on a life of its own and started 
addressing topics such as discourses and power. It has developed some ontological 
and epistemological problems of its own along the way. This is telling of how 
neo-institutionalism evolves and how very much IS wants to develop. On account 
of its ambitious endeavour to be taken seriously as a scholarly tradition and its 
controversial relationship with HI, the IS approach deserves serious attention. This 
section of the chapter examines ideas as an object of research, against the backdrop 
of whether there is specific need (in relation to existing theory or to the prevailing 
conditions of the world) for such an explanatory category in its own right. The ‘idea’ 
concept will be located in relation to HI and, thereby, reconstructed in pursuit of 
answers that HI could not supply but also in relation to the questions created for HI. 
Do ideas explain the processes of institutionalisation, and can they explain where 
change agents get their desire to alter the institutions? On what kinds of premises 
does IS rely, and how does it understand institutions? The discussion begins with 
consideration of ideas in general. However, since IS has not experienced a uniform, 
straightforward, and linear trajectory and has given rise to further traditions, we, 
secondly, take an independent look at its latest descendant, discursive 
institutionalism, which has even been dubbed the fourth new institutionalism 
(Schmidt 2008). 
For one of the first neo-institutionalisms, rational choice institutionalism, ideas 
are the vehicle for stability since it cannot be easily explained otherwise. According 
to Blyth et al. (2016, 148), ‘the lack of structure in their models, in particular, the 
problem of multiple equilibria in repeated games, suggested an endless cycling of 
choices that was quite at odds with the stability our world seemed to actually exhibit’. 
By definition, RCI is not a social theory, in the first place because its premises are 
derived from the level of individual actors, and I consider it an extension to the field 
of economics28. In full awareness that this position may upset a multitude of RCI 
specialists, I anchor my position, on one hand, in the critique of RCI’s highly 
individualistic premises (e.g., see Hay & Wincott 1998; Blyth 2002b, 2003; Schmidt 
 
28 Ideas as an explanatory factor have actually begun to figure in neo-classical economics as well. For 
example, Dani Rodrik (2014) has used the neo-institutionalist literature to explain policy choices. 
Moreover, with their latest work, Mukand and Rodrik (2018, 1) have taken steps toward a ‘minimal 
conceptual framework to think about ideas as a distinct vehicle from interests. In our framework, 
political entrepreneurs use ideas to catalyse political (and policy) change’. This may be one small step 
for mankind, but it marks one giant leap for the discipline of mainstream economics. It also 
demonstrates how the work done in the neo-institutionalist field may be bridging the gap between 
economics and other social sciences. However, at what price and for whom is a completely different 
question. Theoretical debate about the possibility of the convergence of particular branches of neo-
institutional can be found elsewhere (e.g., Hall & Taylor 1996; Hay & Wincott 1998). 
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2008, 2010; Conran & Thelen 2016) and, on the other, especially in the structural 
emphasis of this dissertation. In keeping with my rejection of an autonomous, 
sovereign, free-floating individual (addressed in greater depth in the next chapter), I 
shall deal with RCI’s idea-reception only as necessary, while focusing on the problem 
of order in the context of ideas in connection with historical institutions. I also agree 
with Blyth (2003a, 702) in his observation that ‘the point of rational choice theory 
was to do away with the need to posit unobservables as causes’. In the relational 
theory of social structures – as well in theory of ideas – the factor in question is 
specifically unobservable and therefore difficult to reduce to individual actors as 
such; hence, it stands in fundamental opposition to RCI. My handling of ideas in this 
section is based on the premise that they are unobservable explanatory factors in the 
social theory of IS (see also Larsson 2015, 176). 
Several labels have been suggested for ideational research in neo-institutionalism. 
Colin Hay (2006) saw at least three options: ideational, discursive, and constructivist 
institutionalism (he associated himself with the last of these). Irrespective of these 
differences, there are strong connections and common denominators among the 
field, to which I will refer from here on – following Blyth’s (2011, 83) suggestion – 
as ideational scholarship. Calling it IS does not exclude anything yet affords the most 
general level of argumentation, in which the focus is on the main ingredient of this 
tradition: ideas. In addition, whereas it would have been a coherent decision to call 
it ideational institutionalism, this could have created confusion with an existing 
branch to which attributes have already been assigned (for example, by Hay 2006). 
Therefore, IS it is. 
Blyth et al. (2016) conducted a network study wherein the key players of the neo-
institutional field and the relations between them were identified. The relations 
between these parties in the resulting network map were determined on the basis of 
‘citations between different scholarly communities’ within the neo-institutionalism 
field (ibid., 143); the map covers the most-cited scholars’ most frequently cited 
publications, according to Google Scholar. The breakdown is based on reporting by 
the scholars themselves, and it was on this map that I based my choice of the central 
figures for this investigation, such as Blyth and Schmidt. I took this tack because 
most of the explicit IS theory is written in relation to HI and the corpus shows even 
greater diversity than HI – the self-identification served the purpose of identifying 
the scholars who consciously aim at building the IS tradition (for my treatment, 
especially theoretically). In addition, two edited volumes about ideational studies 
exist (Gofas & Hay 2010a; Béland & Cox 2011a), both of which I refer to in my 
enquiry into the theory, regardless of the authors’ position in the network. Alongside 
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the key players’ texts and these two edited works, supplementary material is used 
whenever needed. 
Thus far, I have considered ideas primarily in terms of theoretical variables, not 
specific explanatory variables for a given case, such as variables explaining change in 
a political-institutional context. There is no specific reason for narrowing ‘ideas’ to 
only political environments in efforts to explain change or stability. Rather, there 
must be some social-theoretical premises behind their operation in any human context. 
In addition, I narrow the scope to the theorists mentioned above, since they are the 
prominent figures in the field determining the usage and content of the concept. 
Therefore, I turn my attention next to the distinct theoretical premises connected 
with the concept of ideas and on putting them in social-theoretical context as 
presented earlier in the dissertation. 
2.3.1 Placing Ideas in Context 
Whatever the field’s origin and further demarcation, there is reasonable consensus 
that IS is ultimately based on social constructionism: ‘In ontological terms, the basic 
tenet of the ideational perspective is that the world is socially constructed: ideas form 
the foundation of this construction and are often the inspirations to act’ (Béland & 
Cox 2011b, 13)29. According to multiple theorists, this is so whether the field in 
question is directly denoted as constructionist/constructivist institutionalism or has 
to do more with bringing constructivist ideas into some other field, or with bringing 
ideas back into the theory in a contrast against structuralist and/or system-theory 
thinking (see, among others, Blyth 2002a, 2007a; Hay 2002, 2006, 2011; Schmidt 
2008; Béland 2009; Gofas & Hay 2010a; Tønder 2010; Béland & Cox 2011b; Peters 
2012; Blyth et al. 2016). In other words, the principle behind IS is to bring the 
contingency of social life back into the social explaining but with a twist: idea 
scholars want to see the idea as an object in itself. 
At a very general level, the ideational scholars originally aimed to tackle the 
problem of historical change in institutions. The problem, from their perspective, 
was that ‘[f]or historical institutionalists, institutions are said to be historical products 
which exist anterior and a priori to any agent who happens to operate within them 
at any given moment in time […]. As such, institutions are seen to give content to 
agents’ preferences’ (Blyth 2002b, 300). Because American political science was 
 
29 The authors refer particularly to Berger and Luckmann (1991 [1966]) in the endnote specifying their 
definition of constructionism. 
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dominated by RCI theory in the 1990s, HI was forced (in terms of the agent–
structure dichotomy) to try to turn the tide such that a position obtained wherein 
the ‘structural’ institutions had to precede agents causally as ‘material’ beings (Blyth 
et al. 2016, 147). Theoretically, this meant an ‘implicit sozialization model, where 
actors’ exposure to an institution’s routines, plus its longevity, altered the preferences 
of the agents therein […]. [But, if] institutions structure [an] agent’s choices so 
completely, why would the agents inside these institutions ever get the urge to change 
their environment?’ (ibid., 148). In light of this question, some have gone so far as 
to ask ‘whether there can be a specifically HI approach to agency’ (Schmidt 2010a, 
12).   
According to idea scholars, this makes historical institutions constraining rather 
than enabling action and, thus, makes other than exogenous change difficult to 
explain (Béland 2005, 3; see also Blyth 1997, 2003a). The main problem for HI, in 
the view of these scholars, could be found in the ‘over-socialised’ agent and a concept 
of action wherein policy change is possible only through a change in paradigmatic 
‘idea framework’ (a concept introduced by Hall 1993) producing a change in 
individual preferences (Blyth 1997). In other words, the structure–agent relation 
always involves precisely that order: structure first, then agent. But what if the agents 
have ideas of their own? Ideas were brought into neo-institutional research 
principally because they restore the contingency and struggle aspect to the 
institutions (e.g., Blyth 2003, 2008; Béland 2005; Béland & Cox 2011b). 
In the most general terms, the existence of IS is justified in terms of the need to 
confront especially that kind of structuralism wherein institutions are seen as material 
and (therefore) deterministic. On the other hand, in these structuralist accounts, 
interests as much as institutions are viewed as material – i.e., ‘real’. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, a structuralist framework can be portrayed as relegating people to 
the status of dopes30 with very limited agency, which in an institutional context 
usually ties in with the so-called exogenous shocks needed for a paradigm to change 
(Campbell 1998; Blyth 2003, 2007b, 2011; Hay 2011; Mehta 2011; Blyth et al. 2016). 
Daniel Béland and Robert Henry Cox (2011b, 7) presented this juxtaposition by 
stating that ‘[i]nterestingly, even some scholars tied to Parsonian tradition now 
support an empirically grounded form of cultural and ideational analysis that focuses 
on shared beliefs and public narratives’. This statement highlights the anti-Parsonian 
sentiments among IS scholars, which they share with adherents to HI. 
 
30 The reader may recall the contrasting view in which HI paints SI as rendering people cultural dopes, 
while IS has taken HI to make the actors into structural dopes. I wonder whether SI sees IS as turning 
the actors into ideational dopes, as it were. 
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Mostly because of the above-mentioned over-socialisation problem – closely 
associated with structural-functionalist theory – ideas needed their own research 
programme: ‘They must be conceptualized apart from preexisting categories and 
epistemological commitments and treated as an object of investigation in their own 
right. The focus needs to be shifted from the question “how can ideas help explain 
X?” to a broader conceptualization of the role of ideas in politics beyond their 
institutional effects’ (Blyth 1997, 246). This should be considered in light of the 
history of institutionalist research, since, at least in Blyth’s view (2006), it has seen a 
series of failures to predict the major historical events of the 20th century (key crises), 
for reason of its obsession with institutional stability. This is a strong argument for 
bringing in social contingency. Again, the general orientation of the scholarship in 
this field is set in relation to HI: ‘While historical institutionalism and other leading 
theories (such as interest groups or rational choice) offer accounts of the forces that 
govern policy making, a theory of ideas is needed to explain the content of policy 
choices’ (Mehta 2011, 26). 
The idea content has indeed been one of the main foci within the IS tradition: 
‘The unique claim of ideational scholars is that [people’s] choices are shaped by the 
ideas people hold and debate with others’ (Béland & Cox 2011b, 12). Ideas are 
capable of explaining such situations as disparity between people’s material interests 
and their ideals – e.g., contradictory political positions (ibid., 5). This tool could 
explain why poor people may vote against their interests. In concert with Blyth, 
Béland (2005, 4) highlighted the specific policy contents in relation to the scope of 
agents’ choices: 
[E]ven […] a flexible vision of institutional patterns cannot allow historical 
institutionalism to explain fully the specific content of key political decisions that 
shape social policy outcomes. Because historical institutionalist researchers tend to 
downplay the influence of ideas on policy-making, mainstream historical 
institutionalism is excellent for explaining how institutions create obstacles and 
opportunities for reform; however, it cannot shine a satisfactory light on the policy 
ideas that influence legislative decisions […]. To understand the meaning and the 
scope of policy choices, these researchers must bring policy ideas to the centre of 
their theoretical framework.  
Still, Béland situated his understanding of ideas in a supportive relationship with HI 
by trying to articulate how ‘[i]deational forces can become an independent variable’ 
in the context of ‘institutional arrangements’, where ideas could be seen as 
‘compatible with historical institutionalism’s basic assumptions with regard to 
political structures’ (ibid., 2). For him, ‘[i]deas only become a decisive causal factor 
under specific institutional and political conditions’ (Béland 2009, 702), which means 
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that they have to ‘interact with powerful institutional forces and political actors’ 
(ibid., 707). For Béland, then, ideas’ operation demands a favourable environment. 
He cited national institutions as an example of the impasse an idea may run into and 
referred to their resistance to international organisations’ ideas and logics as opposed 
to the national policies and programmes. John Campbell’s (2005) analysis of tax 
regimes could serve as an example: his study of advanced capitalist economies (18 
OECD countries) shows that national tax rates have been resistant to change and do 
not adapt to the relative prices of the world economy. Localities with relatively high 
tax rates may resist ideas pushed by international organisations, in awareness that the 
local structural circumstances may favour investors’ profit-making. Here, ideas 
operate against a strong historical-institutional environment31. 
In the same spirit, Blyth has described ideas as complementing structures since, 
while structures ‘are [not] irrelevant – far from it – […] such structures do not come 
with an instruction sheet. There is still plenty of room for agents to make history 
apart from their structurally given interests’ (Blyth 2003, 698). Going still further, 
Blyth speaks of how ‘[t]aking ideas seriously does not mean abandoning social 
science; it means accepting that the limits of one set of theories open up space for 
others to move forward and enrich the discipline’ (ibid., 702), and he refers on other 
occasions to the need to introduce new causal factors instead of making any single 
strong ontological claim (Blyth 2002b, 2003a). Here, Blyth takes institutional stability 
as a given in many respects (2007b), yet his suspicions of it were raised by recognition 
that the structural explanations do not speak to what happens at the moment of 
change itself, or why, for instance, a certain kind of (new) institutions gets chosen 
during or after a crisis. 
Despite these aspirations, Blyth adopted a more fundamentalist position on ideas 
with his later texts. In the first place, he saw IS as resting on ‘distinct social ontology 
[and therefore] practicing social science without viewing ideas as fundamental to both 
the nature of human action and causation in social systems produces seriously 
misleading explanations’ (2011, 83). While this still could be interpreted as support 
for complementarity between ideas and structures, he and his colleagues (2016, 159) 
ended up emphasising the dichotomy between material and ideational explanations 
by arguing that ‘even the most materialist of positions implicitly rests upon a theory 
 
31 In another text, Campbell (2002) attempts to synthesise IS concepts to clarify their use by forming 
clear categories on the basis of context. However, dichotomies such as ideas–interests remain, wherein 
the two concepts are seen as opposed to each other. While this solution might be operationally 
reasonable in some specific research settings, it lacks explanation of what the concepts refer to other 
than their empirical manifestations. For Campbell (ibid., 21), ideas are ‘theories, conceptual models, 
norms, world views, frames, principled beliefs, and the like’. 
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of ideas or cognition to explain change’. This strongly suggests a causal setting with 
ontological priorities, in which one object precedes another (and indeed must), and 
it at the same time illustrates the paradoxes that plague this line of thinking. Even 
though Blyth poses fair questions for HI and other structural theories, he gives ideas 
a heavy burden to carry. 
This kind of burden and ambiguity colours not only Blyth’s argumentation but 
the whole new ideational tradition. There is ambiguity as to the weight of the ‘idea’ 
per se in this line of research, and as to its theoretical relation to existing social theory. 
Andreas Gofas and Hay (2010b, 3) are among those who have recognised that, while 
‘it now seems obligatory for every work to consider the “power of ideas” hypothesis 
[…] the debate remains caught up in a series of heated disputes over the ontological 
foundations, epistemological status and practical pay-off of the turn to ideational 
explanations’. Below is my adaptation of the figure in which Gofas and Hay (ibid., 
4) presented the ontological, epistemological, and methodological ‘perennial 
dualisms’ that they consider to dog IS’s theoretical efforts. 
Figure 2.  ‘Perennial dualisms’ in ideational theory. 
 
There seems to be a need to give the idea a strong explanatory position in the neo-
institutionalist field and in the social sciences in general. It is that apparent need that 
led to the above-mentioned debates about the benefits of doing so. In addition, as 
we have seen, ideas are constantly set in relation to HI in two ways at the same time: 
complementary and contradictory. Moreover, a heavy explanatory burden has been 
placed on the shoulders of the idea as IS’s main category: it should be able to explain 
why agents may decide to go against the grain, what happens at the eye of the 
social-crisis storm, and why new kinds of institutions get chosen. Blyth has been 
prepared to claim that the social sciences cannot produce satisfactory explanations 
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without the idea (2011, 83), and the joint paper stated that no such materialist 
explanation for social phenomena can be found as would not rest on the broad 
shoulders of ideational explaining (Blyth et al. 2016, 159). 
There is also a more normative positions behind IS. According to Jal Mehta 
(2011, 24), denying the force of ideas in human life would mean denying the 
influence of people’s ideals over things such as ‘science, religion, democracy, slavery, 
colonization, gender, race, and homosexuality, to pick just a few salient examples’. 
Moreover, ‘[t]o reduce politics solely to material interests and strategic calculations 
is not only to be willfully ignorant of how the world actually works, but it is also to 
deny a significant part of what it means for individuals to be human and for societies 
to be democratic. Individually and collectively, it is in the exchange of ideas that we 
define who we are and what we hope to become’ (ibid., 45). This seems to be an 
important question for idea scholars, since Hay (2011, 78–79) also found that ‘to 
deny agency, autonomy, individuality, and identity of the agent […] is to reduce the 
agent to the status of a mere bearer, rather than shaper, of systemic logic. It is, in 
short, to deny that agent’s humanity’. This probably goes some way toward 
explaining IS scholars’ eagerness to highlight the agency-based starting point for the 
analysis. While one can sympathise with this position for its general respect for 
human dignity, it still serves as a basis for selecting a theoretical approach that has 
little to say about how ‘ideas’ give people the ability to act as agents. 
After 20–30 years of empirical and theoretical research, the IS programme has 
developed to the point where most of its proponents agree that ‘ideas matter’, in a 
causal sense. This means that they are ready to move on to investigate ideas’ 
relationship to such things as power (Béland et al. 2016). Still, one can follow Gofas 
and Hay in pointing to unclear answers on theoretical questions remaining in this 
field (2010b). It appears that if all the various developments are going to be pursued 
at the same time – with heated debate about the premises for the concept and the 
further work building on it – a closer look is required, with the aim of simultaneously 
situating the theory and the concept in context with other social theories. As Oscar 
L. Larsson (2015, 177) has recently stated, ‘too little attention has been directed to 
the nature of ideas themselves’.32 Ideas should bring some substantial matter to the 
table in order to justify their unique position. Their purpose must be explained since 
we are dealing with the theory of ideas themselves. Therefore, in the further analysis 
below, I will concentrate on the definition of ideas; on parallel concepts; and, 
especially, on the concept’s function in (neo-)institutionalist theory. 
 
32 On this point, see also Finlayson (2004). 
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2.3.2 The Ideas Themselves 
As Schmidt (2008, 306) correctly states, ‘[d]efining ideas, the substantive content of 
discourse, is no easy task because there are so many ideas about ideas’. There are 
dozens or even hundreds of texts about ideas in neo-institutionalism (for only a few 
examples, see Hall 1993; Smith 1995; Blyth 1997, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2016; 
Campbell 1998, 2002; Schmidt 2002, 2008, 2010a, 2017; Finlayson 2004; Béland 
2005, 2009; Hay 2006, 2011; Rodrik 2014; Larson 2015; Gofas & Hay 2010a; Béland 
& Cox 2011a)33, most of them being empirically based analyses and further 
elaboration of typologies of ideas. In these volumes of literature, however, the idea 
may lose touch with its purpose, its function as a part of social theory. This is 
because, while we can find all kinds of ideas in empirical reality, the idea as an 
independent explanatory devices still must represent something more general. 
We can look beyond the era of neo-institutionalism, though. After all, the last 20–
30 years has not been the only time, even in the history of the social sciences, when 
this issue has been considered. For example, in his essay ‘The Role of Ideas in Social 
Action’, Parsons defines ideas as ‘concepts and propositions, capable of intelligible 
interpretation in relation to human interests, values and experience. So far as qua 
ideas, they constitute systems, the relations between these concepts and propositions 
are capable of being tested in terms of a certain type of norm, that of logic’ (1938, 
652). Parsons recognised also that ideas cannot ‘arise through some process of 
“immaculate conception” […] without relation to the other elements of the social 
system’ (ibid.). 
For Parsons, then, ideas are relational beings, meaningful parts of the social 
systems, that make the systems themselves and human experiences within these 
systems understandable. But, since ideas are never disconnected from their 
environment, they become understandable only in relation to the norms that, in turn, 
constitute the logic of the system with all of its elements. This formulation is not far 
from that of Schmidt (2008) in that her brand of discursive institutionalism takes 
ideas to be the contents of discourses, where discourses are understood as interactive 
processes conveying ideas. In this connection, Schmidt quite rightly raises the 
question of what ideas are in the first place, although soon proceeding to the 
question of what kinds of ideas there are. Because of such shifts in focus, the idea of 
 
33 A further list of references to ideational approaches in the social sciences domain is provided by, for 
example, Béland and Cox (2011b, 4–5). Also, they recognise that there is a separate field of ‘history of 
ideas’ that has no immediate relationship with IS. 
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‘idea’ usually is left overly vague in IS studies (Finlayson 2004, 530). Thus, ‘what’ 
remains an important question deserving a satisfactory answer. 
In their introduction to the volume Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research, Béland 
and Cox (2011b, 3) suggest that ‘ideas are [the] primary source of political behavior’ 
and proceed to define them as ‘causal beliefs [that] are [a] product of cognition. They 
are produced in our minds and are connected to the material world only via our 
interpretations of our surroundings’. They ‘shape how we understand political 
problems, give definitions to our goals and strategies, and are the currency we use to 
communicate about politics’ (ibid.). Accordingly, they ‘provide us with interpretive 
frameworks [which have] serious consequences for how we understand the role of 
interests in politics’ (ibid.). Béland and Cox saw interests not only in material terms 
but as including also ideals, pride, and fears, while aware that it is ideas that provide 
the sense of appropriateness and legitimacy among people. 
It should hardly come as a surprise to anyone that ideas have consequences such 
as providing ‘interpretive frameworks’, since said frameworks are, again, concepts 
and propositions, just as Parsons suggested. If we strip down this definition from all 
the things ideas do to what they are, we are left with mind-generated beliefs that have 
consequences. The ‘what’ begins, then, with the mind as the source of ideas capable 
of generating effects on the world (the causal aspect). Of further interest for our 
purposes is that this definition suggests ideas to be ‘products of cognitions […] 
connected to the material world only via our interpretations of our surroundings’ 
(Béland & Cox 2011b, 3). This enigmatic claim intimates that ideas are a product of 
an independent mind, since ‘minds can create ideas from any of a multitude of 
sensory perceptions, or the mind can create ideas based on no connection to reality 
at all’ (ibid.). 
Béland and Cox are straightforward in their formula, with ideas as beings 
themselves irreducible to a material world and held by individuals whose minds are 
capable of creating ideas out of thin air. They see ‘human cognition [as having] its 
own independent force’ (ibid., 11). As beings of this sort, ideas have ontological 
status, as they can produce causal effects on the world by themselves. Still, ideas 
work mainly as communicative ‘cluster concepts’ (ibid.), which allows them to do 
things such as ‘take [the] form of high-profile public frames, discourses, and 
ideologies at the foreground of the political arena […] or constitute lower-profile 
assumptions and paradigms that often remain at the background of this arena’ (ibid., 
6). Alongside beliefs on the list of ideas are norms, policy prescriptions, worldviews, 
etc. (ibid.). The most important point is that Béland and Cox really push for the idea 
of ideas in their own right, insisting on serious recognition of them as objects with 
 90 
causal powers, no matter how great an emphasis these authors put on them 
appearing as clusters. They are a creation of individual minds with a clear-cut 
distinction from the external, material world, a world that is not necessary for 
creation of new ideas. 
A rather more nuanced cognitive interpretation of ideas is to see them as 
‘cognitive filters’, in Hay’s words (2011; see also Hay 2006). As filters, they form the 
interpretation of the world for its observer, but actors at the same time ‘come to […] 
conceive their own interests. Yet, crucially, they are also concerned with the 
conditions under which such established cognitive filters and paradigms are 
contested’ (Hay 2011, 69). The ideas, then, that shape the interests for actors are a 
product of the dynamic environment; the interests are not innate to actors but 
adopted in meaningful practices. In essence, this means that, for Hay, actors cannot 
create ideas out of thin air. The ideas exist in dynamic relationship with their 
environment. This obviously follows from Hay’s dialectical ‘constructivist 
institutionalism’ in which the material or ideational has no independent existence, 
where such an existence would automatically make interests ‘perceived’ (Gofas & 
Hay 2010c). Referring to Blyth’s (2002b) formulation of perceived interests, Hay 
(2011, 70) concludes that the actors’ conduct ‘is not a (direct) reflection of their 
material self-interests but, rather, a reflection of particular perceptions of their 
material self-interest’. 
This brings an interesting twist to the debate that revolves around material and 
ideal. In their joint article, Gofas and Hay (2010c, 21) state that ‘ideas exist as 
collective structures of meanings that are connected, but irreducible, to the actors 
who draw upon them’. After this, they present their ontology, designed to privilege 
‘neither the material nor the ideational’, since material properties of things, such as a 
nuclear arsenal, exist beyond the meanings given to them (ibid., 34). The point of 
considering perceived interests in this example might be that, in relation to the 
arsenal and its material implications, actors may perceive their interests in many ways, 
but they are never to be disconnected from the destructive properties34. This leads 
the authors to propose a ‘morphogenetic approach’ aimed at ‘linking [material] 
structure and [ideational] culture to agency without [analytically] sinking their 
 
34 One interesting application for perceived interests in the context of nuclear arsenals is the anecdote 
that former United States Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara relates in Errol Morris’s 
documentary film Fog of War (2003): ‘So I asked him [Fidel Castro] three questions. One: did you know 
there were nuclear warheads in Cuba? Two: would you have recommended to Khrushchev to use 
nuclear missiles in the event of an American invasion of Cuba? And three: what would have happened 
to Cuba? He said: “One: I knew the missiles were there. Two: I would not have recommended it, I did 
recommend it! And three: we would have been totally obliterated.”’ 
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differences’ (ibid., 41). In this approach, ideas ‘matter all the time [and are] not simply 
reducible to the context in which they arise’ (ibid., 48), which means also that 
‘interests do not exist, but constructions of interests do’ (ibid., 50). 
No matter how (or how many times) I read Gofas and Hay’s proposal for 
resolving material–ideal dualism, I find no other solution presented than that we live 
in a world of ideas that are not to be detached from material circumstances. This 
does not entail overcoming the dualism so much as reserving one sphere for ideas 
and another for material ‘stuff’. My criticism pertains to two dimensions of this kind 
of thinking. Firstly, let us look at Hay’s (2006, 65) comment on ideas as cognitive 
filters: 
Actors appropriate strategically a world replete with institutions and ideas about 
institutions. Their perceptions about what is feasible, legitimate, possible, and 
desirable are shaped both by the institutional environment in which they find 
themselves and by existing policy paradigms and world-views. It is through such 
cognitive filters that strategic conduct is conceptualized and ultimately assessed. 
While this most probably is in some ways a valid description of the operation of the 
social world, it tells us mainly that people operate in institutional surroundings as 
perceptive beings and communicate about those surroundings. The strategic 
conduct stems from within the actor. My first criticism is that here the idea remains 
a black box, which tells us nothing since it refers to the manner and content of people’s 
participation in the world (involving perception and meaning, respectively). My 
second criticism, a more cautious one, follows on from the point Blyth made when 
speaking of being ‘far from convinced that ontological (and therefore logical) 
consistency is the sine qua non of good research, or that scientific (or critical) realism 
is of much help to empirical researchers’ (2011, 172). In my view, the issue arises 
because the solution to social scientific problems cannot stem from the ontological 
problem settings, since there is nothing ontological in the sphere of the social. The 
problem is not ontological in the first place but social, so the perennial dualisms rear 
their head. Hence, I would still bear in mind Gofas and Hay’s general point about 
ditching the ‘real’ of ostensibly material interests as such from the social analysis 
(2010c). 
From Blyth’s standpoint, the social fabric is ‘ideas all the way through – […] a 
situation where ideas permeate all aspects of materiality and determine agents’ 
orientations to social objects [but not] all the way down into an a-material 
nothingness’ (2002a, 29–30). In his formulation, ‘[c]ognitive mechanisms, pace ideas, 
are important because without having ideas as to how the world is put together, it 
would be cognitively impossible for agents to act in that world in any meaningful 
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sense […]. [A] complex set of ideas, such as ideas about the working of the economy, 
allow agents to order and intervene in the world by aligning agents’ beliefs, desires, 
and goals’ (ibid., 32). Therefore, in relation to preferences, which I interpret here to 
be the same as interests, ‘ideas give content to [them] and thus make action 
explicable’ (Blyth 2003, 702). This reasoning creates a perfect circle, since for Blyth 
(2007b), complex sets of ideas equate to shared mental models, whereas shared 
mental models equal cognitive mechanisms. Nevertheless, Blyth went on to define 
ideas ‘simultaneously [as] the media through which agents understand the world and 
the material that constitutes it’ (2011, 84), meaning, ‘variously norms, conventions, 
schemas, and ideologies, collective products that make the world hang together’ 
(ibid., 95). He drew all this together by stating that ‘[c]ontemporary constructivists, 
increasingly common throughout the social science, come closest of all to the 
position espoused here’, but, importantly, ‘[i]deas, whether in the form of free trade 
doctrines, religious worldviews, schools of legal pedagogy, or laws of the road, are 
the basis of all such constructions’ (ibid., 95–96). 
This is best interpreted as meaning that the single ideas, as the ‘basic units’ of the 
world (Blyth 2002b, 306), eventually cohere into a more complex sets of ideas 
forming, again, shared mental models, which, in turn, are the same thing as cognitive 
mechanisms in practice. Furthermore, while single ideas form the root of these 
mechanisms, they are of no such use by themselves; the utility is in the more complex 
and, especially, shared models. One may possess all kinds of ideas, but as mental 
models they become important only when they are shared, so the shared nature is 
their key feature. This leaves Blyth’s definition swaying in the wind, since the 
relations between his concepts remain somewhat unclear. He seems to support an 
analogy in which the idea is the atom of the social world, yet he also indicates that 
no single idea matters. What purpose does the single idea serve in this theory? 
Another question remaining is how he sees the process of generating these ideas and 
how exactly these atomic ideas operate as the basic units of the world, as isolated 
and shared beings simultaneously. Moreover, how do ideas take over the social world 
by themselves? 
Now, we have in our hands a very broad and multifaceted definition of ideas. I 
interpret ideas to be the meaningful and substantial contents of beliefs, desires, 
norms, worldviews, goals, etc. and, at the same time, systems of meaning that explain 
how the world works. There are many inputs to this conclusion. For Béland and Cox 
(2011b), they are the ultimate causal factor at the start of a causal chain making the 
social world tick, while Hay sees them as cognitive filters in terms of (sensory) 
perceptions. In addition, Blyth emphasises that ideas are the thought contents for 
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the cognitive processing that enables agents to engage in meaningful (inter)action. It 
is hard to define what the idea per se is, but for all these authors it seems to be the 
meaningful content of (shared) cognitive process(es), and in some cases it is also the 
filter through which interpretations and perceptions of the world come to be, or it 
might even consist of the perception itself. Ideas encompass almost all aspects of 
communication, making them the key to understanding, and as cognitive beings they 
are ultimately located in the consciousnesses of individuals. In my view, the above 
definitions of an idea are far too broad to explain anything specific or be applicable 
for interpreting anything with meaningful content. 
Another way of understanding ‘ideas’ is to treat them as synonyms and/or 
substitutes for beliefs, desires, norms, etc. The range of terms that are 
interchangeable with ‘idea’ is a wide one (see also Finlayson 2004; Larsson 2015). 
Even key theorists such as Campbell (1998), Blyth (2003a), and Schmidt and Mark 
Thatcher (2013) usually end up forming typologies rather than discussing the idea’s 
fundamental properties. On the other hand, theorists such as Hay (2006, 2011) who 
focus on philosophical questions end up turning the actors’ cognitive properties into 
ideas’ properties and, thereby, making the idea ultimately the above-mentioned black 
box. As Alan Finlayson (2004, 530) so astutely pointed out, these practices, 
regrettably, usually tell us more about what ideas do and/or the background 
conditions wherein they operate than about what they actually are. I must reiterate 
that locating all the various uses of ideas by reference to empirical reality may give 
us plenty of important information on how the world works, but, since the idea is 
the common theoretical denominator connecting all these observations, its powers 
still must be explained somehow. This is because, irrespective of their vague 
definition, they are treated as objects in their own right that have causal properties. 
All this makes IS into agency-based theory, in which the answers to social 
questions are ultimately derived from individuals’ state of mind. Hence, IS is a theory 
of cognition, not ideas. This becomes clear at least by the time its prominent theorists 
start to discuss their theoretical convictions. While in some cases there has been 
some reconciliation of structure and agency in a complementary manner, the whole 
tradition is based on the idea that the structures do not dictate the individual actors’ 
actions. However, the closer the problem setting gets to the fundamental question 
of which does the determining, agency dominates the IS stage, since, in the end, the 
ideas have to be located somewhere. I suggest that it is the insistence on causal 
thinking that leads to this theoretical impasse: since the ideas must be derived from 
somewhere, the logical conclusion is that they reside in individuals’ heads. Below, I 
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continue to delve into ideas’ causal properties, since these appear to be the reason 
for the unique explanatory position of the idea in the neo-institutionalism field. 
2.3.3 Ideas with Causal Force 
One important reason for proving ideas’ causal force is closely related to the question 
of traditions’ incentives for scientific legitimacy (Gofas & Hay 2010c; Tønder 2010). 
In her studies, Schmidt (2010b, 189) has found this connection typical in American 
academia and also brought out how ‘the only thing on which the philosophers of 
science agreed was that the social science could never be as good as “science” […], 
mainly because they were too messy, given that their objects of inquiry were reflexive 
subjects’. This speaks volumes about why IS puts so much effort into proving that 
social science can practise causal reasoning35. Without a doubt, it has been important 
for IS scholars to prove that such causality exists when they claim scientific standing 
for their ideas, but this has been of key value also for proving ideas’ worthiness as 
an object of enquiry. In one of her recent works, Schmidt brings this out nicely in a 
sentence clarifying her understanding of the nature of institutions (2017, 256): 
Institutions are not material because they don’t exist without sentient agents, but they 
are real to the extent that the collective agreements by which they were established 
continue to hold and, like the institution of property or of money, are real and have 
causal effects. 
According to Schmidt’s statement above, the ideas are ‘real’ when the collective 
agreements, produced by sentient agents, hold in that they have causal effects. The 
definition for the real is dependent, then, on those causal effects, since only real 
things should have such effects. This is telling in light of the definitions presented in 
the previous section, where we find an insistence on seeing ideas as objects. Above, 
Schmidt provides a definition for ‘material’ as well: everything there is in the absence 
of sentient agents. Accordingly, sentient agents are the ones capable of producing 
agreements that are real to the extent that they have causal effects, whereas 
everything outside those agreements – all things that exist irrespective of these 
sentient agents’ presence or ever having been present – marks the material. 
 
35 Blyth too (2008, 10) discussed the nature of American academia, stating that ‘[a]cademics constantly 
reinvent the wheel’ because they want to come up with a ‘thing’. This implies institutional motives for 
devising new demarcations and concepts, just as Fiorina (1995, 197) suggested when expressing doubt 
as to whether new institutionalism would actually present anything very new so much as merely 
advance young scholars’ careers. 
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The treatment of ideas’ causality presented here is set mainly against the 
theoretical dialogue on the matter that took place in the edited volume The Role of 
Ideas in Political Analysis (Gofas & Hay 2010a). Woven into my exposition of the 
theoretical premises behind ideas’ causality will be discussions of some of my general 
criticisms of idea-oriented explaining, again largely in light of that volume. Hence 
the lengthy treatment. 
The book lays out a debate precisely about the causality of ideas, wherein the 
premises for it are discussed in detail. The debate is illuminating in that, while the 
theoretical questions were taken seriously, the contributors ended up mostly 
justifying ideas as causal factors in their own right in a manner pointing to a need for 
that justification instead of just laying out the premises and assessing them as such. 
The presentation of the debate was structured as follows: Scholars such as Gofas 
and Hay (2010c) and Lars Tønder (2010) laid down their premises, and these 
presentations were followed by replies by Blyth (2010) and Schmidt (2010b). 
Furthermore, the volume was divided into two parts, the first one being theoretical 
in nature and the second empirical. Blyth handled the commenting on the theoretical 
pieces and Schmidt dealt with the empirical ones. 
Tønder (2010, 56) begins his analysis by highlighting that, according to critics, the 
weakness of the ‘first generation of ideational analysis’ lay in ‘being too fussy in its 
explanation of how ideas are able to cause change as well as for being unable to 
eliminate interest-based approaches to the study of political change’. According to 
his analysis, the problem of causality arises because social constructivism as 
constitutive theory can answer only static questions of ‘what?’ and ‘how-possible?’ 
(ibid., 64–65), while causal analysis ‘is a way of analyzing how political change evolves 
along pathways that are neither arbitrary nor occasional’ and answers ‘why?’ (ibid., 
57). Tønder’s solution is to reject the deterministic and materialist ‘efficient causality’ 
and replace it with his own ‘immanent causality’, in which the material and ideational 
should be seen as equal in an ontological sense but in which, also, ideas retain ‘unique 
causal powers’ (ibid., 56–57). 
The sort of causality Tønder criticises is rooted in the formulation by David 
Hume. According to Tønder (2010, 60), that formulation is summarised well by 
Hume’s statement that the cause is ‘[a]n object precedent and contiguous to another, 
and where all the objects resembling the former are plac’d in like relations of 
precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter’ (Hume 2007 
[1739], 114)36. Gofas and Hay (2010c, 22) too pay attention to the problem of the 
 
36 I quote here from the critical edition of Hume’s Treatise (2007), whereas Tønder refers to the earlier 
version, from 1978. The citations differ a little, for reasons unknown to me, but not so much that this 
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so-called Humean logic of causation, which ‘stipulates not only a mechanistic notion 
of constant conjunctions – according to which each cause must always produce a 
specific effect – but also, and more significantly, that the cause must be independent 
of, and antecedent to, that effect’. Having made an ontological commitment to ‘ideas 
matter[ing] all the time’ (ibid., 48), Gofas and Hay found the following resolution to 
the causality problem: the actors’ behaviours are shaped at all times by the ideas, 
which ‘allows a recognition of the causal significance of constitutive processes’ (ibid., 
49). This means that causality and constitution are not to be considered in opposition 
to each other. 
Constitution will be discussed further in the next chapter, in connection with 
social constructionism, so I will just point out briefly here that, according to Esa 
Díaz-León (2013, 11), ‘any property that is constitutively socially constructed will be 
relational, not intrinsic, given that by definition, what makes a property constitutively 
socially constructed is the fact that something satisfies the property only if it bears a 
relation to certain social practices and communities’. In consideration of this, I 
regard relations as dependencies, meaning that the property in question is wholly and 
fundamentally dependent on the presence of the parties on occasions of (productive) 
relation to each other (see also MacBride 2016). In their contribution to the volume, 
Gofas and Hay emphasised this relational nature of institutions, and their view has 
been espoused also by several theorists addressing the fundamental premises for 
institutions (e.g., Hodgson 2006; Lawson 2016). As the discussants once gain 
transformed the question into one of causal logic, Gofas and Hay (2010c, 16) 
suggested the following: 
[W]ithin a causal logic, ideas are treated as distinct ‘variables’ whose power can be 
established only by demonstrating a mechanistic and autonomous effect of ideational 
factors on specific (political) outcomes. Within a constitutive logic, by contrast, ideas 
provide the discursive conditions of possibility of a social or political event, behavior 
or effect. 
Despite this progressive effort to move the discussion beyond a basic dualism, 
Tønder (2010, 60–62) pushed for viewing ideas as independent causal factors, 
although not in the sense of efficient causality but as simultaneously ‘expressive 
 
would have consequences for the interpretation. More interesting with regard to the subject at hand is 
how Hume (2004, 114) continues: ‘If this definition be esteem’d defective, because drawn from objects 
foreign to the cause, we may substitute this other definition in its place, viz. “A CAUSE is an object 
precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the 
mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the 
other.”’ Hume is clearly speaking here about the causality of one idea relative to another, and hence 
the argument about ‘Humean’ causality is cast into doubt. 
 97 
entities’ and a part of more general social structural phenomena. He also stated four 
requirements, elements that future ideational analysis should incorporate into its 
structural explanation models: 1) addressing the full spectrum of ideas present in the 
conditions examined, or at least a fuller one; 2) breaking down the neat separation 
between effects and causes; 3) opening up to a non-linear concept of time, with 
feedback; and 4) taking the interaction of the ideational and material seriously via 
‘parallelism’, since ‘the material and the ideational [are] two aspects of the same 
explanations’ (ibid., 66–67). While Tønder’s statement dealt with the structural 
conditions wherein ideas operate, he insisted that, because of their expressive 
qualities, ideas are capable of expressing, among other things, courses of future 
action. This entails the ideas also being capable of disconnecting from the linear 
conception of time to which the linear concept of causality is bound. 
With his ‘expressive quality’ hypothesis, Tønder proceeded to a rather strange 
analysis of real-world events (2010, 67–71). He began by placing George W. Bush’s 
‘axis of evil’ at centre stage, explaining how that notion came into being in reaction 
to changes in material conditions – caused by, for example, the 9/11 events – that 
altered the US’s geopolitical interests in the Middle East. The events were a 
prerequisite for the idea of an ‘axis’. Tønder (ibid., 67–68) continued: 
[O]nce an idea such as the axis of evil has begun resonating with the public, it, too, 
has the ability to change the circumstances in which it is situated, reinforcing the 
discursive perception of geopolitical interests as well as augmenting affective states of 
fear and insecurity. Ideas have this ability because of their expressive quality […]. On 
the one hand, ideas are expressive because of their involvement with both the material 
and the ideational world […]. On the other hand, ideas are also expressive because of 
their ability to explicate the world with which it [the idea] is involved. This explication 
is not a neutral endeavor. Instead, it entails a reorganization that enables the idea to 
reconfigure the existing world. 
The latter depiction of events contains several untenable suggestions. Firstly, there 
is no description of precisely how an idea just begins to ‘resonate’ with the public. It 
takes over the public space by itself and then gets to work. All the apparatuses and 
institutions in place (the government, media, etc.) are disregarded while the ideas do 
all the heavy lifting. A host of other questions will follow if one were to take this 
description of events more literally. Secondly, what exactly are the above-mentioned 
ideational and material worlds? Such a suggestion can only be born of maintaining 
the notion of two separate spheres of being. For me to subscribe to this programme, 
one should first point out the world where ideas live without matter, or a material 
world that operates without meaningful communication. What good does it do for 
us to keep these realms of ideational and material factors separate? Thirdly, if, for 
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some strange reason there should exist material and ideational worlds such that ideas 
are involved in both, what are the ideas if they are not products of either of these 
worlds but merely explicate the things these worlds consist of with their ‘expressive 
qualities’? Finally, what does an idea do apart from ‘explicate the world with which 
it is involved’? The idea is the substance of communication. I cannot conceive of 
any situation in which the ideas would not be explicating something. 
After regarding the axis of evil, Tønder continues his story by bringing up an 
important topic connected with ideas: ‘Do all ideas have the same power to cause 
changes in policy?’ (2010, 68). This question could be turned into that of why some 
ideas are chosen over others, a matter that has been subject to discussion within IS 
(see, for example, Finlayson 2004; Schmidt 2008; Gofas & Hay 2010c). Schmidt 
(2008, 307) lists ideas’ viability as among the criteria that have been suggested to be 
significant, and national traditions, values, and culture also have been seen as 
important factors. On the other hand, it has been posited that the outcome is a 
matter of expertise connected with research institutes or think tanks, or even the 
timing of the policy process could influence the viability (ibid.). Tønder’s solution to 
this problem – in the spirit of Spinoza and Deleuze – is to stress the sufficiency of 
the idea, which in practice means emphasising that ‘the expressive power of an idea 
depends on how it engages the world. […] [A]n idea is adequate – and, hence, 
powerful – as long as it shows how its expression of the world is able to persist’ 
(2010, 68). It follows that any state existing in the world is proof of the idea that 
expresses its state. Obviously, this is a vicious circle. 
To bring his point about ideas’ ‘immanent causality’ to the finish, Tønder (ibid., 
69) proceeds to demonstrate how exactly ‘an idea can be the effect of its own cause’. 
In this, he aims at proof of ideas’ unique causal powers and showing that there is no 
strict separation between cause and effect, as they are so closely related. In practice, 
if an idea inspires policy paths in the real world, it then gives meaning to results of 
those policies, which makes it, in Tønder’s terms, an effect of its own cause and 
therefore an immanent source of its effects. He refers to the expressive quality of 
ideas next, stating that ‘an idea is able to establish its own indispensability for future 
policy decisions because it is the anticipation of that policy’ (ibid.). He cites an 
example from the Bush administration here too, but this time it is the ‘war on terror’. 
In Tønder’s handling, which follows Brian Massumi’s (2002) analysis of events, the 
expressive quality of ideas starts to operate in such a way that they get detached from 
the linear concept of time (Tønder 2010, 70): 
Massumi develops his analysis […] with the reference to the color-coded alert system 
that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security uses to communicate to the public 
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what it perceives to be the appropriate level of threat coming from terrorists and 
rogue states (green indicates a ‘low’ level of threat; red indicates a ‘severe’ level of 
threat). […] [T]he threats are able to influence the course of the nation because of 
their own futurity, one in which the anticipation of what might happen tomorrow 
becomes a reason for acting today. 
Here, Tønder finds that the futurity indicated by this colour-coding system dissolves 
the sharp distinction between cause and effect: latent threats of the future become 
the reason for today’s actions. Through making the threat constantly present, the 
system has the ability of ‘augmenting affective states of fear and insecurity’ in the 
citizens (ibid., 68). This serves as evidence of an expressive idea that ‘takes on its 
own life [because] the alert system […] managed to instil a basic mood in the public, 
a mood in which the worst threat was the unknown itself’ (ibid., 70). In other words, 
these ideas of the latent threat are capable of expressing things that might happen in 
the future and therefore precipitate constant fear based on events that have not even 
taken place. Tønder emphasises the affective components especially, since, 
according to him, ideas ‘give meaning to the fear and insecurity invoked by the alert 
system [and] explicate the affective components that are involved’ in that system 
(ibid., 71). 
Firstly, I find both cases addressed by Tønder interesting, and they express well 
the things he generally tries to say. The axis of evil and the war on terror are 
unprecedented and interrelated phenomena that have had much to do with 
transforming – even manipulating – public debate and the prevailing general climate 
(in a shift toward one of fear). The events connected to these have a long history, 
but the 9/11 events in particular had a clearly huge effect on how things eventually 
turned out; first off, they rendered the general climate more favourable for US 
actions in the Middle East, but they also elevated ‘homeland security’ concerns into 
a major issue, with numerous effects extending far into people’s day-to-day life. In 
addition, both cases involved strong foundations of ‘American values’, such as 
freedom and justice, as Tønder (ibid.) is right to point out. I take no issue with any 
of this chronicle. My problem is with the claim that this serves as proof of ideas’ 
expressive qualities or immanent causality, especially in the ‘futurity’ sense suggested 
above. 
Tønder seems to move the gaze from a wider picture of concrete practices, 
institutions, and ideas onto solely the ‘idea’ when interpreting the events described 
above. In effect, he claims that it is the ideas that do all the heavy lifting in an 
environment comprising people and various kinds of institutions where the ideas are 
selected and spread to support the atmosphere he so nicely describes. However, 
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ideas do not just float around and get selected for their innate properties; they are 
chosen because they suit or are created for some purpose. They are distributed 
through the existing machinery, and they come to rule because they have the 
necessary mass and/or fertile ground in relation to other, competing ideas. Of 
course, this does not imply that the content of an idea itself does not matter or that 
people cannot have ideas of their own, but what makes an idea imaginable or 
operational in the first place – especially in a political context – is primarily a 
historical and institutional matter, not a question of ideas’ qualities in themselves. 
When Tønder addresses the war on terror, he delves more deeply into the 
causality question. The main issue here is the so-called futurity, wherein a very simple 
colour-coding system is used to communicate with the public about imaginable 
threats that have not yet been actualised and may never be. This undeniably 
ingenious system enables the reflection on the issues that Tønder presents; however, 
the claim as to the expressive properties of this colour-code system or about the 
immanent nature of the causality presented here is based on a presupposition that 
the ‘idea’ is the main operator and its ‘futurity’ somehow can break the time-linear 
chain of events. The whole suggestion becomes manageable only through this lens. 
Without the ‘idea’, we would not need to consider whether this main operator goes 
through any kind of straightforward cause–effect chain in explaining social 
phenomenon in the first place. In addition, even in the idea-explanation context, 
whether the linear timeline is ‘broken’ in the way Tønder suggests is another matter 
entirely. When it comes to the colour-code system, it is the idea of threat that changes 
the behaviour, not the execution that the futurity would suggest. Actually, the only 
way that the timeline could be broken in the manner suggested by the idea of futurity 
is for the future events themselves to affect the present somehow, which is 
impossible. 
Obviously, this does not counter the fact that our expectations for the future can 
have behavioural effects on us, and these expectations can be built, upheld, and used 
for political purposes. But it is the idea of threat that changes the expectations held 
by Americans, without any breaks in the linear timeline. The chain of events begins 
with ‘creation of the idea’ and proceeds to ‘distribution of the idea’ to ‘adoption of 
the idea’, all away to ‘modified state of consciousness’. People are constantly subject 
to numerous types of attempts to influence their behaviour. Sometimes these are 
successful, and sometimes they are not, but if a colour-code system results in changes 
in American behaviour, it does so only after it has been implemented. Our ability to 
imagine an alternative outcome of events that have already taken place does not 
change the fact that it is only the unforeseeable future that we may (sensibly try to) 
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influence. One could also ask whether anything mentioned above diverges 
significantly from the everyday expectations people have for all sorts of things. They 
have retirement savings, and they get some exercise on the basis of abstract 
expectations for the future, produced by various institutions. That is, people are 
beings capable of imagining future happenings (with this ability separating us from 
most other animals), but we cannot twist and turn the clock in historical events. 
In a complex social situation wherein adjustment of present actions is based on 
the anticipation of future events, it may be difficult to say much about the individual 
ideas’ causal relations. The impulses to act may be spontaneous or planned. What is 
less difficult to say is that placing the events on a historical timeline and positioning 
the operative institutions in the equation leaves us far wiser with regard to what is 
going on. It might be more fruitful to study how ideas such as that of colour-code 
systems spread through institutional arrangements rather than assume that ideas just 
start ‘resonating with the public’ as Tønder put it (ibid., 67). Thinking of these events 
in terms of ‘feedback loops’ of causal effects, as he calls them, only confuses the 
analysis by obscuring the relations between the actors and the chain of events. 
Moreover, the ‘feedback loops’ idea has a long history in, for example, social 
constructionism literature (e.g., Hacking 1999) and the notion of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy in general is hardly new (for example, see Merton 1968, 475–492)37. One 
could even suggest that the idea of immanent causation makes the whole idea of 
causality pointless: if causality suggests that ‘each cause must always produce a 
specific effect – but also, and more significantly, that the cause must be independent 
of, and antecedent to, that effect’ (Gofas & Hay 2010c, 22), why not follow that 
route? Why contort a concept that was not designed to explain structural 
constitution in the first place? Why not stick with the ‘structural phenomena’ alongside 
ideas, for which Tønder, after all, articulated four progressive requirements? 
In his commentary, Blyth (2010, 177) picks up on a sentence from Tønder’s 
contribution that should begin to respond to my criticism above. In it, the immanent 
causality is described ‘as a mode of explanation that recognizes the way in which the 
agentive capacities of the ideational challenge the neat separation of cause and effect’. 
According to Blyth, Tønder here makes ‘a bold step towards what some scholars 
 
37 Interestingly, prominent economist John Maynard Keynes has expressed this idea also. Whereas 
Keynes’ writings are well-known among IS scholars on account of his view of how economists 
influence policy-makers (for example, see Schmidt & Thatcher 2013), it is far less commonly 
highlighted that he wrote about subjective probability and qualitative theory of probability (2004 
[1921]). From this earlier work grew several of his later ideas about how expectations influence the 
economy (see, for instance, Keynes 1937). For a brief introduction to his thinking on ideas and 
subjective probability, see Wiley (1983). 
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have called “thing-theory” […], where non-human actants are granted agency’ (ibid.). 
The actant nature of ideas results from the ‘parallelism’ presented above – the 
ontological materialism–ideational equality – which makes the ideas themselves 
repositories of the future action in a world where ‘the capacity to act upon the 
material is engendered by the interaction of the ideal with the material itself’ (ibid.). 
Blyth saw this position as something through which Tønder sought to prove ‘the 
idea of cause and effect as temporally discrete events and objects […] difficult to 
sustain’, although Blyth was swift to present a caveat in an endnote where he cites, 
for example, some thermodynamic actions as cases in which this logic does not apply 
(ibid., 183). 
Blyth’s initial reaction to Tønder’s theory development is that it did not go far 
enough, in that Tønder tied his ideas to a single source (Spinoza) rather than bring 
the whole tradition of ‘emergent causation’ into the conversation (Blyth 2010, 177–
178). Moreover, causation had become a subject of such debate that significant 
plurality had been recognised already – there are several distinct kinds of causal laws, 
which differ in logics. In this respect, Blyth (ibid., 178) saw ‘Tønder’s stress on 
immanence [as] something future scholars of ideas need to take seriously, as they are 
being taken seriously already elsewhere’. I had the same initial reaction (alongside my 
criticisms above), to both Tønder’s and Blyth’s views: they go too far. Giving agency 
to non-human actors renders a separation between human and natural history 
pointless, along with the concept of agency itself, and very curious conclusions about 
practically anything follow. Moreover, when we equate the idea of a non-human 
actor with the idea of emergence, I am not convinced that we are even talking about 
the same thing. With regard to institutions, emergency theory addresses the structural 
effects of the kind of collective human action in which no single individual can exert 
control or even be fully aware of the overall consequences (Lawson 2015). To sum 
things up, we can borrow Tere Vadén’s phrasing (2014) and say that both Tønder 
and Blyth take the right step but in the wrong direction. I will present this position 
in more detail in the next part of the chapter. 
As for a richer understanding of causality, Gofas and Hay presented their 
constitutive logic wherein ‘ideas provide the discursive conditions of possibility of a 
social or political event’ (2010c). Their handling of the ideas was more generally 
based on the criticism according to which the IS discussion had become mired in 
the perennial dualisms, stuck in a rut of ‘ontological foundations, epistemological 
status and practical pay-off of the turn to ideational explanations’ (Gofas & Hay 
2010b, 3). They stressed also that, while welcoming theoretical plurality and diversity, 
this should not come at the expense of consistency: ‘plurality is one thing, eclecticism 
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another’ (Gofas & Hay 2010c, 14). Against this backdrop, they hoped to overcome 
the ‘tendency to lump together all existing ideational approaches [and] the context 
of [a] narrow, Humean, conception of causation’ (ibid., 14–15). All this was in 
response to questions of ‘whether ideas should be accorded a causal role 
independent of material factors or not’ (ibid., 15; also cited by Hay 2002, 205). 
Gofas and Hay characterised their general position as a dialectical stance from 
which ideational and material are not seen as having an independent existence, yet 
both are real (2010c, 15–16). While the position here is already dualistic, they still 
posed interesting questions in their treatment of ‘ways in which ideas can be invoked 
in causal logics’ (ibid., 23). A central one involves the conditions of uncertainty 
usually related to insufficient information, uncertainty that is seen as a major source 
of ideas. It opens possibilities for new (causal) ideas and strategic action that would 
be unimaginable in static circumstances. However, the authors find that this 
observation ‘offers no analysis of “which ideas are available”, where they come from 
and how they become influential and/or persuasive’ (ibid., 23–24). Despite the crucial 
nature of these questions, they immediately return to materialism–ideational dualism, 
since the conditions are seen to be determined in either/or fashion; that is, in the so-
called material circumstances, uncertainty is the ‘exception rather than the norm’ 
(ibid., 24). While they fall back on their dialectical but ever-dualistic worldview, they 
offer as a solution the idea of ‘uncertainty as […] universal human condition and 
[…] discursive regime’ (ibid., 25–26). Instead of explaining where this uncertainty 
comes from, they embark on a regrettable critical realist defence delving into ‘the 
ontological status of cats and dogs’ (ibid., 32). 
This debate goes off its mark immediately, since Gofas and Hay – and with them 
the whole neo-institutionalism debate – proved unable to provide any reasonable 
definition for the material. The latter works mostly as a common-sense concept. 
Their attempts to rise above the materialism–idealism dichotomy notwithstanding, 
they end up reiterating a realist position in their examples of house pets, nuclear 
bombs, and monetarist economics. Saying that ‘both matter’ is simply not very 
informative, no matter how many philosophical jawbreakers one attaches to it. Blyth 
too (2010) has little patience for Gofas and Hay’s lengthy theoretical exposition, 
although he disregards their general criticisms against IS. On the other hand, Blyth 
asks ‘how and why it matters for what I do as a researcher’ if critical realists imagine 
their formulation of the constructivist position to be better than someone else’s 
(ibid., 172). In Blyth’s account, it is better to concentrate on more detailed theoretical 
questions, such as that of the uncertainty that plagues all neo-institutionalists (see 
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Blyth 2006, 2007b, 2008, 2011, 2015), than on the ones related to the fundamental 
ontology of human life. 
In summary, the debate raised several intriguing questions, but ultimately the 
basic dualism between material and ideal remained. The nature of the material is left 
unexplained, rendering this a common-sense concept. Ideas are considered causal-
objects, beings with innate properties capable of bringing about effects in the world 
by themselves. This is despite the attempt to disassemble the separation between 
ideal and material conditions, even with sensitivity to such issues as constitutional 
causality and the idea of emergence. This implies that the heavy baggage of agent–
structure dualism was brought along for this debate in such a way that the entire 
concept of structure that followed seems to be tailored for its purposes. I consider 
this an impasse, because it is a simple reflection of the insistence on assigning ideas 
an ontological status for their scientific legitimation. Moreover, Blyth’s earlier 
suggestion of plurality of causal logics far too easily strips the whole concept of any 
reasonable meaning. So, again, why should we even try to cleave to this concept 
when we could also speak about constitution or emergence and attempt to find full 
appreciation for those through relational-structural logic? 
Furthermore, according properties to ideas produces enigmatic metaphysics. 
Ideas matter, yes, but the above-mentioned type of analysis is produced only when 
they operate as the ultimate prism, through which the whole social world is refracted, 
in effective ignorance of all the institutions that must exist and the practices that 
must be followed if the things are to happen. People operate with ideas; ideas do not 
operate with people. Moreover, how can ideas have properties when they are not 
things but ‘unobservables’ (Ethington & McDonagh 1995; Blyth 2003)? One can 
write an idea down on paper and devise any kind of ideas one desires, but for ideas 
to become (socially) effective, they must be engaged in real human practices. A book, 
with all of its bright ideas, may rest on the shelves of a library (an institution) from 
here to eternity, but if nobody ever picks it up, it is of no use. Ideas need books, 
computer screens, or at least sound waves to be presentable. Therefore, ideas cannot 
be separated from social relations and from a material environment that we inhabit 
as material beings with material media for communicating ideas, and any analysis 
that pursues this isolated treatment makes a magic charm of an idea. 
In Karl Marx’s terms, treating ideas as causal-objects could be described as 
fetishism, dealt with in more detail in the last main chapter, addressing ideology 
theory. The term, from critique of religion, refers to how people are ruled by things 
they have produced themselves. According to Marx (2010 [1867], 83), these products 
of the human brain start to appear as ‘autonomous figures endowed with a life of 
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their own’38. In this sense, fetishism refers to a phenomenon wherein the properties 
of social relations begin to appear as properties of things. Hence, the term ‘fetishism’ 
suggests not that the ideas themselves are seen as objects but, rather, that, as the objects 
in/of the analysis, they are assigned properties that are actually properties of those 
social relations in which the ideas are produced, upheld, and used. 
2.4 Discursive Institutionalism 
Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism is the next step in the evolutionary 
development of neo-institutionalism. It positions itself between IS and HI, still 
leaning on ideas as its explanatory category of last resort. The main premises and 
features of discursive institutionalism are laid down in a few articles by Schmidt 
(2008, 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2017)39, and the extension to ideational power in DI 
context is reported upon in an article by Martin B. Carstensen and Schmidt (2017). 
The initial justification for this independent tradition took the same starting point as 
IS in general: institutional change cannot be explained without the ideas, and, at the 
same time, the existing institutionalisms were struggling to explain institutions’ 
origins. After about 10 years of development, Schmidt (2017, 250) summarised DI’s 
more specific and progressive purposes as follows: 
With this naming exercise I seek to call attention to the significance of approaches 
that theorize not only about the substantive content of ideas but also about discourse. 
By discourse, I mean not just the representation or embodiment of ideas, but the 
interactive discursive processes by and through which agents generate and 
communicate ideas. The ‘institutionalism’ in the name, meanwhile, underlines the 
importance of considering both ideas and discourse in institutional context, by which 
I mean the meaning context as much as the context of formal institutions, informal 
rules, and everyday practices. 
In the above quotation, Schmidt identifies IS’s basic premise as lying in the ideas’ 
substantive content. This corresponds to my interpretation. Instead of just 
concentrating on these meanings, she aimed to move the focus to processes, where 
ideas still are the substantial content of discourse but the discourse is seen as an 
interactive process and context wherein ideas are conveyed (see also Schmidt 2008, 
305; 309). A discourse is a communicative and co-ordinative process in which the 
 
38 Already at this point, it is crucial to stress that Marx did not support any brand of ‘cognitive’ theory 
of ideas. 
39 Schmidt’s theoretical ideas were manifested in her earlier empirical work too (see, for instance, 
Schmidt 2002, 209–256). 
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institutional context matters to how the ideas represented become effective and 
successful (ibid., 310; 322). It is fair to say, therefore, that Schmidt’s intent was not 
to claim that DI offers something completely new and different but to characterise 
it as simply a ‘re-arrangement of the role of ideas’, as Larsson (2015, 185) phrased it. 
If other IS scholars have been interested in the meaningful content of the ideas, DI’s 
novelty is in the description of the interactive processes and the context where these 
ideas are conveyed – i.e., the discourse. 
With her DI, Schmidt (2017, 250) sought to develop a constitutive ‘umbrella 
concept for all […] approaches to ideas’ under which all idea-practitioners ‘can 
discuss, deliberate, and contest one another’s ideas from epistemological, 
ontological, methodological, and empirical vantage-points’. Other branches of neo-
institutionalism are treated as ‘background factors’, since Schmidt (2008, 322) viewed 
them as equilibrium-focused and static40. She shared the overall conviction of IS 
according to which ‘the turn to ideas undermines the basic premises of the older new 
institutionalism [HI, RCI, and SI]’ (ibid., 304). Therefore, DI represents a clear 
confrontation with them in which an institution ultimately is ‘the meaning context 
[which does] not include objective and material interests’ (Schmidt 2017, 255). As 
one will recall from the discussion above, Schmidt considered the objective (‘real’) 
to refer to the kinds of collective agreement produced by sentient agents that hold 
in that they have causal effects. The material, again, is everything that exists outside 
and/or irrespective of these agents (ibid., 256). Thus, the actors’ interests are 
subjective ideas, beliefs and desires (Schmidt 2010a, 7). 
In more specific analysis of the nature of ideas, Schmidt (2008, 306) took the idea 
largely as a given – or as equivalent to the meaningful content of an idea – and 
concentrated on specification that identifies particular types and levels of ideas. Here, 
she followed Campbell’s (1998, 385) classic typology comprising cognitive- and 
normative-level background and foreground ideas. According to Campbell (ibid., 
384–385), ideas can be divided between first-order and second-order concepts, 
wherein, in rough terms, some ideas work more on constitutive level as taken-for-
granted assumptions. They may even be invisible – unconscious, if you will – and 
therefore are seldom the ones under debate, as opposed to the first-order ideas that 
are the political cause of disagreement. Background ideas are the ideas against which 
the foreground ideas are (unconsciously) reflected. When it comes to cognitive and 
normative ideas, the former (sometimes called causal ideas) ‘elucidate “what is and 
 
40 In a later article, Schmidt (2010a, 12) downrates ‘the results of the HI investigation’ not only to 
‘background factor’ but to ‘background information’. 
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what to do” whereas the normative ideas indicate “what is good or bad about what 
is” in light of “what one ought to do”’ (Schmidt 2008, 306). 
After this elaboration, Schmidt proceeds to discuss ‘why some ideas become the 
policies, programs, and philosophies that dominate political reality while others do 
not’ (ibid., 307). While, for example, Tønder’s solution was to emphasise the 
adequacy of the idea (to stress the property of the idea itself), Schmidt’s begins by 
covering a variety of explanations, ranging from the ideas’ problem-solving potential, 
through very concrete methodological process-tracings, to how ideas can be valued 
for their novelty. In the most general of terms, Schmidt was interested in how ideas 
are tied to concrete processes and how they can be used, but she found that, 
ultimately, we ‘have no way of considering the process by which such ideas go from 
thought to word to deed, that is, how ideas are conveyed, adopted, and adapted, let 
alone the actors who convey them to whom, how, where, and why. This raises the 
question of agency, which brings us to the concept of discourse’ (ibid., 309). As one 
can see, the agent in whose head ideas are located is elevated to serving as the 
ultimate explanatory factor from which the category of discourse is derived. 
In DI, the definition of discourse is tied to ideas’ success or failure in ‘how it 
articulates their substantive content’ (ibid., 311). The success of the discourse is 
connected to the above definitions with regard to ideas’ success, whereas discourse 
also includes wider contexts, such as ‘consistency and coherence across policy 
sectors’ (ibid.). The keyword here is ‘articulation’, since Schmidt (ibid., 309) also 
stretches the idea-definition effort beyond the types and levels of ideas to forms of 
ideas, such as narratives, myths, frames, and scripts, thereby including pretty much 
all theoretical differentiations of the ‘kinds of’ ideas that are to be found in the neo-
institutionalism literature. Moreover, she distinguishes further between co-ordinative 
and communicative discourse, on the basis of the policy sphere in which the 
discourse occurs. Co-ordination is at the centre of the policy process, whereas 
communication is directed toward the public. Schmidt also muses on the discourse 
literature’s typical emphasis on a top-down approach, expressed in seeing the elite as 
shaping mass opinion, so she proceeds to add bottom-up and horizontal effects and 
deliberations to the picture (ibid., 310). Finally, she takes the discussion beyond 
arguing and persuading with ideas, to bargaining by means of them, which she views 
as strategic action (ibid., 312). 
Since ‘articulation’ sums up the core purpose of discourse, one could ask whether 
the features presented here articulate the actual premises or even properties of the 
discourse or, rather, merely represent and describe the variety of approaches and 
questions that have been attached to ideas since the ‘ideational turn’. Because the 
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general description of DI seems very theoretically oriented (dealing with ‘how the 
world is’), Schmidt states not just that DI ‘adds another institutionalist approach to 
our methodological toolkit’ (ibid., 305) (to address how we can know of the world) 
but also that ‘with discourse, I mean its theorization not just as the representation or 
embodiment of ideas’ (Schmidt 2012, 85). This question concerns other sub-fields 
of IS and their theorists also, since it is sometimes hard to separate the theoretical 
statements from the epistemological or methodological statements. Consider the 
case presented earlier in the chapter in which Tønder tries to attach the properties 
of the communicating process to ideas themselves, which, in my interpretation, only 
confuses the debate about the state of the world. The idea-based approach is usually 
applied as a theoretical framework for empirical work rather than as a 
methodological approach (for example, see Berman 2011), but sometimes the border 
between theory and method may be blurry (see, among others, Hudson & Martin 
2010). 
This fuzziness between theory and method may result from IS’s identification 
with social constructionism, which easily confuses the two. Consider the proposition 
that meanings (ideas) represent the social reality, maybe even as it truly is. In this 
case, the epistemological point is that we should use the language to gain knowledge 
of the reality we aim at understanding – i.e., in theorising. However, if the meanings 
of which language is composed are studied as reality, one easily confuses the language 
representing the social reality with the reality itself, seeing language as that reality. If, 
on the other hand, the meanings are considered to be the basic components of 
human reality, how do we delineate the difference between theory describing this 
reality and our method of gaining knowledge of this reality? In the IS literature, the 
solution posited seems to be that anything goes, the only difference between the 
approaches being in how explicit the attempt is to push ideas as themselves as objects 
(of enquiry). That is, they differ principally in whether the idea grants us direct access 
to social reality as it is or, instead, there is a problem since one should draw a 
distinction between the object and the method of enquiry. A crucial question arises: 
if even the tradition itself is unclear on this, how can it know whether it needs a 
separate theory for explaining the (social) world? 
When discussing ideas as something that does not ‘float freely’ and pointing out 
that, even when agents are treated as carriers of ideas, the connection between ideas 
and collective action remains unclear, Schmidt (2012, 91) suggests that ‘[t]he missing 
link is discourse not as representation but as interaction, and the ways in which ideas 
conveyed through discursive argumentation lead to action’. The latter sentence 
reiterates the description presented above of the process ‘by which such ideas go 
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from thought to word to deed’ (Schmidt 2008, 309), with a clear and identifiable 
causal chain: the idea is located inside an actor’s head, and when communicated, it 
may lead to action. Schmidt points to an interactive process wherein the social world 
does not unambiguously open through meanings but directs us to the 
communication practices wherein the exchange of meanings takes place. However, 
it remains somewhat unclear whether this is a theoretical or a methodological 
characterisation. By following the interaction, we may understand how the magic 
happens, but what is its relation to meanings and to institutions? This problem is 
especially evident when Schmidt distinguishes among ideas, discourses, and 
institutions as separate objects. 
According to Schmidt (ibid., 312), ‘[t]he formal institutional context also has an 
impact on where and when discourse may succeed’. In simple terms, that means that 
we must have a theory addressing the institutions separately from discourses (and 
ideas). This goes back to the division between exogenous and endogenous structures, 
since ‘[a]ction in the three older institutionalisms conforms to a rule-following logic, 
whether an interest-based logic of calculation, a norm-based logic of 
appropriateness, or a history-based logic of path-dependence. But if everyone 
follows [these external] rules, once established, how do we explain institutional 
change [and agency]?’ (ibid., 314). Once again, we return to the same problem, which 
in Schmidt’s work is most clearly visible in the statement that ‘the formal 
[institutions] may be treated as unproblematic background information’ (2012, 86). 
By insertion of the single word ‘unproblematic’ into the previous definition (Schmidt 
2008, 2010a)41, she naturalises and effaces the problem of structures by directing the 
gaze to only the meanings within the discourses. In other words, the problem of 
structures is handled by internalising them to agents, but one still finds it tricky to 
see what the ‘formal institutional context’ actually is then. 
In DI, institutions are created and maintained in the process of agents exercising 
their ideational (background) and discursive (foreground) abilities. In practice, this 
involves agents’ internal capacity to use communicative logic that ‘enables agents to 
think, speak, and act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, to 
deliberate about institutional rules even as they use them, and to persuade one 
another to change their institutions or to maintain them’ (ibid., 314). But, since 
Schmidt seeks to transcend the agent–structure dualism lurking here, she follows in 
John Searle’s footsteps by presenting the collective agreements as institutional facts 
produced by ‘sentient agents’. In short, people grow in an institutional environment 
 
41 She also starts to speak about ‘background information’ in her later text, in place of the previous 
formulation, ‘background factors’ (Schmidt 2008, 322).  
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where they possess inherent capacity to absorb and agree on the rules, but the 
background constitutive factors tend to be lost from sight because of the more 
pressing foreground issues. We are capable of understanding, negotiating, and 
agreeing on rules, but the less apparent they are from the agents’ point of view, the 
more readily they blend into background variables. It follows that we usually become 
conscious of the rules only in cases of them being contradictory (ibid., 315). 
Therefore, DI’s institutions are internal to actors with regard to both the context and 
the contingency element. 
In sum, DI’s understanding of the institutions is that they are internalised 
structures of meanings, which are shared and maintained through the interaction by 
sentient agents. From the agents’ standpoint, the institution is the ‘meaning context’ 
(Schmidt 2017, 255) for which ‘the material reality [is] out there’ (Schmidt 2008, 322), 
and the institution is real in the sense that the collective agreements, such as money, 
hold and have real effects. The agent is the key player inside whose head the ideas 
are located. The sentient nature of the agents entails their capability of thinking and 
speaking reflexively, whereas their beliefs (interests included) and goals may be (re-
)negotiable and could be (again) considered in accordance with the agent’s own 
(revisited) judgement and deliberation with others (Schmidt 2010a, 17). I count it 
among DI’s strengths that it so clearly takes agents as real people, even stating this 
directly, but the fundamental problem still remains that, yet again, there is no clear 
indication where the agents’ capacity to act is derived from, especially while the 
unconscious background factors are exerting their own effects. Actually, Schmidt’s 
thinking on this ties in with ideas also: ‘increasing numbers of historical 
institutionalists have turned to ideas and discourse for agency’ (Schmidt 2008, 317). 
It follows that the property of individual-level agency is identified with one’s 
capability of imagining and using ideas. 
In Schmidt’s DI, the agent forms the starting point for the theory, from which 
the rest of the premises are derived. This becomes clear from, if nothing else, her 
outright statement according to which ‘ideas and discourse [provide] another kind 
of micro-foundation logic to institutional development’ (Schmidt 2011, 59). In the 
best I can discern here, the discursive side of affairs entails interaction through which 
the agents’ ideas become effective and through which we may receive knowledge of 
the social world. In the last instance, all the ‘structural’ variables are treated as 
naturalised surroundings wherein the significant, meaningful (inter)action takes 
place, but only as ‘scenery’. When ‘structural’ variables are treated as unproblematic 
background information for ideas, Schmidt is exactly in line with Hall’s (1978, 136) 
characterisation of the fundamental tendency of sociology of knowledge: 
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[T]he whole of social and historical life could in fact be theoretically mapped out in 
terms of these basic processes of meaning construction / meaning interpretation. 
Since everything that had ever been in the world was the product of intentional 
inter-subjective consciousness, everything was meaning. Thoughts or references to 
others not present ‘to consciousness’ – whether simply absent, or deriving from the 
past – as well as ‘theories’ about social actions were simply second- or third-order 
constructs. 
This is a common problem for IS, since it creates a hierarchy of variables with regard 
to the social reality, in which the agency, defined as capacity to imagine and use ideas, 
always precedes other variables. The concentration on agents and underscoring of 
the capacity to act rules out or downplays other variables, if they are even seen as 
existing at all. Even critics of IS mostly proceed from these premises, though they 
may have valuable suggestions for other paths for the tradition’s development. For 
example, in his ‘sympathetic criticism’ of Hay and Schmidt, Larsson (2015, 181–182) 
begins his expression of sympathy for the ‘ideas’ approach by addressing the 
problem of agency and structure thus: 
The intersubjective ideas that underlie social systems possess a reproductive ability 
since they are embedded in social routines and practices that are repeated by 
interpreters who participate in their production and functioning. This does not mean 
that we should disregard human agency altogether. If we do not take into 
consideration the interpretive and meaning-making abilities that conscious individuals 
have, all social actors would have to be seen as cultural dupes [sic] devoid of any ability 
to change their circumstances. Furthermore, such a world would be saturated with 
structure and utterly static. 
Larsson reiterates the agent–structure problem since he sees the ability to reproduce 
structures as existing because ideas possess properties of doing so, while agents can 
act counter to ideas. In addition, he sees the consciousness as being what grants the 
actors the agency to act against these ideas. While it should hardly come as a surprise 
to anyone that people are conscious and capable of thinking and speaking, only in 
that kind of theoretical formulation is this given such weight. However, if we grant 
agents – instead of ideas (which have agency in the above formulation) – full ability 
to produce, reproduce, and change the structures in their social relations, we could 
ask the following question: why is the capacity to reproduce structures not regarded 
as the stuff of human agency, which is confined to conscious action to do something 
else? After all, Schmidt does address the unconscious side of human action as well, 
and, while it may be unconscious, human action it is. On the other hand, if the 
purpose is to declare that something other than unconscious action exists, I am 
already convinced. All that said, Larsson (2015, 187) recognises that Hay and 
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Schmidt ‘tend to overemphasize the autonomy of the agents by relying on 
individuals’ ideas and actions to explain change’. After pointing this out, he proceeds 
to highlight an important feature of Schmidt’s understanding of discourses: 
In this context discourse means communication in institutional settings and arenas, 
with no consideration given to the broader ideational structures and dynamics that 
may construct the identities and motives of political agents. 
In effect, Schmidt means by ‘discourse’ debate rather than framework of meaning. 
When ideas and communication are understood in this manner, the former are 
primarily regarded as properties of individuals who are disconnected from ideational 
structures and existing discourses, although discursive institutionalism focuses on 
how actors construct, and later engage in, strategic communication in order to 
promote their ideas and influence others. (Ibid., 190) 
In her response to this criticism, Schmidt (2017, 254) asks why Larsson is so eager 
to insist that her discourse is ‘only about strategic communication and “debate”’ in 
a way that disconnects ideas from structures. Firstly, I agree with Schmidt that the 
ideas are not disconnected from structures, since the structures in her formula are 
made up of (unconscious) ideas. On the other hand, I agree with Larsson, for the 
reasons mentioned above: she does not consider broader structural variables and 
effectively downgrades them to unproblematic background information. Larsson 
(2015, 192) goes on to point out that agents’ choices are not made on a tabula rasa, 
so there is room for agency in the structural theories of HI and with regard to 
structures in general. This leads to the question of what kind of structure the IS 
scholars are thinking about, since ideas could be seen as possessing a structural 
quality. This would be a logical conclusion even from Schmidt’s own premises, if, 
for example, the unconscious side of human agency were to be recognised. On the 
other hand, this far too easily leaves the ‘unconsciousness’ as a theoretical refuge that 
can be left unexplained. 
Whatever criticisms may be posed, Schmidt (2008, 318) hits the mark in asking 
whether the ‘real’ consists of ‘material’ in the first place. When she lays the stepping-
stone that ‘institutions may be real in the sense that they constitute interests and 
cause things to happen’ (ibid.), relational social theory could take off from here. 
However, this too is a right step in the wrong direction. Schmidt – as we have seen 
– continues her journey to the deep end of ideas instead of taking the next step of 
truly casting away the separation between the so-called material and real and thereby 
adopting a holistic view on social reality. Instead of bridging this gap, Schmidt’s way 
of bringing idea studies closer to the real world is to include power in the theoretical 
corpus. While she adopts the notion of power and theorises on it, the idea remains 
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the prism through which social reality is refracted. For Schmidt, power means 
ideational power per se. 
The fundamental premise that serves as the starting point for the examination of 
power in DI lies in its understanding of political influence. Schmidt (ibid., 311) 
recognises the ‘extensive literature [on] how elites shape mass opinion by establishing 
the terms of the discourse and by framing the issues for the mass media’, but she 
simultaneously sees that ‘[t]he arrows can also go from the bottom up [and] even 
remain solely at the level of civil society’. Viewing influence in this way, as exerted 
on both the vertical and the horizontal axis, with the arrows going in all directions, 
offers rich understanding of the plurality of social forces brought to bear to influence 
the public climate. Schmidt (ibid.) also sees that once debate is set loose, it cannot 
be controlled by anyone. Appreciating this kind of contingency is one of the key 
strengths and basic premises of the whole IS position. As for the specific premises 
of DI’s definitions of power and power positions, the starting point is that ‘[p]ower 
and position do matter. The question is how to define power and position in such a 
way as to also take account of the power of ideas and discourse [since] actors can 
gain power […] from their ideas even when they may lack the power of position’ 
(Schmidt 2010a, 18). According to Schmidt (2017, 258), this is a general problem for 
IS since, while many state that ideas have power, very few try to describe how ideas 
have power. 
2.4.1 Ideational Power  
In 2016, an entire Journal of European Public Policy special issue was devoted to the 
subject of ideational power. In the discussion therein, Carstensen and Schmidt were 
key developers of the concept. It and the debate about it are indicative of how neo-
institutionalism has developed, and of how it produces new conceptual innovations. 
What Carstensen and Schmidt (2016, 321) did was develop it in relation to existing 
power forms – compulsory, structural, and institutional – in a firm belief that it 
‘retains enough distinctiveness to constitute a form of power in its own right’. This 
belief stemmed from the observation that the IS field lacks descriptions of how ideas 
hold power. The difference between prior literature and DI was seen as lying in DI’s 
‘agency-oriented approach’ (ibid., 320), contrasted against the above-mentioned 
power forms. Therefore, these authors defined ideational power as ‘the capacity of 
actors (whether individual or collective) to influence other actors’ normative and 
cognitive beliefs through the use of [an] ideational element’ (ibid., 321). The element 
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in question is described with regard to particular ways of using power, which involve 
power through, over, and in ideas. Further justification for the notion of ideational 
power was rooted in the observation that, rather than ideas just having causal force, 
powerful ideas must have ‘particular kinds of effects […] when actors seek to influence 
the beliefs of others by promoting their own ideas at the expense of others’ (ibid., 
322). 
For Carstensen and Schmidt, the various forms of ideational power operate 
through persuasion (power through ideas), control and domination of meanings (power 
over ideas), and authority that the background assumptions have at the expense of 
other ideas (power in ideas) (ibid.). They saw ideas not ‘as internalized or “contained” 
in the minds of actors, but instead as a resource […] that exists between and not 
inside the minds of actors’ (ibid., 325). This was taken to be something opposite 
what is found in structural theories of dominance or socialisation. Also, in her earlier 
work, Schmidt (2010a, 18) defined power position as actors’ ability to wield power. 
She hence cast power as an ability of actors through and through. This makes the 
statement about ideas’ power problematic – after all, the aim of the whole endeavour 
was to justify the claim as to the power of ideas themselves. Furthermore, while this 
observation indicates that a theory of agents’ power capacity might be involved, not 
much is said about the agents either. At the end of the day, ‘ideational power’ refers 
to the ways power can be used or gets used in situations wherein sentient agents 
communicate for their or their interest groups’ benefit – i.e., how people use these 
particular ideas. One could ask how this theory differs from structural theories and 
what we gain if we assume that the agents are not socialised units of the social reality. 
Big questions related to power are left unanswered, such as that of ideational 
power’s relationship to resources, rules, or the individuals’ personal capacities. While 
Carstensen and Schmidt did discuss these matters to some extent, the theoretical 
premise still seems to be that the starting position for all agents is the same. That is, 
while these authors did not deny the existence of structures or power positions, 
neither did they posit differing starting positions for people either. In fact, they did 
the exact opposite: since the framework is built in opposition to structural theories, 
it assumes that the ‘ideational’ power resource is distributed equally among agents at 
the outset. Furthermore, they seemed to deny the existence of such differences 
between people in talking only about actors’ abilities to influence other actors’ beliefs 
and, through this, the general public environment. Therefore, the whole discussion 
about ideational power remained confined to the sphere of communication and 
actors’ (inherent) abilities to use ideas. 
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On the other hand, when addressing, for example, the structural Marxist 
approaches, Carstensen and Schmidt (ibid., 320) presented them as promoting ideas 
only as ‘means for furthering the dominance of the ruling class […], or as an 
expression of the “false consciousness” of the masses’. This view stands in 
somewhat of a contrast to the Marxist approaches to ideology, which we turn to as 
the topic of the last main chapter of the dissertation. From their stance, ideas are 
part of the hegemonic (discursive) struggle mediated by various kinds of apparatus 
and taking place in concrete practices in social relations, where the power resources 
are distributed unevenly (see Rehmann 2013). In practice, DI considers structural 
approaches to power to be deterministic and not acknowledge the structures present 
in and through the social relations in which actors must act, and wherein the ideas are 
always produced and communicated – be they far-fetched ideas of individuals or 
more philosophical-structural norms underlying those individuals’ mundane 
operations. Therefore, a naïve view of the world is conveyed: in essence, everyone 
shares the same capacity to take part in exerting political influence. 
In addition, commentary by Blyth (2016, 467) presents a critical stance to 
Carstensen and Schmidt’s categorisation, for ‘weaken[ing] the ideas research 
program by narrowing the focus such that it misses as much as it illuminates’. The 
reference is to engaging in an endeavour of trying to conceptualise power in specific 
terms, which easily leads to a ‘hermeneutic loop’: if one starts with the agent, ‘one 
ends up with a structural account of agency, and vice versa’ (ibid., 466). For this 
reason, Blyth suggests that this kind of categorisation of ‘what power is’ ends up 
limiting ‘the work that power can perform in […] ideational analysis’ (ibid.). After 
identifying the problem of imposing overly clear frames for the analysis, Blyth 
proceeds to examples wherein structural concepts such as hegemonic power 
immediately run into problems of ‘how agents can know what the world really looks 
like such that one can escape the hegemony and call it as such’, musing that ‘if agents 
can do that, why is the hegemony so powerful?’ (ibid.). Thus, while Blyth sees 
problems in Carstensen and Schmidt’s ideational power conception, he moves closer 
to them in holding Gramscian and more generally Marxist conceptualisations of 
power in suspicion (for other IS accounts on the subject, see Hay 2002; Blyth 2008; 
Schmidt 2010b). Since Blyth supports the general account of ‘ideational power’, we 
take a brief look at his arguments below, making preliminary comments with regard 
to his criticism of the Marxist accounts we will examine further on. 
For Blyth (2008, 7–8), there are three problems in what ‘Gramscian scholarship’: 
Firstly, it suggests too straightforward hegemonic projects with class-derivation, 
whereas reality shows many actors, even business firms, not having a clear sense of 
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what their (material) interests should be. Also, it would create the above-mentioned 
problem of hegemonic ‘false consciousness’, to which no-one would be immune, 
and, thirdly, it assumes a certain understanding of history that evolves irrespective 
of agents’ opinions and their orientations to it. In other words: no classes, social 
forces, and historical blocs exist without actors ‘on the ground’ identifying these 
categories (ibid.). This finally takes us to the nub of the neo-institutionalists’ division 
between material and ideal interests and how they connect with power. Ideal interests 
are something that the agents may decide for themselves without being dopes to 
some external power source. While sympathising with this kind of view and the faith 
displayed in human rationality, I must return to Larsson’s criticism of Schmidt and 
IS for a tendency to overemphasise the agents’ autonomy. Blyth has corresponding 
great faith in people, which, regrettably, leads to a totalising theoretical 
conceptualisation of structures – the original sin of IS. 
Firstly, these problems arise only if one wants to understand structural and/or 
Marxist concepts such as class, social force, and historical bloc in such a way that a 
totalising conceptualisation of structures results. Here, if there is a structure in 
operation, it mystically swallows all the other dimensions of human life, as if we were 
not subject to structural conditions and not people with abilities to think and speak. 
Consider Blyth’s own example of running a business (2008). If you run a business, 
you may be unaware of your interests to any extent, but I am highly confident that 
the competition will either clarify them for you or run you out of business. Still, there 
is leeway for you to consider how to organise your business, just not without 
considering the competitive landscape and other conditions. Actually, the social 
force from competition is the epitome of the kind of historical power that does 
operate without anyone specific being in charge (Marx 2010 [1867]; Shaikh 2016), as 
do many legal constitutive premises, such as ownership rights, through fundamental 
effects on organising production and producing competition (Weber 1978; Hodgson 
2015). However, rearranging ownership rights would immediately have an effect on 
the amount of leeway and on ways of organising business. Moreover, one may 
subjectively identify with any class one wants, but the number of seats at the 
boardroom table is limited, and the power there is not purely symbolic. 
Secondly, the totalising understandings of the concepts are accompanied by 
evaluation of them all on the structure–agent axis (Blyth 2016, 467). I suggest that 
the general problem consists of an overly narrow view of the concepts in the first 
place, whereby they must be considered isolated and total, with things being either 
structural or agency-based. Blyth (ibid.) asks what good it does to describe the world 
yet again in such a way that, for example, the author himself is seen as reproducing 
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the structures of late capitalism in his practice of penning commentary in the role of 
university scholar. Blyth’s question could be reflected upon in relation to Parsons’ 
(1991 [1951], 39) understanding of statuses and roles, which elevates the social 
relations to the foreground, since status refers to a structurally ‘located’ position. 
This means that the actor is an object of others’ (and the self’s) orientation, or 
expectations. The initial answer to Blyth’s question is that the good it does is in 
comprehension of the (inter)relations and (inter)dependencies between people 
and/of these as the structures in question. Moreover, when considering the 
ideological practices that are presented later in this dissertation, one finds the 
ideological reproduction of society to be, in actuality, a very practical matter, since 
ideas cannot be detached from these practices. By operating as a university professor, 
one does all manner of things in addition to what is obvious and consciously 
perceived. 
In Finland, there is a saying: whose bread you eat, her songs you sing. If one 
wants to be a scholar, write articles one must. If one wants to publish those articles, 
one must cite well-regarded works in the reference list. This is how institutions work 
whose power lies not in ‘false consciousness’ but in those concrete replicating 
practices that on a day-to-day basis reproduce the social relations organising our 
social world. Every time one presses the Enter key to accept a new curriculum, to 
acknowledge students’ study credits, to accept someone as a postgraduate student, 
or to submit an article to satisfy a university performance requirement, one 
instantiates a concrete practice and a decision on which direction to ‘steer the ship’ 
or whether to let it continue on its course. These practices organise as a mass without 
anyone particular being in charge, but they leave room for agents to operate more or 
less successfully, depending on their positions and their interrelations with existing 
institutions. 
Blyth himself offered a good example of this kind of power when drawing 
attention to a piece in the above-mentioned special issue on ideational power, the 
contribution in which Oddný Helgadóttir (2016) describes how a specific set of 
Italian economics ideas grew in the course of travelling from one institution to 
another and ultimately came to affect the economic policy of entire nations – namely, 
to confer a blessing on austerity policies in Europe. The Italian economists in 
question, the ‘Bocconi boys’, from Bocconi University, passed through a series of 
institutions to earn their spurs as legitimate authorities. This brilliant historical 
network-analysis serves excellently as proof of historical structural-institutional 
power, in demonstrating how not just any ideas could have been accepted as the 
basis for the economic debate and policies but only ones gaining their influence from 
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the institutional positions, which ultimately determine the associated arguments’ 
credibility. Helgadóttir (ibid., 401–402) nicely illustrates this with an extensive list of 
universities, think tanks, academic journals and other publications, economic 
institutions, and positions these prominent economists went through, clearly 
suggesting the power of these institutional connections gathered to these specific 
actors, ready to sing the songs of those who feed them. 
However, Blyth’s (2016, 469) ultimate argument seems to be that a more fruitful 
approach to concepts such as power is just to leave aside the theoretical issue and 
render them visible through analysis of how the ideas flow. From the perspective of 
an empirical scientist, Blyth (2010, 181) also asks about the gains in adopting this or 
that philosophical fundament; for the sake of real-world analysis, it is better simply 
to get to work. Schmidt too asks why we should engage in lengthy theoretical 
exercises in the first place ‘if empirical rather than philosophical reasoning makes the 
case’ (2010b, 188). I hold it to be a serious misconception, however, to assume that 
all scientific reasoning would not be philosophical (read: theoretical) in the first place. 
As soon as we employ an abstract concept, it is a theory of (social) reality. While I 
understand Blyth’s and Schmidt’s position on the philosophical questions as often 
over-complicated abstractions / self-sustaining intellectual exercises, I suggest that 
scientific explaining is always theoretical explaining, where the theoretical object that 
is given explanatory status affects the results and conclusions that are made. 
Therefore, what sorts of premises form the basis for the idea of ‘idea’ is not a trivial 
matter. 
2.4.2 Interim Conclusions on Ideational Scholarship and Discursive 
Institutionalism 
IS grew out of HI, and it has since developed from a counter-movement into an 
ambitious tradition with an agenda of its own. On the basis of the study presented 
above, one can summarise the agenda thus: Agency must be defended! Whether the 
agenda is purely one of seeing the human-made meanings as an important building 
block of the social reality offering substance for various kinds of contingencies or, 
instead, it is defended as an appendage for humanity, that exclamation captures its 
essence. It represents concern related to structural theories that are interpreted as 
teleological and determining in such a way that the humanity is removed from the 
picture and people are viewed as over-socialised dopes without free will. While actual 
empirical research focused on ideas produces good results, providing new 
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information on the ever-changing world (see, for example, Blyth 2002a, 2015), IS 
itself as a theoretical framework suffers from shortcomings and problems. 
The original effort with IS was to bring in the unobservables and intangible 
objects as factors in institutional analysis, and the question in relation to historical 
institutions was of whether ideas/ideologies can be deemed to possess significant 
political life in themselves, even when the institutions or practices that gave rise to 
them or supported them have grown weak. Or, as Orren put it, ‘[h]ow loosely 
attached can ideas be to institutional developments and remain politically viable?’ 
(1995, 98). Over its journey, IS has forged an ambiguous relationship with HI. In 
some cases, it accepts HI’s structural core, settling for enriching it (Béland 2005, 
2009). In others, it either rejects HI in favour of a research agenda of its own (Blyth 
1997; Schmidt 2008, 2010a) or is indecisive about the matter (Blyth 2002b, 2003, 
2007). While empirical investigation has provided alternative sorts of answers to the 
question of the political viability of ideas, the core question remain: what is the 
theoretical function of ideas in institutionalist enquiries? 
For an answer to this and to consider how well, if at all, IS can answer the 
questions it posed to HI, I have looked at the tradition in depth and found it to be 
equivalent or very close to traditional social constructionism (for example, see Blyth 
2002a; Hay 2002; Béland & Cox 2011b). While some of my critique will be fleshed 
out only in the next chapter, the parallel between IS and constructionism primarily 
involves concentration on meanings and how they construct the social reality; in 
other words, it involves the lifeworld. Therein lies the starting point for explaining 
the contingencies of social life or institutions. In a neo-institutionalist context, these 
elements are supposed to provide plausible explanations especially for institutional 
change. If one proceeds on the assumption that ideas are building blocks of social 
reality, they may provide a source of change; refer to human capacity in themselves; 
or be synonymous with beliefs, desires, norms, values, etc. This means that they can 
be regarded as ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ ontological objects, depending on whether they are 
seen as causal-objects as such – objects capable of producing causal effects – or, on 
the other hand, appear through some kind of manifestation. 
Ideas as ‘hard’ ontological objects are understood as beings themselves, causal-
objects. They can be seen as products of some ‘ideational’ sphere, as in Tønder’s 
(2010, 68) discussion of the ‘ideational world’ (as opposed to the ‘material world’), 
or in the manner of Béland and Cox, who described ideas as things that minds can 
create without the need for any connection to reality whatsoever. This stems from 
the need to see ideas as causal-objects, as Schmidt (2017, 256) brought out. A strange 
‘ideational-realist’ double position emerges here, since, on one hand, for ideas to be 
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considered real, they ought to have causal effects, but, on the other hand, for ideas 
to be considered causal, they ought to be real. If your explanatory variable is not 
‘real’, it cannot have causal effects. Even Schmidt adopted this position, despite the 
discursive emphasis, on account of ‘the material reality out there’ (2008, 322). Similar 
positions are typical and to be found in, for example, the work of Blyth (2002a, 30): 
‘This is not to say ideas are all there is. I can drop a brick on my foot and it will hurt.’ 
However, Blyth remains much more ambiguous, since he clearly tries to keep some 
distance from ontological questions (2010) and ends up adopting an evolutionary 
theory as a basis for his fundamental understanding of social reality (2011). 
This recognition of material reality may be a response to a practical stance, since 
support for IS can come from quarters with much less ontological ambition. For 
Blyth (2010, 177), constructionism mean that ‘things can be otherwise […] which 
means that fixed identities and qualities are a bad place to start’. This made him a 
‘reluctant constructivist’, as he pointed out that he ‘came to studying ideas because 
studying the world without reference to them simply made no sense’ (ibid., 181). 
Along similar lines, Schmidt (2010b, 192) found that ‘we should get on with the task 
of explaining political reality with as many methods as are appropriate. We may lose 
our “trump” of science, as Blyth has already suggested, but we gain our freedom to 
be social scientists’. 
Against this backdrop, I find it troubling how attached these scholars, in justifying 
their existence as social scientists, became to the above-mentioned agent–structure 
ontologies and causal reasoning. That result also calls for reflecting seriously on what 
‘the social’ as examined by the tradition might be. This is because the IS school, as 
agency-based scholarship, is based on methodological and ontological individualism, 
since it draws its premises from the ‘individual consciousness’; for example, see the 
work of Larsson (2015, 176). When one draws the whole of social reality from 
consciousness, all the effects and events must be treated as an aggregate of minds; 
i.e., they must be derivable from these individual minds without any ‘remainder’, 
which makes the question of ‘social’ impossible. Even if these meanings are 
‘conveyed’ in interactive processes, as in Schmidt’s discourses, this does not change. 
Not all is lost: one could favour an idea-focused approach for practical reasons, 
in which case they can be conceived of as ‘soft’ ontological objects. In that case, the 
field ‘is dominated by the vague theoretical category of “the ideational” and a range 
of terms are often used interchangeably and seemingly imagined to substitute for, or 
to be synonymous with, “idea”: norm, belief, paradigm, value, habit, tradition, 
narrative and even culture’ (Finlayson 2004, 530). Moreover, this approach has led 
to the above-mentioned effect, identified by Larsson, of devoting too little attention 
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to the nature of ideas in themselves. Instead of unravelling the problems, the 
correction attempts have, regrettably, led either deeper into the ontological-
ideational swamp or to presenting only another approach to ideas, from the same 
premises. In other words, both the critics and the IS scholars have repeatedly taken 
a good step but in the wrong direction. 
Firstly, after setting forth plausible critique of IS, Finlayson (2004) concluded the 
only problem to be that ideas had thus far not been understood as rhetorical devices, 
and he left the basic ontology alone. Secondly, in Larsson’s (2015) otherwise fine 
ontological critique that attends to the basis of ideas in consciousness, the solution 
is found in an attempt to redefine the ideas themselves from post-structuralist 
perspective. Thirdly, Schmidt (2008, 318) was on the right track in asking whether 
the ‘real’ even consists of ‘material’ in the first place, but she eventually found herself 
in deep ontological contemplation of ideas. Fourthly, Tønder (2010) tried to detach 
himself from the causal logic he considered problematic, but he ended up contorting 
the course of time in a manner that hampers real-world analysis. While Blyth (2010) 
supported Tønder’s move against one-dimensional causal reasoning, he, in turn, 
ended up suggesting that non-human objects should be granted agency in their own 
right. Finally, Gofas and Hay (2010c, 23–24) too asked good questions, about which 
ideas are available, their origins, and their expansion in influence and coverage, but 
they ended up reiterating the material–ideal dualism in their defence of critical 
realism. 
As is already clear to the reader, my solution for this problem is to see ideas and 
institutions as relational – i.e., dependent on each other. This will be expanded upon 
as the discussion progresses. Institutions consist of historically developing and 
changing social relations, which are maintained in concrete practices. Blyth (2011, 
101; see also his 2008 work) actually uses himself as an example of this approach: 
When I leave the house in the morning, I do not say to my wife, ‘See you later, honey, 
I’m off to replicate the structures of late capitalism,’ even if my going to work does 
precisely that. 
This ties in with Blyth’s (2011, 96) chain of evidence of the superiority of the 
constructionist premise as to agency in social science: the people themselves ‘create 
the stability that they take for granted’. Duly noted, since there is no-one else around! 
Nevertheless, it is the people in relation to each other who actually perform this task. 
Blyth (2008, 3) actually recognises this when speaking of how ‘the relationship 
between ideas and institutions is […] constitutive’ such that it creates dynamics 
independent of any given individual. He cites as an example the phenomenon of 
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inflation. However, he still is reluctant to let go of the ideas, since he finds it to be 
his ‘action in combination with everyone else’s actions’ that matters (ibid., 5). This 
approach makes the claim that it is an aggregate of actions that matters, though, so it 
fails to fulfil the definition of social phenomenon. 
There is a vast difference between the agency and the relational approach, since 
the latter discards the agent–structure dichotomy. Moreover, there is no point in any 
divisions between the ‘ideational’ and ‘material’, since there are only different kinds 
of relations between people (and other objects) in need of meaningful 
communication if things are to work. Neither is there a point in detaching ideas from 
the (institutional) environment wherein they are used, because ideas are not things. 
They are, just as IS states, the meaningful content of the human interaction. Ideas 
are utterly dependent on the people who use them, who, in turn, are just as 
dependent on the ideas, other people, and the environment that surrounds them. No 
matter how deep we go, a human is a relational being, through and through. 
What does this mean for Blyth as he sets off in the morning and replicates the 
structures of late capitalism? Firstly, while this is indeed what he does, it is not 
‘structure’ that operates here but Blyth in relation to other people. The point is that 
the structures are reproduced in everyday practices, but the people who reproduce 
these cannot observe that directly, since it is only through their senses (i.e., their 
immediate perception) that they see their operations and the effects of those 
operations. We will consider the example of money below. The critical ideology 
theory I address more fully in Chapter 4 would see the ‘real’ of money in its historical 
social relations. 
Money as an institution is a historical product, one that is indifferent and 
irrelevant to its individual users. Simultaneously, it is dependent on the majority of 
its individual users, since the properties of money are mere abstractions in that they 
are reducible not to money as a carrier of these properties itself but to real practices 
and relations that relate to money and its usage. The fetishism of the money – the 
confusing of social relations with properties of any given object – is manifested in 
such a way that the money itself seems to incorporate these properties because of 
the effects money-usage has in market exchange, although money does not possess 
any properties outside those social relations in which it operates. To be more precise, 
money does not have any properties as a ‘material’ thing at all; every one of its 
properties is social. Yet the ‘material carrier’ of these properties – a coin, a banknote, 
or a card – has its practical function in the sphere of exchange, since it functions as 
any utility article does. Because people usually observe only this material carrier of 
social relations, they tend to see the properties of those relations in the money itself. 
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Its abstract nature notwithstanding, money fulfils its purpose in everyday use. Its 
existence makes it ‘real’ in the sense that using money has ‘material’ consequences: 
in its various manifestations, it is an essential part of organising the production and 
producing the division of labour. If we cannot root our explanation of all these 
phenomena in the theoretical category of ideas or actors’ actions summing up to an 
aggregate, the consequences exceed the explanatory power of these concepts. It is 
highly problematic to derive the historical properties of money from individual-level 
cognitive processes or ideas, since individuals simply cannot possess and handle all 
the information related to money and consequences of its use. Without the relations 
and the dynamic context they create, we lose sight of everything apart from the tight 
package of individual behaviours and end up with the problem Durkheim posed. 
Moreover, another problem arises, via how we encounter the money in day-to-day 
life in a manifestation that reveals only the ‘common sensible’ aspects of it. To use 
money, we almost need not have any idea what we are doing – in an ontological sense 
– because the practices related to the exchange can be taught to a five-year-old. When 
Blyth steps out the door, he sets himself in various kinds of relations with the rest 
of us, but only some of the effects are directly observable, because of the multiple 
relations present in all situations. Hence the category of the social, and the institution. 
If we substitute the relations with ideas that are seen as incorporating properties 
themselves, further problems occur. Firstly, when ideas are used as the ‘lens’ to the 
social world as such, curious results may follow. The historical and practical nature 
of institutions could become lost, since the ideas do all the heavy lifting. For example, 
as noted above with regard to Tønder’s analysis of the so-called axis of evil, one 
could consider the ideas to just get to work and start ‘resonating’, without any 
reference to the media, government, and other apparatuses that take part in this. This 
displays naïveté with regard to actual instance-specific differences in capacities to 
affect the public climate. Secondly, curious theory could emerge that ends up 
justifying the existence of an idea in terms of itself. Hence, the problematic 
dichotomies of agent–structure and material–ideal rear their head. Thirdly, the idea 
remains a black box, which seems to give any result necessary. Finlayson (2004, 531) 
pointed this out, saying that theory often treats ideas as excessively homogenous: 
But ideas are not a uniform class of things. An idea of God, an idea of good, an idea 
of right and an idea of what to have for lunch may all be connected in some chain of 
reasoning, but, if we regard them as things of essentially the same sort, just examples 
or instances of the category ‘idea’, then what makes them important, their specificity 
as ideas of particular things, formulated in and for particular contexts and uses, is 
dissolved. 
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While IS tries to respond to this problem by introducing several kinds of ideas, it 
ends up clashing with causality. If an idea is treated as an object for the sake of 
causality, there must be some unifying essence; one cannot have it both ways. The 
idea on its own should incorporate properties if it is to be able to cause something. It 
is here that the problem of homogeneity appears: if the category incorporates all that 
there is in social reality, it is rendered redundant since it explains nothing. This 
becomes apparent if we compare ‘ideas’ with notions from economic theory, 
wherein the typical problem is how to aggregate all the economic phenomena with 
a tendency toward equilibrium from rational, atomistic actors who possess and are 
able to handle all the relevant information pertaining to the economic reality. 
Geoffrey Hodgson (2012, 97–98) illustrated this point with regard to rational choice 
theory and its utility-maximising individual: 
Because utility is unobservable, all kinds of behaviour can be ‘explained’ in terms of 
the idea, without fear of refutation. […] [N]o evidence can possibly refute the theory 
that agents are maximizing some hidden or unknown variable (such as utility) […]. 
The utility-maximization assumption is unfalsifiable, but it is not a tautology in the 
logical sense because it is conceivably false. Logical tautologies – such as [that] a triangle 
has three sides – are true by definition. By contrast, it might be the case that 
individuals are not maximizing anything. But we can never establish this on the basis 
of empirical evidence […]. A key problem with utility maximization is that it is so 
general that it can explain anything; consequently its explanatory power in specific 
instances is dramatically diminished. 
I echo Hodgson and, as quoted above, Finlayson by proposing that the idea-based 
explanations may be so general as to be unfalsifiable. On the other hand, since those 
explanations are derived from individual agents’ minds, they cannot explain the 
unobservable remainder or residual of the social reality that moves the markets or 
causes inflation. When these are taken in combination with the fact that such 
explanation is hard to come by with any single definition of an idea, I suggest that 
IS scholars should make a small shift in theoretical position by giving up their 
dualistic ontological positioning and accept that we live in a wholly and 
fundamentally relational social world composed of dependencies. Should agency, 
then, be defended? That depends on the price. If the purpose of the entire theoretical 
exercise is to prove that human beings are capable of reflexive thinking and speaking, 
and capable of deciding about their interests for themselves (Schmidt 2008; Blyth 
2008; Larsson 2015; Carstensen & Schmidt 2016), I am not sure. By the same token, 
if the purpose is to stand up for humanity and human capacities as opposed to 
‘determining’ structures (Jahta 2011; Hay 2011), I am still not sure. In both cases, my 
suspicion is two-pronged: I wonder, firstly, whether this defence is based on 
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reasonable theory of structures and, secondly, whether this position actually defends 
humanity. 
The first part is probably clear, since my concept of structures is of social relations 
that are always present but do not determine everything. The problems described 
above seem to stem from a totalising structure concept adopted by IS. Also, I am 
not sure we defend humanity very well by using concepts such as ‘preferences’, 
wherein people are seen mostly as choice-making creatures. In addition, the notion 
according to which we all share equal power of using language and meanings might 
do people a disservice by reassuring them of an equal starting position for political 
struggles. This is related to the second point, in that I consider it potentially harmful 
to emphasise individuality so much. We are living in an increasingly individualistic 
culture, which is exploited as a commercial tool for marketing and political purposes. 
Instead of amplifying this effect by reassuring people of the validity of their 
individualism, I would emphasise our relational and interdependent nature as social 
beings, since doing so does not call into question or ‘threaten’ anyone’s individuality 
or personality but does give a realistic, institutional context for our being. 
2.5 Institutions As Historical Structures or Ideas 
In this chapter, I have addressed neo-institutionalism theory, especially with regard 
to the ambiguous relationship between historical institutionalism and ideational 
scholarship that it birthed, which, in turn, produced the descendant discursive 
institutionalism. The original agenda for the whole new institutionalist movement 
was one of reconciliation across fields of institutionalism studies, from old to new, 
and to bridge the gap between the so-called system and lifeworld theories. As I 
investigated neo-institutionalist theory, I strove to reconstruct its premises to 
uncover how it sees the world and why this reconciliation has not happened yet, but 
this reconstruction was a difficult task, on account of huge ambiguity even in the 
basic vocabulary. Some concepts appear to retain their common-sense meaning, as 
with ‘material’ and ‘interests’, yet these are core theoretical concepts of the field. Still, 
it was possible to pursue my aim of understanding the premises neo-institutionalism 
proceeds from in its analysis. 
I started by asking whether neo-institutionalism needs the concept of an 
institution in the first place. This was because institutions seem to have been replaced 
with all kinds of things: rules, norms, values, beliefs, etc. (Peters 2012). According to 
neo-institutionalism literature, the common denominator was an approach revolving 
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around the problem of order, producing dualities such as stability vs. change and, a 
variant of the same problem, agent vs. structure. Originally, neo-institutionalists 
called for more fine-grained, feet-on-the-ground, and specific theories on 
institutions that would not be blind to change, details, and exceptions. Whereas HI 
represents system thinking in this movement, IS is all about lifeworld. Within this 
framework, institutionalists need an explanatory theory to take stability and change 
simultaneously into account, and this aim was expressed well in the debate in Polity 
in 1995, wherein many progressive contributors seemed to understand how 
unobservables and intangible objects should be seen as the basis for institutional 
enquiry.  
Strong proponents of the latter idea, Ethington and McDonagh (1995, 86–87) 
articulated that the institutions should be understood through underlying principles 
such as the regularities of relatively durable principles of collective human conduct, 
not as ‘ontologically’ separate objects in accordance with their immediate 
observability. Accordingly, scholars should delve into institutions’ underpinnings 
and the connections of those with ideas and meanings, since the difference between 
tangibility and intangibility would not be the decisive factor. The ‘ideas’ concept was 
considered to fulfil this promise, through an ability to answer questions about the 
lifeworld’s vitality in relation to institutions’ durability (Orren 1995). However, the 
neo-institutionalist discussion has become deeply entrenched in dualistic positions 
that reiterate the agent–structure and material–ideal positions. This has served the 
separation of lifeworld thinking into a field of its own, for separate investigation, 
whereas the ‘idea’ has been elevated into the primary intangible explanatory category, 
with ontological status of its own, capable of producing causal effects on the world.   
System and lifeworld theories are distributed along an axis where the former takes 
the stability as a given and focuses on explaining it, while the latter might take general 
stability as a given but focuses on explaining the contingency of the human life and 
change. Therefore, for institutional theory with power to explain social reality 
effectively, we need a theory of institutions that addresses the overarching problem 
of order in a manner that fulfils the promise of reconciliation between the system 
and the lifeworld perspective. However, a profound question remains in how to deal 
with these dualisms. Hay and Daniel Wincott wrote some years ago that ‘if 
institutionalism is to develop to its full potential, it must consider the relationship 
between structure and agency […] as a central analytic concern’ (1998, 951). In their 
progressive presentation, they located the change as residing ‘in the relationship 
between the actors and the context in which they find themselves’ (ibid., 955); this 
could open the road to scholarship in which ‘structure and agency are conceived of 
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as comprising not a dualism, but a complex duality linked in a creative relationship’ 
(ibid., 956). Regrettably, no matter how close they came to unravelling the last few 
threads of this ‘duality’, they did not point out explicitly how precisely these 
‘relationships’ are the stuff that matters. And if the story thus far has told us anything, 
it is that talking about the relations has not been a good strategy. The historical 
development of the field seems to fall back repeatedly to the perennial dualisms 
identified by Gofas and Hay.   
The appearance of these dualisms is connected to the above-mentioned question 
of unobservables and intangible objects. When we consider the questions that HI 
and IS scholars have themselves posed to RCI scholars, it is clear that we need some 
category to describe the remainder that the observable and immediate action 
produces, since, again, we simply cannot perceive all the consequences and the 
dynamics that action collectively has. Blyth (2008, 2015) links this to the uncertainty 
that prevails in a world that does not submit to probabilistic models based on rules 
characterising behaviour of rational agents. I suggest that this is exactly why we need 
relations-based ‘structural’ explanations of the world. If we look at the rules, the 
norms, the beliefs, or the ideas in general, we look at the meaningful manifestations 
of these ordering principles that operate in mundane practices with effects beyond 
the naked eye. These relations, as structures, while they do not determine everything, 
are present in all situations.   
Still, Blyth and colleagues have remained unconvinced and made their final move 
to salvage the independence of ideas, by appealing to a logical formula according to 
which ‘the inverse of theories of violence are not theories of peace [meaning that] 
theories of change are not simply the inverse of the theories of stasis […]. [T]he 
conditions of the former state cannot be simply translated to the conditions of the 
latter state’ (Blyth et al. 2016, 157). This is aimed at proving that the ‘material’ 
theories of HI just do not cut it: ‘even the most material of positions implicitly rests 
upon a theory of ideas or cognition to explain change’ (ibid., 159). However, this 
kind of logical inversion works only in a world of ontological dualisms. In that 
respect, their point is solid in that structures do not determine everything, and there 
are real, reflexive people acting. There is no disagreement here; the world gets 
messier the closer we zoom in, but still the actors do not wander aimlessly. To 
illustrate the relativity argument, I want to point out that even ideas always relate to 
some standards. A good way to illustrate this is with what is called the Overton 
window, a construct depicted below.  
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Figure 3. The Overton window (from Herranen & Vadén 2018).
 
According to Wikimedia Commons, the political theory of the Overton window 
suggest that ‘new ideas fall into a range of acceptability to the public, at the edges of 
which an elected official risks being voted out of office’42. Vadén and I have used it 
in an article to illustrate the limits of political common sense, but it can be used also 
to clarify the point that not just any idea will do in a given situation (Herranen & 
Vadén 2018). This tells us something about the importance of the context. Ideas 
need a context, a breeding ground in which to become acceptable, and a distribution 
mechanisms and machinery to become operational. Ideas cannot be separated from 
their environment, which is fundamentally institutional and suffers from structural 
differences between people in how effectively they can express their ideas. Blyth et 
al. illustrate this very point in their analysis, where they claim that, because of their 
strong position in the neo-institutionalist field, HI never needed to go on the 
defensive. They refer to its position of power in American academia and to idea 
 
42 The Overton window was originally presented by Lehman (2012). More information on the concept 
and an interactive ‘gadget’ for playing with the model can be found at 
https://www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow (accessed on 12 Apr. 2019). 
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scholars having always represented the underdogs, to whom HI scholars never 
needed to refer in their publications. Ironically, I would interpret this resilience more 
as a structural property of the institutions than a characteristic of the ideas, which 
requires strong institutional positions with interests, funding, etc. When discussing 
institutionalism’s position in the real-world institutions, Kloppenberg (1995, 125) 
hits the mark: 
Institutions do not fall from the sky […]. The new institutionalism was born when a 
group of social scientists decided they wanted to construct a new way of 
understanding American politics […]. In short, particular people, operating at a 
particular historical moment, with a particular ideas, [sic] and funding from particular 
sources, were able to create their own informal institution, which we now call New 
institutionalism. 
One could say they had a good idea, but I would add that they had good funding 
too. Actually, it was Blyth (2003a, 696) who asked whether the development of neo-
institutionalism as a whole ‘tells us something important about how the discipline of 
political science evolves’. Later, Blyth (2008, 8) took a position on this issue in stating 
that ‘American academia is very dynamic, to that point that one might even call it 
ambulance-chasing. Fads appear and disappear with regularity’. It appears that one 
needs an opposition position and institutional backing to develop something of one’s 
own and new, and that is what gets rewarded in academia. This would be because of 
the nature of these institutions, but also it illuminates how the institutions develop 
historically. 
According to HI, institutions ultimately consist of common expectations that 
organise collective life in conditions of scarcity. In spite of the fact that HI also 
reiterates the perennial dualisms and the theoretical analysis revolves around them, 
it suggests a somewhat relational approach to institutions, one with an emphasis on 
stability. However, while addressing the expectations as the relational element that 
could rise above basic dichotomies such as agent–structure, HI lacks description of 
how the mechanisms of expectation-based institutions come into being and are held 
in place. That said, HI does, paradoxically, offer a rather functionalist-relational 
explanation for the problem of order (e.g., Streeck & Thelen 2005; Thelen & 
Mahoney 2010), whatever its sentiments of ‘anti-functionalism’ (Blyth 1997, 244–
245; Conran & Thelen 2016, 53). Scholars of HI conclude that institutions and 
general order must serve some purpose because individuals alone cannot control 
institutions and their stability. 
In addition to holding Marxist explaining in suspicion, HI and IS share a 
somewhat hostile attitude toward functionalism in general. This has its roots in the 
 130 
history of HI, wherein functionalism was associated with teleology. One early 
example is the account in which Orren and Skowronek (1994, 323) deal with the 
critique levelled by Anthony Giddens (1979, 110–112) at Marxism and Parsonian 
‘teleology’ and ‘totality’. Giddens offered his relational approach to replace these, 
without recognising, even in his critique of Parsons’ role-theory (ibid., 115–120), that 
the latter was relational from the outset. Because of these readings of the classical 
theorists, structures continue to appear monolithic, teleological, and deterministic. 
Just as a parallel may be seen between IS and classical social constructionism, the 
next chapter will show reconstruction of Parsons’ structural-functionalism in parallel 
with the corpus of HI theory, for pointing out the similarities between these ‘system’ 
theories. In addition, the reconstruction of Parsons’ theory of social systems is set 
alongside reconstruction of Berger and Luckmann’s social constructionism theory, 
to bring more structure to the handling of neo-institutionalism and for following the 
path more deeply into the debate about the lifeworld and its relation to systems in 
the history of social theory. 
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3 THE SOCIAL SYSTEM AND THE 
CONSTRUCTIONIST LIFEWORLD 
Here, we continue on from the presentation of the neo-institutional theory of social 
institutions, in which I addressed stability and change as the essence of the 
explanation in its various branches in accordance with agent–structure dualism. I 
suggest that, to transcend these dualisms and accomplish their reconciliation agenda, 
they should find an institutional basis stable enough to carry their ambitious and 
multifaceted orientations and research settings. As social scientists, scholars of all 
neo-institutionalist traditions acknowledge some kind of ‘basic stability’ of human 
societies and institutions. While the structurally oriented system scholars take 
stability more for granted, lifeworld-focused theorists emphasise the change aspect. 
They also build their tradition rather in opposition to the system-oriented historical 
institutionalists’ tendency to take the stability of institutions, and thereby societies, 
as a given. Therefore, lifeworld theorists see HI as falling into a trap of ignoring the 
complexities and irregularities of contingent social reality. Importantly, however, HI 
scholars Streeck and Thelen (2005, 24) do not share this view, and they hence 
provide a jumping-off point for reconstructing an alternative course: 
There is nothing automatic about institutional stability – despite the language of stasis 
and stickiness often invoked in relation to institutions. Institutions do not survive by 
standing still, nor is their stable reproduction always simply a matter of positive 
feedback or increasing returns […]. Quite to the contrary institutions require active 
maintenance; to remain what they are [–] they need to be reset and refocused, or 
sometimes more fundamentally recalibrated and renegotiated, in response to changes 
in the political and economic environment in which they are embedded. 
Here, Streeck and Thelen make it quite clear that there is no automaton upholding 
the order; they find it to be a result of constant and active effort. I claim that 
maintaining even some ‘basic level’ of stability in modern societies would be 
inconceivable without integration of the most fundamental individual motivations 
into society’s rules and norms. Unlike what deterministic readings of the structural 
theories suggest, this tells us about the variety of human personalities and individual 
goals. To prove my point, I must begin by reconstructing the social system theory 
of Parsons. This is done against the backdrop of the theoretical corpus of HI 
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presented in the previous chapter. I take this step because, while HI has been able 
to provide a preliminary foundation for a relational understanding of the social 
institutions, it falls short of truly describing the concrete mechanisms that Streeck 
and Thelen actually point to above: institutions’ day-to-day survival is because of 
constant maintaining and upholding by real, living people – us. I suggest that 
Parsons’ theory provides a fine-grained and useful description of those maintaining 
and upholding mechanisms and that it thus supplements and comments upon the 
structural theory corpus of HI. 
I use the social system theory of Parsons for exemplifying two points: firstly, how 
HI’s core premises can be found also in his theory, in similar form, and, secondly, 
how they have developed to the same point but through reverse logics. Without any 
organic relation to Parsons’ theory and without one coherent, unifying theory 
corpus, HI has developed similar theoretical premises for itself through empirical 
investigation. This seems outstanding in light of the outspokenly antagonistic stance 
taken in HI against Parsons (e.g., Orren & Skowronek 1994; Conran & Thelen 2016). 
In his advances related to the integration of economic and social theory, Parsons 
(1991 [1953] 16) states that there ‘is one set of fundamental variables of the social 
system which are just as fundamental in its economic aspect as in any other, and of 
course vice versa’. Approaches to social institutions might benefit just as much from 
deep integration of their premises. Moreover, whether or not one supports Parsons’ 
view, the concepts that represent these variables should at least be in meaningful 
relation to each other. 
After reconstructing Parsons’ theory, I will proceed to consider Berger and 
Luckmann’s social constructionism. Since the ideational scholars dealt with in the 
previous chapter identified themselves as constructionists, addressing the latter 
theory of institutionalisation of society provides valuable insights on the matter and 
reveals how fundamental the division between system and lifeworld theories is. It 
also provides evidence of how social theories seem to anchor themselves in the 
problem of order, in ultimately aiming at answering the question of why we need a 
social theory in the first place. Interestingly, Berger and Luckmann reiterate the same 
premises that Parsons lays down in his system theory, despite being among those 
who position themselves in outspokenly antagonistic relationship to him. When 
considered alongside the debate in neo-institutionalism, this should tell us something 
more general about the development of social theory. Moreover, debate about social 
constructionism provides us with an opening to discuss the materiality of the world, 
a thorny issue familiar from the previous chapter. 
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In the first chapter’s discussion of the key social-theory question about social 
order and the institutions that follow with it, as dealt with by Durkheim, I asked what 
the ‘social’ is and how it can be. This question maintains an organic link to concepts 
such as institution, structure, and (social) system, because all these concepts entail 
the same presupposition of a structural factor in collective action that extends 
beyond the individual. Neo-institutionalists’ answers to the problem of order, 
responses based mostly on empirical research and applying the rules of causal 
reasoning, were discussed in the previous chapter. The investigation presented below 
builds on those premises. 
3.1 The Social As a System: The Problem of Institutional 
Integration 
Parsons (1902–1979) was a prominent but often dismissed theorist who followed in 
the tradition of Durkheim, Marx, Sigmund Freud, Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, 
and Max Weber to put together his own theory of social systems by asking how the 
social stability is possible: how is it that societies hold together? This is Parsons’ 
formulation of the well-known question posed by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), 
who saw the human state of nature as a war of all against all, bellum omnium contra 
omnes43. According to Parsons (1949 [1937], 89–94), Hobbes saw all men as seeking 
to realise their desires. Because there are things all desire but only a few can enjoy, 
all seek command over means, eventually by force or fraud. This is the formulation 
of Hobbes’ utilitarian44 ‘problem of order’ (this is instrumentality in a sense that 
rational choice scholars would recognise). Alternatively, one could put it in modern 
terms thus: how is the social stability possible in conditions of scarcity wherein 
people try to achieve individual ends, ultimately even by using power? One will recall 
that scarcity was the social condition pointed up in the previous chapter too for the 
operation of institutions. In conditions of a constant danger of conflict and chaos, 
 
43 As will be considered later in the dissertation, this is also the description that Shaikh (2016) gives to 
the capitalist state of economy, as a description of the prevailing state of the real competition and its 
consequences that is an alternative to the equilibrium that the much-vaunted market competition is 
seen as producing if not interrupted in the course of its ‘natural’ way of working. 
44 Although calling Hobbes’ theory utilitarian is an anachronism, since the term is associated with 
the name of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), who was born about 70 years after Hobbes died. Joas and 
Knöbel (2009, 27) conclude that Parsons’ use of the term is ‘too broadly conceived, attaching a single 
label to a large number of different currents in the history of philosophy’. 
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Hobbes’ solution is the social contract: we all agree to give up some of our natural 
liberty to the sovereign authority for the sake of common security. 
The Hobbesian problem of order serves as a basis for the most elementary social 
scientific questions about the possibility of people’s co-existence in societies. The 
issue was no stranger to Durkheim either, and it informed his formulation of the 
suicide types around the question of collective order – i.e., the degree of integration 
(Durkheim 2005 [1897]). Hence, this could be seen as articulating one of the most 
essential features of the problem of social institutions. As Parsons (1949 [1937], 93) 
put it, while Parsons would not concern himself with Hobbes’ solution itself in the 
work at hand, ‘Hobbes saw the problem with a clarity which has never been 
surpassed, and his statement of it remains valid today’. This emphasis, which we too 
apply, is because we are interested not in the individual desires at this point but in 
the existence of the social relations that create and regulate them. Our focus will be 
on this major factor from here on, for offering a supplement to contemporary 
institutionalism studies. 
The work at the centre of this investigation is Parsons’ The Social System (1991 
[1951]), which expresses Parsons’ theoretical thinking up to that point (Therborn 
1976, 16) but also integrates his preceding material with psychoanalysis, analysis of 
deviant behaviour, and cultural history (Alexander 1983, 8). It is a somewhat atypical 
entry point for considering Parsons’ thinking – usually the interest is in his The 
Structure of Social Action (1949 [1937]), which lays the basis for his systematic theory 
of action and introduces many of his key concepts, such as the ‘unit act’ (ibid., 43–
51), in addition to which pieces in a work co-edited with Edward A. Shils, Towards a 
General Theory of Action (1962 [1951]), are considered to be among his major 
theoretical contributions. However, the approach chosen suits the present 
endeavour well, and, while Göran Therborn (1976, 16) is somewhat fair in stating 
that this ‘monumental but dated postwar work [The Social System] has been harshly 
criticized for its inability to deal with change, especially change resulting from 
internal contradictions’45, one will see that the criticism has only partly been apt. 
 
45 For a good, albeit brief, outline of criticisms levelled against Parsons, see Sciulli and Gerstein’s work 
(1985). Extended evaluation and criticism has been offered by Habermas (1992). The most 
comprehensive outline and discussion of Parsons’ overall work is by Alexander (1983). Another, a less 
known and shorter evaluation of Parsons’ theories, is by Stephen Savage (1981), whose specificity lies 
in his Althusserian relational approach. His reading comes close to mine in that we both recognise this 
standard criticism but point out how obvious it actually was to Parsons that change is an inherent and 
constant problem for social systems. Still, Therborn (1976), Savage (1981), and I share the same view 
on how ‘Parsons leaves no room for systemic sources of conflict and deviance’ (ibid., 197). Briefer 
discussion outlining his overall work is found in the work of, among others, Robert Holton (1998). 
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In addition to concentrating mostly on The Social System, I will, to some extent, 
bypass many of Parsons’ key theoretical frameworks, such as the AGIL schema and 
pattern variables, and concepts such as the voluntaristic theory of action46. What will 
be investigated instead is his ‘wholly and fundamentally relational’ theory of social 
systems (1991 [1951], 541), reconstructed below from his system-theoretical magnum 
opus. In this connection, I consider the above-mentioned AGIL schema and pattern 
variables to deal with empirically identifiable factors or variables, and I find these 
frameworks and concepts that are locatable in empirical reality to be manifestations 
of the underlying relations rather than to explain anything by themselves. This 
approach lets me stress the fundamental relativity. That is fitting since, in the efforts 
to explain social order, Bryan S. Turner (1991, xxviii) identified one of Parsons’ main 
findings from Durkheim as lying in the so-called noncontractual element of the 
contract, an intangible element behind the tangible contracts and behaviour. 
Contrary to the instrumental, utilitarian-thinking-inspired assumptions of 
classical economic theory, Durkheim concluded that the contracts necessary for a 
stable social order cannot be enforced without shared agreements, meaning moral 
values. This is because the coercive force necessary for social stability emanates only 
from the combination of rational, judicial contractual, and moral agreements. What 
stands out from the background of Durkheim’s ‘noncontractual element of contract’ 
is found also in many other social theories: a normative order and a body of rules as 
an emergent phenomenon or reality of social systems (Moore 1978, 325–326). In other 
words, they could not answer the question of social integration through the lens of 
self-interest or the rules alone. Following these lines, Parsons saw the main 
sociological question as lying at the heart of ‘institutional integration’, an issue 
 
46 The AGIL schema is Parsons’ identification of the basic social functions necessary for society’s 
equilibrium and development – in other words, functions a society must perform to survive: 
adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latency (also known as pattern maintenance) (Holton 1998, 
99–100). Pattern variables are fundamental value-orientations concentrated in empirical ‘clusterings’, 
and, hence, they are institutionalised such that they can be empirically observed (Parsons 1991 [1951], 
152–153). The voluntaristic theory of action is at the centre of The Structure of Social Action (1949 [1937]), 
wherein Parsons brings classic European social theories together in a manner whereby free will and 
the individuals’ voluntary choices are considered together and integrated into a single theory with 
utilitarian and normative starting points, in essence. Interestingly, Camic claimed that Parsons owed 
many of the ideas presented in the latter work to his teachers in Amherst, who were American 
institutional economists. According to Camic (1992, 436), one reason Parsons turned instead to 
European thinkers in his magnus opus was the weak intellectual position of institutionalists in American 
academia at the time. That is, Parsons was originally an institutionalist but turned to European 
sociology because the prevailing institutional conditions in American academia did not allow him to 
develop economic institutionalism further; however, Camic saw this not as an instrumentalist 
manoeuvre but as a mechanism for developing an argument Parsons truly believed to be correct and 
highly important. 
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addressed by Streeck and Thelen in the discussion above. According to Parsons 
(1991 [1951], 42), disregarding the question of institutional integration has led 
economic and other rational-instrumental theories to an impasse, making them 
incapable of providing ‘an adequate model for the dynamic analysis of the social 
system in general terms’. In addition, Parsons acknowledges – again in keeping with 
Durkheim – how sociological theory in essentially theory of institutions, which 
serves as a context for observing the dynamics of a social environment: 
It has been repeatedly shown that reduction of motivational dynamics to rational 
instrumental terms leads straight to the Hobbesian thesis, which is a reduction ad 
absurdum of the concept of a social system […]. The theory of institutional behavior, 
which is essentially sociological theory, is precisely of the highest significance in social 
science because by setting the problems of social dynamics in a context of institutional 
structure and drawing the implications of the theorem of institutional integration 
which has just been stated, this theory is enabled to exploit and extend the knowledge 
of modern psychology about the non- and irrational aspects of motivation in order 
to analyze social processes. It follows also that any conceptual scheme which utilizes 
only the motivational elements of rational instrumental goal-orientation can be an 
adequate theory only of certain relatively specialized processes within the framework 
of an institutionally structured social system. (Ibid., 43) 
The integration could be seen as a process that maintains the stability of the system47. 
In the above quotation, Parsons also situates himself in relation to economic theory 
in the same way Durkheim did: equilibrium can be achieved in the right social 
conditions. Although Parsons contrasts the social theory against the economics, his 
position on economic theory is not unidimensional48. He supports the idea of social 
equilibrium – with market equilibrium being the theoretical cornerstone for 
economic theory – although from his point of view the economic explanation is 
flawed. This would be one of Parsons’ main approaches to the systemic theory of 
the ‘social’: drawing, on one hand, a contrast against economic theory and, on the 
other, a parallel with it. 
Parsons’ approach to theorising on the social was exceptional in many ways, 
whereas it also resembles something that could be called a backbone theory for a 
 
47 Also, Chilcott (1998, 104) suggests that, rather than see Parsons’ abstract theoretical categories as 
definitions of institutions (as any other functionalist’s might be), one should generally regard them as 
processes of institutionalisation. 
48 Parsons has provided a more comprehensive but compact theoretical account of economics and of 
his theoretical positioning in relation to economics (Parsons 1991 [1953]). He has also offered a 
broader formulation of the economic questions in the social sciences and in society (Parsons & Smelser 
1972 [1956]). 
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sociologist49. This is because he covers a wide range of topics that have been – and 
still are – subjects of heated theoretical debate. This might be the reason Alexander 
(1983, xxv) called Parsons ‘the only modern thinker who can be considered a true 
peer of the classical founders [of sociological theory]’50. Whether the criticism of 
Parsons is fully justified or not, the significance of his work is hard to deny. Therborn 
(1976, 14) identifies Parsons’ theory as ‘dominant in sociological thought from about 
the late forties until the middle sixties’. Moreover, despite the criticism he offered, 
Jürgen Habermas (1992, 199) too claimed that ‘no theory of society can be taken 
seriously today if it does not at least situate itself with respect to Parsons. To deceive 
oneself on this point is to be held captive by questions of topicality rather than being 
sensitive to them’. For me, one of the greatest merits of Parsons’ work is the logical 
completeness in explaining mechanisms leading to social equilibrium. This 
aspiration, of course, is not without its problems51. 
This striving for logical completeness is something that Parsons himself, in The 
Structure of Social Action (1949, 7) called a theory with ‘a determinate logical 
structure’52. While many may not agree with him or even share the need for such a 
 
49 I thank Jari Aro for this insightful expression. Because of this definition, Parsons would fit 
Latour’s (2005) definition of a sociologist of the social perfectly. 
50 For an extensive list of Parsons’ influences on later social theory, see Alexander (1983, 1–7). 
Alexander’s list is a couple of decades old but makes a convincing point about the range of subjects 
Parsons dealt with, and about how hard it was to avoid referring to him before opposition to his theory 
gained ideological force. 
51 In his classic work The Sociological Imagination, C. Wright Mills attacks Parsons for his theoretical 
jargon in The Social System. In the course of what he describes as translating portions of Parsons’ book 
into English, Mills argues that in ‘translation’ of three pages of theoretical text into three sentences, 
‘no explicit meaning is lost’ (2000 [1959], 27). I beg to differ. While I have deep sympathy for Mills’ 
more general point of view and agree about the unnecessary opacity, Mills seems to wholly disregard 
the fact that Parsons was writing a general theoretical outline for sociological research and therefore 
sought to answer theoretical questions about all the various (interrelated) levels of human life. If this 
is to be done in a complete manner, every concept should be defined in relation to others so that they 1) 
are logically related to each other, 2) answer the questions posed about them, and 3) give actual 
explanations as to the phenomena in question. While Mills scrutinises some of the most important 
concepts employed by Parsons and claims them to be sociological common sense, Mills disregards the 
questions that those concepts imply, such as that of the problem of order, for reason of taking the 
status quo as given. Still, someone needs to answer why, as Mills puts it on page 29 of his treatment, 
‘[m]en act with and against one another’ and why ‘[e]ach takes into account what others expect’. Taking 
these descriptions of human interaction for granted, Mills leaves the big ‘why’ question open. ‘A grand 
theory’ – with all its deficiencies – is an attempt to explain why things happen rather than just describe 
them. Without such efforts, we would live in our modern, developed societies as fish in water (to 
borrow Marx’s famous expression), without even acknowledging what kinds of questions should be 
answered if we wish to understand our ‘naturalised’ environment. 
52 ‘Not only do theoretical propositions stand in logical interrelations with each other so that they may 
be said to constitute “systems” but it is in the nature of the case that theoretical systems should attempt 
to become “logically closed.” That is, a system starts with a group of interrelated propositions which 
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structure, it should be considered a virtue that he understood that, in social theory, 
one should seek to find reasonable solutions for questions about the relations 
between dimensions of human life. In my reading, the quest for logical completeness 
represents recognition of the need for a non-metaphysical explanation: the need to 
explain the ‘social’ as a result of real human action. Where this feature distinguishes 
Parsons’ theory from other logically conclusive theories of human interaction – e.g., 
economic theory – it also foregrounds the question of the social. In the analysis 
below, I build my reconstruction around Parsons’ theoretical nodal point – what he 
termed complementary role-expectations. I see a resemblance between Parsons’ 
nodal point and something that Durkheim (2005 [1897], 75–82) initially identified 
when talking about the levelling of consciousness with sympathy and respect for our 
fellow citizens. Parsons develops the idea further by showing how socialisation and 
peer pressure works and produces the effect Durkheim describes, and what operates 
as the integrative mechanism in our institutional environment. 
3.1.1 Conceptual Preconditions for the Sub-systems 
In its most elementary form, the system was, for Parsons (1991 [1951], 481–482), 
something that attains maintenance of its boundaries in relation to its environment. 
His theory of social systems involves three interdependent sub-systems with some 
mutual independence: the social, the cultural, and the personality system. Irrespective 
of its wholly and fundamentally relational nature, this theory has a clear reference 
point for these sub-systems: the complementary role-expectations, defined as the 
nodal point where these systems meet as the constitutive patterning of different 
networks of interactive relationships (ibid., 540). He states: ‘The most central 
institutions therefore are those directly constitutive of the patterning of these 
relationships themselves through the definition of the statuses and roles of the 
parties to the interactive process’ (ibid., 51). Within his theory of the social, each of 
the sub-systems represents a particular function; if one puts it roughly, the social 
 
involve reference to empirical observations within the logical framework of the propositions in 
question. Each of these propositions has logical implications. The system becomes logically closed 
when each of the logical implications which can be derived from any one proposition within the system 
finds its statement in another proposition in the same system. It may be repeated that this does not 
mean that all the other propositions must be logically derivable from any one – on the contrary, if this 
were true[,] scientific theory would be sheer tautology’ in the words of Parsons (1949, 9–10). 
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system consists of mechanisms, culture consists of patterns, and personality consists 
of motivations53. 
The social system is addressed in two meanings. The first draws the main line for 
the whole theoretical system: the analysis that deals with ‘the social systems in terms 
of the action frame of reference’ (ibid., 1). This means that Parsons defines his entire 
theoretical and therefore scientific reference point in terms of the action frame of 
social systems. On the other hand, ‘it is [also] one of the three main differentiated 
sub-systems (or aspects) of the larger conceptual scheme, the other two being the 
theory of personality and the theory of culture’ (ibid., 537). These could be traced 
through empirical research as interrelated parts of human societies. In other words, 
the social system simultaneously represents a more general, theoretical denominator, 
meaning that Parsons sees himself in the social-theory domain as being an action 
theorist of social systems but at the same time holds that, within his framework, it is 
one of the three components or sub-systems that constitute the human interaction 
system that is opened to empirical enquiry. 
Parsons termed action ‘a process in the actor-situation system which has 
motivational significance to the individual actor, or, in the case of a collectivity, its 
component individuals’ (ibid., 4). This raises the question of actors’ motivations to 
the foreground. In Parsons’ treatment, all motivationally relevant action processes 
have some ‘bearing on the attainment of gratifications or the avoidance of 
deprivations’ (ibid.)54. Above all, these have an organic significance in the ‘relation 
of the actor to his situation and the history of that relation, in this sense of 
“experience”’ (ibid., 5). The experience gained from the historical relation to 
situations develops a system of expectations, as Parsons terms it, for the actor55. 
 
53 For a shorter presentation and a summary of these systems, see Parsons and Shils (1962 [1951], 3–
29). 
54 In The Structure of Social Action, Parsons shows awareness that, in the schema of action, ‘concrete 
individual[s are] thought of as adapting means to ends’ (1949, 30). This means that, while the action is 
oriented so as to achieve ends, these ends may not always be utilitarian in nature. Parsons continues 
(on page 49): ‘An end, then, in the analytical sense must be defined as the difference between the 
anticipated future state of affairs and that which it could have been predicted would ensue from the 
initial situation without the agency of the actor having intervened. Correspondingly, in an analytical 
sense, means will not refer to concrete things which are “used” in the course of action, but only to 
those elements and aspects of them which are capable of, and in so far as they are capable of, control 
by the actor in the pursuit of his end.’ 
55 ‘Expectations’ were introduced in the previous chapter as the relational aspect of the constitution 
of historical institutions (for example, see Streeck & Thelen 2005; Hall 2016). This concept is also 
widely used in modern economic theory. Where Parsons’ and historical institutionalists’ expectations 
develop historically in relationships with the social patterns encountered in social interaction, the word 
as used in economics usually refers to rational expectations held by individuals. It has quite justifiably 
been asked why, if the economic agents form their rational expectations individually, they all react, 
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Thus, actors develop probable expectations associated with particular objects (social, 
physical, and cultural) in the given situation and associated with the alternative 
actions they might undertake. In these situations, there are many special signs, 
meanings, and symbols relevant to the expectations, especially in the case of social 
interaction, wherein they ‘acquire common meanings [that] serve as media of 
communication between actors. When symbolic systems which can mediate 
communication have emerged we may speak of the beginning of a “culture”’ (ibid., 
5). In other words, the expectations for the situation are organised in accordance 
with the related symbolic systems, or meanings. When these meanings appear, we 
can start speaking of the basic factors in a culture; in other words, this symbolisation 
is ‘the necessary condition for the emergence of culture’ (ibid., 10). 
This expectations schema resembles the one presented in the previous chapter, 
addressing the premises of historical institutionalism. However, Parsons continues 
by pointing out this important observation about the human action systems: they are 
‘not possible without relatively stable symbolic systems where meaning is not 
predominantly contingent on highly particularized situations. The most important 
single implication of this generalization is perhaps the possibility of communication’ 
(ibid., 11). The stability brought by these relatively stable symbolic systems, 
meanings, ‘must extend between individuals and over time’ (ibid.). This provides a 
preliminary definition for ‘structure’; it is something produced in a process of 
historical interaction between a plurality of actors while it is not dependent on the 
participation of any specific individual or on a certain situation or location, and its 
durability holds potential to exceed the human life span. The ‘empirical’ proof of the 
existence of structure is found in the possibility for communication. We would not 
be able to communicate in highly particularised situations without the relatively 
stable character of the shared symbolic system. 
It is noteworthy that structure as an abstract concept refers not to any particular 
structure but to a logic or property of relations, a way in which any given system 
holds together in human interaction. The relational aspect of systems enables one to 
conceive of social structures without referring to any concrete constructions, such 
as buildings, organisations, or statistical classes. For Parsons (ibid., 25), the structure 
is ‘the structure of relations between the actors as involved in the interactive 
 
according to this theory, in a manner similar to, for example, governmental action (Fine & Dimakou 
2016, 111–117). The important thing to notice is how many of the core ideas in social theories 
resemble each other yet cleave along the dividing lines dictated by the theories’ premises with regard 
to the social nature of the human world. 
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process’.56 He suggests that we, as creatures who operate and make decisions in 
relational structures, must share some operational standards on which these 
decisions are based. He considers ‘values’ to be the common standards, a relatively 
stable criterion for social practice in a situation wherein we must choose among 
courses of action (ibid., 12). 
Values are relevant in two ways. Firstly, actors’ value-orientations involves ‘the 
content of the selective standards themselves’ (ibid., 12). The motivations do not 
develop in a vacuum but are formed in relation to social value-standards. If an actor 
(ego) expects gratification from the other actor (alter), the gratification–deprivation 
balance of the action is dependent on acceptance by the other actors – i.e., on the 
standards for acceptable behaviour. Therefore, the action usually is ‘normatively 
oriented’ (ibid., 36). Secondly, the problem of integration of the motivational and 
normative cultural standards – values – goes beyond individual situations57. At this 
point, the question could be formulated in the following manner: how is ‘the 
mutuality of motivational orientation to the normative aspect of expectations’ (ibid.) 
possible? In other words, how can human motivations be integrated with normative 
 
56 This is an important part of the picture with regard to the famous critique of Parsons’ theory of 
intersubjectivity presented by John Heritage (1984, 27–30), who viewed Parsons’ general system 
analysis as supported by the correspondence theory of truth. Heritage claims that this gives little room 
for observers’ analysis of their situation and that, on the other hand, the validity of their truth claims 
could, in principle, be affirmed or rejected by an objective scientist comparing claims to the objects at 
hand. Furthermore, ‘[t]he institutionalization of common meanings for symbols in advance of their 
use in particular situations is […] the basis upon which communication is possible’. He continues by 
stating (on pages 30–33) that this, when combined with the actors’ incapability of making moral 
judgements and the denial of their reflexivity that follows from it, results in a pernicious dilemma: 
denying the actors’ views and denying the individual as a source of a system’s change. While I 
sympathise with the critique, two remarks should be made: Firstly, Heritage turns Parsons’ formula 
upside-down and says that meanings are institutionalised before their use and this enables the 
communication. In my reading, the institutionalisation takes place in the process of using the symbols 
and meanings, which, in turn, is the process of historical experience with objects without objective 
features suggested by the correspondence theory. Rather, encountering these objects creates probable 
effects on how the communication turns out. The result may purely be based on, for example, speech 
conventions arising from the order of the symbolic meanings without an a priori correspondence relation 
to some objective objects in the environment (Parsons 1991 [1951], 11). This underlines Parsons’ 
relational approach to the institutionalisation of meanings. Secondly, in my reading, the 
communication is the ‘empirical’ proof of the existence of the shared symbolic universe rather than 
the last stage in some symbolic evolution toward the point at which communication can begin. For 
the theory of social structure, this is a noteworthy distinction. Without the relatively stable shared 
symbolic system, the communication would not be possible, but there is no objective relation to some 
objects or evolutionary stages to determine when the language is sufficiently ready for communication. 
Still, many questions about the actor’s reflexivity are left unanswered in Parsons’ theory. 
57 In the vein of Merton’s (1938) differentiation, ‘cultural’ values can be seen as special cases of ‘systemic’ 
norms. 
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cultural standards (patterns of value-orientation)? This will be examined further in 
the subsections below. 
So far, we have ascertained that the historically developed expectations related to 
the interaction situations are symbolically organised. These organisational patterns – 
standards – inform egos’ actions and mediate them to correspond to alters’ 
expectations through communication. We have not, however, addressed how this 
observation should be generalised such that it could serve as a basis for the theory 
of social systems and provide a solution for the problem of order. The answer is 
rooted in the universalising assumption that Parsons (ibid., 204–205) made about 
human interaction: 
Now it must again be remembered that motivational processes are always processes 
in individual actors […]. What, then, for our immediate purposes is an established 
state of a social system, or relevant sub-system? 
The answer to this question is given in the basic paradigm of social interaction which 
has been discussed so often. An established state of a social system is a process of 
complementary interaction of two or more individual actors in which each conforms 
with the expectations of the other(’s) in such a way that alter’s reactions to ego’s 
actions are positive sanctions which serve to reinforce his given need-dispositions58 
and thus to fulfill his given expectations. This stabilized or equilibrated interaction 
process is the fundamental point of reference for all dynamic motivational analysis of 
social process. 
Firstly, Parsons states that individuals are motivational beings and, as such, cannot 
be treated as automatons. The problem, then, pertains to conformance with their 
motivations, which takes place through complementary interaction (a subject also 
discussed later in this section in connection with social constructionism). When two 
or more individuals interact, they act in a complementary manner, which entails them 
aiming to fulfil each other’s expectations. People act in accordance with standards 
of acceptable behaviour because they try to avoid deprivation and gain others’ 
acceptance for their own gratification. This is the mechanism behind the 
spontaneous equilibrium-seeking behaviour hypothesised also in neo-
institutionalism. In this process, Parsons (ibid., 205) raises these complementary 
role-expectations to the status of ‘the first law of social process’, and we indeed need 
this assumption for an integrated theory of social systems: 
It is certainly contrary to much of the common sense of the social sciences, but it will 
nevertheless be assumed that the maintenance of the complementarity of 
role-expectations, once established, is not problematical, in other words that the 
 
58 Need-dispositions are discussed below in connection with the personality system. 
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‘tendency’ to maintain the interaction process is the first law of social process. This is 
clearly an assumption, but there is, of course, no theoretical objection to such 
assumptions if they serve to organize and generalize our knowledge. Another way of 
stating this is to say that no special mechanisms are required for the explanation of the 
maintenance of complementary interaction-orientation. 
Accordingly, Parsons’ fundamental answer to the problem of order proceeds from 
the theoretical assumption that people tend to act in a complementary manner. They 
socially create the environment that contains the ‘rules of conduct’ that, again, stem 
from the self-preserving nature of the social system(s). It is in the system’s character 
to maintain its boundaries in relation to its environment; this is the functional aspect 
of the system. The self-preservation stems from the actors’ tendency to act in a 
complementary manner in a structured environment. This tendency may be a part 
of our genetic heritage, but, above all, it is learned in the socialisation process (ibid., 
205)59. Socialisation is one functional aspect of the social system, which ties in with 
such phenomena as the division of labour and is discussed in the next main section 
of the chapter. 
Next, however, we will consider Parsons’ sub-system analysis. Here, the general 
action theory of social systems entails these sub-systems being in relation to the 
complementary role-expectations, and, therefore, the answer to the problem of order 
– institutional integration – is found from the institutionalisation of the roles. Firstly, 
we explore the social system a bit further, in the longest of the subsections addressing 
the sub-systems. The second one addresses the cultural system, complementing the 
analysis and discussing the role of symbols and symbolic universe. This should also 
provide useful grounding when we get to the section dealing with social 
constructionism. Last, Subsection 3.1.4 introduces the personality system, which 
deals with the human motivation to act. The subsection in question is brief since it 
is the ‘social’ that we are interested in here, but it is necessary. After all, it is important 
to bear in mind that we are speaking of fundamentally relational theory. This means 
that the sub-systems presented cannot be found on their own; they represent 
different aspects of the same phenomenon. 
 
59 Parsons does not explicate the origin of the concept of complementary behaviour. Durkheim (2005 
[1897], 207–210) offers an interesting suggestion as to the origin of the complementary nature of 
behaviour, in Suicide. He claims that the awakening of conscience produced unlimited desires in the 
human being. The awakened human mind is capable of creating needs, passions, and desires it cannot 
restrain without an external force provided by the social environment. Thus, humans’ boundless 
desires are kept in check by the relations to – and, through them, dependencies on – other people. 
 144 
3.1.2 The Social System 
In The Social System, Parsons (1991 [1951], 480) describes the social system as an 
organisation of patterned interaction that takes place through ‘the stabilization of the 
processes of [the actors’] mutual orientation within complementary roles’. This 
means that people are interacting creatures who mostly act in situations involving 
other (interacting) objects, such as other people. People differ in their motivations 
to act, so different symbolic systems – language being the most important – are 
needed for understanding and communicating these motivations. However, because 
we deal with many, quite different situations that involve many, quite different 
people yet things should go at least reasonably smoothly, our motivations cannot 
differ too much, so we must share some standards of acting and behaving. At the 
same time, motivations cannot be understood merely as individual-level features; 
they have the aspect of system attributes that actors must internalise if they are to 
act in a reasonable manner. In social systems, these standards are mediated through 
complementary roles, and, therefore, the institutionalisation of roles holds ‘the most 
essential components and points of reference for analysis of social systems as such’ 
(ibid., 22). 
Firstly, Parsons tells us, ‘[t]here are no roles without corresponding statuses and 
vice versa’ (ibid., 39). Here, ‘statuses’ refers to a structurally ‘located’ position, 
meaning that an actor is an object of others’ orientation (alongside one’s self), and 
‘roles’ refers to an actor’s functional significance in relations with others in the social 
system – in other words, what the actor does within the system. When playing a role, 
an actor is oriented to others. It is important to notice that ‘statuses and roles, or the 
status-role bundle, are not in general attributes of an actor, but are units of the social 
system, though having a given status may sometimes be treated as an attribute’ (ibid., 
25). An actor is a holder of a status and a performer of a role, and this must be 
distinguished from the personality of an actor, which has a given amount of 
autonomy irreducible to one’s status-role (ibid., 25–26). Thus, a contradiction may 
evolve between the status-roles and motivations of an actor. 
Secondly, if ‘structure’ refers to ‘the structure of the relations between the actors 
as involved in the interactive process [and] [t]he system is a network of such 
relationships […] it is the participation of an actor in a patterned interactive 
relationship which is for many purposes the most significant unit of the social 
system’ (ibid., 25). The way to participate in these patterned interactive relations is 
to occupy various status-roles. ‘Structure’ is a label for the relatively stable interaction 
patterns in static and/or changing social systems entailing the logic of the 
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organisational standards that represent the meaningful content of the accepted terms 
of conduct. The roles represent the functional necessities of the system to which 
people are socialised. For the integration to work, the actor’s motivations must 
correspond sufficiently with the structure’s operational demands, or functions. To 
be more specific, for Parsons, the higher-order unit for ‘macroscopic analysis of the 
social systems’ is what is called the status-role (ibid., 25). 
Again, if structures are the ‘framework’ for the relatively stable symbolic systems, 
they must carry the meanings of the roles, which are the counterpart for the 
expectations that actors meet when encountering new situations. ‘In the case of a 
given actor, ego, there is soon built up a system of expectations relative to a given 
other, alter’ in the words of Parsons (ibid., 37). In other words, were the roles not 
structured, the ego would not know what to do and how, and the alter would not 
know what to expect. That could lead to social disintegration. For Parsons, roles 
serve as the nodal point for the standards since they incorporate the ‘description’ of 
the system’s functional necessities and, hence, produce the understanding of how 
the roles should be performed and what to expect from actors performing the roles 
in question. Roles tell the people what should be done for the system to work, even 
though this involves not acting for the sake of the system but just living one’s life. 
This conceptualisation is based on Parsons’ (ibid., 204–205) basic paradigm of the 
social system: the complementary interaction. We are creatures born to meet one 
another’s expectations. Moreover, the paradigm describes mechanisms that operate 
‘underneath’ our motivations. 
However, another question appears: if the number of standards to follow is 
practically infinite – after all, we have a rich symbolic universe and a complex social 
life – and the integration is dependent on following the same standards, how do we 
choose between them? The idea of a structure implies only that there are relatively 
stable patterns around the interaction, yet people should know what patterns to 
follow in new situations. Here we may recall Parsons’ definition of values. They set 
the criteria for selecting among the alternatives of orientation in varying situations 
and define role-expectations. Serving as the base criterion, values create the basis for 
the ordering between standards: some things are valued over others60. 
The implication of values is that the social systems are not relativistic but 
relational and normative in nature. Things must be put in order because people and 
 
60 However, as values are understood to be structural evaluation criteria in this context, the concept 
has more profound meanings in other works of his (e.g., Parsons 1935). The concept of values is an 
element through which Parsons builds his demarcation in relation to utilitarian theory and illuminates 
the indeterminacy and the ‘non-logical’ – a term used by Vilfredo Pareto – aspects of human action 
(Savage 1981, 106–111). 
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goods are distributed within the system. This process of distribution of various 
objects is called allocation. While Parsons uses the concept of allocation in a broader 
sense, he recognises the benefits of the economics concept by acknowledging that 
the resources and positions in social systems are usually scarce, and we are dealing in 
many cases with quantifiable entities, a typical case being, of course, money (ibid., 
114–116). Thus, Parsons (ibid.; see also pp. 120; 418–421; Parsons 1991 [1953], 15) 
elevates ‘scarcity’ to the key structural condition in relation to which the structural 
integration and allocation of resources takes place. Thus, the Hobbesian definition 
of the problem of order enters in also. If the supply of goods and/or statuses to 
distribute is more limited than the number of people with a will to possess them, 
there must be a shared allocative standard. This is something discovered also by 
Thelen and Mahoney (2010), as came out in the discussion of the theoretical 
premises of HI (see the previous chapter). To some extent, we all must share some 
idea of the basis on which things and responsibilities are distributed, and we must 
act accordingly. Whereas the roles are the behaviour-standard, values set the standard 
for evaluation between objects. 
From the system point of view, one prerequisite for allocation of resources (and, 
more generally, overall co-ordination) is functioning division of labour. Whereas the 
roles may be somewhat open to subjective selection and less scarce, statuses are 
usually more competition-prone. There are fewer positions in the various 
(hierarchical) organisations than there are people willing to occupy them. Therefore, 
we need selective standards for choosing who occupies what position. This connects 
the role-statuses with the division of labour, which, of course, is one of the most 
fundamental features of functioning societies. In the idealised case, the positions and 
rewards in instrumental systems, such as organisations, are distributed in line with 
the concomitant responsibility in relation to the actors’ competencies (Parsons 1991 
[1951], 158–160). The reality, of course, differs from this ideal. The division of labour 
involves institutionalised occupational role-statuses, which means that the questions 
about their relationship with the actors’ motives become a pressing one (ibid., 184). 
Since the division of labour is a system-level structural attribute beyond the control 
of any individual actor, the role-statuses must be relatively stable, and people must 
be functionally allocated between them. This is where the ‘socialisation’ steps in: 
The allocation of personnel between role[-statuse]s in the social system and the 
socialization processes of the individual are clearly the same processes viewed in different 
perspectives. Allocation is the process seen in the perspective of functional 
significance to the social system as a system. Socialization on the other hand is the 
process seen in terms of the motivation of the individual actor. Learning to decide 
between alternatives of role-incumbency which the social system leaves open to the 
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individual is certainly part of social learning and such decisions manifest the 
value-orientations acquired through socialization. (Ibid., 207) 
In essence, socialisation means becoming a member of a society, a social being, 
through social learning – learning the patterns of orientation to the social roles (ibid., 
23; 205). If complementarity is the fundamental human social characteristic, ‘[t]he 
socializing effect will be conceived as the integration of ego into a role 
complementarity to that of alter(s) in such a way that the common values are 
internalized in ego’s personality, and their respective behaviours come to constitute 
a complementary role-expectation-sanction system’ (ibid., 211). 
It follows from the complementarity paradigm that ‘a stably established 
interactive process, that is, one in equilibrium, tends to continue unchanged’ (ibid., 
251). At this point, the most elementary principles of Parsonian theory have been 
established, involving the complementary and therefore equilibrium-seeking nature 
of the human interaction. Accordingly, people tend to act such that the system 
constantly tends toward a state of equilibrium if not interrupted. If it is prerequisite 
to the stability of the system that the integration be inbuilt in the motivational 
structures of the actors, the maintenance results from two fundamental processes: 
the socialisation, which is necessary for obtaining the actors’ role-orientations, but 
also the mechanisms of ‘social control’ that are needed to maintain a balance between 
deviant behaviour and stabilised interactive processes. The social control is the 
motivational flipside of the ego–alters role-complementarity, where the ego learns to 
‘counteract a tendency to deviance from the fulfillment of role-expectations, in himself 
or in one or more alters. It is a re-equilibrating mechanism’ (ibid., 206). Thus, social 
control is a mechanism of rewarding and sanctioning others. 
Socialisation is, on one hand, ‘organized largely about kinship’ (ibid., 116) but, on 
the other, an institutional practice that, ‘like learning, goes on throughout the life’ 
(ibid., 208). However, since people differ in their genetic constitution, in the 
constellation of their reciprocal relationships, and by the individual idiosyncrasies of 
their socialising agents, a wide variety of socialisations is produced (ibid., 229). 
Respectively, the possibility of multiple kinds of resistance against common 
standards develops – numerous possibilities for deviant behaviour are formed. For 
Parsons (ibid., 250), ‘deviance is a disturbance of the equilibrium of the interactive 
system’ caused by a change in the state of the system or re-equilibration by 
counteracting forces. For instance, the expectations of conformity – even written 
rules – may not be specific and/or detailed enough, or they may be in mutual 
contradiction, which poses an acute problem for complex systems. Moreover, actors 
may suffer from incapability of living up to the expectations set or face the problem 
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of not knowing what is expected. All this brings an element of uncertainty into the 
picture (ibid., 269–272). In addition, a role conflict may arise, wherein an actor is 
exposed to a set of conflicting but still legitimised role expectations (ibid., 280). In 
addition, of course, it is possible for a contradiction between the normative 
expectations and an actor’s motivations to develop, since, as noted above, 
personalities cannot be fully reduced to status-roles. 
If deviance is to be minimised and hierarchical systems beset by such problems 
as scarcity and (structural) differences between actors are to be stabilised, an 
institutionalised order of precedence among norms must prevail (ibid., 271–272). For 
example, with respect to institutionalised property rights, those value-patterns that 
integrate the action of component actors relative to possessions are governed by 
expectations, by obligations, and therefore by the definition of property (ibid., 39). 
Possessions, in general, are ‘transferable from one actor to another’, but, whereas 
physical objects ‘change hands’, rights themselves are a relative matter (ibid., 119). It 
follows that the physical exchange process is in many ways irrelevant and the 
attention should be paid to the governing relations. These property rights governing 
the physical exchange are determining in nature, and therefore they outrank several 
other norms, such as those pertaining to the inappropriate behaviour of jaywalking. 
Also, the highly institutionalised nature of property rights makes this exchange highly 
valued in the hierarchy of norms, and this enables the somewhat peaceful everyday 
market exchange needed for our survival in this complex environment. 
The idea of market exchange is easily expanded into that of division of labour. 
Parsons (ibid., 159) notes that division of labour in modern societies usually requires 
a formal organisation since it is a complex co-ordinative process. An organisation 
such as a big company is an interesting example of co-ordinative structure and of 
the order of precedence among norms. It clearly requires the kind of co-operation 
that cannot be controlled by any individual but is also structured to function in 
accordance with its institutionalised principles, which are set in place, for example, 
by its owners and corporate law61. Because of the functioning co-ordination, people 
know what to do with regard to particular roles or role-statuses, but, also, each role 
has a function within the division of labour. People are allocated and rewarded, at 
least in principle and to sufficient extent, in accordance with shared norms that 
 
61 Something that Marx would term the relations of production. It should be noted at this point that, 
since Parsons’ social systems are equilibrium-seeking by nature, there is no room there for system-
level contradictions produced by the property relations or the production relations. These are 
addressed in the last main chapter of this dissertation. Parsons’ theory of organisations is set forth in 
other work (Parsons 1956a, 1956b). 
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makes the process understandable and acceptable to the parties involved. These 
norms are ordered by functional priority – the order of precedence that prevails 
among the norms is articulated. Norms are not just organising standards; they need 
organising standards themselves. 
It becomes apparent that co-ordination and the integration of the system are two 
sides of one equation. Since this is one of the most elementary and profound features 
of the social system, we should let Parsons himself elaborate: 
[I]nstitutionalization has integrative functions on various levels, both with reference 
to the different roles in which any one actor is involved, and to the coordination of 
the behavior of different individuals […]. The individual engages in a wide variety of 
different activities and becomes involved in social relationships with a large number 
of different people whose relations to him vary greatly. One of the primary functions 
of institutionalization is to help order these different activities and relationships so 
that they constitute a sufficiently coordinated system, to be manageable by the actor 
and to minimize conflicts on the social level. (Ibid., 302) 
The active institutionalisation merges the integration and co-ordination functions. 
By ‘institution’, Parsons refers to ‘a higher order unit of social structure than the role 
[where said unit] is made up of a plurality of independent role-patterns or 
components of them’ (ibid., 39). Therefore, institutionalisation can be deemed, at 
base, synonymous for the so-called standardisation of behavioural patterns and, 
thereby, role-statuses. The greater the degree of institutionalisation of a pattern, the 
more stable and observable it is. Therefore, an institution could be considered a 
special case of social structure62, as with an institution related to property or an 
educational institution. 
Now, if the social system must fulfil integrative and co-ordinative functions 
simultaneously, people are socialised and allocated simultaneously. Still, these are 
two distinct functions, since, in the course of socialisation, actors absorb information 
and behaviour patterns, while allocation is a process wherein they are distributed 
among the system’s functional positions. As Parsons has stated, socialisation has an 
integrative function for the system, since people learn how the system works and 
what roles are available, alongside the grounds for these. During socialisation, actors 
also learn skills and values, etc. They learn the role-statuses that are crucial for the 
 
62 I thank Juho Karvinen for this formulation. In addition, Parsons (1954 [1945], 239) elaborates: 
‘Institutions are those patterns which define the essentials of the legitimately expected behaviour of 
persons insofar as they perform structurally important roles in the social system […]. It is the structurally 
significant elements of the total concrete relationship pattern which are institutionally relevant. What 
these are cannot be decided in terms of the subjective sentiments of participant observers but only in 
the perspective of structural analysis of the social system. 
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integration of the system. On the other hand, there are certain tasks that need to be 
performed. For us to be able to buy food from the store, grain must be sown, bread 
must be baked and transported to the shops, and so on. No-one can control this 
system alone, so functional division of labour must obtain, and therefore people 
must be allocated (between roles) across the system accordingly in conditions of 
prevailing scarcity. 
The most crucial point connected with this observation is that these functions 
are present simultaneously in the system. This is important, since I argue, generally, 
that, just as ‘[t]he allocation of personnel between roles in the social system and the 
socialization processes of the individual are clearly the same processes viewed in 
different perspectives’ (ibid., 207), the stability and change, respectively, are also the 
same process viewed from different perspectives. This is clear for Parsons (ibid., 
503) too: 
[E]ven in a relatively stabilized society, processes of structural change are continually 
going on in many sub-systems of the society, many of which are institutionalized. In 
other words stabilization and change are relative to the problems on which the 
observer focuses his attention; a complex social system is not either stabilized or 
changing as a whole, but in different parts and different respects, always both. 
In effect, Parsons repeats what was quoted from Streeck and Thelen on the first 
page of this chapter. Following though diverging slightly from Parsons’ view, my 
interpretation of the systemic and institutional stability and change is that they can 
be viewed as two fundamental sets of social relations: two sets of relations operating 
at the same time on different dimensions of social reality. The relation of change and 
stability proves much more illuminating than does observing these two dimensions 
of the phenomenon as separate research objects. There might be an institution 
whose stable vested interests (values) are protected against more general constant 
social change, just as was the case in the study by Campbell (2005) that illustrated 
how individual nation-states may withdraw from international tax competition. 
Therefore, contradictions may arise between individual institutions of a society. This 
does not necessarily require separate theories of change and stability so much as 
investigating the relation between the institution and the environment. It also implies 
that integration and contradiction may prevail at the same time, and there is only a 
seeming paradox in the co-existence of these phenomena. 
In the simplest possible terms, a social system consists of plurality of interacting 
actors in conditions of scarcity, a condition at the heart of the problem of order. The 
prevailing distribution of resources must be accepted to sufficient extent for 
institutional integration to be possible and for preventing the society from falling 
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apart. The system tends to maintain itself through fulfilling its two main functional 
premises – namely, by integrating people’s motivations in shared norms and values 
and allocating them in accordance with the prevailing division of labour. Actors’ 
motivational structures stem from their historical experiences, and the mediation is 
through culturally structured symbols that represent shared expectations as to 
appropriate behaviour. People as conforming creatures seek to satisfy each other’s 
complementary expectations. These expectations are learned in socialisation 
processes and are upheld and regulated via constant social control. However, while 
scarcity and the prevailing conditions in general are often understood in very 
‘material’ terms, Parsons extends his approach to expressive objects as well in his 
theory of the cultural system. 
3.1.3 The Cultural System 
If the structural order must have a shared, relatively stable, and normative system of 
standards, we need a symbolic system that gives meanings to these shared norms and 
values. Because of its symbolic nature, culture enables transmitting, learning, and 
sharing abstract objects. Transmissibility ‘serves as a most important criterion for 
distinguishing culture from the social system, because culture can be diffused from 
one social system to another. Relative to the particular social system it is a “pattern” 
element which is both analytically and empirically abstractable from that particular 
social system’ (Parsons 1991 [1951], 15). Therefore, culture forms and consists of 
patterned and ordered symbol systems that serve as objects of actors’ orientation. It 
also provides the meaningful content for orientation of an action, personalities, and 
institutionalised order through mediating and regulating communication – it 
‘provides the [meaningful] standards of selective orientation and ordering (ibid., 327). 
Alongside these ‘properties’ of culture, the signs, symbols, and meanings could be 
called the ‘tools’ and communication the ‘method’ through which culture operates. 
The main cultural objects are systems of ideas and beliefs, value-patterns, and 
expressive symbols (ibid., 4; see also Parsons & Shils 1962 [1951], 8, 2063). The so-
 
63 Parsons and Shils (1962 [1951], 8) ‘distinguish the following three major classes of culture patterns. 
(1) Systems of ideas or beliefs […]. (2) Systems of expressive symbols; for instance, art forms and 
styles […]. (3) Systems of value-orientations’. They continue (on page 20): ‘Each type of culture pattern 
might then be regarded as a solution of a type of orientation problem – systems of ideas are solutions 
of cognitive problems, systems of expressive symbols are solutions of problems of how 
“appropriately” to express feelings, and systems of value-orientations are solutions of problems of 
evaluation, particularly but not exclusively in social interaction.’ 
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called expressive symbolism is ‘the primary cultural component in any form of 
expressive action, [which] is involved in some way in all types of action’ (Parsons 
1991 [1951], 385). If the instrumental action involves calculation of probabilities of 
‘successful attainment of a particular goal or the probable cost of its attainment’ 
(ibid., 40), expressive action is oriented in a symbolic manner. Therefore ‘the 
prototype of the expressive symbol, within the context of interaction, is the symbolic 
act’ (ibid., 387). This means not that the instrumental action could not comprise 
symbols but that the expressive action is oriented to meanings and norms, and hence 
the gratification in expressive action and symbolism is the meaning of the act itself. 
The reciprocal interaction between ego and alter is symbolically oriented in that 
their performances ‘become directly gratifying or deprivational to [each other]’ (ibid., 
387). However, to become meaningful in an expressive way, many of the relevant 
attitudes must be generalised to such extent that they have become objects. In his 
further differentiation with regard to the subject, Parsons cites the penis as an 
example of a symbolic object of such a high degree, whereupon ‘a substantial part 
of its psychological significance is to be interpreted in the light of this fact’ (ibid., 
388). The symbol has become objectified so far that the symbolism transmitted 
orients the action irrespective of the actual attributes of the reference point. Of 
course, the relevant observation is that the ‘expressive symbolism generally is 
“embedded” in concrete action’ (ibid., 399), and therefore is always a significant part 
of the action system. Another example Parsons employs is patriotism, which means 
not that one loves every fellow citizen individually but that one loves the (symbolic) 
collectivity (ibid., 77–78). This further differentiates the role of norms, values, and 
attitudes in human action by pointing out how deeply our action is oriented by 
objectified expressive symbolism, and how it is intertwined with our expectations of 
our actions and of others’64. 
Along with value-patterns and expressive symbols, common beliefs and ideas too 
are central cultural objects. Existential beliefs and ideologies are some of the most 
profound. When Parsons uses the term ‘ideologies’, he refers to belief and idea 
systems that are held in common in collectivities. Ideologies integrate these ‘by 
interpretation of the empirical nature of the collectivity and of the situation in which 
it is placed, the processes by which it has developed to its given state, the goals to 
which its members are collectively oriented, and their relation to the future course 
of events’ (ibid., 349). In practice, according to Parsons, ideologies answer questions 
 
64 Parsons (1991 [1951], 408) sees the creative artist as a person specialising ‘in the production of new 
patterns of expressive symbolism [while] the performing artist is the person [who] specializes in the 
skilled implementation’. 
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related to 1) who we are, 2) how we have become who we are, and, 3) where we are 
going. If ideologies are systems of beliefs and ideas, which, in turn, are generalised 
expressive symbols and (normative) meanings, one important aspect is that they need 
to be incorporated into structures and institutionalised into roles before they may have 
a significant influence on action. They ‘constitute more than a body of “ideas”’ (ibid., 
348), in that they cannot be detached from the whole-of-a-system revolving around 
its cultural and motivational elements: norms, values, and roles. Parsons (1938, 652) 
elaborated on his views about the role of ideas in social action in one of his earlier 
texts: 
Ideas in general have been held either to have or have not to have an important role 
in determination of action […]. Above all, from the fact that this paper will maintain 
that ideas do play an important part in the determination of action, it is not to be 
inferred that its author is committed to some kind of idealistic metaphysics of the sort 
from which it has so often been inferred that ideas must arise through some process 
of ‘immaculate conception’ unsullied by social and economic forces or that they 
influence action by some automatic and mysterious process of self-realization or 
‘emanation’ without relation to the other elements of the social system. 
In this perspective of Parsons, brought out to some extent in the previous chapter 
in connection with ideational scholarship and the role of ideas in social theory, the 
context of ideas is once again emphasised. What Parsons appears to be saying is that 
ideas cannot be the driving force of social change by themselves, since they are part 
of a system made up of various elements. However, as we will see in Section 3.2, 
addressing social constructionism, Parsons seems quite prophetic when describing 
the discussion of ideas. Even expressive symbols become objectified in that they 
cannot be treated merely as ideas; rather, they are objects that are dependent on the 
shared, organising standards – structures – around them. 
This point that ideas should not be examined outside their social context and 
without their relations to economic or other social processes and forces will be 
developed further in the last main chapter, on ideology theory. For now, it should 
suffice to consider a work of art. Art may express anything an actor might want to 
see in it, but the distribution and its (monetary) value are still based on some shared 
standards. There are art markets that are dependent on systems of expertise, art 
galleries, marketing, etc., which regulate the market and influence the price and even 
the reception (experience) of art. There is no ‘idea of art’ detached from these 
structures. To cause a revolution in an artistic field, one must be able to rearrange 
the teaching in art schools to have an influence on the expertise, make the new form 
of art visible by using galleries and marketing, etc. And there are also the concrete 
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art pieces. While ideas are relevant and necessary, even the new idea exists in relation 
to the existing art. There is always the existing standard to compare with, to create 
the relation that enables the understanding of something new. 
One important aspect of expressive symbolic objects is that the access to them is 
institutionally regulated. This is at the centre of the canons of ‘taste’: its objects are 
inherently scarce, and this scarcity is related to things such as purchasing power and 
positions. The better the position in reward systems, the better the access to objects 
of good taste (Parsons 1991 [1951], 420–421)65. This also means that different 
reward types are transmittable via each other since the relative nature of the 
possessions – money, art, etc. – renders them subordinate to standards. The most 
important common denominator among rewards is money by dint of its ‘one 
particularly striking property of unambiguous quantitative measurability [and 
therefore it] is a necessary common denominator as between different classes of 
concrete achievement goals’ (ibid., 424). Hence, relative standards are not equal, but 
the relative nature of standards makes them transmutable: money can be exchanged 
for fine art, so good taste can be bought. In a world of differences which must be 
organised, it is no wonder that one object with such a universal feature is the modern 
primus inter pares, first among equals. 
Culture provides the meaningful content for the normative standards of selective 
orientation and ordering. It also highlights for us the relative and therefore normative 
nature of social phenomena. We live in a world of scarcity that produces differences, 
and these differences must be justified and put in order since not everyone can 
always have everything. Parsons’ view on culture and the cultural system underscores 
the important factor that the prevailing scarcity is not just ‘material’ – the scarcities 
exist in the field of statuses and other expressive gratifications, just as the objects of 
needs and gratifications do. 
3.1.4 The Personality System 
Since we are living, acting human beings with individual personalities, one last 
ingredient to the social system is needed: the personality system. For Parsons, 
‘[p]ersonality is the relational system of a living organism interacting with a situation 
[…]. The mechanisms of the personality must be understood and formulated relative 
 
65 This idea has a great resemblance to Bourdieu’s field theory (see, for instance, Bourdieu 2000 [1997], 
especially Ch. 1). 
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to the functional problems of this unit’ (ibid., 17).66 Thus, Parsons formulates the 
problem of ‘the human factor’ in a way that acknowledges our nature as both 
biological organisms and wholly, fundamentally relational creatures in our interactive 
environment, where the adaptation problem determines the relationship. Current 
knowledge suggests that the ability to read alters the ‘mind’ and beliefs starts to 
develop at one year of age. This often unconscious, continual ‘mind-reading’ makes 
complex human (linguistic) communication possible, because we are physiologically 
tuned, as it were, to learn and react in such ego–alter relationships, a tendency that, 
in turn, results from and is explained by the fact that human cognition is essentially 
social (Bloch 2015). 
It follows that, while human capacities and abilities are biologically determined to 
some extent, they are also highly differentiated between individuals. Because of this 
biological basis, Parsons concludes that ‘no two human organisms are alike by 
genetic constitution. Therefore, the same influences operating on different genetic 
material will not necessarily bring about the same result’ (Parsons 1991 [1951], 229). 
Although all individuals encounter the same structures, structures do not constitute 
all individuals in the same way; the same roles do not signify the same thing for all 
actors (ibid., 17–18). That said, since variations between large populations are far less 
important than the variations between individuals, it is unlikely that large-scale social 
differences are determined primarily by differences in biological capacities (ibid., 9–
10). In an active relationship with our environment, we must, notwithstanding our 
individual features, adapt to successive situational requirements. It is equally 
inappropriate to treat social systems as resultants of the individual personalities in a 
 
66 Parsons’ definition of the personality system does not differ so much from Daniel Dennett’s 
definition of consciousness. Therefore, it is interesting that Dennett, in one of his best-known works, 
Consciousness Explained (1991, 31), ‘defend[s] a version of [cognitive] functionalism’. For Dennett, 
consciousness is fundamentally a relative phenomenon: it is irreducible to brain but corporeal in the 
sense that the brain is just one part of the whole, functioning body, where there is still no consciousness 
without an active relationship to environment. The subjective experience of hurting your arm does 
not ‘lodge in your brain’, since there is no experience of hurting your arm without that arm itself. 
Moreover, injury is a result of an active relationship to something, such as a blade or stick. Without 
this relation, there would be no conscious experience. One may extrapolate the notion to any 
experience. This view stands in sharp contrast to popular assumptions that consciousness is 
fundamentally a biological and subjective phenomenon, lodging in one’s brain. John Searle (2002, 7) 
defends such a view: ‘[I]t is important to say exactly what we are talking about because the 
phenomenon of consciousness that we are interested in needs to be distinguished from certain other 
phenomena such as attention, knowledge, and self-consciousness. By “consciousness” I simply mean 
those subjective states of sentience or awareness that begin when one awakes in the morning […] and 
continue throughout the day until [one becomes] “unconscious”. Above all, consciousness is a biological 
phenomenon.’ These assumptions have far-reaching consequences, as we saw in the previous chapter 
with regard to the role of ideas in institutional stability and change. 
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psychological sense, since it is unacceptable to see the personality system as reducible 
to biological constitution, just as reduction to social system per se would be (ibid., 
539). We may conclude that, while Parsons eschewed all kinds of genetic 
determinism67, he established his theory of individual personality differences partly 
on a biological basis and partly in terms of structural relations. 
Our investigation focuses on the social system and on the problem of order, so 
we can leave most of Parsons’ genetic and psychoanalytical theorising alone. His 
notion of need-dispositions, however, remains relevant. Need-dispositions, which 
create the basis for individuals’ motivations, have a ‘gratificational’ and an 
‘orientational’ aspect (ibid., 7; see also Parsons et al. 1962 [1951], 8–29). In a broad 
sense, the gratificational element has to do with the gains and costs in actors’ 
interaction with the object world, whereas the element of orientation is connected 
with how the relation between an actor and the world of objects is structured, with 
the organisation of the patterns of the expectation system. Overall, this means that 
the actors’ motivations are organised in relation to personality, which seeks to find 
gratification and has historical experiences. 
Actors create acting dispositions that are based on their basic (biological) needs 
and experiences. We may speak of motivational orientations that provide ‘essentially 
a framework for analyzing the “problems” in which the actor has an “interest”. 
Value-orientation, on the other hand, provides the standards of what constitute 
satisfactory “solutions” of these problems. The clear recognition of the independent 
variability of these two basic modes or levels of orientation is […] the very basis of 
a satisfactory theory in the field of “culture and personality”’ (Parsons 1991 [1951], 
14). In other words, motivations are actors’ interest-based problem-analysis 
frameworks, and values provide the solution standards for the problems: 
This integration of a set of common value patterns with the internalized 
need-disposition structure of the constituent personalities is the core phenomenon of 
the dynamics of social systems. That the stability of any social system except the most 
evanescent interaction process is dependent on a degree of such integration may be 
said to be the fundamental dynamic theorem of sociology. It is the major point of 
reference for all analysis which may claim to be a dynamic analysis of social process. 
(Ibid., 42) 
 
67 Interestingly, Parsons makes a series of references to genes and genetics in The Social System. It is 
important to note, however, that he emphasises on several occasions that the role of genetic 
constitution in human capabilities and abilities is unknown (1991 [1951], 32), and he states explicitly 
(on page 216) that the extent to which our needs are genetically inborn remains an open question. 
Moreover, he eschews social Darwinism (on page 353) and maintains that it should be considered an 
example of scientific ideology. 
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We come to the same conclusion once more. Actors’ personalities must correspond 
with the value-patterns. If people do not accept the common values as standards for 
their action, the institutional integration is not going to hold. Discrepancies in this 
integration form the causes of deviant behaviour and, by the same token, may work 
as seeds for institutional change. 
3.1.5 The Integration Compromise and Institutional Change 
If there is any novelty in my reading of Parsons’ social system theory, it is in the 
observation that all the elements of the theory represent dimensions of 
complementary role-expectations where the system-level integration compromise 
takes place in relation to scarcity, the prevailing social condition. In most 
commentaries addressing Parsons’ system theory, role-expectations have been dealt 
with by way of introduction to Parsons but just by way of a brief connection ‘to 
broader analyses of social order, linking social action at the individual level, with the 
wider social system’ (Holton 1998, 103)68. For me, however, they deserve in-depth 
treatment since the whole theory culminates in them: 
[T]he fundamental common sector of personalities and social systems consists in the 
value-patterns which define role-expectations. The motivational structures thus 
organized are units both of personality as a system and of the social system in which 
the actor participates; they are need-dispositions of the personality and they are 
role-expectations of the social system. (Parsons 1991 [1951], 540) 
The role-expectations are defined in the value-patterns, which, again, must become 
an integral part of the actors’ personality to work in an integrative manner on a 
system level. The trick in working with role-expectations is that they are complementary, 
which means that they constitute the relation between ego and alter. We operate in 
units of role(-status), the structural units with meaningful value-contents that refer 
to an actor’s functional significance relative to others in the system. Actors, then, 
 
68 The Social System has been presented also as constructed in such a way that ‘the social system provides 
a linkage with two other analytically distinct systems: personality and culture’ (Moore 1978, 333), 
without any mention of role-expectations whatsoever. A notable exception is the scholarship of Savage 
(1981), whose Althusserian reading of Parsons’ system theory most closely approaches my treatment. 
That said, he still falls short of understanding how the relational aspect affects understanding of the 
relations among sub-systems, disregarding the complementary aspect. Moreover, he completely 
disregards the way in which the system’s functionality ties in with conditions of scarcity, the latter 
being an elementary aspect of my reading. Nonetheless, he quite rightly points out how misinformed 
most conflict-theoretical criticisms are in the claim that scarcity plays no role in Parsons’ theory 
whatsoever (ibid., 197–199). 
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perform the roles that are necessary for the integration and operation of the system 
by standardised means – i.e., appropriate behaviour. Thus, we are socialised to roles 
with regard to those aspects of our overall behaviour connected with the functional 
necessities of a given system. In other parts, there are additional degrees of freedom, 
and the personalities’ need-dispositions may be expressed more freely. 
It is clear, then, that – as mentioned several times already – roles are the area of 
social life wherein the institutional integration takes place. On the other hand, there 
would no point in talking about the roles without interactive context, so the 
expectations part is needed also. Whereas the roles are the functional units of the 
system, constant regulation – socialisation and social control – is needed to maintain 
the functional ability of the system. Here, the expectations enter the picture. In our 
historical process of becoming civilised individuals, we have learned the proper ways 
of behaving, and the performance-control dialectics69 form a central part of our 
everyday interaction. We know how to play our part just as well as we know what to 
expect from the others. Deviance leads to sanctions70. We are creatures who seek to 
please each other and who suffer the consequences if failing in this. This time, let 
Durkheim (1982 [1895], 51) elaborate: 
The system of signs that I employ to express my thoughts, the monetary system I use 
to pay my debts, the credit instruments I utilise in my commercial relationships, the 
practices I follow in my profession, etc., all function independently of the use I make 
of them […]. Thus there are ways of acting, thinking and feeling which possess the 
remarkable property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual. 
Here, Durkheim begins by pointing out how the existing order works irrespective of 
our individual feelings, and he sees these compelling relations as the social force 
‘outside’ us. It is the relations to these institutions that exert external force upon us 
as thinking and feeling individuals, but only because people tend to act in accordance 
 
69 Although Parsons uses the word ‘dialectics’ only in a pejorative manner, this is not germane here; 
the point is to emphasise how these sides of the process operate simultaneously. While it may go 
against Parsons’ own views to do so, I still choose to call it dialectics at this point, since dialectics is 
an essential concept in the chapter addressing social constructionism and its relation to Parsons’ 
theory. 
70 I shall briefly note that Parsons makes an interesting case with regard to gambling, which is largely 
illegal in the United States. Since gambling has important functions for acting out tensions, either 
wholly suppressing it or removing all restrictions to gambling would be ‘seriously disruptive to society’ 
(Parsons 1991 [1951], 307). Therefore, there are special arrangements of social control, such as partial 
legalisation. This could be seen as a ‘safety valve’ through which an integration compromise can take 
place without the whole system being driven into crisis. Parsons based his views on research of his 
day, which may or may not have fully accounted for the (conservative) views obtaining in the first half 
of the 20th century in the United States, but the general point still is interesting. 
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with the generally accepted demands of their society. It is only when we try to rebel, 
however, that the force of these relations reveals itself: 
Not only are these types of behaviour and thinking external to the individual, but they 
are endued with a compelling and coercive power by virtue of which, whether he 
wishes it or not, they impose themselves upon him. Undoubtedly when I conform to 
them of my own free will, this coercion is not felt or felt hardly at all, since it is 
unnecessary. None the less it is intrinsically a characteristic of these [social] facts; the 
proof of this is that it asserts itself as soon as I try to resist. If I attempt to violate the 
rules of law they react against me so as to forestall my action, if there is still time. 
Alternatively, they annul it or make my action conform to the norm if it is already 
accomplished but capable of being reversed; or they cause me to pay the penalty for 
it if it is irreparable. (Ibid.; emphasis added) 
The conformity that results from our ‘internal’ tendency to complement each other’s 
expectations tends to cover the fact that breaching these norms has consequences. 
Again, this ‘basic paradigm of the social interaction’ (Parsons 1991 [1951], 204) – the 
complementarity of the behaviour – would not be possible ‘[w]ithout a sharing and 
relative stability of meanings’ (ibid., 327). Against this backdrop, the integration is at 
all levels dependent on standards that are independent of any given individual but 
upheld by most of the individuals, who aim, consciously or not, to maintain the 
status quo to sufficient extent. This notion of complementarity is especially 
important in Parsons’ theory of social change. Here, Parsons (ibid., 481) brings out 
two essential points: Firstly, social systems are, again, inherently boundary-
maintaining, an aspect that goes to the heart of the concept of equilibrium. Secondly, 
there is a need to distinguish between ‘the processes within the system and processes 
of change of the system’ (ibid.), though things often get muddled in the use of the 
term ‘dynamic’. This view is related to the observation made earlier: the system must 
simultaneously fulfil its integration and co-ordination functions. Accordingly, we see 
once more that institutional stability and change are just two halves of the same 
equation (ibid., 503). 
In Parsons’ terms as introduced above, if the theory assumes a system’s tendency 
toward stability and, yet, change takes place, there must be a processual explanation. 
The answer might begin with his observation ‘that there are no one or two inherently 
primary sources of impetus to change in social systems. This is true both in general 
and with reference to particular types of social system. The “dominant factor” 
theories, which were so popular a generation ago, that is, with reference to the 
priority of economic factors, of the genetic constitution, of organisms or of “ideas,” 
have no generalized basis in the theory of the social system’ (ibid., 493). Clearly, 
Parsons rejects the idea of simple determinations. In the irreducible conditions 
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wherein the interaction processes tend to continue unchanged, interruption may 
occur in either of two ways: as a failure in processes of socialisation or in mechanisms 
of social control (ibid., 481–483). 
Parsons begins to elaborate on his theory of change by considering ‘vested 
interests’71. While the term normally is used with regard to positions achieved or 
(other) material gains, Parsons refers to general patterns of gratification, whether 
‘material’ or ‘expressive’. Thus, change always means overcoming of gratification-
based resistance unless the process of change is not institutionalised itself, which is 
sometimes the case in systems such as scientific investigation (ibid., 490–496). This 
simultaneously means that vested interests in Parsons’ vocabulary are values and 
norms that are generally accepted – at least to some extent – since people gain 
gratification from pleasing each other, from meeting their expectations and, 
therefore, meeting the value demands of the general public. On the other hand, 
overcoming resistance suggests that the aspiration is primarily conscious, 
acknowledged, and therefore the resistance should primarily stem from the system’s 
observed defects. The driving force behind change might, then, be a deviant or 
radical group seeking to break away from larger society by challenging the dominant 
values and ideology (ibid., 355). Otherwise, internal or unconscious contradictions 
in the system may develop, as in cases of failing socialisation, wherein the elements 
necessary for the system’s functioning are not internalised to the actors’ motivational 
structures. Here, contradictions between the status-roles and motivation of an actor 
may emerge (ibid., 25–26), just as Durkheim described in the context of anomie. 
Moreover, as Parsons (ibid., 16–17) points out, the integration is always partial 
and incomplete, whereas consistency across various components of the system – 
social, cultural, and personal – can only ever approach perfect integration. This leaves 
room for deviance and opposing actions, and it demonstrates at the same time that 
change in the equilibrium-seeking system is always present as the other side of the 
stabilisation process. On the other hand, Parsons continues by musing on how it 
would be impossible for society to stabilise on a foundation where people’s 
motivations are fundamentally ambivalent in relation to central values (ibid., 529). 
These values function as a yardstick by which the (inter)action is proportioned. The 
key factor in producing deviance and alternative interpretations of the prevailing 
values is scarcity, for which reason not everyone can always have everything. In this 
world of differences, any settled values are always a compromise solution and prone 
 
71 Further elaborating on his theory of institutional change, Parsons offered a case analysis (1954 
[1945]). 
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to alternative interpretations and deviance. A theory of contradictions is already 
present here, but Parsons leaves it halfway. 
In this system, role represents the functional necessity and status the structurally 
located position where the actor is an object of others’ orientation. Expectations 
with regard to the action are formed by the culturally shared rules that values imply. 
Complementarity is the fundamental motivational mode of human interaction: we 
are creatures who are taught to please one another, and this makes our living together 
possible. As personalities we may be lots of things, but, for the sake of institutional 
integration, the motivations we have as acting units of our society must correspond 
to its demands. That enables the peaceful reproduction of our everyday social 
conditions. This is at the heart of the Parsonian structural-functionalist theory 
presented in The Social System: it is intended to explain how life in modern, complex, 
highly organised societies and in conditions of advanced division of labour is 
possible. It tells us how we manage to reproduce our predominant and functional 
day-to-day social relations peacefully. 
3.1.6 Interim Conclusions on Social System Theory 
While the starting point for Parsons’ theory development was to bring together 
classic European sociology and economics and introduce the need for a social 
explanation for order in contrast with utilitarian theories, Alexander (1983, 213) 
points out that Parsons was ‘not sure whether he is arguing for multidimensional 
theory or simply against the instrumentalist one’. We can be grateful that Parsons 
did not exhibit a fundamental change in his oeuvre, ‘early vs. late Parsons’72, as this 
makes it easier to interpret the grand-theory line of his thinking (ibid., 212). The 
harder part is to figure out which parts of it, and on what basis, are the lasting and 
interesting ones in light of the new millennium, in light of contemporary institutional 
theory development, and for the light to be shed by the present work. While Parsons’ 
structural-functionalist theory of the social system indeed displays ‘a determinate 
logical structure’ (Parsons 1949 [1937], 7), which addresses multi-dimensional issues 
of social order, his massive theoretical project still leaves a range of questions 
unanswered. However, before embarking on critique, I begin with some definitions 
of concepts and offer a run-through of what has been at stake here. The following 
 
72 This does not necessarily mean strict intellectual consistency, which in any case is an uninteresting 
side of this particular reading since it is aimed only at locating the ‘hard core’ of Parsons’ reasoning 
regarding the social systems and institutional integration. 
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definitions act also as a point of departure and thus begin serving my further 
purposes in supplementing neo-institutionalist theory. 
In my reconstruction of Parsons’ (1991 [1951], 541) ‘wholly and fundamentally 
relational’ and ‘structural-functional’ (ibid., 20–22) social system theory, I have 
suggested that it is an abstract depiction of at least modern Western societies with 
highly differentiated division of labour. These societies must reproduce themselves 
peacefully if they are to keep going, and, simultaneously, there are some 
preconditions for that reproduction. In other words, some functional prerequisites 
determine whether the societies can remain viable and operational as they strive to 
keep themselves going. To meet these demands, societies must simultaneously fulfil 
two functions: integration and co-ordination (or allocation). Hence, the term 
‘functionalism’ is used for Parsons’ theory73. On the other hand, we live in 
fundamentally relational social reality, wherein we are inherently interdependent with 
each other. Historically, we have produced relatively stable but dynamic systems such 
as language. When these systems institutionalise, they become relatively independent 
of particular individuals and, thus, their existence transcends any specific situation 
or location, and their durability potentially passes beyond the human life span. 
Without these relatively stable systems, any such thing as, for example, meaningful 
communication would be impossible. Thus, the ‘structuralism’ aspect of his theory 
comes in. 
When understood as a Durkheimian object that exists outside individuals, the 
structure is a shared collective representation of a collective subject. A ‘shared 
symbolic system’ (ibid., 12) serves as an example. Structures manifest as standards, 
whether that system is values, the grammar of a language, or money. Thus, standards 
are something shared beyond individual control. Finally, the function of these 
standards is to organise, be it to integrate or to allocate. Therefore, we may say that 
‘social structure’ (in the functional sense) refers to a shared organising standard. 
However, one should remember that, while standards – especially as values – are of 
a shared nature, this does not mean that they are generally and actively acknowledged 
and accepted (though they cannot be totally rejected either). They just organise our 
collective behaviour. 
Whenever we speak about empirically observable manifestations of structures, 
we are talking about institutions. In other words, institutions are empirically 
identified social structures, such as communicated language, a plurality of role-
patterns, marriage, or government administrations. To achieve stability and the 
 
73 For more comprehensive introduction to functionalism and its development in social theory, see 
Moore (1978), among others. 
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allocation of people and resources, institutional standards must represent 
institutional(ised) values. This is where Parsons makes an important point with 
regard to my study: standards are learned through socialisation that, for the most 
part, takes place in and through these institutions. Because we live in highly 
differentiated and complex modern societies that operate in conditions of scarcity, 
these standards are needed to organise differences between people. Therefore, the 
prevailing structures arbitrate the Hobbesian problem of order in societies as many 
of us pursue desires that only a few can satisfy. 
Scarcity has two sources: relational and non-relational, according to Parsons, who 
states that non-relational sources of scarcity are ‘extrinsic to the social system as 
such. They concern for example physical and biological limitations on the availability 
of physical objects […]. Similar considerations apply to a certain class of cultural 
possessions that may be important as facilities. […] [F]or example the right to use 
an academic degree, which may even as in the case of the M.D. degree, be the 
prerequisite of practicing a given profession’ (ibid., 120–121). These cultural 
possessions represent an ‘intermediate’ level of scarcity, at which the physical 
institutional environment is actively present while the statuses and similar elements 
are the resource distributed (ibid.). The more fundamental scarcity is the relational 
sort, which limits freedom of action. This ‘relational limitation rests upon the fact 
that it is inherent in the nature of social interaction that the gratification of ego’s 
need-dispositions is contingent on alter’s action and vice versa’ (ibid., 121). This 
characterisation of relational scarcity emphasises the social nature of producing 
scarcity in the first place: we actively organise our distribution standards. 
Importantly, Parsons’ account of scarcity goes beyond the narrow economistic 
definition of the concept. As we are multi-dimensionally relational creatures, several 
dimensions of scarcity limit our actions and produce differences between people that 
must be overcome and settled for the sake of order. 
Parsons’ solution for the Hobbesian problem of order reaches from the smallest 
social unit of action to the largest. Accordingly, his higher-level, system explanation 
of the social order is reducible to smaller units, here to complementary role-
expectations whereby people satisfy each other’s expectations in very immediate 
encounters. A problem arises when we consider, for example, the unintended 
consequences of collective human action74. For the theory of complementary 
 
74 For material on the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action, see, for example, Merton 
(1936). The economics concept of externality could be placed in the same category of concepts 
describing the unintended consequences of human action. An economics approach is presented in 
other work (e.g., Cornes & Sandler 1996). 
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role-expectations to be valid in its explanation for these residuals of social 
phenomena, either the definitions of roles should encompass these consequences or 
the interaction within the roles should not produce any effects other than those 
‘scripted’ into those roles. Obviously, this is not the case, since we have managed to 
produce all kinds of external effects through collective action without being aware 
of them – climate change, for example. Moreover, the ‘social facts’ are not wholly 
based on expectations of other people, since they might not be aware of what to 
expect, or the expected behaviour might produce effects additional to those 
connected with our gratification-based motives. Also, actions may be unconsciously 
motivated, just as some social arrangements, such as market competition, may 
operate on such a basis that their effects occur as a by-product of perfectly normative 
and acceptable behaviour. Our intentions may not include advancing capitalist 
competition when we choose products at a shop, but this is exactly what we usually 
do. That is, while people’s actions in various situations and positions fulfil the social 
functions that uphold the social system, they do other things as well. 
Let me elaborate further. Our understanding of our doings does not necessarily 
correspond with all the effects of said doings on our (social) environment. We do 
not necessarily have any idea what we are doing (pun intended) beyond the 
immediately observable effects of behaviour. It follows from this that ‘other stuff’, 
the remainder or leftovers from collective social action, such as unintended 
consequences, must be explained with another theory. Even more importantly, when 
we encounter the ‘social facts’ that Durkheim spoke about in such forms as business 
bankruptcy, the ultimate reason for these social arrangements is invisible to the 
naked eye. The reason behind them cannot be derived from role-expectations alone. 
Still, this is not to say that Parsons’ theory is worthless for macro-level explaining; 
rather, there are limits to its explanatory power. Hence, I recommend understanding 
Parsons’ theory of the social systems as a theory explaining the stability through 
immediate interaction and therefore the immediate reproduction of the social 
conditions. This might be why Ken Menzies (1976) ended up suggesting that ‘[t]he 
action program focuses on the meaning of an action to an actor, while his social 
systems program focuses on the consequences of an activity or a system of activity. 
Parsons does not have an action system, as he claims, but only a behavioral system 
and a separate action theory’ (quoted also by Habermas 1992, 201).75 
 
75 My argument resembles also Durkheim’s critique of Comte’s positivism, even though Parsons does 
not derive the macro-level phenomena from the individual consciousness as Comte does: ‘Indeed, if 
society is only a system of means set up by men to achieve certain ends, these ends can only be 
individual, for before society existed there could only exist individuals. It is therefore from the 
individual that emanate the ideas and needs which have determined the formation of societies. If it is 
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Recall that Parsons’ theory describes the peaceful reproduction of our everyday 
social conditions, meaning the necessary functions that maintain the conservative 
structural ‘base’ that enables other activities. For Parsons, structures are the 
normative base for social continuity and make collective action predictable. 
Complementary role-expectations could be described as routines that uphold the 
observable social stratum, and, because of this, they explain why people tend to go 
to work on time, behave appropriately, and keep doing what they have been doing 
– what they did yesterday and the day before. 
However, they also might inform us of the reasons and mechanisms behind 
phenomena such as the interconnected manifestations of xenophobia and climate-
change denialism, for the arrival of new cultures and environmental patterns may 
seem a threat to the prevailing values. For instance, studies of climate-change 
denialism, proceeding from extensive statistical research in the United States, have 
found conservative white males to be significantly more prone to endorse these 
denialist views than other Americans (McCright & Dunlap 2011)76. The Parsonian 
explanation for this would be that conservative white males are the ones whose 
experiences of the social domain best meet the standard pertaining to appropriate 
behaviour: their worldview is the most ‘naturalised’. Changes in social environment 
and, thus, in the legitimation of particular vested interests – which entail privileges 
usually invisible to the people who enjoy them – cause disturbances principally for 
those whose experiences largely correspond with current standards. One could say 
that conservative white males are ‘norm conglomerations’ of a sort, with regard to 
what is acceptable and standardised. 
One may not think about upholding these structures and institutions in the 
processes present in one’s action, as in Blyth’s example cited in the previous chapter, 
but those processes usually do so nonetheless. Equally, while one may not see oneself 
as being a part of causing social problems with one’s legitimised behaviour, such as 
going to one’s workplace or consuming, one still might have that effect. All this 
should be explained differently. The structural social theory should get past the idea 
of equilibrium and address the structural contradictions as well. 
As noted above, several other criticisms levelled against the social-systems and 
other aspects of Parsons’ thinking could be mentioned. Robert Holton (1998, 106) 
 
from him that everything comes, it is necessarily through him that everything must be explained. 
Moreover, in society there is nothing save individual conciousnesses [sic], and it is consequently in 
these that is to be found the source of all social evolution. Thus sociological laws can only be a corollary 
of the more general laws of psychology’ (Durkheim 1982 [1895], 125). One may consider this against 
the backdrop of economic theory as well.  
76 This finding has been replicated in Norway (see Krange et al. 2018). 
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lists the most typically cited shortcomings, among them inability to explain power 
and inequality, issues with identifying conflict, and his tendency to operate with an 
‘over-socialized conception of human actors [that] left individuals as robots 
programmed by an all-powerful set of rules’. The latter critique pertaining to agency 
is often repeated (see, for instance, Heritage 1984) and present with the over-
socialisation argument in several neo-institutionalist accounts, as we have already 
seen. In contrast, my reading of Parsons points to the latter argument presenting a 
rather over-simplified depiction of Parsons’ multi-dimensionally relative approach 
to social systems. Still, I find some resonance in David Sciulli and Dean Gerstein’s 
(1985, 370) observation in line with which the very abstract ‘ideal type’ approach in 
The Social System went against the agenda Parsons set in his earlier writings and led to 
overemphasis on formal distinctions at the expense of interesting research findings. 
This is a fair criticism since, no matter how much Parsons emphasised the relational 
nature of his theory, the picture still is composed of blocks such as ‘the social system’ 
and ‘the cultural system’. 
I leave these criticisms alone here, since my focus is on the problem of order – 
and therefore on the problem of social institutions. We may, however, still address 
the problem of agency briefly. It is true that, as John Heritage (1984) suggests, 
Parsons did not address the problem of reflexivity in such a way as would explain 
how individuals evaluate their own action or make moral judgements. Still, I do not 
consider agents in Parsons’ theory to be programmed robots. Actually, I find the 
exact opposite: if they were, the actors would automatically aim for the same goals 
after the programming, and there would not be any room for deviance. While they 
might do that, the variety of goals – even the utilitarian ones – is so broad that 
maintaining even basic-level stability in modern societies would be unimaginable 
without integration of the most fundamental motivations into society’s basic 
functions. This tells us about the variety of human personalities and individual goals 
more than social engineering producing robots77. Even elementary stability requires 
constant upholding through social control because of the human diversity. Just as 
Parsons (1991 [1951], 16–17; 481–483) said, the integration is always incomplete and 
constant social control is needed. 
Thus, my reading of Parsons also emphasises the order of precedence among 
norms, whereby the higher the value placed on a norm, the stronger the resistance 
against change is. One’s latitude, or room for freedom, rises as one approaches the 
more peripherally social functions and shared values. Moreover, as I have brought 
 
77 On the other hand, isn’t the whole of neo-liberal literature one big case of people’s needs, 
motivations, and desires being standardised into non-critically consuming market-subjects? 
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out above, we should consider stability and change to be the two sides balancing an 
equation, wherein the processes of stabilisation may lead to contradictions because 
of the external effects (such as everyday consumption accumulating into 
environment-hostile emissions). Nevertheless, this is where the everyday perspective 
reaches its limits, since the relations of commodity production are not visible to the 
naked eye as such and may even be irrelevant for the mundane interaction of 
individuals. The theory of complementary role-expectations cannot take us further, 
in that if the interaction that sums into a system were reducible to bilateral role-play, 
all the macro-level contradictions should be actively present in the micro-level 
interaction. This is obviously not the case, so a different theory is needed, which is 
provided in the last main chapter’s presentation of critical ideology theory. 
I see Parsons’ social system theory as a set of integration and co-ordination 
principles that tell us where the limits of our freedom lie and, at the same time, could 
make the spots and positions of action and counter-action visible. It tells us why 
people’s attitudes are so hard to change and why they resist change, or, more 
generally, it tells us why our whole social environment is fundamentally normative 
yet still may be investigated scientifically without us falling into full-blown relativism. 
Social structures that are dependent on collective human action are beyond the 
individual’s control, so methodologically they may be treated as ‘things’, just as 
Durkheim suggested. On the other hand, while this is an equilibrium theory, it does 
not tell us where the structural contradictions lie, raising another issue for the last 
chapter of this dissertation. Before embarking on discussion of the theory of 
contradictions and conflict, I address the lifeworld dimension of institutions by 
considering social constructionism. The following section complements the neo-
institutionalist juxtaposition between institutions and ideas in the context of classical 
social theory. 
3.2 The Social As a Lifeworld: The Social Construction of 
Reality and Beyond 
From the reconstruction of Parsons’ ‘structural-functionalist’ social system theory as 
a lens for discussing institutions and ideas, stability and change, and agent and 
structure, it has become clear that, despite its ostensibly anti-Parsonian sentiments, 
historical institutionalism shared a wide expanse of common ground with Parsons, 
whose theory would provide tools for revision of HI’s theoretical premises but also 
premises for idea scholars to consider. However, no matter how many functional 
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necessity principles the supporters of structural theory stack for the lifeworld 
theorists, they still tend to insist on priority for agents’ ideas about their action and, 
thereby, emphasise the lifeworld aspect in social explaining. Since the ideational 
scholarship presented above identifies generally with social constructionism, I turn 
next to the lifeworld-related premises for the institutionalisation of society. This part 
of the chapter examines the neo-institutional discussion that supports rooting the 
theory in ideas by aiming to illuminate how the social world is constructed from the 
lifeworld of agents, if this is even possible in the first place. 
The turning point between structural-functionalism and constructionism is 
crucial in many ways, but for our purposes we may begin by summarising it in one 
observation: the structural logic of necessities and norms transforms into a question 
of multiplied individual consciousnesses. In other words, after the constructionist 
turn there is no longer a foundation of concrete social conditions for the social 
phenomena, only an aggregate of individual consciousnesses as institutionalised 
interaction mechanisms. However, before diving head-first into the deep end of 
differentiation between Parsonian structural-functionalism and social 
constructionism (and the respective branches of neo-institutionalism), we should 
take a brief look at the central questions that constructionism addresses. In his article 
‘A Field Guide to Social Construction’, Ron Mallon (2007, 94) sums up the general 
idea thus: 
Social constructionists are particularly interested in phenomena that are contingent 
upon human culture and human decisions – contingent upon the theories, texts, 
conventions, practices, and conceptual schemes of particular individuals and groups 
of people in particular places and times. 
Mallon addresses the contingency as the key issue in constructionism: things that are 
constructed and construct the human interaction are contingent, and hence they are 
‘neither necessary nor impossible’ (Mautner 1997, 112). They are solely products of 
human conduct, so everything that is constructed can be changed by changing the 
conduct. There is a curious catalogue of things that have been said to be social 
constructs, such as danger, facts, illness, nature, quarks, reality, and gender, which 
may be in dramatic contrast against common sense (Hacking 1999, 1). Nevertheless, 
where such things as gender are involved, Simone de Beauvoir has elegantly stated 
that it is not about being born as a woman but about becoming a woman. The same 
thing goes for several other things to which we are highly accustomed. In addition, 
since social constructions are contingent, constructionism also refers to localism and 
cultural-relatedness rather than universalism, because human conduct varies between 
places and between cultures, and it very often attaches itself to ways of using 
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language (or, more broadly, discourse). Constructionism also questions the neutrality 
of language itself, seeing it as means of using power and as actively creating 
inequalities between people (Burr 1995; Hacking 1999; Mallon 2007; Haslanger 
2012). 
Another important issue related to constructionism is its twofold nature. It is said 
to be ‘a realist account of the nature of a certain category: it is claimed that the 
category is a real feature of human beings’ but one ‘determined by social, rather than 
natural or biological properties’ (Díaz-León 2013, 1). With this definition, 
constructionism takes a certain kind of realist stand while the properties of the 
category are social in nature. This is where the well-known idea of social ontology 
becomes paradoxical and, in my understanding, a frustrating bone of contention 
between the constructionist and realist scientific accounts that were present as the 
‘material’ and ‘ideal’ positions in the neo-institutionalism debate. On the other hand, 
the constructionist thesis that the scientific theories are not natural, inevitable, and 
therefore necessary was central to the ‘science wars’ in the US in the 1990s78. This 
all boils down to confusion of the object’s properties with the social properties, as I 
will expand upon later. 
Several, quite different kinds of interpretations of how this puzzle should be 
solved were introduced after the reign of constructionism began. Again, the 
interesting one from our point of view is social theory’s division between material 
and idea-related factors in explanation of the social. Because of their importance in 
neo-institutional theory, they are addressed later, when I dismantle the realist–
relativist account, but for now I will continue following the debate about ideas, to 
reveal what kind of role they have in one of the most influential accounts presenting 
social constructionism ever, Berger and Luckmann’s landmark The Social Construction 
of Reality (1991 [1966]), a seminal work in which two familiar angles for considering 
social phenomena are dealt with: the question of social structures and the problem 
of order. 
Berger and Luckmann identified the problem of order as the departure point for 
their particular construction of social reality. They proceeded from the observation 
that, ‘[e]mpirically, human existence takes place in a context of order, direction, 
stability. The question then arises: From what does the empirically existing stability 
of human order derive?’ (ibid., 69). This formulation of the problem is directly 
related to the question of social structures, since Berger and Luckmann saw that the 
answer could be given at two levels: firstly, we may approach the problem from ‘the 
obvious fact that a given social order precedes any individual organismic 
 
78 For a brief introduction to the main points of the ‘science wars’, see Hacking (1999, 3–5). 
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development’ and, secondly, the question could be turned around by asking ‘in what 
manner social order itself arises. The most general answer to this question is that 
social order is a human product, or, more precisely, an ongoing human production. 
It is produced by man in the course of his ongoing externalization’ (ibid., 69–70). 
In building their sociology of knowledge, Berger and Luckmann deemed Parsons’ 
social system theory ahistorical (ibid., 209). In addition, they saw ‘the standard 
versions of functionalist explanations in the social sciences [as] a theoretical 
legerdemain [at which they arrived] by reifying [the] social phenomena[,] confusing 
its own conceptualizations with the laws of the universe’ (ibid., 208). However, as 
we have seen, in the latest stretch of its development in the context of ideational 
scholarship, social constructionism ended up reifying the social phenomena in 
‘ideas’. Moreover, in the introduction to the book, Berger and Luckmann positioned 
themselves through Karl Mannheim in relation to Marxist ideology theory and the 
classical structural sociology presented by Parsons, among others. On these bases, 
they held that the constructionist solution to the problem of order and social 
structures should go beyond both Marxist ideology theory and structural-
functionalism (ibid., 23). From the presentation that follows, one may judge how 
well that endeavour has succeeded. 
3.2.1 Crusoe and Friday ‘in Nucleo’ in the Institutionalisation Process 
From their observation about the ongoing externalisation process, Berger and 
Luckmann proceeded to examine the origins of institutionalisation, embarking on 
their Robinson Crusoe thought experiment, familiar from economics. This 
represents the turn in which internalisation of the world, meaning adjustment to the 
existing structures and ideologies, turns into externalisation, wherein the origin of 
the structures is found from the person’s internal reality. It also leads to ‘[t]he central 
question for sociological theory […]: How is it possible that subjective meanings 
become objective facticities?’ (ibid., 30). To understand theoretically how everyday 
common sense constructs the objective reality we all encounter, Berger and 
Luckmann need to imagine A and B who are the starting point for typifications 
produced in reciprocal habitualised interaction (ibid., 70–85). People are creatures of 
habit who tend to solidify the ways they act while interacting in meaningful concert 
with others. 
Next, a description of an institutionalisation process is presented. Firstly, in 
familiar fashion, Berger and Luckmann acknowledge that ‘[t]he typifications of 
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habitualized actions that constitute institutions are always shared ones […]. 
Institutions further imply historicity and control. Reciprocal typifications of actions 
are built up in the course of a shared history’ (ibid., 72). In other words, the 
institutions are built on historically developed shared meanings and are supported 
by the social control (and socialisation). More specifically, ‘[a]s A and B interact, in 
whatever manner, typifications will be produced quite quickly. A watches B perform. 
He attributes motives to B's actions and, seeing the actions recur, typifies the motives 
as recurrent […]. In the course of their interaction these typifications will be 
expressed in specific patterns of conduct. That is, A and B will begin to play roles 
vis-a-vis each other’ (ibid., 74). This role-play quickly evolves as constitutive among 
the multiplied actors and, voilà, ‘institutionalization is already present in nucleo’ (ibid.). 
The presupposition that Berger and Luckmann saw as ‘theoretically important 
[is] that the institutionalizing process of reciprocal typification would occur even if 
two individuals began to interact de novo’ (ibid., 73). Importantly, when deriving the 
principles of their theory from the bilateral interaction, the authors factually derived 
all the properties of institutions from this primitive reciprocity. However, they 
attempted to expand the logic by giving A and B children, wherein the character of 
the social interaction taking place changes. When their bilateral institution is passed 
on, the ‘institutionalization perfects itself’ and institutions ‘become historical 
institutions’ (ibid., 76). At this precise point, along with historicity, another quality 
of institutions is acquired: objectivity. That is, the properties of the institutions are 
no longer tied to persons carrying the roles (in this case, paternity) and they instead 
appear objective for the experience of the children who encounter them. They exist 
‘over and beyond the individuals who “happen to” embody them at the moment. In 
other words, the institutions are now experienced as possessing a reality of their own, 
a reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact’ (ibid.; emphasis 
added). 
This makes direct reference to Durkheim’s idea of the externality of the social 
reality to the observer. It also addresses the problem Durkheim identified in asking 
what the exact process is wherein the collective state is created and what its 
constituent elements are. As Berger and Luckmann ask about the ‘manner [in which] 
social order itself arises’ (ibid., 69), they do and do not answer Durkheim’s question. 
Firstly, they give almost the same description of the institutionalisation process that 
Parsons offers in The Social System, but a strange inversion takes place here. They fall 
into the trap of a kind of causal reasoning wherein one tries to find the ultimate 
starting point for a chain of events from which the complete social reality could be 
derived. The result is remarkably reminiscent of Durkheim’s and Parsons’ 
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description of the social; i.e., it is an objectified patterned network of interacting 
socialised actors who reproduce the habitual typifications (institutions) in their roles 
while also controlling and socialising others. However, Berger and Luckmann must 
play with their thought experiment before they can get this causal reasoning to work. 
There is a break by which the logic is merely returned to the individual experience 
of the objective reality: ‘An institutional world, then, is experienced as an objective 
[and self-evident] reality’ (ibid., 77). 
Has the internalisation now been externalised, or what has now happened? It 
seems that the objectiveness of the institutions has been lost, since the properties of 
institutions just represent the experiences of individuals. No matter how objective 
these institutions might feel for the actors, there is no objectivity in anything existing 
outside the individual’s consciousness. One might ask where it should be then, but, 
irrespective of how this question is worded in Berger and Luckmann’s terms, we are 
back at square one (recall Durkheim’s problem). This calls for elaboration on what 
exactly is meant by externalisation and internalisation: 
[I]t is important to emphasize that the relationship between man, the producer, and 
the social world, his product, is and remains a dialectical one. That is, man (not, of 
course, in isolation but in his collectivities) and his social world interact with each 
other. The product acts back upon the producer. Externalization and objectivation 
are moments in a continuing dialectical process. The third moment in this process, 
which is internalization (by which the objectivated social world is retrojected into 
consciousness in the course of socialization), will occupy us in considerable detail 
later on. It is already possible, however, to see the fundamental relationship of these 
three dialectical moments in social reality. Each of them corresponds to an essential 
characterization of the social world. Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. 
Man is a social product. (Ibid., 78–79) 
Even more strangely, now the objective social reality stemming from the individual-
level consciousnesses is met in dialectical relationship. How can one meet one’s own 
consciousness as objective outside reality? If the reader is not yet convinced that this 
is the authors’ de facto meaning, we need only go a couple of pages further to make 
sure: ‘The logic does not reside in the institutions and their external functionalities, 
but in the way these are treated in reflection about them. Put differently, reflective 
consciousness superimposes the quality of logic on the institutional order’ (ibid., 82). 
What is actually integrated in the process of institutionalisation is meanings: 
‘Language provides the fundamental superimposition of logic on the objectivated 
social world. The edifice of legitimations is built upon language and uses language as 
its principal instrumentality’ (ibid.). Now Berger and Luckmann (ibid., 82–83) may 
turn Parsons’ formula around: 
 173 
[The] integration is not a functional imperative for the social processes that produce 
them; it is rather brought about in a derivative fashion […]. This has far-reaching 
implications for any analysis of social phenomena. If the integration of an institutional 
order can be understood only in terms of the ‘knowledge’ that its members have of 
it, it follows that the analysis of such ‘knowledge’ will be essential for an analysis of 
the institutional order in question. 
In other words, we only imagine the necessities we face as things external to us. We 
have abandoned the necessities brought by the real social conditions arising from 
scarcity that create the compelling norms. Berger and Luckmann also abandoned the 
idea of a system’s functional necessities as conditions for societies’ peaceful 
reproduction of themselves in their real conditions. These conditions would result 
from, for example, historically developed division of labour wherein all the actions 
are interrelated but be beyond the reach of any individual consciousness at pure 
experimental level. Still they should work in sufficient harmony, while there is no 
need for them to work in any specific manner. Instead, we are asked to adopt a view 
in which only knowledge of the members of society, in the form of language, is 
needed for understanding the social reality, since language is social reality. One may 
cast one’s mind back to a problem raised in the previous chapter in connection with 
ideational scholarship: if language is the social reality, we do not need to separate 
theory from method, since investigating language grants us direct access to reality! 
In Berger and Luckmann’s ‘dialectics’, it is the shared habits and meanings 
stemming from individual consciousness that constitute the whole human 
institutional universe. Thereby, the human world is opened such that all social 
conditions are free for spontaneous (expanded bilateral) re-negotiation. Even the 
social division of labour can be derived from the bilateral exchange of experiences 
(ibid., 75), where ‘the historical accumulation of knowledge in a society’ (ibid., 95) 
leads, further, to an ever-deepening knowledge-based division among the duties in 
the society, with no reference to any concrete conditions whatsoever. What is lost is 
the logic of the historical relations that maintain the institutions’ properties without 
them being dependent on any particular individuals’ consciousness. 
At this juncture, Berger and Luckmann’s institutionalisation theory adds a little 
more to Parsons’ analysis of social systems: The institutional order lies in the 
typifications (institutions) expressed in specific patterns of conduct in one’s (the ego’s) 
and the other’s (the alter’s) role-performances. We recognise other actors’ performances 
in the relevance structure (pattern variable) in question. Relevance structures are, in 
fact, created while one is acting in a socially objectified world; when we repeatedly 
run into certain types of action, we begin to recognise and create expectations with 
regard to them (ibid., 89–91). For Berger and Luckmann, roles are actor types in a 
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context of an objectified stock of knowledge, where the ‘construction of role 
typologies is a necessary correlate of the institutionalization of conduct’ (ibid.). What 
is new in their story is the expansion of the concept of socialisation, in the second 
part of their book, which addresses the society as subjective reality. It is the two-
stage process of socialisation wherein the individual internalises the meanings 
necessary if one is to become a member of the society (ibid., 149–165). Again, 
‘language constitutes both the most important content and the most important 
instrument of socialization’ (ibid., 153). 
Even though matters are expressed slightly differently in their telling, Berger and 
Luckmann seem to be talking about complementary role-expectations. While the 
authors’ primary attempt was to bring the social phenomenology from Alfred 
Schütz’s The Phenomenology of the Social World (1967 [1932]) to the centre of 
social analysis, their anti-functionalist dialectics greatly resemble Parsons’ social 
system theory. The biggest difference from Parsons’ work is that Berger and 
Luckmann’s story is told from the experience point of view. Therefore, it somewhat 
describes the historical construction of the experiences that Parsons was talking about, but 
in more detail, instead of institutionalisation. Another contribution is in their detailed 
description of the socialisation process, especially as far as it differentiates between 
primary and secondary socialisation, the former being a more primitive and general 
stage and the latter involving institutional and more specialised knowledge. As the 
main beats of the institutionalisation story seem familiar here, it may be interesting 
to see whether social problems and change as characterised by Berger and Luckmann 
might be similarly recognisable. 
3.2.2 Trouble in an Island Paradise 
The institutionalisation-related problem that plagues human societies is the issue of 
integration and, according to Berger and Luckmann, specifically the integration of 
meanings. In the scenario of perfect institutionalisation, the order presents itself as 
given and generally known to everyone. In this situation, the problems with 
integration are purely subjective ones; i.e., the individual has not internalised the 
meanings that are socially agreed upon. The greater the discrepancy between this 
heuristic model and reality, the more objective the problems are: the problem 
involves integration of the social institutions themselves and a reality where 
disproportionate and incomplete institutions may and/or must exist side by side. 
Our best empirical knowledge indicates that this phenomenon does occur (Berger & 
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Luckmann 1991 [1966], 99–100). Simultaneously, institutions ‘tend to persist unless 
they become “problematic”’ (ibid., 135). In other words, when people do not share 
the same institutional presuppositions as the guiding principles for personal life but 
live in a complex reality wherein several institutional settings persist simultaneously, 
we face the problem of order and change. 
According to Berger and Luckmann, the co-existence of contradictory 
institutions should be impossible a priori in the conditions imposed by the functional 
necessities, so it can only be ‘accounted for […] in reference to the reflective 
consciousness of individuals who impose a certain logic upon their experience of the 
several institutions’ (ibid., 100). Now, Berger and Luckmann decide to take their 
argument a step further by returning to their A–B explications and offering an 
example of a triangle drama involving A–B–C, wherein A becomes dissatisfied with 
the prevailing situation. Theirs is a far-fetched example wherein the solution stems 
from the explanation that some behaviour patterns ‘are functional in terms of the 
“personality system”, while [others are] functional in terms of the […] “social 
system”’ (ibid.). The trick is that, after all the reconciliation of the various forms of 
knowledge, it all boils down to whether ‘A is successful in propagandizing [B and C] 
with this theory, [after which] their “knowledge” of the functional imperatives 
involved in their situation will have certain controlling consequences for their 
conduct. Mutatis mutandis, the same argument will hold if we transpose it from the 
face-to-face idyll of our example to the macro-social level’ (ibid., 101–102). This is 
why ‘it is essential to keep pushing questions about the historically available 
conceptualizations of reality from the abstract “What?” to the sociologically concrete 
“Says who?”’ (ibid., 134). 
From here, the problems of providing integrative meanings for the whole society 
and causing an increasingly fragmented social experience for the individuals multiply; 
‘[f]urthermore, there will be not only the problem of overall meaningful integration, 
but also a problem of legitimating the institutional activities of one type of actor vis-
à-vis other types’ (ibid., 102). Carried even further, the role specialisation may develop 
‘to the point where role-specific knowledge becomes altogether esoteric as against 
the common stock of knowledge […]. The chance of sub universes appearing, of 
course, increases steadily with progressive division of labour and economic surplus’ 
(ibid.). Even if we do not pay attention to the similarities with Durkheim’s and 
Parsons’ accounts, one may wonder how people find the ‘propaganda’ that stems 
from bilateral interaction plausible. It could also be asked where these society-
binding stories come from, since Berger and Luckmann imagine the abstract A–B–
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C existing at the same time as complex knowledge forms, such as mythologies, 
religions, and the social sciences79. We can only guess the answer. 
As their theorising progresses, Berger and Luckmann explain how legitimation is 
the key to the integration of symbolic universes and, therefore, for the entire 
institutional order. Again, in a contrast to Parsons’ theory, the legitimation ‘has a 
cognitive as well as a normative element. In other words, legitimation is not just a 
matter of “values”. It always implies “knowledge” as well’ (ibid., 111). As we already 
know, the knowledge in question is the everyday common sense held in the 
individual consciousness, acquired from everyday dialectical interaction. The same 
knowledge serves as a foundation for the symbolic universe that ‘provides order for 
the subjective apprehension of biographical experience. Experiences belonging to 
different spheres of reality are integrated by incorporation in the same, overarching 
universe of meaning’ (ibid., 115). The significance of the symbolic universes is 
underscored as follows: 
This nomic function of the symbolic universe for individual experience may be 
described quite simply by saying that it 'puts everything in its right place'. What is 
more, whenever one strays from the consciousness of this order (that is, when one 
finds oneself in the marginal situations of experience), the symbolic universe allows 
one 'to return to reality' – namely, to the reality of everyday life. Since this is, of course, 
the sphere to which all forms of institutional conduct and roles belong, the symbolic 
universe provides the ultimate legitimation of the institutional order by bestowing 
upon it the primacy in the hierarchy of human experience. (Ibid., 116) 
What we learn here is that the order of institutions resides in the individual 
consciousnesses that create the symbolic universes. These symbolic universes order 
the biographic experiences of the actors to correspond with the institutions to 
sufficient extent. Discrepancies between institutions are dealt with via legitimising 
‘propaganda’, whereby there is negotiation with others, on one side or another of 
the relevant dispute. Institutional change takes place mostly in development in which 
‘more complex forms of knowledge emerge and an economic surplus is built up’ 
(ibid., 134). The specialist knowledge then becomes ‘increasingly removed from the 
pragmatic necessities of everyday life’, and, hence, conflicts emerge (ibid., 134–135). 
 
79 There is a striking similarity between Berger and Luckmann’s so-called Robinson stories, which 
economists have long referred to, and what Marx problematises in his Capital. Marx criticises David 
Ricardo, a classic figure in political economics, for the same fallacy: ‘He makes the primitive hunter 
and the primitive fisher straightway, as owners of commodities, exchange fish and game in the 
proportion in which labour time is incorporated in these exchange values. On this occasion he 
commits the anachronism of making these men apply to the calculation, so far as their implements 
have to be taken into account, the annuity tables in current use on the London Exchange in the year 
1817’ (Marx 2010 [1867], 87). 
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Still, Berger and Luckmann understand that ‘[t]he historical outcome of each clash 
of gods was determined by those who wielded the better weapons rather than those 
who had the better arguments’, and it follows that, in any intra-societal conflict, ‘[h]e 
who has the bigger stick has the better chance of imposing his definitions of reality’ 
(ibid., 127). 
In this respect, they recognise the role of interests in society, but that is 
subordinated to the mechanisms creating the conflicts in the first place. In essence, 
any kind of special or everyday knowledge could prevail, but the overarching 
symbolic universe happens to be the one that it is. Interests then follow the existing 
knowledge. Against this backdrop, one can understand the critique arising from the 
Marxist ideology theory80 that Berger and Luckmann were supposed to transcend. 
By adopting Mannheim’s concept of relationism, under which ‘knowledge must 
always be knowledge from a certain position’ (ibid., 22), they turned the question 
into one of perspective. While this quite rightly brings out the contextual nature of 
the knowledge, it also demolishes its historical foundations. Hall (1978, 21) was a 
key Marxist ideology theorist who elaborated thus on the problem with regard to 
ideas – even before ‘ideas’ become a novel explanatory factor in institutionalism 
studies: 
[T]he sociology of knowledge has a complex position in relation to the theory of 
ideology. Ideas are no longer treated in terms of their historical roots, the classes 
which subscribe to them, the specific conjunctures in which they arise, their effectivity 
in winning the consent of the dominated classes to the way the world is defined and 
understood by the dominant classes. The relation of the ideological instance to other 
instances in a social formation has been obliterated. Their specific practico-historical 
function is lost. Ideas have been given a far wider and more inclusive range: they form 
the background to every social process. Indeed, it would be more correct to say that 
social processes are treated essentially in terms of ideas. They are pre-eminent because 
it is through ideas that we construct social reality itself. There is no objective reality – and 
hence there can be no ‘scientific’ knowledge of it. There are only the different ‘takes 
on reality’, lodged in the different perspectives which social actors bring to the world. 
The area of everyday social interactions only feels like a substantial sector of reality, 
because it is the zone in which the vast majority of individual perspectives overlap. 
Juha Koivisto (1995, 70) also pays attention to how the connections between the 
historical knowledge and social relations fade away amid the transformation into 
everyday knowledge. In addition, where this knowledge came from remains a 
mystery, since in Berger and Luckmann’s thought experiment it is created in the 
interaction of two sovereign, completely asocial(ised) individuals (ibid.). In sum, 
 
80 Marxist ideology theory will be presented in the last main chapter of this thesis. 
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lifeworld theorists such as Berger and Luckmann seem to share with diverse 
ideational neo-institutionalist scholars the idea that there exists some kind of social 
equilibrium, wherein the only resources available, ideas and meanings, are distributed 
equally at the start. They also imagine sovereign individuals with capabilities to 
change the world through negotiation wherein people could simply be persuaded to 
abandon their imagined interests. In their world, all knowledge is produced without 
any connection to objects apart from other sovereign individuals’ corresponding 
consciousness. While there are some references to bigger sticks, the power here is in 
ideas, and in the ways of using them (see also Carstensen & Schmidt 2016). 
In my interpretation, this is due to the strange inversion mentioned above, 
wherein Durkheim’s question pertaining to the objectivity of the ‘external’ world for 
an actor is at the same time re-created and demolished by way of a certain kind of 
causal reasoning. It seems that Berger and Luckmann arrived at the inverse question 
by trying to capture the essence of the social through tracing it along a one-
dimensional causal chain. So, where does the chain lead? 
3.2.3 The End of the Causal Rope 
So far, while addressing several neo-institutional approaches to causality, I have 
discussed also how the linear causality model may have affected Berger and 
Luckmann’s social constructionalist reasoning as well. As brought out in the 
previous chapter, for establishing neo-institutional lifeworld-rooted theories, 
causality served as a legitimation and demarcation tool. ‘Ideas’ needed to be ‘real’, 
and idea science needed to be based on causal reasoning for it to be convincing in 
the eyes of the scientific community (for example, see Schmidt 2010b, 2017). In 
Berger and Luckmann’s constructionism, it served as a theoretical background factor 
since these authors were troubled by the question of the source of the empirically 
evident stability of human order. Embedded in this question is an organic link to 
linear causal reasoning through the assumption that some ultimate factor behind 
institutionalisation can be found, while it also leads back to the old realism–relativism 
debate, understood as material–ideal in neo-institutionalism, where also the borders 
of valid science are drawn and negotiated. I will address this issue, however briefly, 
since I find it important in making my case as to how following linear causal 
reasoning both leads to problems in social explaining in general and has led 
particularly to lifeworld scholars explicating their primary explanatory factor ‘ideas’ 
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as causal-object. In addition, this handling is part of building my case for relational 
social theory. 
The question of causality has been a problem for social constructionists. This is 
because in causal reasoning some isolated social agents or factors ought to be causally 
responsible for the existence of any object, or kind/class, and its corresponding 
properties (Díaz-León 2013, 5). In these terms, it is hard to see anything social in 
each object or kind, since all the properties these constructions may have should be 
derivable from their constitutive parts only (hence also the above-mentioned 
inversion of Durkheim’s problem). Moreover, I maintain that this is a more general 
problem especially for the kind of social research wherein social questions are 
modelled in a language of linear causality and, thus, in ideational neo-institutionalism, 
where it leads to forming of causal-objects of ideas. This is also why there must be 
something at the end of the causal chain: the ultimate explanatory category, from 
which all the other things can be derived. In Finland, there is a saying that if you pull 
the rope long enough, you will only reach the end of it. Perhaps this is the case here. 
What is lost in the inversion is the social relations. Durkheim had a somewhat 
incomplete picture of the mechanisms by which the individual-level action turning 
into social action acquires properties that are solely products of those relations 
created in this association. This altered state, as Durkheim termed it, is something 
that exerts effects upon the very same association of people that created it in the first 
place. In an attempt to be more specific with regard to the mechanisms, Parsons 
developed his ‘wholly and fundamentally relational’ theory of social systems, derived 
from complementary role-expectations. While there are numerous similarities 
between Parsons’ conceptions and Berger and Luckmann’s ‘relationism’, the starting 
point for Parsons was the relation between A and B, whereas in Berger and 
Luckmann’s treatment it was A’s and B’s consciousness – more specifically, ideas, 
meaningful thought contents. Parsons struggled to explain where his ‘norms’ 
originate, but it is also hard to understand how Berger and Luckmann’s dialectics 
work if all the external social objectiveness resides in the individual minds. 
It would be useless to turn this into an actor–structure dichotomy or, more 
generally, defend either one via an object- or kind-first approach. This would 
inevitably follow from the requirement of deciding which position we want to defend 
in relation to causal logic with clear-cut cause and effect at the respective ends of the 
chain (or rope). I instead defend a position from which theoretical interest especially 
should be focused on the social relations, associations between people81. These social 
 
81 I expand on this stance further in the last main chapter but will state here that it also resembles many 
contemporary theoretical accounts considering institutions (e.g., Hodgson 2006; Lawson 2016). 
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relations may be considered productive by their very nature in that people are capable 
of creating institutions historically without conscious effort, by coming together in a 
(co-)operative manner. These institutions are dependent on the presence of human 
beings and their (re)productive conduct but independent of any given individual. As 
the operation of institutions escapes from the control of individuals, they become 
an ‘outside’ force in relation to the individuals and hence encountered as ‘objective’. 
This is because people cannot control all possible effects, especially of their collective 
behaviour. These effects accumulate and build structures in social practices that 
become objectified (i.e., institutionalised) over the course of history and get 
articulated and entwined differently in different situations. This is why they cannot 
be derived from individuals (i.e., from consciousness) alone – they are not under the 
control of any single individual. Shrouding this perspective from view might produce 
drastic results as theorists fight over the objectiveness of social phenomena. 
We are fortunate that this potential problem has not gone wholly unnoticed: for 
example, Díaz-León (2013, 11) acknowledges that ‘any property that is constitutively 
socially constructed will be relational, not intrinsic, given that by definition, what 
makes a property constitutively socially constructed is the fact that something 
satisfies the property only if it bears a relation to certain social practices and 
communities’. Indeed, per the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy definition, relations 
‘hold between things, or, alternatively, relations are borne by one thing to other things, 
or, another alternative paraphrase, relations have a subject of inherence whose 
relations they are and termini to which they relate the subject’ (MacBride 2016). One 
way to express this in more general terms would be to say that the relations are 
dependencies. The property in question is a result of, and therefore dependent on, 
the relation(s) that constitute(s) the object(s) in question. Now, we could get mired 
in metaphysics by discussing which objects are ‘mind-independent’ and which are 
not (Díaz-León 2013, 6). From my point of view, herein lies the danger of social 
ontology that lurks behind the ways in which we try to track the essential properties 
of various objects and further differentiate which properties are those of mind-
independent objects and which are the mind’s properties. An excellent example of 
this is Paul Boghossian’s (2007, 38) rat race of proving, from the realist standpoint, 
that constructionism is nonsense: 
How, then, could their [electrons’, mountains’, dinosaurs’, giraffes’, rivers’, and lakes’] 
existence depend on us? How could we create our own past? Wouldn’t this commit 
us to a bizarre form of backwards causation, where the cause (our activity) comes 
later than its effects (the existence of the dinosaurs)? 
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This is a crystallisation of how the constructionism debate is stuck in what 
Boghossian (ibid.) quite rightly calls the problem of causation. While there are other 
problems too, it is fair to say that they mainly follow from this. If one constructs the 
questions as Boghossian does in the quotation above, the answers would be ‘they 
don’t’, ‘we can’t’, and ‘it would’. However, this is the point where it all goes terribly 
wrong. Please, let me elaborate. 
3.2.4 Beyond the Worldly Dough? 
Boghossian’s anti-constructionism and anti-relativism are built on two general 
principles. Firstly, he firmly stands behind the very realist fundamental idea that the 
objects existing independently of the description truly do exist independently of our 
descriptions of them (just as in Díaz-León’s formulation above, referring to mind-
dependent and mind-independent objects in the world). Duly noted! Secondly, in 
addition to taking that fundamentalist stance, he sees the dispute as being about the 
existence of the objects qua objects. As Boghossian puts it, constructionists see facts 
as description-dependent. This view is somewhat understandable, in light of the 
cases he presents, such as that of Latour denying that tuberculosis existed before the 
bacillus was ‘discovered by Robert Koch in 1882’ (ibid., 26). Provocative claims of 
this sort create easy ammunition for the science wars82. 
Boghossian’s general point in talking about the metaphysical objects that are at 
the hard core of the realist view is that, for the constructionist argumentation to 
work in the first place, it always needs ‘worldly dough’ (ibid., 22–23; 36–38). From 
any sets of objects (apples, pears, or oranges), one may put together any set of objects 
and give the cluster whatever name one wishes (picnic basket, work of art, or supper), 
but the possibilities for doing so are always dependent on the existing worldly dough 
(the fruits). It follows that the world exists ‘largely independently of us and our 
beliefs about it’, and also, therefore, [f]acts of the form – information E justifies 
belief B – are society-independent facts’ (ibid., 22). On the other hand, according to 
Boghossian, for constructionists, the world and, therefore, also facts related to the 
 
82 When recently interviewed for The New York Times, Latour stated that he ‘had never seen himself as 
doing anything so radical, or absurd, as calling into question the existence of reality’ (Kofman 2018). 
Latour asked a full 20 years ago: ‘[I]s it even necessary to say again that reference [for the 
realist/relativist, “out there”] is real, social and narrative at once?’ (Latour 1999, 22). However, at the 
same time he described his theoretical movement as ‘one of the many anti-essential movements’ (on 
page 20), and he has made contradicting statements about the matter, on different occasions, as indeed 
highlighted by Boghossian (2007, 26). 
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form ‘are not what they are independently of us and our social context; rather, all 
such facts are constructed in a way that reflects our contingent needs and interests’ 
(ibid.). 
Now, Boghossian makes two kinds of argument above. Firstly, he confuses the 
fact with the object. This seems rather amazing, but Boghossian manages to find 
examples such as the one of the tuberculosis bacillus, wherein at least it seems that 
the constructionists are talking about the existence of the bacillus per se as dependent 
on our beliefs. This is at the nub of the dispute, where it might be that Boghossian 
refuses to understand that the constructionists’ point of view was never that; instead, 
they see the fact as the significant question, whether such things as realist-style 
independent objects exist. Boghossian does recognise that institutions such as 
money and the priesthood are socially constructed (ibid., 33–34), but, according to 
him, it makes absolutely no sense to confuse the objects, such as constellations of 
stars, with the priesthood. This is a reasonable statement, but it just might be that 
the constructionists were not talking about the stars as existing objects in the sense 
Boghossian addresses. For them, that may not be a very interesting question. 
This leads us to the second type of argument, wherein Boghossian sees the 
dependence–independence question as a straightforward binary matter. The main 
idea here is to defend the realist assertion that there are objects existing outside the 
socially constructed world. Boghossian’s formulation of constructionists’ notion of 
facts about the form is revealing. He says that all ‘facts are constructed in a way that 
reflects our contingent needs and interests’ (ibid. 2007, 22; emphasis added). I do not 
recognise the need for the amendment ‘needs and interests’, since it results in several 
reservations with regard to the constructionist conceptualisation of facts. It seems 
that Boghossian needs it to salvage his argument; i.e., he has to construct such an 
image of constructionism to mesh with his needs and interests. One can see the 
irony. However, there is absolutely no need to treat objects thus when operating with 
social construction, since, as Mallon states in the extract above but with my emphasis 
added, ‘[s]ocial constructionists are particularly interested in phenomena that are 
contingent upon human culture and human decisions’. I suggest that, when dealing with 
social questions, we should focus on this contingency instead of trying to prove 
anything to exist per se independently of human perception. 
The argumentation in social constructionist literature itself usually gets bogged 
down with things that are treated as metaphysical objects, with the concomitant felt 
need to force them into clear-cut causal relations with other objects (including orders 
of precedence), although the ‘object’ might be a meaning, legal arrangement, or social 
practice. Even in Mallon’s and Díaz-León’s accounts of constitutive social 
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construction that address the institutional issues of collective human action and/or 
behaviour, the reasoning gets stuck in these essentialist categories. This is 
problematic, since the properties then are found in the objects themselves, while it 
is the relations that should be under examination. It is not the mind-(in)dependence 
or description-(in)dependence that should be given the attention but – forgive me 
the tautological expression – relation-(in)dependence. 
If social constructionism is interested in the humanly contingent phenomena, we 
may express this by saying that constructionists are interested in phenomena that are 
dependent on us being in productive relations with each other and other objects. 
The real objects so dear to Boghossian should be considered not mind-independent 
or description-independent but objects with non-contingent properties. Some objects in 
the world maintain properties that are not contingent in the way constructionists 
suggest, as in the case of stars and constellations. The realist argument demands that 
the objects exist as such, independent, but the significance of any object’s existence 
for us as humans is wholly and fundamentally dependent on the relation that is 
established with that object. An object may or may not exist without us being aware 
of it, but it becomes significant once a relation between it and us is established. All 
objects may retain their constitutive properties, be they ‘social’, as with money, or 
‘physical’, as with metal that acts as the bearer of money, but the non-contingent 
properties of these objects reveal themselves only in relation to us, whatever they 
may be. Therefore, the stars may (or may not) have some properties independent of 
the relationship with humans, but they just do not matter to us without the relationship. 
Boghossian may pursue his realist argument all he wants, but it does not alter the 
fact that he is stuck in his own relation with these objects that are, on one hand, 
dependent on the relation per se and, on the other, dependent on the meanings that 
he uses to communicate his findings. It may be that Boghossian is right that the stars 
were there long before anyone called sets of them constellations, but the relation 
that was established between stars and us enabled the debate. Again, this does not 
mean that objects such as stars or bacilli would not exist if Boghossian or Latour 
were not in relation with them. Rather, their non-contingent properties have 
significance for the established relation that should be considered essential and, 
therefore, accorded primary focus for especially social scientists. A relationship must 
be established for anything to become treatable in the first place, whatever the 
differences between the objects’ actual properties and those inscribed in the relations 
that connect us with these objects. 
Let us suppose that Ramses II died of tuberculosis in 1213 BC. It is a fact that 
Ramses did not have to be aware of the disease that killed him; the bacillus existed 
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and killed him anyway. Whether a case was diagnosed by Koch in 1882 or a Chinese 
doctor in 2018 is immaterial in that the properties the bacillus has in relation with 
humans are not a matter of culture or meaning. Yet, in both cases, it is the relation 
that matters: whether between the bacillus and Ramses II, between the bacillus and 
Koch, between Ramses II and Koch, or between Koch and the Chinese doctor. 
From the social scientific perspective, there is a great difference here with regard to 
the facts of what killed Ramses II: was it revenge of the gods or tuberculosis? 
Because the relation between the bacillus and people has historically changed, its 
meaning differs dramatically between the whole society around Ramses II and 
around that Chinese doctor. 
The non-contingent properties may not be dependent as such on the ways in 
which we treat them, but the facts that are formulated on their basis are83. 
Furthermore, the properties of an object affect the relation that is established – for 
example, if I get skin cancer, it is hard to negotiate the cancer away. However, there 
remains difficulty in establishing clear-cut differentiation among the objects present 
in the relationship: was it the sun, the rays, the atmosphere, a genetic predisposition, 
or the lack of sunscreen cream that was responsible for my cancer? In another 
example, if I decide to resign the membership of Finland’s state church that is mine 
by default, will my mother be upset, or do I just receive some benefits from not 
having to pay church tax84? These are always primarily matters of productive 
relations, although observation of the related causal relationships in isolation usually 
is needed also for shedding light on these issues. 
I have emphasised that, in particular, the social sciences’ theoretical interest 
should be directed to the productive relations. In the spirit in which Parsons 
described co-ordination and integration of the system as two sides of an equation, 
one could argue that the stability and change in societies work as two sides to a single 
phenomenon, for no change could be perceived without stability to compare it with. 
What kinds of relations produce change in conditions of stability, or vice versa, and 
how do some stable relations last in conditions of turmoil? These would be matters 
 
83 Even this might not always be true. Barad (2007, 106) points to one unexplained phenomenon in 
physics as represented via the ‘two-slit experiment’, wherein observation of the phenomenon changes 
the result of the measurement – ‘the nature of the observed phenomenon changes with corresponding 
changes in the [measuring] apparatus’. My relations-based approach to non-contingent properties 
somewhat resembles the overall idea of Barad’s agential realism, where in the scientific measurement 
‘the measure[d] properties refer to phenomena’ and ‘[t]he referent is not an observation-independent 
object but a phenomenon’ (see page 20). Moreover, according to Barad, measurement is where the 
‘natural’ and the ‘social’ meet. 
84 Everyone baptised in Finland belongs to the Evangelical Lutheran congregation at least until age 18, 
when one can resign or, alternatively, have church tax automatically deducted from one’s income. 
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of social conditions or frameworks in which people’s collective practices take place. 
The question would be about the type, quality, or class of relations established 
between objects, whether social, physical, cultural, or something else. Also, several 
kinds of relations might exist among a given set of objects, but if the theory is stuck 
in considering objects with innate properties and clear-cut causal relations, it is 
impossible to see the productiveness of the relations themselves. The discussion of 
neo-institutionalist dichotomies above laid bare the consequences. However, now 
that the relations are established, the background assumption of social equilibrium 
remains to impinge on our analysis. Moreover, it should be explained further why 
social relations may set themselves against us as an ‘external’ force. Before we delve 
into these questions, however, some final thoughts are in order with regard to social 
constructionism, as is synthesis of the entire chapter’s discussion of the classic social-
theoretical division between system and lifeworld thinking. 
3.2.5 Interim Conclusions on the Social Construction of the Lifeworld 
When embarking on my analysis of social constructionism above, I suggested that a 
shift in theory from the determining social conditions to social constructionist mind-
dependency has taken place. According to my analysis, the transformation took place 
through Berger and Luckmann’s constructionist theory. Though that theory shows 
remarkable resemblance to Parsons’ theory of social systems, Berger and Luckmann 
considered the social sciences’ standard functionalist explanations to be theoretical 
legerdemain. This was arrogance that they could not afford, since their own theory 
of institutionalisation borrowed greatly from Parsons’ functionalism, even only if 
when entering the realm of ‘psychologization’, about which Durkheim had warned 
social scientists. This led Berger and Luckmann’s dialectics into problems, which 
they could not explain away. Still, they also emphasised questions that remain 
relevant today, questions pertaining to the role of subjects’ (actors’) consciousness 
and the ‘starting point’ of the society, in a counter-motion balancing out the earlier 
structural theories, for which the society was always already there. 
Since Berger and Luckmann wanted to turn their backs on Parsons, they had to 
try to find an other-than-functionalist solution for their problem with regard to the 
‘origin’ of society or an institution, a solution that would also address the problem 
of order sufficiently well. They saw the order as a result of everyday knowledge 
institutionalised into a symbolic universe. Here, the fatal inversion took place by 
which a question of ultimate causal explanatory category emerged via reasoning that 
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all things, whether phenomenon or society, should have an equally locatable starting 
point. In the resulting thought experiment, society was found in the consciousness 
of abstract, asocial(lised), and sovereign A and B. In the absence of a social reason 
for people to seek equilibrium collectively, the question was moulded into language 
of common sense wherein individuals want to reconcile their needs and interests, 
together. In this view, the norms are set in a ‘propaganda’ contest – legitimation – 
wherein people choose from among the socially available theories what they want to 
believe of the world but are forced to adjust if their individual-level stock of 
knowledge stands in excessively stark contradiction with the generally accepted 
everyday knowledge. Since people’s Weltanschauungs cannot be forced into the same 
mould, several stocks of knowledge may thrive in parallel, simultaneously. Thus, 
contradictory institutions may live side by side. 
Their best intentions aside, I have found that Berger and Luckmann’s 
constructionist depiction of the institutionalisation of social reality ended up being 
largely a description of the formation of individuals’ historical experiences. It does 
not describe how institutions come into being, because the fully mind-dependent 
origins are mired in the problems of A–B dialectics, however well it might describe 
that historical development of experiences. In other words, their account of 
institutionalisation could offer valuable insights for explaining how individuals’ 
experiences evolve as a function of their life processes – a matter that was addressed 
both in neo-institutionalism and in Parsons’ system theory but not explained by 
either in such detail. 
With regard to the general constructionism discussion, the term ‘contingency’ 
proved to be useful for understanding the significance and the role of relations in 
(social) research. While Berger and Luckmann’s treatment left a lasting ontological 
fingerprint on theory of social phenomena, it also has aided in understanding what 
kind of union prevails between social relations and the contingency of objects that 
people deal with. These questions keep troubling social philosophers and theorists, 
and the debate continues to gravitate toward realist–relativist conceptions of the 
‘real’ nature of the world. In these formulations, everything coalesces in questions of 
whether ‘mind’ should be considered first or second. However, this phrasing of the 
question makes it ultimately an issue of precedence, and it also objectifies the 
controversial elements, such as ‘mind’. Accordingly, I have recommended the 
alternative course of dealing with the issue in relational terms, whereby no ‘object’ 
would be first. These operational categories should be seen in their productive 
relations with each other. Moreover, as social theory, social constructionism adopts 
the above-mentioned social equilibrium approach to society, since it assumes only 
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mind-dependent objects as a starting point for social issues. Without bringing in 
social conditions, such theory leaves the relation between social necessities and their 
relationship to, for example, division of labour and structural inequalities 
unaddressed. Against this backdrop, it is hard to see where new ideas or their appeal 
originates. 
3.3 The Social World As Equilibrium 
Let us return to the interpretation I have suggested in which the social ‘thing’ that 
Durkheim saw as external for individuals is the compelling associations between 
people, social relations. As Therborn (1976, 246) has brought out, political economy 
was the point of departure for Durkheim, with ‘[h]is main and decisive criticism 
[being] that the economists isolated economic phenomena from their social context’ 
(ibid., 252). This connects Durkheim with Parsons (1991 [1953], 20–23), whose 
central criticism of economic theory was the same: the economy is one of the 
sub-systems of society, without any primacy in relation to other sub-systems. 
Therefore, people’s interconnected operations require a social base. Still, just as 
Durkheim did, Parsons adopted the idea of equilibrium as a spontaneous state of 
collective action if left uninterrupted. Whereas Durkheim saw in this a general moral 
issue and necessity, Parsons responded by developing his relational theory of the 
complementary role-expectations resulting in the integration compromise, which is 
simultaneously able to explain the resource allocation within functioning division of 
labour. 
According to Parsons, social conditions such as scarcity, in its relational and non-
relational forms, create differences and divisions between people, with some always 
having more goods and better positions than others do. Hence, all structural social 
arrangements must be normative in nature, since norms are directed to conciliating 
these differences by ‘explaining’ to people why these arrangements prevail. For a 
non-utilitarian solution to the problem of order, Parsons suggested that people must 
follow some normative standards to sufficient extent. These standards differ in the 
purposes they serve, as they organise people’s behaviours in complex societies in 
such a way that some necessary social functions are kept fulfilled, such as division of 
labour and obedience to the law. In other words, Parsons’ theory of social structures 
comprises three elements, which come together in the concept of shared organising 
standards. 
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They must be shared in that their existence depends on the majority of us: they 
cannot be ‘predominantly contingent on highly particularized situations [and they] 
must extend between individuals and over time’ (Parsons 1991 [1951], 11). Hence, 
the structures are a result of collective human conduct yet are beyond the reach of 
any particular individual. Secondly, whether they integrate or allocate 
people/resources relative to some aim or objective, the structures organise human 
interaction. Without this function-oriented organising component, the collective 
interaction is bound to fall into chaos. A language without any grammar would be 
futile. Finally, since this organising is directed toward a shared objectives, it holds a 
standard that directs the interaction more specifically. Alternatively, the standards 
exist for purposes of organising: they direct the interaction to some shared goal 
through behavioural patterns. These standards are learned in socialisation processes 
and constantly upheld through social control, which makes them wholly and 
fundamentally relational; they are social products that can be changed. While they 
prevent highly complex societies from falling apart, they are not necessarily actively 
accepted, let alone supported by all the individual people, and they may cause 
discontent and contradictions both within and between the institutions driving 
change. 
These abstract structures always include a cultural element, for, in Parsonian 
vocabulary, culture both refers to symbols and meanings that mediate 
communication and connects it with our value and norm standards. If structures 
represent the relatively stable nature of human institutions, culture populates those 
structures with meaningful content. Values and norms integrate people’s actions one 
with another by offering them a ‘criterion or standard for selection among the 
alternatives of orientation’ (ibid., 12) that informs them of the acceptable conduct. 
It follows that if we live in a world of differences that is structured on some 
principles, these values must always have a normative nature: they give instruction 
for our day-to-day life and justify the differences between people in a certain way, 
which is socially constructed but also set in relation to prevailing social conditions. 
What Parsons lacked was an explanation as to where these values and norms are 
derived from and as to the origin of the structures described. This was the stuff of 
disagreement between system and lifeworld theorists, leading to the social 
constructionist movement 50 years ago and still serving to legitimise demarcation 
within the neo-institutionalist movement. 
It is interesting that Berger and Luckmann’s theory of social constructionism 
recognised the problem of order as the starting point for social explaining but turned 
Parsons’ formula around by both characterising it as legerdemain and also denying 
 189 
societies’ functional imperatives. Their view of these imperatives as instead arising 
in a derivative fashion renders the institutional order understandable only with regard 
to the ‘knowledge’ its members have of it. Thereby, their internalisation–
externalisation dialectics of society dispelled the structural differences between 
people that arise from arrangements in accordance with which resources in society 
are distributed, and that are beyond individuals’ control. As mind-first theory, Berger 
and Luckmann’s social constructionism takes an agential, individualistic approach to 
social order that has been followed to this day by ideational scholars within neo-
institutionalism. 
For their institutionalisation theory, Berger and Luckmann adopted a framework 
very similar to that of Parsons and took people’s historically developing experiences 
as the starting point for the analysis. Experiences constitute the roles that people 
play in day-to-day life. What arises from this is an interesting description of the 
development of historical experiences of members of society rather than an actual 
theory of institutionalisation. It is regrettable that in turning Parsons’ formula around 
they ended up with the above-mentioned inversion wherein the whole relational 
logic is transformed into linear causality. Both ends of the causal chain are reified by 
an implicit suggestion that there must be clear objects that make up the relation and 
where the direction of the cause–effect chain is determined. Thus results the logic 
wherein the ‘thought content’ as the aggregated cause produces the institution. This 
kind of logic, already identified in the new institutionalist logic, could be considered 
causal-object reasoning. The primary worry with this explanation model is that it 
dismisses the productiveness of the social relations while the lifeworld theories seem 
to anchor their ultimate premises more generally in objectifying micro-foundations. 
Micro-foundations in social theories represent an agential approach to collective 
human action, wherein it is claimed that social phenomena can be derived and 
modelled from individuals alone. As we have seen with regard to neo-
institutionalism, agent-theorists tend to insist that structures cast people as dopes, 
thus portraying human activity in such a way that even human rights may be 
disregarded (for example, see Mehta 2011, 45; Hay 2011, 78–79). The problem of 
agency is significant in the sense that people are real, living humans with capabilities 
that are exceptional in animals, such as reflexive ability that extends to making plans 
with regard to future conduct and to (re)assessing those plans in a creative manner. 
This probably also explains a large amount of the variation between the ideas that 
people have and use (for any of various purposes) and, to some extent, accounts for 
the intra-institution changes that the idea scholars considered in the previous chapter 
sought to explain. However, I sense a trap here, in suggesting that a human being is 
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a sovereign, autonomous individual and the structures that we discuss in the social 
sciences are only a matter of individuals’ attitudes, in the end. In my interpretation, 
the agential theorisation addressed here also signals normative aversion to structural 
theories. This positioning should be reconsidered since it results in losing sight of 
the context of human conduct and participates in a project wherein the structurally 
produced and maintained differences between people (and ideas about them) are 
reduced to problems connected with individuals’ attitudes. 
While lifeworld theories need the micro-foundation to explain the institutions, 
they seem to share one premise with the system theories introduced above, of 
equilibrium as grounding for the collective human action. This premise is somewhat 
justified since these theories focus on non-utilitarian phrasing of the problem of 
order, which Parsons addressed as ‘institutional integration’. Accordingly, the 
endeavour is to respond to the problem of how a society may hold together when 
all men seek to realise desires that few can fulfil (Parsons 1949 [1937], 89–94). As 
Parsons abandoned the utilitarian solution and focused on the normative premises 
behind human conduct, the equilibrium premise remained. However, while Marxist 
theory has always stressed the opposite approach to system integration, some recent 
neo-institutionalist accounts have also questioned the premises that most social 
theory has leant on for many of its fundaments since the dawn of specialised social 
sciences. For example, in one of his recent texts, Blyth (2011, 99–100) questions the 
stability assumption and aims to show how misleading the presupposition of social 
equilibria as the normal state of the world is. However, as always, he reduces these 
struggles to struggles over ideas, thereby reiterating the problematic presuppositions 
as to the ‘ideal’ that were unpicked in the previous chapter. Therefore, my next step 
is to suggest a wholly different approach to matters institutional and to the problem 
of order: an ideological-theory approach wherein the ideas represent a systemic 
phenomenon of organising people’s lifeworlds in capitalist societies. 
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4 IDEOLOGY IN CAPITALIST SOCIETIES 
In this chapter, I address the critical ideology theory that opens the last layer of my 
theoretical analysis of the problem of order, and the social institutions that follow. 
It is related organically to the foregoing analysis while it still provides its own twist. 
In the previous chapters, while dealing with the theory of social structures, I have 
pointed out repeatedly how vital it is to explain the structural effects without deriving 
them from individual minds. Whereas Parsons provided a theory of structures that 
sheds light on their immediate reproduction mechanisms, the logic of structural 
external effects remains unexplained. For this, we need to tackle the questions of 
unconsciousness and competitive capitalist relations. Just as Parsons connected up 
his structural-functionalism with a conditional term of scarcity, this chapter’s analysis 
of capitalist society and capitalist relations puts meat on the structural bones by 
situating the mechanisms of creating and maintaining scarcity; explaining through 
examples how differences between people are produced and maintained, and 
identifying how dynamics created by these mechanisms lead to the structural ‘surplus 
effect’ heretofore missing from the picture. Capitalism is a concrete condition 
creating scarcity for what is a highly specific purpose in functionalist terms: making 
profit. This chapter’s final contribution is to turn around the equilibrium 
presupposition discussed earlier on and, in so doing, offer one explanation for 
structural relations being ‘out of hand’ (displaying a strong disorganising tendency) 
but still holding without the system crashing under the weight of its own 
impossibility. 
I begin where I ended the previous chapter, with Blyth’s reservations about the 
presupposition of social equilibrium as a normal state of the world. Blyth (2011, 83–
86) listed four fundamental assumptions of social scientific theory before the ‘turn 
to ideas’, under which everything is seen as, in essence, relying on a self-perpetuating 
circle of equilibrium, linear causality, normally distributed outcomes, and exogenous 
change. In this view, in the absence of interruption to this innate harmony from 
outside, the world kept circulating in its relatively predictable and stable manner, in 
which change was an exception. Blyth goes on to characterise the ‘idea’ approach as 
bringing uncertainty, inconstant causes, dynamics, and contingencies – in sum, 
change – to the centre of the social sciences (ibid., 83–84, 99). 
 192 
So far so good, but we have seen that placing ‘ideas’ at the core of refraction of 
the social reality might lead to serious problems, especially with regard to bringing 
ideas and their carriers, agents, into meaningful social context. Another problem 
emerges when Blyth himself implements the more implicit assumption of linear 
causality into his reasoning. This paradoxical move leads to searching for some 
ultimate factor in social order at the end of the causal chain, and, since structural 
reasons are no longer available, he ends up adopting a popular evolutionary approach 
to social explaining (ibid., 97–99). I maintain that this is because he lacks sufficient 
understanding of any historical explanation of human institutions that would neither 
automatically exclude evolutionary understandings of social phenomena nor require 
them. In any case, it seems to be quite a stretch to apply evolutionary theory with 
respect to a phenomenon such as climate change for explaining a particular kind of 
‘spontaneous’ organising of people capable of bringing on that change. Moreover, 
when such reasoning is applied to the ideational framework explored in some detail 
in Chapter 2, the leap of faith becomes too great. Explaining requires an alternative 
approach. 
While I agree with many of Blyth’s views, I recognise that one does not have to 
see ideas as the ultimate explanatory category with regard to change in human 
societies. For example, change may stem from the contradictions (internal to social 
relations) that determine the conditions that people encounter and within which they 
must act. In addition, raising ideas to this position begs one to ask what ‘ideas’ 
actually are and where they and their appeal come from. Blyth’s fellow ideational 
theorists have not missed this question, however. Here lies the first point of 
connection with critical ideology theory as introduced in this chapter. When 
addressing neo-institutionalists’ questions about which ideas are available, their 
origins, and how they gain influence (e.g., Gofas & Hay 2010c, 23–24), ideology 
theory takes its turn to wrestle with the problem of order; however, it provides an 
alternative angle and specifies other factors that aid in understanding the social 
dynamics and what there is in the collective action that cannot be reduced to agents 
alone – the social factor. 
As I have already suggested, addressing institutions as historically developing, 
collective structures may offer at least a plausible answer to the question pertaining 
to the social remainder that vexes social theories. In simpler terms, the context 
matters, whereas isolating ideas as actors links events one to another in clear-cut 
causal chains. Aware of this, Pierson addressed the large inequalities of power in 
contexts wherein ideas become organised as systems of ideologies. Furthermore, 
instead of conceiving of various kinds of inequalities frequently erupting into 
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conflicts, Pierson (2016, 125) saw the exact opposite – ‘large inequalities of power 
are unlikely to generate open political struggles’. This is precisely because of power 
asymmetries in agenda control and systematic cultural manipulation: 
Powerful actors can gain advantage by inculcating views in others that are to their 
advantage. In essence, this involves what Marx termed false consciousness. Those 
controlling the media, schools, churches, think tanks, or other key cultural institutions 
may promote beliefs in others (about what is desirable or possible) that serve the 
interests of the powerful. Again, what looks like consensus on the surface may reflect 
underlying inequalities of influence. (Ibid., 127) 
In this account, as critical ideology theory too suggests, ideas do not float freely but 
are tied to various kinds of apparatus, which, again, possess unequal resources and 
possibilities to take part in formation of public opinion. These apparatuses are 
‘grounded in durable policy arrangements’ and used to ‘exercise authority’ in a field 
of ‘fierce contestation’ (ibid., 132). The powers develop over time and 
simultaneously become less and less visible as the process progresses (ibid., 134). It 
was on the basis of these observations that Pierson set a new research agenda: after 
identifying how ‘the very concept of ideology has lost ground in the empirical study 
of politics with the rise of behavioralism and experimentalism’ (ibid., 136–139), he 
states that just this ‘ideology’ binds together the distinct areas of institutional power. 
Pierson’s agenda setting connects neo-institutionalism and ideology theory in two 
further ways. Firstly, it places ideas in historical social institutional context, and, 
secondly, he addresses the concept of false consciousness – so strongly associated 
with Marxist theory – also with regard to the realm of institutionalists such as Hay, 
Blyth, Streeck, and Carstensen and Schmidt. 
With this chapter, I suggest that the context in which social institutions and, thus, 
ideological powers operate is capitalism, where I consider modern societies at least 
in the West to be capitalist in nature. Capitalist models and their phases of 
development may vary between countries or regions, but societies with highly 
developed institutions of individual rights and liberties to ‘own, buy, and sell private 
property’ (Hodgson 2015, 259) coupled with the necessary and supporting 
institutions constitute the phenomenon. Capitalism has a crucial role in creating the 
necessary incentives, behaviour patterns, and interdependencies for people’s 
operations in these societies. Simultaneously, its internal contradictions create 
conditions whereby instability is predominantly present, leading to ideological 
reconciliation of social conflicts of the manner Pierson refers to in the extract above. 
I should stress that, instead of embarking on empirical analysis, I aim at providing 
theoretical context that supplements existing institutional theory and thereby enables 
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multifaceted analysis of the dominant ideological institutions of our modern, 
Western societies today. In addition, critical ideology theory suggests that the 
difference between system and lifeworld theories can be surmounted in a manner 
that also eliminates the need to see ideologies as ‘false consciousness’, although it 
does not necessarily suggest that false consciousness could not exist at all. 
Nevertheless, with the concept of ‘ideology’ being so readily recognisable in terms 
of everyday use, the analysis must begin with identifying what problems its mundane 
use could cause. 
In day-to-day life, ideology is often associated with worldviews and normative 
beliefs, or values. This is understandable, since ideologies, as values do, have a strong 
association with personal political ideas – in particular, with -isms, such as liberalism 
and socialism. Also, ideologies are considered something opposite or competing with 
objective reasoning or logic. Therefore, ideologies are seen as blurring the kind of 
reasoning that is held to be valuable especially in scientific communities. This is 
probably why Michael Freeden (2003, 1) started his introductory text on ideology by 
saying that this ‘is a word that evokes strong emotional responses’. To drive this 
point home, he shared an experience from a lecture in which, after introducing the 
ubiquitous nature of ideology, he received this indignant response from someone in 
the audience: ‘Are you suggesting, Sir, that I am an ideologist?’ 
Ideologies, thus, are considered to be mental images of the world that represent 
personal values in the form of political opinions, as opposed to objective reasoning. 
Therefore, it may be insulting to suggest that people who are not directly engaged in 
(party) politics disseminate ideology. However, just as values are, ideologies are much 
stranger things than they appear to be, whose comprehension requires going beyond 
common sense and immediate perception. Instead of regarding ideology as blurring 
our otherwise straight, objective take on the world, I suggest that our spontaneous 
relationship with the world can be ideological. This is the exact opposite of how 
ideology is usually understood. The formulation here may resemble a ‘false 
consciousness’ hypothesis, but it refers instead to how we engage with the world: 
what kind of relationship we form with it in terms of the kind of order we accept and 
the kind of world-building in which we actively or passively participate. While our 
understanding of the world may be exactly right, especially in a practical sense, it still 
covers only some aspects of the world. 
The implications of this are a somewhat more complex matter, but where 
Freeden says that ‘ideologies will often contain a lot of common sense’ (ibid., 2; 
emphasis added), critical ideology theory suggests that ideologies also produce 
common sense. Again, this does not mean false consciousness; rather, it suggests a 
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view wherein ideologists and their interest groups struggle ‘over people’s “hearts and 
minds” (Rehmann 2013, 7). This means that they struggle over people’s spontaneous 
relationship with the world, on which basis they comprehend it and carry out 
social-material practices that either consolidate the prevailing order or do not. This 
depends on how contradictory the social reality appears in the lived experiences of 
these people. From this perspective, our ideological relationship to the world is 
material but not in the sense of materiality ‘out there’. The ideological-material 
‘existence [means] an ensemble of apparatuses, intellectuals, rituals and forms of 
praxis’ (ibid., 5). 
The prevailing order is thus constituted through material practices in which the 
social relations are either consolidated or disintegrated. Recall our discussion of the 
relationship between historical institutionalism and ideational scholarship, in which 
the debate about stability and change was motivated by a need for a theoretical 
supplement to HI, which the field gained via ‘ideas’. I suggest that, instead of seeing 
ideas as objects of investigation in their own right, scholars should pay attention to 
the functioning of the ‘ideological’ and its material practices, meaning something that 
Marx (2010 [1845], 3) brought out in his Theses on Feuerbach: 
The chief defect of all previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that things 
[Gegenstand], reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object, or of 
contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in 
contradistinction to materialism, the active side was set forth abstractly by idealism – 
which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants 
sensuous objects, really distinct from conceptual objects, but he does not conceive 
human activity itself as objective activity. 
As Marx states here, as long as we treat the reality ‘out there’ as an object, we cannot 
see how real human activity constitutes the ‘objectivity’ of reality. As I have already 
brought out, I hold the division between material and ideal to be one of the most 
wicked problems of neo-institutionalism, since it regards materialism to denote 
something ‘out there’ in the most common-sense meaning. Therefore, in this 
chapter, I will introduce materialist theory of the ideological wherein an ideology is 
treated not as ‘an edifice of thought and consciousness, but rather as a set of social 
relations determining human practices and thought-forms’ (Rehmann 2013, 245). In 
doing this, I will use Projekt Ideologietheorie (PIT) as a backrest for drawing together 
the two positions that neo-institutionalism too addressed, system and lifeworld. This 
unifying project boils down to the analysis of contradictory relations that prevail in 
capitalist societies, producing, on one hand, the kind of disorder that stems from the 
market competition and, on the other, the kind of spontaneous relationship to the 
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surroundings that naturalises the capitalist relations. The ideological operates in these 
conditions, so we must begin with investigation of said conditions. 
Firstly, I will briefly lay down the premises for competitive capitalist relations, to 
explain what kind of social conditions may get ‘out of hand’, producing disordering 
dynamics and a tendency toward crisis at social level. This adds to the theory of 
structures in an attempt at explaining the remainder that classical sociology and 
historical institutionalism could not fully explain, and it represents a system 
dimension to ideological explaining. The question, again, is this: what kinds of 
mechanisms are able to produce the structural surplus effect that transcends the 
agent-based explanations? In addition, this turns the structural equilibrium formula 
around. That is, we consider matters not from the perspective of the system-
theoretical and historical institutionalist equilibrium-seeking order addressed in 
previous chapters but its flipside. In a capitalist society, people do not tend toward 
spontaneous equilibrium unless interfered with. Rather, there is a strong tendency 
toward disorder. For the society not to fall apart because of its contradictions, the 
order must also be maintained from above. 
Secondly, I will address the question of the spontaneous relationship with the 
world in which the above-mentioned relations operate. For this, I apply Marx’s idea 
of commodity fetishism, which is an ‘anchor’ for the ideological in PIT. As is 
discussed above, he saw the products of human brains as beginning to appear as 
‘autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own’ (Marx 2010 [1867], 83). He 
uses this idea to ‘explain the phenomenon that in the capitalistic market the 
producers are ruled by the “things” they produce’, and that a fundamental ‘inversion’ 
hence arises in bourgeois society (Rehmann 2013, 39). This inversion plays a 
significant role in the lifeworld dimension of the ideological explaining. 
After introducing these theoretical premises, I address the systemic order and 
ideas in terms of ideological social relations. My aim in this is to point out how the 
approach transcends the unnecessary dualisms and offers a realistic theory that is 
workable for dealing with modern capitalist societies. From the outset, I wish to 
stress that I am not attempting to offer definitive answers to the philosophical 
questions of the ages. My aim is only to point out, once more, how these questions 
have been considered again and again, while showing also how applying some very 
basic social theory gives us a concrete and solid framework to grapple with social 
questions that extend beyond the reach of the individual observer’s eye. 
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4.1 Capitalist Relations As Conditions for Operation of the 
Ideological 
Capitalism could be regarded as the objective conditions in which people in capitalist 
societies must act. Whereas so-called neo-liberalism is a widely discussed 
phenomenon nowadays and figures in newspaper-level debate, capitalism often 
remains a somewhat vague and unspecified concept85. Still, there have been recent 
attempts to define capitalism and its characteristics (e.g., Lippit 2005; Hodgson 2015; 
Kocka 2016; Shaikh 2016; Streeck 2016), and there is also ongoing debate about its 
history, future, and contemporary development (e.g., Wallerstein 1983; Boltanski & 
Chiapello 2005; Kliman 2012; Wallerstein et al. 2013; Anievas & Nişancıoğlu 2015; 
Harvey 2015; Wood 2017 [1999]). Streeck (2016, 201) offered a particularly good 
starting point for understanding capitalism as a social phenomenon: ‘Once upon a 
time sociologists knew that modern society is capitalist society; that capitalism is not 
one thing – a particular kind of economy – and modern society another. […] 
[C]apitalism denotes both an economy and a society […]’86. What Streeck obviously 
emphasises is that capitalism is not something separate from society; we live in 
comprehensive capitalist society. 
Interestingly, several broad-based debates that cross the boundaries of (political) 
economy and institutionalism and tackle the critical questions of capitalism have 
taken place in the neo-institutionalist field. Examples range from ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ (Hall & Soskice 2001) and ‘economic sociology of capitalism’ approaches 
(Nee & Swedberg 2005) to institutional economics (Hodgson 2015) and to more 
general historical institutionalism (Streeck 2016). Where political economy scholars 
are often institutionalists, they usually also are those social scientists who have added 
the term ‘capitalism’ to their vocabularies and research programmes for a distinctive 
phenomenon. That said, they have their own reference apparatus, which overlooks 
the Marxist tradition almost entirely, even though it would be reasonable to look in 
 
85 For an introduction to the history of neo-liberalism, see, for instance, Harvey (2007). For a treatment 
of more recent debate about its development, see, among others, Davies (2016). 
86 According to Streeck (2016, 201), Parsons ‘negotiated’ the division of labour between modern 
economics and sociology. This is true, but one should keep in mind when assessing Parsons’ social 
system theory that in Parsons’ elaboration the economic variables are not treated as something 
different from the others but handled as resultants of some relatively constant functions that appear 
in special conditions. This means that they are derived from fundamental variables that determine the 
social system’s basic functions. The correct view is, rather, that there is one set of fundamental variables 
of the social system, which are just as fundamental in its economic aspect as in any other, and, of 
course, vice versa (see Parsons 1991 [1953], 16); accordingly, economic theory is ‘considered a sub-
theory of the general theory’ in Parsons’ words. 
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exactly that direction when seeking answers to questions about capitalism87. For 
example, in an institutionalist framework it is hard to find references to the so-called 
Brenner debate even though that is one of the most fundamental 20th-century 
historical-theory debates on the subject (see Brenner 1976, 1977; Aston & Philpin 
1985)88. 
Much of the obscurity in the debate pertaining to capitalism is due to definitional 
vagueness. One reason can be found in mainstream economics, in whose textbooks 
capitalism is often synonymous with market system or market economy (e.g., 
Hubbard & O’Brien 2010). While it is not my wish to engage in deep historical debate 
about capitalism, I follow Robert Brenner (1976, 1977) and Ellen M. Wood (2017 
[1999]) in suggesting that the capitalist relations should be seen as an essential part 
of economic history in institutional research. Therefore, I find that capitalism should 
be seen as a distinct phenomenon of the market economy. There is no ‘natural’ 
development of market forces or a market society that, as market economics would 
suggest, brings human evolution to perfection. While capitalism is often seen as 
eternal and without origin, Marxist tradition usually emphasises the historical break 
and the specificity of capitalism (ibid.). This is the opposite of what Brenner (1976) 
and Wood (2017 [1999]) call the ‘commercialization model’. In this model, a 
commercial society indicates the furthest stage of natural social progress: it 
‘represents a maturation of age-old commercial practices (together with technical 
advances) and their liberation from political and cultural constraints’ (ibid., 13). 
The concept of market economy retains other problematic connotations also, 
since elementary economic theory holds that autonomous individuals exchange their 
goods, services, and labour freely in such a market, associated with barter. 
Furthermore, as a system-level phenomenon, it is claimed to make its way into 
equilibrium and eventually reach a point at which resources – factors of production 
– are efficiently allocated. The concept of market economy is inadequate and even 
misleading when one is considering capitalist dynamics. Where the market economy 
theory begins with the assumption that a market spontaneously seeks equilibrium 
(order/stability) as a result of free exchange, capitalism theory begins with the 
assumption that, along with strong ordering patterns, the order in question ‘is 
 
87 For an exception, see Dugger and Sherman (2000), who bring Marxist and institutionalist economics 
under comparison within an evolutionary framework. They describe the fundamental difference 
between institutional and Marxism economics as being that the institutionalists usually fall back on 
Darwinism in the end, whereas even ‘evolutionary’ explaining is social and historical in nature for 
Marxists. 
88 For a brief introduction to the Brenner debate, see Ellen M. Wood (2017 [1999], 50–64). 
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generated in-and-through continual disorder, the latter being its immanent 
mechanism’ (Shaikh 2016, 5). 
Many theorists and historians of contemporary capitalism agree that, whether or 
not we may call market systems prior to modern industrialisation capitalistic, the 
kind of modern society that consists of capitalist imperatives and institutions should 
be distinguished from earlier models (Hodgson 2015; Kocka 2016; Streeck 2016; 
Wood 2017 [1999]). From the Marxist perspective, the decisive factor for the origin 
of capitalism is the ‘so-called primitive accumulation’ (Wood 2017 [1999], 36; Marx 
2010 [1867], Part VIII). The primitive accumulation is ‘so-called’ because it 
comprises not only accumulation of wealth but also, more importantly, 
reorganisation of the social relations that govern production and ownership: 
The specific precondition of capitalism is a transformation of social property relations 
that generates capitalist ‘laws of motion’: the imperatives of competition and 
profit-maximization, a compulsion to re-invest surpluses, and a systematic and relentless 
need to improve labour-productivity and develop the forces of production. (Wood 
2017 [1999], 36–37) 
Marx (2010 [1867], Part VIII) saw this critical transformation as having taken place 
in the English countryside through expropriation from direct producers. Along with 
the imperatives, compulsions, and needs, this change in social relations enabled a 
new kind of division, into classes of landowners, capitalist tenants, and wage 
labourers. This division would eventually evolve into classes of capitalist producers 
and workers, although the distinction is not purely statistical and refers to positions 
in the organisation of production. What is important in this transition is that 
feudalism did not carry a capitalistic embryo of some sort; rather, the class conflict 
between the feudal lords and peasants set the capitalist dynamics in motion as an 
unintended consequence (Brenner 1977). In practice, this meant ‘a situation in which 
[direct] producers were subjected to market imperatives’ (Wood 2017 [1999], 52). In 
competition, they forced themselves into unprecedented market conditions wherein 
rents were not fixed but had taken on the form of leases as a politically constituted 
form of property. Wood (ibid., 54–55) summarises the main point by highlighting 
that Brenner brought under discussion the political and social features of capitalism 
that required explanation, rather than seeing them as part of a natural progression of 
self-perfecting markets. 
In consequence, capitalism became a ‘mechanism beyond communal control, as 
the transparency of market transactions was supplanted by the mysteries of a “self-
regulating” market, the price mechanism, and the subordination of all communal 
values to the imperatives of profit’ (ibid., 69). This did not take place purely through 
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market forces. It required state coercion – as such scholars as E.P. Thompson (1980 
[1963]) and Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]) have emphasised – along with more 
capitalism-affirmative traditions, such as ordo-liberalism89. The important 
implication is the juxtaposition between natural and social-political development of 
the capitalist market society. Critical theories such as PIT hold that maintaining order 
in capitalist societies requires constant operation of a state since there is nothing 
natural in the capitalist relations, nor do they automatically keep the promise of 
equilibrium. The capitalist market system is a social and political system that required 
enormous effort for creating and demands constant maintenance work, just as 
Polanyi (ibid., 60) has highlighted: 
[T]he control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming consequence 
to the whole organization of society: it means no less than the running of society as 
an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, 
social relations are embedded in the economic system. The vital importance of the 
economic factor to the existence of society precludes any other result. For once the 
economic system is organized in separate institutions, based on specific motives and 
conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that 
system to function according to its own laws. This is the meaning of the familiar 
assertion that a market economy can function only in a market society. (Emphasis added) 
The critical implication of the above quotation is that the market society must be 
created if the ‘self-regulating markets’ are to function. According to Wood (2017 
[1999], 178), ‘[i]n fact, capitalism, in some ways more than any other social form, 
needs politically organized and legally defined stability, regularity, and predictability 
in its social arrangements’. Wood continues this line of thought by stating that capital 
cannot provide these conditions for itself since its own laws constantly tend to 
subvert them (ibid., 178–179). Therefore, there is nothing natural in these unleashed 
social forces, and a great deal of effort is put expended to uphold institutions of such 
a sort as could serve these uncontrollable forces, which were set in motion as an 
unintended consequence of the historical-political reorganisation of social relations. 
This explains why we need another theoretical perspective, one that opposes (or 
complements) the naturalising view of equilibrium models that underlie so many 
social theories. Marxist historical theories of capitalism and critical ideology theory 
offer several perspectives for neo-institutionalist thinkers to consider. Firstly, 
institutional theorists see all of capitalism’s properties in its constituent institutions, 
 
89 For a very short introduction to ordo-liberalism in the context of austerity politics, see, for example, 
Blyth (2015, 135–143). A somewhat longer treatment in the context of the neo-liberal movement and 
its origins is provided by Foucault (2008 [2004]). 
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such as property, money, markets, and firms, but also in governmental and other 
national or international systems and organisations (e.g., Hall & Soskice 2001; 
Hodgson 2015). However, these theories, while perhaps able to compass institutions, 
systems, and organisations as social relations, do not consider capitalist competition 
as a force in producing the system-level contradictory dynamics. Also, as they fall 
back on equilibrium models, they largely disregard the imperatives that property and 
class relations produce. Secondly, deriving the market economy and its development 
from mainstream economics’ free-market models leads to interpretations of 
historical processes wherein these processes are rendered natural and eternal: they 
become fetishised. This means that historical processes are seen as forming an 
evolutionary story wherein eternal market forces operate in such a way that the more 
obstacles are removed from its path, the more ‘naturally’ human evolution and 
progress may perfect itself. Hence, capitalism loses its historical (non-eternal) and 
specific nature. 
The perspective gained from the historical aspect of the development of capitalist 
relations supports avoiding determinist or teleological views in which the modern 
market is a natural being or any kind of ‘end of history’ hypothesis. It also offers an 
angle from which structural social theory can see how capitalist relations operate by 
creating dependencies. These dependencies create imperatives in accordance with 
which people must act, but it is important to notice that these imperatives as 
historical relations do not determine all the outcomes of collective or individual-level 
action; rather, they regulate collective action. Thus, following Anwar Shaikh’s 
argument (2016), one could say that they are present in most of the social relations 
as a contradictory, regulative force, creating order and disorder at the same time. In 
this way, capitalism distinguishes itself from the mere market economy that is often 
associated with equilibrium-seeking circulation of goods and money. 
4.1.1 Defining Capitalism 
According to economic historian Jürgen Kocka (2016, 94–104), modern 
industrialisation-based capitalism has its origins in the early 19th century. Even in 
the 16th century, the term ‘capital’ in European languages was used for invested or 
lent money, and it later started to refer to profit-gaining assets – money, 
commodities, commercial papers, etc. – by the 19th century at the latest (ibid., 2). 
Correspondingly, since the 18th century, ‘capitalist’ has denoted a wealthy person 
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capable of living off interest and rent payments90. Kocka (ibid., 101–103) summarises 
the four major ways in which industrialisation changed capitalism: 1) Contract-based 
wage labour that is subordinate to fluctuating market relations became a mass 
phenomenon. 2) Fixed capital – factories, mines, and infrastructure – started to 
accumulate on an unprecedented scale. 3) Technical and organisational innovation 
escalated and its role grew rapidly, just as benefits and disadvantages between groups 
did. 4) The nature of the crisis changed: capitalism ‘had become the economy’s 
dominant regulatory mechanism, intensively influencing society, culture, and politics 
all at the same time’ (ibid., 103). While modern capitalism grew from 19th-century 
industrial soil, it reached global dimensions only in the latter half of the 20th century. 
As the debate about capitalism’s birth and history could continue forever, I agree 
with Streeck (2016, 4) that ‘[t]here is no need to get into the unending discussion 
about when capitalism came into the world’. I will focus instead on trying to 
understand its consequences for our contemporary societies. For this, we need an 
operational definition for it. Streeck’s definition draws on classical political 
economists’ and sociologists’ definitions, such as thoughts of Marx, Weber, Werner 
Sombart, Joseph Schumpeter, and John Maynard Keynes. Streeck characterised 
capitalist society as a version of industrial society ‘distinguished by the fact that its 
collective productive capital is accumulated in the hands of a minority of its members 
who enjoy the legal privilege, in the forms of private property, to dispose of such 
capital in any way they see fit, including letting it sit idle or transferring it abroad’ 
(ibid., 1–2). The class-society that thereby arises is produced through the fact that 
‘for the vast majority of its members, a capitalist society must manage to convert 
their ever-present fear of being cut out of the productive process’ (ibid., 2). 
Because of the highly unequal distribution of wealth and the concomitant 
authority to decide about production, capitalist societies arrange people in 
accordance with their positions within these ownership relations. For the sake of 
simplicity, those positions are denoted from here on as ‘capitalist producers’ and 
‘workers’. Most people are dependent on the twists and turns of decisions and 
dynamic processes involving capital, while only a few are more privileged. From this 
arises the special nature of capitalist relations: while a relation in the general sense 
encompasses dependency, most of the people in the case of capitalism are far more 
dependent on the work that the few offer than the few are dependent on any 
individual worker’s contribution. All of them, however, are dependent on the market 
and the process of accumulation of capital. 
 
90 On the etymology of capital, see also Hodgson (2015, 174–184). 
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Nevertheless, the nature of capital and its accumulation dynamics remains to be 
explained. Here, motivational aspects often are cited, since the dynamics of 
capitalism are associated with greed and/or desires. Even Streeck uses this kind of 
wording when talking about capitalists’ ‘desire to maximize the rate of increase of 
their capital’ (ibid.). While greed and desires most definitely have a part in these 
dynamics, such talk may be somewhat misleading since the social dynamics of capital 
cannot be derived from individuals. Their roots are in its dynamics as a social force. 
Streeck (ibid., 13) recognises this fact when he speaks of the end of capitalism as an 
emergent phenomenon, and he points out that the ‘nature of capitalist competition’ 
(ibid., 206) is what is vital for the markets alongside rules and regulation. 
One of the most extensive recent attempts to produce a systematic definition for 
capitalism is Hodgson’s Conceptualizing Capitalism (2015). Hodgson, an economic 
institutionalist, proposes his own ‘legal institutionalism’ as an entry point for defining 
the phenomenon. By this, he refers to capitalism as consisting of various governing, 
productive, distributive, and exchange sub-systems, many of which are constituted 
by the state and its effective legal framework. As an institutionalist, he concludes 
that, fundamentally, ‘rules and relations constitute social reality and some of the most 
important and powerful social rules are legal and statutory in nature’ (ibid., 9). 
The first point Hodgson makes is that we must, at the outset, ‘clear up the mess 
caused by the promiscuous application of the term capital by economists and 
sociologists’ (ibid., 11), by which he refers to concepts such as human capital, social 
capital, and cultural capital. Later, he lists ‘a plethora of capitals’, cataloguing 23 
distinct capital applications he has found in social scientific literature (ibid., 191–
192). Hodgson then gets to work on building a social-theoretical backrest for his 
definition. He sees social structures as consisting of enduring, orderly, and patterned 
social relations (ibid., 54–57). Whereas these relations operate between interacting 
individuals, ‘social positions are a specific form of social relation’ (ibid., 55). 
Relations, then, have various types, modes, and dimensions that manifest themselves 
in actual practices as social positions – social positions become observable through 
actual practices that follow the relations in question. Moreover, Hodgson brings out 
that ‘[w]e do not necessarily have to claim that structures somehow impinge directly 
and causally into individuals; it is simply that our interactions with others depend on 
the type of relations involved’ (ibid.; see also Hodgson 2006).91 
 
91 Interestingly, Hodgson’s theoretical texts (e.g., Hodgson 2006, 2015) make very little reference to 
the sociological classics discussed in chapters 1 and 3, and there are no references at all to neo-
institutionalists. Still, he manages to build his ‘not functionalist’ (Hodgson 2015, 40) social theory 
somewhat similarly to Parsons’ functionalist theory or historical institutionalism, on the basis of 
Darwin’s theory of evolution and Veblen’s evolution-influenced institutional theory. This leads him 
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Under his relational-structural formula, Hodgson (2015, 181) identifies the 
immaterial essence of capital in social relations and in information. While he leaves 
his understanding of immateriality unexplained, in practical terms he sees capital as 
‘a fund of money to be invested by a person or a firm in some enterprise’ (ibid., 184), 
meaning production. Hodgson also extends his definition to cover tangible and 
intangible assets, in which regard his supplement to prior definitions of capital is the 
point that it can be used as collateral. Therefore, as such, ‘[c]apital is money or the 
realizable money value of owned and collateralizable property’ (ibid.). He continues 
by underscoring this point, stating that ‘factories and machines can serve as collateral 
on a loan but the labor power of a wage worker cannot’ (ibid., 188). It follows also that, in 
Hodgson’s definition, capital cannot be understood in isolation from its relation to 
the capitalist system of debt. 
In sum, capital is a social relation that manifests itself as money or money values 
that are either invested in production or used as collateral for obtaining loans. 
Hodgson (ibid., 199–203) narrows the concept down with that definition because 
extending it beyond its monetary meaning would necessitate giving this historically 
particular phenomenon another word. Such extension would also create the 
impression that all human and natural phenomena can be appraised, invested, and 
controlled in monetary terms. Finally, ‘the issue of collateral, inherent in the 
monetary definition of capital, helps highlight a key difference between the assets 
owned by a capitalist and the labor power owned by a worker […]. This illuminates 
an important aspect of class inequality intrinsic to capitalism’ (ibid., 201). Capitalism, 
then, is understood in terms of private ownership of means of production, the 
employment relationship that follows, and the dominant financial institutions (ibid., 
258). Hodgson (ibid., 259) ends up defining capitalism as a system of production via 
six characteristics: 
 
1) A legal system supporting widespread individual rights and liberties to own, 
buy, and sell private property; 
2) Widespread commodity exchange and markets involving money; 
 
to look to human biological nature for the ultimate origin of social behaviour (see, for instance, pages 
10, 54, 67–73, 90, and 101). His stance on ideas, articulated on page 37, is that ‘[i]deas and rhetoric are 
vital, but their origins and spread among the population must also be explained’. Moreover, he holds 
that ‘[i]nstitutions are not simply ideas in people’s heads […]. Both the ideas and the social relations 
have to be understood’ (see pages 61–62). Hodgson obviously adopts some kind of conception of 
unconsciousness in his discussion of people’s incapability of being fully aware of all the ideas and the 
nature of the system alongside still being able to function in such a way that the system remains 
operational. 
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3) Widespread private ownership of the means of production by firms 
producing goods or services for sale in the pursuit of profit; 
4) Much of production organized separately and apart from the home and 
family; 
5) Widespread wage labor and employment contracts; 
6) A developed financial system with banking institutions, the widespread use 
of credit with property as collateral, and the selling of debt.  
 
(Some punctuation marks added for presentation here) 
This definition of capitalism broadly follows the lines of Marx’s and Schumpeter’s 
understandings of its conditions in particular. However, similar summaries are found 
in many classic works of social theory, such as Weber’s (1978 [1922]), as Streeck has 
noted (2016, Introduction) in his own characterisation. In fact, while the description 
above quite usefully specifies the conditions that prevail in capitalist societies, the 
most classical formula for capitalism’s dynamics is what Marx provides in the first 
part of his Capital. Capital has one specific feature that opens up the dynamics we 
look for: 
M–C–M' is therefore in reality the general formula of capital as it appears prima facie 
within the sphere of circulation. (Marx 2010 [1867], 166) 
This formula illustrates how capital is used in the profit-making process. Here, 
‘[m]oney (M) is invested in commodities (C) representing labor power, raw materials, 
plant, and equipment with the intent of recouping more money (M')’ (Shaikh 2016, 
206). When the initial money capital is invested in production, it transforms into 
commodity capital and is finally sold for money capital. The most important point 
is that all this is done ‘to make more money[;] profit is the bottom line: M' must be 
greater than M if the operation is to be deemed successful’ (ibid.). Moreover, it 
underscores how all factors of production – human labour, money, nature, etc. – are 
treated in exactly the same way: as means for making a profit. This is why Shaikh 
(ibid.) points out that ‘Marx’s notion of the circuit of capital M–C–M' provides [a] 
particularly useful method for identifying capital’. It begins with money invested in 
production and ends up being collected as ‘the original sum advanced, plus an 
increment’ (Marx 2010 [1867], 161). 
The M–C–M' formula puts emphasis on the function and purpose of capital: it is 
invested in the circulation solely for profit-making. This differs from market-
economy economists’ thinking, in that they identify economic action with barter 
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wherein all exchange follows the one-to-one principle, meaning direct exchange of 
goods. In this kind of exchange, no money truly exists, since the only purpose of 
money is to serve as a neutral arbitrator of the exchange. This view has been 
challenged repeatedly from several perspectives because it disregards the modern 
economic and financial institutions in place and their history (see, for example, 
Dillard 1987; Graeber 2011; Wray 2012; Bertocco 2013; McLeay et al. 2014; Mitchell 
2015; Shaikh 2016)92. 
Shaikh (2016, 207) approaches money by considering the division between 
money as a commodity used in personal consumption and money as a capital 
commodity used for investment: ‘It is the intent which defines its function. […] 
[M]oney spent for personal consumption is different from money invested as capital, 
even if the object purchased is the same: to purchase fruit to eat is different from 
purchasing fruit to sell for profit. In the former case, both the money and the fruit 
are part of a circuit of revenue; in the latter, both are part of a circuit of capital.’ In 
other words, no such object as ‘money’ exists, only social relations that arbitrate 
various kinds of social processes that share a common denominator. Thus, using 
money for investment activities results in another kind of social action than does 
using money for personal consumption, although these activities intersect in 
circulation. Still, the more financial activities are focused on the money-making 
sphere as such, the more the concrete human activities get allocated to the sphere of 
pure profit-making. Consider the modern financial sector as an example. When 
money is used as capital to gain profits from production and the profits are calculated 
in the form of money, the action operates also in the sphere of capitalist competition. 
As the principle of operation of capitalism is to produce profits through investing 
capital in commodity production, this principle is also the cause of major dynamics 
within this mode of production. 
Hodgson’s definition is useful because it describes the most essential features of 
modern capitalism with sufficient sensitivity to its characteristics. However, he seeks 
answers about the nature and development of capitalism by turning to humans’ 
biological nature and disregards the capitalist competition as its driving dynamic 
force. In fact, when addressing competition, Hodgson pays attention to only 
‘creative tension between organizational cooperation and market competition [as] 
synergetic phenomena’ (ibid., 242), seeing it as a ‘powerful force in capitalism [which] 
promotes cost cutting and innovation’ (ibid., 320). Hodgson is stuck in the ‘perfect 
competition’ framework promoted by market economists and cannot see anything 
apart from the Schumpterian ‘creative destruction’ aspect in the larger social 
 
92 In Marx’s terms (2010 [1867], Part II, Part IV), barter would have the formula C–M–C. 
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dynamics produced by capitalist competition. This approach neglects to consider 
competition’s active part in creating the growth imperative and turbulent dynamics 
of capitalism. Moreover, Hodgson, as is alluded to above, sees social relations such 
as capital as something ‘immaterial’ but leaves this mystical essence unexplained 
(ibid., 181). 
Streeck’s (2016, 204–209) formula, on the other hand, acknowledges the 
difference between the market economy and capitalism by paying attention to 
capitalism’s endogenous dynamics. This formula recognises its expansion – 
economic growth – as its fundamental property. Still, he ties the competition to 
human characteristics such as fear and greed and sees expansion of credit as the 
accumulation mechanism complementary to the intrinsic human attributes. Both 
Streeck and Hodgson have obviously missed one of Marx’s most essential points in 
their otherwise fine analyses: the dynamic social force of the capitalist competitive 
relations. 
4.1.2 The System Dimension of Capitalist Conditions: Competitive 
Relations 
Free competition brings out the inherent laws of capitalist production, in the shape 
of external coercive laws having power over every individual capitalist. (Marx 2010 
[1867], 276) 
For Marx (2010 [1894], Ch. X), competition is the main social force and equalising 
power of capitalist societies. Any conditions wherein capitalist production prevails 
are adapted in accordance with the progress of this mode of production, 
subordinating these conditions by its immanent laws of competition. As I noted in 
the previous section, market operators are subjected to market imperatives that make 
them incapable of controlling the competitive forces. Owners of the means of 
production are forced to attract capital by offering greater profits than competitors 
offer, or it is withdrawn to more profitable spheres of production. On the other 
hand, since these capitalists as producers constantly seek competitive advantages or 
try to respond to advantages reaped by other producers, they have to intensify their 
use of the labour force and/or production forces (e.g., technology), cut wages, or 
expand their profit-making production activities to new areas. Competition creates 
constant fluctuations that even out differences between spheres of production 
through the nature of their production forces and even out differences between 
workers through the nature of their labour forces. In other words, via its profit-
seeking competitive nature, ‘capital becomes conscious of itself as a social power in 
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which every capitalist participates proportionally to his share in the total social 
capital’ (ibid., 194). 
Following Marx, Shaikh (2016, 259) finds that ‘[r]eal competition is the central 
regulating mechanism of capitalism’. Only by taking the capitalist ‘real competition’ 
with the ‘profit motive’ as a starting point for analysis can we understand the 
simultaneous prevailing systemic order and continuous disorder. Shaikh (ibid., Ch. 
2) finds these dimensions of profit-seeking competition to cause ‘turbulent 
regulation’, which renders such economics concepts as (im)perfect competition and 
(dis)equilibrium redundant. This is because even speaking about imperfect 
competition or disequilibrium always brings with it the burden of a perfection- or 
equilibrium-oriented version of the concepts, ultimately reinforcing these 
idealisations. Shaikh describes this set of dynamics thus: 
The profit motive is inherently expansionary: investors try to recoup more money 
than they put in, and if successful, can do it again and again on a larger scale, colliding 
with others doing the same. Some succeed, some just survive, and some fail 
altogether. This is real competition, antagonistic by nature and turbulent in operation. It 
is the central regulating mechanism of capitalism and is as different from so-called 
perfect competition as war is from ballet. (Ibid., 14) 
As one can see, Shaikh’s idea about market competition is in sharp contrast with 
market economics. Competition does not harmonise prices and market conditions, 
making them only more effective, but causes constant turbulence. This turbulence 
results from dynamics wherein producers compete against each other in any way 
possible but mostly by cutting wages, squeezing more out of the workers, and/or 
making technical changes. Shaikh states: 
Competition within an industry compels individual producers to set prices that keep 
them in the game, just as it forces them to lower costs so that they can cut prices to 
compete effectively. Costs can be lowered by cutting wages and increasing the length 
or intensity of the working day, or at least by reducing wage growth relative to that of 
productivity. But these must contend with the reaction of labor, which is why 
technical change becomes the central means over the long run. In this context, 
individual capitals make their decisions based on judgments about an intrinsically 
indeterminate future. Competition pits seller against seller, seller against buyer, buyer 
against buyer, capital against capital, capital against labor, and labor against labor. 
Bellum omnium contra omnes93. (Ibid.) 
When capital as faceless social power operates only in pursuit of increasing its 
amount through production, it leaves individual producers no other option than to 
 
93 ‘The war of all against all’, a Hobbesian maxim first referred to in Section 1.4. 
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try to compete with others. They must also compete against the workers for a share 
of the income, as they try to maximise their profits while simultaneously maintaining 
competitive market prices. However, this relation between workers and capitalist 
producers is not competitive per se; rather, Shaikh sees it as a struggle. Nonetheless, 
it is more likely for workers, holding unequal positions, to compete with each other 
as individuals, whereas as an organised group they could compete against the 
capitalist producers for a share of the income, usually within the legal limits of the 
state. Therefore, I choose to call it competition. What results is emergent properties 
of a capitalist economy such as a ‘general tendency for profit rates to be equalized 
across sectors. A roughly equalized profit rate is an emergent property: it is not 
desired by any, yet it is imposed on all’ (ibid., 66). This entails ever-fluctuating flows 
of capital between sectors that must compete against each other for investments, but 
it also represents the relationship between the ordering patterns and disorder: order 
as roughly equalised profit rates is achieved through the dynamic process of 
competition among sectors, creating disorder at the same time at sector level. This 
example illustrates what Shaikh means with his notion of order being generated in 
and through its immanent mechanism of continual disorder. 
Workers – i.e., labourers – have a role in real competition also because of their 
wage demands. With the competing interests, capitalist producers compete on two 
fronts; however, workers94 too have a double role in the equation – namely, as 
labourers and consumers (or even today’s investors). As labourers, they earn their 
wages from production, and, as consumers, they spend those wages in the sphere of 
commodity circulation – the market. For firms to make their profits, the products in 
circulation must be sold. Consumers, on the other hand, need income for buying 
these products from the circulation that they have produced as workers. Against this 
backdrop, the dynamics become actualised as two-front competition: 
 
1) Competition between capitalist producers: competition forces capitalist producers to 
lower prices, intensify the use of productive forces (production technology 
and labour productivity), and expand profit-making productive activities to 
new geographic or ‘lifeworld’ areas. 
2) Competition between capital (as a social force) and workers: competition forces a 
struggle to ensue over income distribution and the development of labour 
productivity. 
 
94 Once again, one should keep in mind that these labels refer to social positions. A person may be a 
capitalist producer who still earns wage from his or her own company, but that person turns into a 
consumer when entering the sphere of the market. 
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The above-mentioned competition between workers may take place in parallel with 
all this, since most workers have no other option than to obtain their income from 
the labour market, where vacancies may be a scarce resource for reason of 
(permanent structural) unemployment. Thus, the overall dynamics are produced as 
described below. 
The multi-dimensional competition arises from investors seeking profit while the 
investments go to the producers who profit the most. The capitalist producers 
compete against each other for investments as they compete also against the workers 
with regard to income distribution. In the market, these producers compete, via 
prices, to get their products sold to workers, who as consumers tend to expend their 
wages for low prices. For producers to maintain the profit rates under these 
competitive conditions, they must further develop the production forces (via new 
technological solutions, higher productivity, etc.) and/or expand markets to new 
areas (through new types of consumer products, financial derivatives, geographic 
expansion, etc.), lower wages, or fire workers. If profits are to be made, the products 
must be on the market, and for those products to be bought from the market, 
workers must have paid work. 
It follows that, while producers must keep the profit rate high and offer paid 
work, they simultaneously have to cut wages, discharge workers, or develop the 
production forces in ways that lead to reductions to purchasing power. This brings 
challenges to selling of products. If the products are not sold, firms will not be able 
to earn profits, investments will wither, jobs will not be created, and the economy 
will stagnate, Shaikh points out. This ‘incessant equilibration of constant 
divergences’ (Marx 2010 [1894], 195) requires increasingly mobile capital and labour. 
Achieving these conditions necessitates ‘complete freedom of trade within the 
society [and] the development of the credit system’ (ibid.). Society must create these 
conditions for the capital, so that its uncontrollable forces may operate in the most 
effective manner possible. In this web of tense relations, capitalist societies must 
reproduce themselves, which historically has required the state. 
Shaikh brings out in his magnum opus Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises (2016) 
that, while there are many tendencies counter to these abstract dynamics historically 
and at the macro level, this is an effective depiction of the turbulent forces of 
capitalism. While several caveats could be stated with regard to the details, it provides 
us with a theoretical description of mechanisms that operate beyond individuals’ 
control and perception. This multi-dimensional competition is a result of the profit-
seeking nature of capital, which ‘always give[s] rise to unintended outcomes’ (ibid., 
260). Therefore, this picture, on one hand, complements the structural theory 
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addressed earlier in the dissertation, in explaining how the competitive relations 
operate and cause emergent effects. On the other hand, it includes one condition 
that is quite important for the ideology’s operation: when market operators operate 
in this environment, they face the consequences of their actions as social power that 
stands against them, but without being able to observe the cause with the naked eye. 
4.1.3 The Lifeworld Dimension of Capitalist Conditions: Commodity 
Fetishism 
For Marx (2010 [1867], 81), a commodity is ‘a very queer thing, abounding in 
metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’. In the first instance, the commodity 
has use-value because of its useful properties, which as products of a capitalist system 
are produced by human labour. Through its use-value, the commodity simply 
satisfies human needs. The metaphysical subtlety appears when human labour is 
organised in a particular social form (i.e., capitalist production) and therefore 
operates solely for producing commodities for the profit-making market, also as a 
commodity itself. Hence, all commodities within capitalist production receive a 
twofold nature: objective appearance and social character. In this connection, Marx 
(ibid., 83) refers to these ‘products of labour [having] qualities [that] are at the same 
time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses’. 
The notion of commodity fetishism points to the peculiarity that all commodities 
within the capitalist mode of production have a social character that hides itself 
behind their objective appearance and private production mode. Especially when 
nominally free individuals produce commodities solely for sale, the social character 
of the commodities disappears and the social relations between people begin to 
appear as relations between commodities. According to Marx (ibid., 83), ‘[s]ince the 
producers95 do not come into social contact with each other until they exchange their 
products, the specific social character of each producer's labour does not show itself 
except in the act of exchange’. Staring at any given commodity’s objective 
characteristics does not tell us much about the social relations in which it was 
produced – we observe only the ready-made commodity. This makes fetishism a ‘by-
product’ of capitalist commodity production since within the sphere of exchange we 
encounter only private producers with their ready-made products. 
 
95 Marx refers here to ‘producers’ in the broad sense of the word, meaning those who participate in 
the production process with the rules that have been given to them. 
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What Marx means here is that social relations begin to appear both as relations 
between commodities and as properties of the commodities themselves. For 
example, when staring at a commodity’s price tag, one may imagine it to represent 
the product’s properties, even though the price is merely a representation of the 
social relations required to produce the commodity. Moreover, when the commodity 
of money is used as a means of exchange, it begins to appear akin to a ‘thing’ capable 
of producing the effects that its use seems to cause. In other words, when these 
products of the human brain begin to appear as independent beings that have life, 
they seem to be furnished with a life of their own. This is why Marx borrows the 
term ‘fetishism’ from 18th- and early-19th-century historians and sociologists of 
religion, who used it to describe ‘the oldest and most primitive stage of religion’ 
(Rehmann 2013, 39). It designates something man-made while it also refers to 
‘sorcery and witchery: the man-made products gain power over their makers’ (ibid.). 
For this phenomenon, it is important that some features of capitalist commodity 
production are directly perceivable via the naked eye while others are not. The 
trickiness of commodity fetishism lies in inversion between these sets of features in 
practical, day-to-day life. Out-of-control competitive social relations governing the 
production exchange result in ‘an irrational reversal by which exchange-value rule 
over use-value, money rules over labor, accumulated capital rules over life, 
shareholder values rule over life-values […]. Commodities turn into an alien power 
that is used against the workers by replacing them with new technologies, by firing 
them, by impoverishing them, by making them “superfluous”’, in Jan Rehmann’s 
words (ibid., 40). This ‘fundamental “inversion” in bourgeois society’ (ibid., 39) 
means that the products of people’s work turn against them: the movement of their 
own products controls them in place of them controlling the movement of products. 
Thereby, capitalism produces alienation wherein the relations between people 
become subordinate to the relations between commodities – ‘social relations among 
people are mediated by the process of commodity exchange’ (Wood 2017 [1999], 7). 
This is also how commodity fetishism operates as PIT’s anchor for the ideological96. 
Commodity fetishism’s relation to the ideological is twofold. Firstly, it results in 
the inversion that is crucial for the operation of the ideological. Secondly, this does 
not, however, entail apparent false consciousness, since the relations that producers 
and workers encounter when entering the market realm are real for them. The 
 
96 Alienation has been addressed on several accounts in Marxist literature. For instance, Ollman (1975) 
addresses the issue in terms of ‘internal relations’ that resemble the ones referred to here in their 
fundamentally relational nature. For a classic investigation of Marx’s theory of alienation, see the work 
of István Mészáros (1970). 
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imperatives they face have little or nothing to do with false ideas or imagination in 
their own right, since the producers must sell at market prices and workers must gain 
income from the same market. The forces they encounter are real, and the logics 
they apply to manage and succeed in the competition are right in many ways, not 
false. Therefore, it would be wrong to say that they possess false consciousness: they 
live in practical reality, whose conditions determine the rules they must act within. 
Still, the inversion occurs that leads to the ‘objective thought-forms’ of Marx (2010 
[1867], 87). These are a result of direct observation of practical reality (Rehmann 
2013, 39–43). 
For example, when setting foot in the market, one may observe with one’s own 
eyes how things work: one visits a shop, sees the price tag, pays, and leaves the shop 
with the goods. The shopkeeper uses the money to buy further products, which 
sends a signal to the producer to produce an additional product, and the cycle 
continues. 
When market economists peer into this arena, they see only the ‘appearance-
form’ of the economic actions, while the relations that govern the production and 
exchange are hidden behind everyday practices: the nominally free and direct 
commodity exchange. The crookedness of the fundamental inversion is in how 
things look correct in practice but there is a veil over the relations that truly govern 
the material reproduction of society beyond the control of any individual. This leads 
to the kind of everyday thought-categories, objective thought-forms, that are based 
on mundane practices and direct perception. These seem to describe the laws and 
motion of this process, since they focus on the movement of the 
commodities/money. However, they address only immediate relations and actions 
between things, not the organising social relations that constitute the exchange. This 
paradox is present in Marx’s (2010 [1867], 98) definition of commodity fetishism: 
‘the Fetishism inherent in commodities [is] the objective appearance of the social 
characteristics of labour’. According to Rehmann (2013, 43), 
Marx’s critique therefore targets the very normality of bourgeois reality: the ‘inversion’ 
sits in the fundamental structure of unplanned, private commodity-production 
and -circulation itself; what is ‘inverted’ is its mode of functioning that proceeds 
stealthily behind the backs of the producers. The corresponding mode of thinking is 
‘inverted’ only insofar as it takes the reification of praxis-forms at face-value as a 
‘natural’ and ‘self-evident’ fact. 
In summary, the following points arise in considering the commodity fetishism 
operating as an anchor for the ideological: Firstly, commodities seem to possess 
social properties. This is because the relations between people appear to be relations 
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between commodities, and respectively, to be properties of them. In Bertell Ollman’s 
(1975, 28) words, when Marx speaks of fetishism, he speaks ‘of social relations which 
are taken for things’. Secondly, when productive activities are carried out only for 
profit and the profits are calculated in monetary terms, the movement of 
commodities begins to control the movement of the people who produce them. 
Thirdly, since we stand in practical-functional relation to the world, we create 
corresponding objective thought-forms in relation to practicalities we encounter in 
day-to-day life, such as movement of commodities. It is on the basis of these 
thought-forms that we form our practical judgements and evaluations of the world. 
In relation to ideology production, these objective thought-forms create an 
operational base for the ideological to function, since they are adequate descriptions 
of the necessities we encounter. 
Going behind the curtains of commodity fetishism requires that we acknowledge 
how our reflections about social life – and, equally, our scientific enquiries into it – 
always begin post festum, in observing the results of the development that has already 
taken place (Marx 2010 [1867], 86). It may be difficult to see the historical trait in the 
human products since we face these products in a ready-made world of ready-made 
commodities. The exchange takes place through the money-form that as a universal 
equivalent further shrouds the social nature of commodities, giving them a seemingly 
natural and objective character. Staring at this character long enough gives rise to the 
so-called objective thought-forms: thought categories that make capitalist relations 
appear ahistorical and therefore eternal (ibid., 86–87). Objective thought-forms are 
an essential factor for ideology production in that they portray the inverted bourgeois 
world of commodities as natural. With this understanding of Marx’s theory of 
commodity fetishism, we can now journey into the world of the critical ideology 
theory of PIT, which utilises it as a backrest for its materialist theory of the 
ideological. 
4.2 The Critical Ideology Approach of Projekt Ideologietheorie 
Projekt Ideologietheorie is an ideology-theoretical approach founded by Wolfgang Fritz 
Haug in the late 1970s97. It carries the essential aspects of Antonio Gramsci’s theory 
 
97 For Haug’s ‘Outlines for a Theory of the Ideological’, see 
http://www.wolfgangfritzhaug.inkrit.de/documents/Umrisse-engl.doc. The text was written in 1979 
but was published in his book Commodity Aesthetics, Ideology & Culture only in 1987. Projekt Ideologietheorie 
is somewhat unknown to Anglophone audiences since so many of its contributions are in German, 
but some English-language articles in addition to Rehmann’s (2013, 2014) and Koivisto and Pietilä’s 
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of hegemony and Louis Althusser’s theory of ideological state-apparatuses, along 
with the ideology-critique of Marx and Friedrich Engels (Rehmann 2013, 241), but 
its development owes much also to historical enquiry by many other figures in the 
long tradition of ideology theory. It could be said that thinking about ideology began 
in the late 18th century when Destutt de Tracy coined the word in 1796. The 
investigation of ‘ideology’ began in response to a felt need for ‘idea-science’. The 
goal was a discipline wherein human perception could be disconnected from ‘any 
pre-construed causal assumption. […] [According to de Tracy, the] new science of 
“ideology” claimed to overcome the dualism of materialism and idealism’ (ibid., 16). 
However, as so many times before, the eventual result was a ‘semantic shift from the 
systemic knowledge of an object to the object itself, from the critical analysis of ideas 
to the ideas themselves’ (ibid., 15)98. 
Rehmann, one of the key PIT researchers, has highlighted that, when the 
concepts of knowledge, discourse, and power replaced the concepts of ideology and 
hegemony, in a triumph over Marxist class-reductionism and state-orientation, post-
structural theorists ignored the fact that these shortcomings had already been 
challenged by Marxist ideology theories such as PIT99. Indeed, PIT differentiated 
itself from those Marxist traditions that were stuck in ‘economism’, 
‘class-reductionism’, or the false consciousness thesis. It also set itself apart from the 
social-technological ‘legitimacy-theories’ that writers such as Weber and Niklas 
Luhmann represent (ibid., 4–5). The critical ideology theory of PIT advanced beyond 
the understanding of ‘determining economic class-interests’ that created the main 
fuel for the neo-institutional critique of ‘Marxist material interests’. It also offers a 
more sophisticated account of consciousness and consideration of the question 
pertaining to its falsity, as we saw in the previous section’s discussion of commodity 
fetishism. Actually, it poses three objections to the false consciousness accounts that 
also could be levelled at the ideational variants of neo-institutionalism100: 
 
(1996) key works can be found via Haug’s personal homepage 
(http://www.wolfgangfritzhaug.inkrit.de/eu/eu-index.htm). For a very recent application of PIT’s 
theoretical stance, especially its ‘appearance form’ aspect, see Torssonen (2019). All Web links were 
valid as of 3 Jun. 2019. 
98 Rehmann (2007) provides a more detailed history of ideology theory. 
99 Another form of critical ideology theory aimed at overcoming the fundamental problems associated 
with Marxist accounts is provided by authors such as Therborn (1980). 
100 The claim that Marxist ideology theory leans on the false consciousness thesis seems ubiquitous in 
the Anglophone world and is found in almost every political or social science textbook addressing 
ideology (e.g., see Freeden 2003, 7; Heywood 2003 [1992], 7), along with one-dimensional base–
superstructure concepts and ideas on teleological conceptions of history. 
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[Firstly, these accounts] tend to overlook the material existence of the ideological, that 
is, apparatuses, its intellectuals and praxis-forms, which impact on people’s common 
sense. Two, it overlooks or underestimates, by its fixation with phenomena of 
consciousness, the unconscious functioning of ideological forms and practices; and 
finally, the endeavor to refute ideologies risks drawing attention away from the main 
ideology-theoretical task, which is to grasp their appeal and efficacy. (Ibid., 6–7) 
In other words, PIT asks three critical questions of ideational scholarship: Firstly, 
how is the existence of ideas and their impact on people to be explained without 
addressing of the uneven conditions wherein people have to act and within which 
they are socialised. This connects with the way in which ideological impact is directed 
to how the common sense operates (on which premises), not only to its ideal 
contents. Here, the second problem rears its head: if one focuses just on how people 
make conscious choices (in line with preferences), one’s view has no room for 
considering a world that is too complex for conscious beings alone to operate such 
that those ideas that serve as a basis for our consideration get reflected in it. 
Moreover, conscious elaboration is given too much credit despite people’s 
spontaneous and habitual relation to the world. In light of these, some practices and 
thought-forms must be unconscious. Over-emphasising the consciousness grants 
excessive credit to agency too, since we are collectively able to create structures that, 
once created, cannot be fully controlled. Thirdly, if one only describes what kinds of 
ideas have an effect on people, the major question of why they affect people remains. 
It is the ideological that is in operation with regard to these questions. 
PIT’s definition of ideology is unlike several other schools’ in that the ideological 
does not refer to universalising worldviews or some other formulation of subjective 
perception of the world, although these do have their role. In fact, since the ideology 
is not a thing in the first place, it is the adjective form, ‘ideological’, that gets the 
attention here, referring to the practical and relational nature of the phenomenon as 
‘a set of social relations determining human practices and thought-forms’ (ibid., 245). 
In PIT, ideologies themselves are something more particular, various forms of the 
ideological, whereas the ideas in this sense are only meaningful content of particular 
ideologies. Even though the ideological is constituted in social relations, it operates 
concretely through ‘an ensemble of ideological apparatuses, practices, and discourses 
that help reproduce class-society by manufacturing “consensus” from above’ (ibid., 
109). These diverse mechanisms work to produce ideological cohesion for 
maintaining social order. In this way, PIT, just as many other social theories do, 
motivates itself by addressing the problem of order. Rehmann states: 
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The need for an ideology-theory renewal resulted from the fact that none of these 
[economistic, false-consciousness-related, class-reductionist, or legitimacy-
theoretical] traditions was able to explain the stability of bourgeois society and its 
state, let alone to develop a strategy of democratic-socialist transformation capable of 
gaining hegemony. The approaches of ideology-theory attempted to fulfil this need 
by inquiring into the social constitution and unconscious modes of the functioning 
and efficacy of the ideological. (Ibid., 4) 
In this sense, PIT sets itself as a part of continuum of this dissertation. It 
acknowledges the problem of order and places its theoretical approach along the 
agent–structure axis on ideal–real terms by abandoning the consciousness-
orientation. It also sets itself in the long continuum of ideology theory and places 
itself in differing fields of ideology-conceptions as the following table shows. 
Table 2.  The theoretical field of ideology (adapted from Koivisto & Pietilä 1996, 43) 
THE THEORETICAL FIELD: 
Conceptions of ideology 
  
 A phenomenon of consciousness Something that somehow 
constitutes consciousness 
Neutral conceptions Contesting, unified class or group-
specific worldviews 
 
Critical conceptions False consciousness, opposed by 
science and accordant practices 
engaged in anti-ideological 
struggle 
PIT situating the above in the 
context of critique of ideal 
socialisation (Vergesellschaftung) 
‘from above’; this form of 
dominating social relations 
(‘ideological in general’) is 
embodied in the ideological 
powers and contested discourses 
specific to them 
As one can see from the table, Koivisto and Veikko Pietilä place ideology theories 
on two axes, where the first runs from critical to neutral but the second sets ideology 
theories along a consciousness continuum, with ideology as a ‘phenomenon of 
consciousness’ lying at one end and the other holding ‘constituted consciousness’ – 
consciousness as a practical-relational-structural phenomenon. Earlier in the chapter, 
I described how the capitalistic competition and fetishism dimensions intersect with 
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system–lifeworld thinking as relational conditions, where the lifeworld approach can 
be seen as an inverted-perception-form of general competitive conditions. 
Correspondingly, Koivisto and Pietilä use the double-dichotomy approach to point 
out how the ideological operates in society, producing image-like appearances as an 
effect of the whole apparatus. The idea stems from the famous metaphor Marx and 
Engels used of the camera obscura (see the picture below). While usually interpreted as 
a metaphor for false consciousness, it does not refer to images of something false, 
so it should be thought of ‘not primarily as a form of consciousness, but as a form 
of practice that nurtures certain forms of consciousness’ (Marx & Engels 2010 
[1846], 36). 
Figure 4.  The camera obscura (source: Wikimedia Commons). 
 
It is the inverted image that usually imparts the idea of false consciousness perceived 
as cheating or similar; however, the whole point behind Marx and Engels’ metaphor 
is to stress the structure, the apparatus that inverts the picture, not the picture itself. 
If one (anachronistically) views the camera obscura through the lens of commodity 
fetishism, one understands how it operates as an anchor for the ideological. But, in 
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contrast to fetishised appearance and thought-forms, the ideological works through 
apparatuses – the ‘structure’ of the camera that surrounds the observer. That 
structure should get the focus, not the ‘picture’. Following Gramsci and Althusser, 
one could characterise the ideological under PIT as ‘complex material arrangements, 
consisting of hegemonic apparatuses, specific intellectuals, ideological practices, 
rituals, images, and also of texts as an integral part of this whole arrangement’ 
(Rehmann 2013, 218). Correspondingly, focusing solely on texts, communicative 
processes, or discourses ignores the ‘material-ideological settings and practices they 
are embedded [in:] the actual corporeal conditions’ (ibid.). Therefore, the ideological 
is also anchored in the materiality of the human practices. 
It bears reiterating that ‘materiality’ here refers not to either physical entities or 
properties of some physical objects as such but to objective sensuous human activity, 
to seeing human practice in this sense as material, or the material as human practice 
(Marx 2010 [1845], 3). This account, which offers a good starting point for 
understanding both ‘material’ and, hence, ‘objective’, connects with The German 
Ideology (2010 [1846], 43), where Marx and Engels elaborate on ‘aspects of social 
activity […] which have existed simultaneously since the dawn of history and the 
first men, and which still assert themselves in history today’. Rehmann (2013, 24) 
summarises these aspects thus: Human beings must satisfy their basic needs. By 
producing the necessary means for this task, they produce new needs. It follows that, 
while reproducing their day-to-day life and arriving at new needs, they 
simultaneously create co-operative social relations, but also these exist to ‘propagate 
their kind’ (Marx & Engels 2010 [1846], 42). This approach binds the human–nature 
relationship to historically developing social relations, while acknowledging that 
there is no unambiguous division between these sets of relations. 
Wal Suchting (1982, 3) addresses these questions theoretically by pointing out 
that human practice can be understood in general terms as ‘the mode of transformation 
and hence the instrumentation (in a broad sense of that word)’. Hence, practice is ‘a 
regular way of transforming a certain sort of pre-existing situation by applying 
various sorts of instruments to it [ultimately] by the use of labour-power’ (ibid.). 
Following Marx, Suchting steps beyond the material–ideal division and pays 
attention to ‘“subject” and “object” [as] not two items pre-constituted with respect to 
the practice that unites them; rather, it is the practice that is primary, “subject” and 
“object” (in the particular context) being constituted within that practice’ (ibid., 4). 
Suchting further elaborates on his ‘practical materialism’, wherein people conform 
to the results of their own doings, as follows: 
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[A] certain practice […] extends itself in accordance with the objective tendencies of 
its functioning, the executors of the practice conforming themselves to these 
tendencies. Again, it is […] a relation […] between the objective structure of a practice 
and the way in which it is carried on, the latter including ideas about what is going on. 
(Ibid., 9) 
What is essential here is ‘the objective character of the practice’ (ibid., 8) and its 
relation to the ideas of what is going on. This active process of transformation 
wherein human beings create their own world constitutes the relation between the 
practical human beings and their ideas of what they are doing: the ideas become real 
only in practice. In the words of Wood (2016 [1995], 26), this kind of materialism is 
‘not simply a natural given; it is a mode of productive activity, a system of social 
relations, a historical product’. 
Wood, also following Marx, finds there to be no division between the social and 
natural life, since nature is not isolated from productive human activity and social 
relations. Quite to the contrary, nature is entwined with human relations as all these 
relations historically change, and change is wrought on nature too in accordance with 
developments in human societies. Thus, human interaction with nature does not 
leave nature intact, and it is human beings who define this relation, in their own 
terms, in accordance with how the relation is perceived. This defining is a practical 
act also, an act of transforming the relation into ideas and, therefore, making it 
communicable, which, again, seeds behaviour that ultimately changes nature. In this 
connection, Suchting (1982) refers to Marx’s comments (2010 [1867], 97) that 
‘commodity-owners think like Faust […]. They therefore acted and transacted before 
they thought’. The more general point is that once the producers have 
unintentionally created the conditions described in the sections above, the above-
mentioned spontaneous relationship to the world of commodities they use for 
profit-making followed. The perception and thought follow this active relationship, 
which determines their forms and the possibilities available for further transforming 
the surroundings. 
This means, in short, that, in the course of historically reproducing their lives and 
creating new needs, people simultaneously create corresponding social relations to 
co-operate and influence each other; they produce life and make history in the broad 
sense of the word. As these productive forces have developed as practices of life, 
accordant modes of consciousness have resulted. As Rehmann (2013, 25) points out, 
Marx and Engels (2010 [1846], 44) saw consciousness as practical and arising from 
need, from ‘the necessity of intercourse with other men […]. Consciousness is, 
therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men 
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exist at all’. In the process of consciousness developing alongside productive forces, 
it creates division of labour between manual and mental efforts, resulting in ‘the 
formation of a specialized priesthood that is set free from manual labour’ (Rehmann 
2013, 30). The priests arise as the first form of ideologists. 
Rehmann draws from Gramsci too, in pointing out that the idea of objectivity of 
the external world is related to religion and that, as a belief, it has a religious origin. 
Gramsci (1971, 441) stated that all religions teach that ‘the world, nature, the universe 
were created by God before the creation of man, and therefore man found the world 
all ready made, catalogued and defined once and for all, [and therefore] this belief 
has become an iron fact of “common sense”’. Rehmann (2013, 64) concludes: ‘Since 
social practice is both real and subjective, the dichotomy of the “objective” and 
“subjective” cannot be maintained.’ Althusser too adopted these material elements 
for his ideology theory, and Rehmann (ibid., 151) concluded along similar lines that 
‘ideologies have their own “material existence” and therefore temporality. 
Individuals are moved by a system that goes from a particular apparatus to material 
rituals, to everyday practices of the subject101 and produces ideological effects there’ 
(ibid.). With regard to the operation of the ideological, Althusser (2014, 186) 
modified an example from Pascal so as to illuminate what the material practice in 
this sense means: 
Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe. 
Althusser continues the explanation by stating that Pascal ‘scandalously inverts the 
order of things’ (ibid.) in that coming to faith is usually conceived of the other way 
around. Althusser’s formula above is a description of the ritualistic practice that 
keeps up active faith in an institutional religious environment. The faith is an active 
social practice that is upheld through rituals that maintain religious sensations and 
ideas – a man’s ‘ideas are his material acts inserted into material practices’ (ibid.). It 
is the act of kneeling and praying that creates the belief, not vice versa. The same is 
true of the ideological in general. Ideologies are upheld not through ideas by 
themselves but through the practices and rituals combined with the ideas, making 
said ideas the best explanations for the existing material order and the (common) 
sense of the order that follows. This takes place, again, in the ‘complex material 
arrangements’ described by Rehmann, wherein mechanism of several sorts are 
fundamental. This makes all these conditions material, in that they all participate in 
producing the effect. 
 
101 Althusser refers here to the subject of ideological powers, a person. The ideology theory of PIT is 
a theory of subjection, as addressed further on in this chapter. 
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In this institutional environment, upholding ideologies is a highly practical 
exercise. For example, when one teaches at a university, one usually takes the 
curriculum as a given. Then, one makes sure that the students know how to replicate 
what is expected under that curriculum and receive study credits accordingly. It is 
not just the act of transferring the idea from the curriculum to the head of a student 
but the entire material arrangement wherein the act of transfer takes place, involving 
the authority of the university, that of the teacher, and the accordant corporeal 
practice of learning how the world works and thinking accordingly102. One could 
paraphrase Althusser’s formula thus: learn what is in the textbook, repeat the ideas 
in the exam, and you will believe. In other words, the ideological operates through 
learning how to apply the ‘scientific model’ that has been handed down as a given in 
the ready-made university with a ready-made curriculum. The primary ideological 
struggle in the university, then, takes place in forming the curriculum that the 
students encounter when practising their scientific skills (for the first time), not in 
an open field of ideas and deliberation where a rational, autonomous, and sovereign 
individual may freely choose what seems to be the best argument. The ideological is 
concretised in this as practical and material. Next, I consider how it combines certain 
thought-forms with institutional practices. 
4.2.1 The Ideological As Rule by a Hegemonic Class 
Ideological powers operate in capitalist class-society, where, on one hand, capitalist 
competition prevails and, on the other, the respective interests prevail and are 
protected. Even though there is by no means a single unified class with one uniform 
interest, there most likely are unifying class-interests. In a capitalist society, a 
capitalist class consisting loosely of the owners of the means of production is 
probably a group with some unifying interests to protect since these people benefit 
most from the prevailing order. While it is clear that there are groups organised 
 
102 Foucault offers good descriptions of corporeal practices in his Discipline and Punish, with examples 
from such contexts as schools, where ‘an assistant teacher taught the holding of the pen, guided the 
pupil's hand, corrected mistakes and at the same time “marked down trouble-makers”; another 
assistant teacher had the same tasks in the reading class; the intendant who supervised the other 
officers and was in charge of behaviour in general also had the task of “initiating newcomers into the 
customs of the school”; the decurions got the pupils to recite their lessons and “marked down” those 
who did not know them. We have here a sketch of an institution of the “mutual” type in which three 
procedures are integrated into a single mechanism: teaching proper, the acquisition of knowledge by 
the very practice of the pedagogical activity and a reciprocal, hierarchized observation’ (1977 [1975], 
176). 
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around interests, one should still bear in mind that class in an economic sense is a 
result of social relations that follow on from the ownership relations, in a process 
that, again, produces the prevailing division of labour. Within this division, some 
people are more dependent on capital for their immediate subsistence-level life. 
Hence, while human groups may be divided into statistical classes representing their 
structural position within the division of labour, the division principles are equally 
important, from the social relations that organise production, labour, and the 
distribution of well-being in the society (for example, see Wood 2016 [1995], Ch. 3). 
The queer nature of the relation between competition and unifying class-interests 
is visible in how capitalists perceive their interests. Through competitive relations, 
they see it as being in their interest to lower the costs of production and to justify 
and naturalise their position as the owners of means of production. The point is that 
no unified conspiracy or plot of some sort is needed; they become aware of their 
objective interests through the functioning of the capitalist market and the 
concomitant need to keep up with the game. The market that is ‘natural’ for them 
unifies their interests in that respect. Again, these need not be purely ‘material 
interests’ in the way neo-institutionalists understand materialism. They may be values 
and attitudes learned as part of the socialisation process wherein this class take their 
‘natural’ place in society with the privileges it entails. 
This does not mean there is a unifying interest among capitalists any more than 
within the working class, who may adopt values that are hostile to their economic 
interests. This has proved to be the case with so-called Thatcherism in Britain 
(addressed by, among others, Hall & Jacques 1983; Hall 1983, 1988) and, more 
recently, with ‘austerity’ (Blyth 2015). According to Hall (1988), Thatcherism was 
particularly successful in bringing quite different, conflicting social interests together 
by manufacturing ‘consensus’ from above. This is the point on the path where PIT 
breaks with narrow economism: scholars such as Hall have recognised the 
discrepancies between the economic and ideological positions: 
The challenge is how to grasp why turning to certain ideological values and attitudes 
can go hand in hand with the loss of collective and individual agency. A major subject 
of a critical ideology-theory is people’s ‘voluntary’ subjection to alienated forms of 
domination, the consent to conditions restricting their capacities to act. (Rehmann 
2013, 5) 
According to Hall (1988, 41), ‘Thatcherism’s capacity to become popular [is 
particularly significant] especially among those sectors of the society whose interests 
it cannot possibly be said to represent in any conventional sense of the term’. Hall 
saw that ‘class is not the only determinant of social interest (e.g., gender, race)’ and 
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that, more importantly, ‘interests are themselves constructed, constituted, in and 
through the ideological process’ (ibid., 45), of which Thatcherism is a parade 
example. Instead of focusing merely on ideas, PIT and Hall (e.g., 1983, 1988; see 
also Hall & Jacques 1983) brought a special touch to work on ideological hegemonic 
class-rule and struggle, by connecting it with the underlying conditions and the 
historical continuum. Seen from this angle, the rise of Thatcherism, for example, 
resonated with the social conditions of the time and its political conjuncture, and it 
was produced through the existing political machinery. Moreover, in PIT scholars’ 
investigation of German fascism, they were ‘not looking for a specific content of 
ideas, [but instead, concentrated] from the outset on the Nazis’ practices of 
ideological transformation. Indeed, the material-studies showed a continuous 
primacy of ideological arrangements, practices and rituals over the edifice of ideas. 
[…] [A] sequence of “performative acts” with ideological subject effects [took place], 
for example marching, mass-assemblies, collecting foodsfuffs [sic] and money for 
those exposed to the cold [the Winterhilfswerk relief programme], living in camps, 
company-fêtes’ (Rehmann 2013, 264–265). 
When considering the role of ideas in ideology, Marx and Engels brought out an 
especially significant point related to the ideological power struggle. According to 
Marx and Engels (2010 [1845], 60), any new class aiming for power ‘is compelled 
[…] to present its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that 
is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and present 
them as the only rational, universally valid ones’. Thus, with regard to ideas, 
ideological struggle offers the ‘best explanation’ for the order that the groups aiming 
for power try to provide or secure. This takes place through a process wherein 
various kinds of ideologists – politicians, jurists, artists, think tanks, and intellectuals 
who are public figures – work to translate the ‘predominant ideology into a language 
that people find convincing’ (Rehmann 2013, 3). After all, in the ideology domain, it 
is not so important what is false but what makes good sense, ‘which […] is usually 
quite enough’ (Hall 1988, 46). Rehmann (2013, 33) considers this translation practice 
of ideologists to be ‘a crucial component for a class-formation to gain and maintain 
hegemony’. This is how the contradictory values and attitudes of the ruling class are 
brought together in a process of collective identification of mutual interests, which 
are then transformed into ‘voluntary subjection’ of people (i.e., hegemony) through 
an ideological process. 
From PIT’s point of view, the ideological is ‘alienated socialization 
(Vergesellschaftung) from above’ in Rehmann’s words (ibid., 11). This approach takes 
class-rule to be Gramscian ‘hegemony’, wherein the ruling class not only rules but 
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also leads, in the sense of generating among the subjects a ‘kind of consensus (active 
or passive) to its rule’ (ibid., 3). In this description, ‘alienation’ refers to fetishistic 
inversion whereby the movement of commodities controls the movement of people. 
Within this process, people are subordinated by an alien power that is a result of 
their own doings. That power is understood primarily through the objective thought-
forms – in its appearance form – with which the attention is paid to necessities and 
real abstractions such as money, resulting from the uncontrolled movement of 
commodities. While no-one has to be fully aware of ‘how things really are’, 
ideologists work to translate these necessities into the language of ‘inevitable’ and 
‘fair’, to sustain the profit-making (ibid., 106). In other words, the translation of the 
prevailing conditions uses the alienated, objective thought-forms as its foundation 
for explaining to people the things they (objectively) encounter in their mundane 
lives. Because people’s experiences resonate with these thought-forms, they ‘make 
good sense’ (Hall 1988, 46), and get accepted – whether actively or passively – as 
reasonable explanation for the existing order. 
The concept of socialisation, in turn, refers to social upbringing and learning in 
and through institutions (i.e., ideological apparatuses), where individuals internalise 
norms. The PIT notion applies the word in its broad meaning based on the German 
word ‘Vergesellschaftung’, which underscores the societal dimension, with all of the 
social relations included, and stresses that society consists of these relations, which 
are the primary socialising element in ‘making society’ (Rehmann 2013, 248)103. The 
state as the dominant power is distinguished from earlier models for societies by its 
‘permanent “administrative staff” ready to exercise the “necessary compulsion”’ 
(ibid., 253; see also Weber 1978, 53–54104). The state is ushered in thus as an 
ideological power with its vertically socialising ‘super-structural instances and […] 
bureaucratic apparatuses. [It] fixes and regulates the antagonistic class-interests from 
 
103 Rehmann (2013, 248) attaches this German word to contexts when discussing socialisation because 
it ‘has [a] more encompassing and more active meaning of “making society”, in the sense of shaping 
and realising social relationships on all levels. It is in this sense that the concept of Vergesellschaftung can 
be analytically separated into vertical and horizontal “socialisation”’. The English word ‘socialisation’ 
loses these more general connotations of the German word that Marx often employed for the role of 
the state in this process. One could consider the next paragraph’s distinction between the words 
‘socialisation’ and ‘societalisation’ to be a parallel example, setting up a separation uncommon in social 
scientific literature. 
104 Weber (1978, 53–54) wrote: ‘The head of the household rules without an administrative staff […]. 
A ruling organization will be called “political” insofar as its existence and order is continuously 
safeguarded within a given territorial area by the threat and application of physical force on the part 
of the administrative staff. A compulsory political organization with continuous operations (politischer 
Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a “state” insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim 
to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.’ 
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above’ (Rehmann 2013, 246). While states operate in many ways, from the ideology-
theoretical perspective they maintain social reproduction by upholding the vertically 
socialising institutions, such as schools, family, religious communities, and juridical 
apparatuses – all institutions that it directly but also indirectly maintains. This is why 
the realm of ideological powers also includes institutions such as trade unions and 
employer associations, political parties, media entities, and cultural quarters. 
The idea of ideological apparatuses has its origin in Althusser’s essay ‘Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses’ (2014 [1970]), where he lists the above-mentioned 
apparatuses while pinpointing how the question about them pertains to the necessary 
reproduction of ‘conditions of production’. This is because ‘every social formation 
must reproduce […] 1) the productive forces [consisting of labour power and] 2) the 
existing relations of production’ (ibid., 233). Since the schooling system is the 
principal ideological apparatus for Althusser, he is especially interested in the manner 
of reproduction of general qualifications – ‘know-how’. Schools with their obligatory 
attendance are usually the first institution to take over the socialisation function from 
parents. In my interpretation, if parents have the responsibility for primary 
socialisation, schooling and other, equivalent institutions are active in secondary 
socialisation and therefore societalise people. While the schooling system fulfils its 
integrative and co-ordinative functions in a Parsonian sense and thus reproduces 
society with regard to its necessities peacefully, that system has a part also in 
reproducing the predominant class-relations by naturalising them as it teaches how 
the society works practically. In this sense, the ideological struggle is over such 
elements as curricula more than presenting directly opposing political positions. 
Rehmann (2013, 152) describes how Althusser’s perspective on reproduction has 
often been criticised as functionalist – that is, as ‘a view from above that disregards 
the actual contradictions and struggles in social institutions in favour of considering 
their function for the stabilisation of domination, so that their significance seems to 
lie outside themselves’. For him, the PIT approach suggests replacing the term ‘state 
apparatus’ with ‘ideological powers’ and supplementing the idea with, for example, 
some parts of Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory and ideas about ‘habitus’. It follows 
from such a view that people are not so much tied to certain concrete institutions as 
they stand in objective relations between positions (ibid., Ch. 8). Through the term 
‘ideological powers’, attention is drawn to how one may see these concepts as 
complementary, not exclusionary. For true complementarity, I suggest that, while 
the idea of functionalism carries strong negative stigma among social scientists, one 
may still consider the arrangement of objective relations in society in such terms as 
division of labour and integration, along with what kinds of necessities their 
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reproduction entails. One may at the same time give consideration to the cost for 
social theory of abandoning the notion of objective preconditions for a functioning 
society. 
Irrespective of the latter fine-tuning, reproducing apparatuses have ideology-
theoretical value in illuminating how all of these institutions – schools as much as 
trade unions and media outlets – socialise, in a broad sense. As Althusser’s actual 
analysis was tied to the conditions obtaining in France at the time, his key concepts 
maintain their relevance because their perspective on socialising institutions is set in 
conditions still witnessed today, wherein hegemonic interests prevail. These 
institutions do not just objectively inform of how the world works; they also actively 
put forward their interpretations of the contradicting interests and other conditions. 
In Rehmann’s terms, they constantly struggle over ‘hearts and minds’, but in this 
they struggle to persuade of their particular frame of reasoning, since they may 
operate on different bases. Irrespective of their differences, those groups in power 
with sufficiently similar interests manufacture seeming consensus from above. This 
occurs because, in the vertical socialisation, they operate on an institutional basis 
with resources that are provided and backed by state or corporate powers. These 
powers are usually beyond individual-level control, bringing imbalance to the power 
relations between individual citizens and these groups from the outset. 
However, analysis can consider horizontal socialisation too. The latter concept 
refers ‘(in whatever displaced way) to the people’s “commons” […] recognised by 
them as their “own”’ (ibid., 12); i.e., this is construed as socialisation among equals. 
The concept is designed to include people’s present realities and personal 
experiences of the world as it points to the fact that people try to regulate social life 
actively themselves. Therefore, the term denotes ‘common-consensual control of the 
conditions of social life’ (ibid., 248). In keeping with this definition, PIT scholars 
recommend reserving the term for acts that take place ‘whenever the “common”, 
the “commune”[,] which has been alienated by ideological powers, is reclaimed and 
reappropriated’ (ibid., 249). 
Let us return to what the ideological is for PIT: alienated socialisation from above 
that is aimed at class-rule in terms of Gramscian hegemony. The concept of 
hegemony addresses how dominant groups aim for people’s voluntary subjection. In 
addition to ruling – setting the common norms and rules – they want to lead, which 
requires people’s willing surrender of their direct authority for democratic planning, 
be this surrender active or passive (i.e., not embarking on active resistance). In other 
words, hegemony involves a relationship wherein ruling and leading must be 
constantly reproduced from above, but such that the group in power succeeds in 
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forming the necessary consensus among the people and between groups, which 
causes them to choose to give up their power to decide on their own affairs. 
Hegemony is an active ideological-political practice. Gramsci’s use of the term is 
probably one of the most well-known, with Peter Thomas (2009, 159–160) 
describing it thus: ‘It is upon the concept of hegemony, more than any other, that 
Gramsci’s contemporary fame rests; indeed, his name is almost synonymous with it.’ 
While this concept has several dimensions105, I am interested primarily in the one 
that Gramsci (1971, 12) himself called ‘spontaneous’ consent: 
The ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general 
direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 
‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant 
group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production. 
This category is related to the analysis of so-called civil society, usually understood 
as ‘private’ in contrast to the state. Direct domination is exercised within the state, 
but hegemony is something that the dominant group exercises throughout the 
society to achieve the seemingly spontaneous consent of the masses, no matter how 
contradictory the ‘compromise-formations’ may be (Rehmann 2013, 11). In 
Gramsci’s (1971, 12) analysis, though, these two levels of society act in sequence – 
not binary oppositions – where the state with its coercive function uses its legal 
power to enforce discipline on groups who do not consent. This conception ties in 
with Althusser’s ideological state apparatuses, in that they ‘reproduce the relations 
of production under the “shield” [bouclier] of the repressive state-apparatuses’ 
(Rehmann 2013, 147). Therefore, Gramsci’s consent vs. coercion dimension of 
hegemony is one of dialectical relationship, wherein the two complement each other 
in such a way that the classes ‘for’ and ‘against’ the leading group are dominated by 
different means. Thomas (2009, 163) elaborates: 
Leadership-hegemony and domination are therefore conceived less as qualitatively 
distinct from one another, than as strategically differentiated forms of a unitary 
political power: hegemony is the form of political power exercised over those classes 
in close proximity to the leading group, while domination is exerted over those 
opposing it. Consent is one of the means of forging the ‘composite body’ of a class 
alliance, while coercion is deployed against the excluded other. 
He states that these forces must counterbalance each other (ibid., 165). That is, 
domination should not be exercised too much, lest it weaken the ostensibly 
spontaneous consent, since the delicate balance between these dimensions of 
 
105 For in-depth analysis of Gramsci’s conception of hegemony, see Thomas (2009, especially Ch. 5). 
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hegemony is based on a common understanding of ‘natural’ equilibrium that people 
perceive in mundane life. This perceived equilibrium results from the functioning of 
‘sensible people’ or ‘good citizens’, who are willing to be voluntarily subordinate to 
the prevailing order since they accept it in ideological terms based on objective 
thought-forms. Once again, this does not equate to false consciousness, for most of 
us make decisions to sustain ‘normal’ life for very practical reasons, which may be 
the right ones from our individual-specific point of view. Gramsci’s description of 
‘spontaneous’ consent describes the relationship between us and socially dominating, 
leading, and organising forces that aim to disguise the fact that we do not share equal 
starting positions, or convey a sense that unequal positions are ‘natural’, ‘right’, and 
‘fair’, which is required for maintaining the status quo. In the best-case scenario for 
hegemony, people may even demand measures that are directed against disruption 
of this observed ‘equilibrium’. Since the society has dominating and leading groups, 
there is hegemonic regulating ‘from above’ and, therefore, voluntary subjection 
‘from below’. 
Voluntary subjection can involve active and/or passive acquiescence to class-rule. 
One may be active in the society-building or just let it happen, as long as one 
reproduces the society by the rules that prevail via one’s own practices. While we 
may have our doubts about the order, we live in a practical world that appears 
objective to us, especially when we tend to livelihood concerns, immediate 
subsistence. As we take these conditions as given, we are in a spontaneous 
relationship with the world that appears natural since it works in a manner that seems 
immediately understandable. This spontaneous, shared, and immediate 
understanding on the part of ‘the multitude’ is what Gramsci (1971, 421) calls 
‘common sense’. No matter the individualistic connotations of the idea of ‘sensible 
people’ using common sense, this is exactly where the queerness of the ideological 
is situated. If our spontaneous relationship with the world is ideological and the 
ideological struggle is over people’s hearts and minds, it is over how people commonly 
use their sense and over what kind of sense is commonly used to understand the world 
around us. Thus, the question of the spontaneous subject comes into play. 
4.2.2 The Spontaneous Subject 
That’s obvious! That’s right! That’s true! (Althusser 2014 [1995], 263) 
As illustrated in the introduction to this chapter, people tend to take it personally 
when someone claims that they are not thinking for themselves but acting 
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ideologically. Usually, one would rather see everyone else as ideologically oriented. I 
associate this with holding up the image of an autonomous, sovereign individual, a 
conception that is cherished as nearly equivalent to human rights – even among 
social theorists, as we saw in the chapter addressing neo-institutionalism. In fact, this 
spontaneous reaction may be seen as useful for purposes of ruling, since it casts our 
voluntary subjection as automatically a well-thought-out and balanced decision by 
an individual. While there is a fine line between our individual-level consideration 
and spontaneous ideological reactions, the middle ground of a not-so-autonomous 
individual should be taken seriously. If our individual-level perception says that we 
live in a world of acting individuals, I suggest that as socialised individuals we could 
be considered subjects. 
According to Rehmann (2013, 11), ‘PIT’s concept of the ideological does not 
claim to comprehend the entirety of the subjects’ social practices, thought-forms, 
and feelings, but identifies the specific dimension of a socialisation from above, 
which is in turn traversed and counterbalanced by other dimensions of socialisation’. 
As contradictory compromise-formations, the ideological must appeal to people’s 
‘commons’ as well as their ‘own’ (ibid., 11–12), but the difficulty with ideological 
analysis lies more in explaining how different levels of people’s life and experiences 
are combined such that the necessary compromise-formation is produced (ibid., 50–
51). That is why it is so important to ‘grasp the “meeting-points” and combinations 
between ideological discourses and the “objective thought-forms” that produce 
common-sense mystifications’ (ibid., 51). 
Objective thought-forms do not form an ideology by themselves, since they 
cannot be regulated ‘from above’. It is their representations that are articulated, as 
‘an ensemble of institutionally administered norms, values, and ideals’ that must 
‘make sense’ for individuals (ibid., 51). However, since, from the outset, people are 
not homogenous creatures by nature, their reason is conceived of within PIT ‘as an 
ambivalent and antagonistically structured force-field […]. Whoever intervenes into 
ideological struggles concerning the people’s “common sense” is immediately drawn 
into a struggle about what is “reasonable”’ (ibid., 105). The struggle is about 
subjectification, and, therefore, the constitution of the ideological subject must be 
explained. 
For Althusser (2005 [1965], 233), ideology belongs primarily to the domain of the 
unconscious: ‘It is [a] profoundly unconscious […] system of representations [that] are 
usually images and occasionally concepts, but it is above all as structures that they 
impose on the vast majority of men, not via their “consciousness”. They are 
perceived–accepted–suffered cultural objects and they act functionally on men via a 
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process that escapes them.’ Here, Althusser brings out an interesting point 
connected with the relation between agent and structure: the subconscious operates 
akin to a miniature society, a schema that we internalise in socialisation but of which 
we are unaware most of the time since it regulates our spontaneous behaviour. 
Structures, then, being unconscious, are internalised rules, regulations, ideals, 
attitudes, etc. that represent the social relations where we grow and live. Hence, an 
ideology, for Althusser, ‘is a matter of the lived relation between men and their world’ 
(ibid.). When acting as individuals in accordance with our subconscious, we act as 
subjects, so, for ideology to be ‘lived and believed’, concrete individuals must be 
constituted as subjects within the ideological apparatuses (Rehmann 2013, 155). To 
understand ideological subjection, Rehmann highlights how Althusser understood 
the term ‘subject’ in its double meaning: 
On the one hand, it means a subjected being that submits to a higher authority, and 
on the other hand it seemingly means the opposite of this, namely a self-confident 
and responsible author of one’s actions, endowed with free subjectivity, an intentional 
centre of initiatives. According to Althusser, ideology works precisely through the 
combination of these two opposite meanings. One submits to higher authorities, high 
moral values, and while doing this, one considers oneself as a free, independent 
person, guided merely by one’s inner impulses, convictions and beliefs: the subject is 
subjected in the form of autonomy. (Ibid., 155–156) 
As ideological subjects, we respond to calls we recognise. The most powerful call is 
obviousness, since we cannot fail to recognise it. In other words, people tend to 
perceive their surroundings as obvious, and usually the common sense responds to 
things it recognises. For example, it is as obvious that 2+2=4 as it is obvious that 
people must go to work to earn their living, although the latter ‘obviousness’ depends 
on the social arrangements. What is in question here is the mechanism of recognition, 
and this is what Althusser calls interpellation. According to Althusser (2014 [1995], 
264), interpellation ‘recruits’ subjects by calling to them in such a way that they 
recognise themselves from the general call. He cites as an example a police officer 
who shouts out: ‘Hey, you there!’, whereupon ‘the hailed individual will turn around’ 
(ibid.)106. The trick with ideological interpellations is that they are not addressed to 
anyone special, yet people recognise themselves from them and, thereby, ‘recognize 
and accept their identity in the interpellation, and this is what transforms them into 
subjects’ (Rehmann 2013, 156). This seems somewhat trivial, and that is exactly the 
point: ‘It is in this very obviousness, this self-evident reaction of all of us […] that 
 
106 I am not sure this is the best possible example, since I reckon that everyone would turn around in 
a mundane situation of a police officer shouting. 
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the ideological subjection has its foundation’ (ibid.). We do not actively recognise 
the reasons for the appeal and familiarity of the ideological call, since the 
subconsciously constituted subjectivity is what responds to it. 
Public debt serves as an example. People use money in day-to-day life and are 
accustomed to the notion that personal debts are, and must be, repaid. Also, debt 
has a long history and a central position in the development of civilisation, and it 
hence stirs strong moral sentiments in people (for example, see Graeber 2011; Shaikh 
2016, Ch. 5). Thus, when these (learned) moral sentiments are combined with 
people’s everyday experiences of using money, the ‘obviousness’ that public debt 
must be repaid in similar fashion to private debt has a strong sounding board. This 
has served as a fundament of the political struggle over austerity politics, wherein 
proponents of austerity have based their political argumentation on this common 
sense related to debt (Blyth 2015). Said ideological interpellation has strong roots, 
since the argumentation that supports this common-sense reasoning has been 
institutionalised by economic theory that provides a basis for legitimation work 
carried out in politics directed at public-sector cutbacks (ibid.; see also Herranen 
2018). In sum, the common sense of an ‘autonomous subject’ recognises the 
‘obviousness’ from the ideological interpellation that ‘debts must be repaid’. On the 
other hand, the sentiments of a ‘moral subject’ who submits to a higher authority 
insist that debts must be paid even though doing so would mean suffering, since that 
is ‘the right thing to do’. 
More generally, it follows that ideology must have some kind of symmetry with 
people’s experiences (here referring to everything from mundane experiences to 
socialised unconscious representations) or must offer sufficient motives for 
acceptance. Examples of the latter underpinnings are morals and ethics-related 
motives, money, what is ‘common’, and power or other such benefits. In the first 
case, symmetry means that ideology must explain in sufficient extent why things are 
as they are, or ought to be. That explaining must begin somewhere; i.e., it must have 
some point of reference. One might explain how the world works through, for 
example, money and emphasise its circulation as creating the surrounding 
phenomena. Once there is a reference point, causes, effects, and connotations of 
‘freedom’, ‘property’, ‘equality’, etc. may be attached accordingly. If the structure of 
the unconscious can find sufficient verification of the explanation from subjects’ 
experiences, the subjects may approve the explanation and possible contradictions 
may be bypassed as long as they are not overly disturbing. Again, explaining the 
world through such lenses as money is not necessarily ‘false’; after all, it ‘makes sense’ 
to most of us as we perceive its movement. Accordingly, the ensuing dominant 
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discourse about the whole economy may be built around it. The more commonly 
one discourse becomes socially acceptable – ‘sensible’ – the less active ideological 
administration is needed. The central point is that the ideas and discourses must have 
some resonance with prevailing social conditions. Symmetry between them and 
people’s experiences must prevail. 
We have noted that discourse is one element of the ideological interrelated with 
apparatuses, practices, and rituals, but what is specific to that form? The objective 
thought-forms are articulated as an effective communicative practice. I consider 
discourse as such to be a praxis-form consisting of symbols, signs, messages, images, 
etc. – meaningful, communicative practices. Discourses also live and change 
historically and locally, where some understandings in one time or place may be 
wholly different from those in another. However, according to Hall (2006 [1980], 
163), mass-communication discourses must be produced, which requires ‘material 
instruments – its “means” – as well as its own sets of social (production) relations – 
the organization and combination of practices within media apparatuses’. In the 
production of ideological messages, discourses, and hence the ideological in general, 
the whole set of ‘institutional-societal relations of production’ takes part in this 
process while these still must ‘pass under the discursive rules of language for its 
product to be “realized”’ (ibid., 164). Discourses must be encoded in such a 
meaningful form that, once having been put in circulation, they may be translated at 
the receiving end, back ‘into social practices if the circuit is to be both completed 
and effective’ (ibid.). 
Hall obviously emphasises the production aspect, wherein messages for mass 
communication are socially and institutionally constructed, but he also stresses that 
there is no effective message without translation back into social practices. They 
must go through a circuit of ‘encoding – meaningful discourse – decoding’ in a 
production–consumption cycle wherein sufficient symmetry between the encoding 
(source) and decoding (receiver) positions must prevail. Hence, the code is crucial, 
since ‘[d]iscursive “knowledge” is the product not of the transparent representation 
of the “real” in language but of the articulation of language on real relations and 
conditions. Thus there is no intelligible discourse without the operation of a code’ 
(ibid., 167). Decoding is primarily an unconscious set of operations that, in a sense, 
explains the messages for us, so the ‘code’ is what we learn in those socialising 
practices wherein we learn to read messages of whatever kind (ibid.). Therefore, ‘it 
is at the connotative level of the sign that the situational ideologies alter and transform 
signification’ (ibid., 168). Moreover, since there are so many and so very 
contradictory messages and interpellations, along with interpretive conditions and 
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interpreters, there is no guarantee of the message getting decoded in accordance with 
its encoding (ibid., 170). 
In addition to the ideas and discourses having resonance with prevailing 
conditions and, therefore, with people’s experiences, they must be structured in line 
with particular rules, such as grammar. Only through this structure (shared 
standards) can they become effective, since the sending and the receiving end must 
possess a shared understanding of the content. Again, realising the discourses takes 
place through practices – discourses are communicative practices. That means that 
there is no separation between the content of the message and the form of practice 
in which it is realised. Moreover, mass communication especially requires production 
and distribution instruments such as media apparatuses, although these cannot 
guarantee success in communicating. Hence, Hall points out that the communication 
may fail. Also, we may decode the messages in different ways, some of them 
following the dominant-hegemonic position, some negotiating with the message, but 
others using an ‘oppositional code’ – such as understanding ‘national interests’ as 
‘class-interests’. 
This confrontation with what Rehmann calls positive counter-subjectivity offers 
an interesting lens for understanding ‘different responses to ideologies, [where] we 
need to presume that the subjects are not mere “effects” of ideological 
interpellations’ (Rehmann 2013, 178). As Rehmann points out, ‘[l]anguage and 
discourse are certainly always with us, but they are not the only factors that determine 
our lives. Experiences such as feeling hungry, sleeping in the cold and becoming ill 
can hardly be characterised as effects of ideological interpellations or discourses, 
even if the interpretation of that hunger, cold, and illness are heavily influenced by 
the predominant ideologies’ (ibid.). This is one reason people may resist dominant 
interpellations: their lived and/or shared experiences may not fit the ideological discourses 
and may actually contradict them. Hence, we must remember that, while 
autonomous, sovereign agency is a metaphysical abstraction and mere fantasy, there 
are contradicting and different kinds of subjectification and real, lived, and shared 
experiences that make us personalities107. These real, living people can resist 
domination and organise in resistance. 
 
107 Rehmann (2013, 231–236) uses Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to elaborate on the relations between 
social structures and bodily dispositions. According to Bourdieu (2000, 138–139), social structures 
‘inscribe’ themselves into human bodies as they are ‘products[s] of incorporation of the structures and 
tendencies of the world’. Bourdieu points out, on page 141 of the same work, that our experiences of 
the social structures are not just ‘cognitive’ – they are fairly comprehensive and do not leave our bodies 
intact: ‘We learn bodily. The social order inscribes itself in bodies through this permanent 
confrontation.’ This happens not just through Foucauldian ‘normalizing discipline’ but also through 
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Subject formation involves two complementary aspects, socialising and people’s 
voluntary acceptance of some values, ideals, norms, and rules as parts of their 
identity. Therefore, subjectification is a process wherein human beings are seen as a 
product of social relations and as active individuals making decisions between norms 
and ideals. In that process, we learn to be parts of interdependent human societies 
and communities. This observation does not deny our human dignity or worth but 
underscores the relational nature of humanity. It also highlights why people tend to 
defend their ideals and understandings so eagerly: one does not just adopt some 
abstract ideals or ideas – those ideals and ideas are lived as real practices. 
Furthermore, one does not merely act in accordance with the ideals – one is those 
ideals as one’s lived practices and ensuing experiences. As we live the practices, we 
also constitute them in social relations that we encounter as real when we engage 
with the human world. To become subjects of change, then, we must undertake to 
change the social relations and the corresponding thought-forms. 
4.2.3 Contradiction and Resistance 
PIT considers itself critical ideology theory, because it ‘deals with the functioning of 
ideological powers, practices, and discourses from the perspective of their “withering 
away” in a society without class-, state- and patriarchal domination’ (ibid., 241). 
However, it does not suggest a utopian vision without power relations; to the 
contrary, the ideological powers are understood through the term ‘domination’, 
which especially denotes institutionalised, structural, and asymmetric power relations 
referring to superiority and subordination (ibid., 242). In short, it takes dominating 
asymmetrical power relations as its very starting point, with the idea that ideological 
powers are needed for upholding them. For considering the problem of order, it 
paints the problem as bound up with unequal social relations. To disassemble this 
‘ensemble of apparatuses, intellectuals, rituals and forms of praxis’ (ibid., 5), critical 
interventions are needed in theory and in practice. 
As noted above, a counter-concept to the ideological is found in horizontal 
socialisation as ‘self-socialization’ (ibid., 248). This does more than refer to some 
concrete goal. It also takes people’s ever-present realities and experiences into 
account. The process occurs whenever people regulate their own social lives and 
develop their competencies without or against the subordinate apparatuses and strive 
 
what Bourdieu describes as ‘economic and social structures and the mechanisms through which they 
are reproduced’. 
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to assert democratic control of planning their lives. But why would people go against 
the grain? 
Firstly, people have lived and shared experiences that rise above any ideological 
messages and form a basis for resistance to dominant interpellations. Physical needs 
of real bodies or interpretations based on lived life may be in conflict with the 
explanation offered for the prevailing conditions. Opposing ‘decodings’ may arise 
from conditions wherein people rely on their personal and shared interpretations. 
Rehmann goes on to suggest three respects in which Hall’s oppositional code may 
go beyond the interpellation: 1) People may refuse to identify themselves in the 
dominant interpellations’ ‘big subject’. 2) Instead of identifying themselves thus, 
people may identify each other as equal ‘little subjects’, all with the same cause. 3) 
People do not just reject the interpellation but ‘confront it with positive counter-
subjectivity’ (ibid., 177–178). For example, instead of simply refusing to study under 
a given curriculum at university, people may establish study groups and trust in their 
own understanding of what constitutes useful knowledge. 
Secondly, domination may be approached in terms of the top 1% having to 
convince the other 99% of having earned the ‘riches by their own efforts and 
achievements’, in Rehmann’s words (ibid., 286–287). This points up that, when 
discussing horizontal socialisation and positive counter-movement, we too readily 
see ourselves as subordinated and downtrodden. While asymmetry does exist, 
describing the dominant ideological forces in terms of it ignores somewhat that the 
people in charge are fellow people and that they must actively defend their position 
in contradictory conditions. When it comes, then, to the overall distribution of 
wealth and to the 1:99 discourse underscoring the inequality, it is quite easy to see 
why the 1% hold a defence position. It does not require a PhD to understand the 
absurd nature of the situation. According to Rehmann (ibid., 287), ‘[w]e are dealing 
here with an incoherence that is symptomatic for the functioning of the ideological 
in general’. Such incoherence offers a basis for the counter-movement. 
My more general conclusion about change and stability is as follows: not only the 
discursive, logical, or otherwise experienced incoherencies but also contradictions 
between individuals’ experiences and social structures in general are the engine of 
change. This somewhat abstract suggestion is consistent with multiple social-
theoretical approaches to the matter presented in this dissertation, all the way back 
to Durkheim’s discussion of how individuals perform ‘intellectual operations’ 
between adopting social representations and their actions that lead them to either 
approve or rise up against the authority. 
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In my interpretation, in Durkheim’s theory the root of contradiction lies in the 
breaking of collective representations – shared rules and values – that work as a 
regulating standard for people’s collective operations. When social crisis emerges 
that upsets the ‘scale’, people face difficulties in adjusting their conduct and views 
with each other since they cannot reconcile their experiences of the world with the 
now-upset standards. The contradiction between people’s experiences, 
interpretations of them, and prevailing rules and norms may arise when people 
perform ‘intellectual operations’ connected with conforming to ‘social authority’ 
(Durkheim 2005 [1897], 76). Thomas (2009, 163–165) echoed this point with regard 
to Gramsci’s characterisation of delicate balance between consent and coercion, a 
balance that Durkheim himself emphasised in connection with discipline. Thus we 
come full circle. In sum, if social and individual-level representations are in mutual 
contradiction, sometimes because of the use of (state) force, people may try to find 
new solutions to the unresolved situation. 
A parallel is evident in Parsons’ processual explaining, wherein contradicting 
rules, role-expectations, and contradiction between normative expectations and 
actors’ motivations are the key causes of deviations. People’s motivations stabilise 
through shared values directed to arbitrating differences between people that stem 
from prevailing conditions of scarcity in the society. These values inform 
expectations as to roles in accordance with which people perform their functions in 
society. Thus, because of the complex and multi-layered nature of social institutions, 
contradictions may arise between different sets of rules that determine these role-
expectations, as readily as they arise between actors’ motivations and roles (Parsons 
1991 [1951], 25–26; 269–272). Actors may also suffer from incapability in not being 
able to live up to the expectations or face the problem of not knowing what is 
expected, and this too shows a contradiction between expectations and actors’ 
experiences. Deviant behaviour more generally is mainly a result of imperfect 
integration (i.e., contradictory standards) that may even be realised in organised 
radical groups group seeking to break away from mainstream society by challenging 
the dominant values and ideology (ibid., 355). 
Correspondingly, historical institutionalists regard contradictions as a change 
mechanism when describing, for example, gradual change: as people operate 
constantly on foundations of contradicting sets of rules, institutions tend to change 
gradually. In one such account, Mahoney and Thelen’s work on historical 
institutions, contradictions are portrayed as constantly present for the same reason 
Parsons posited: institutions distribute scarce resources. Even Schmidt, whose 
discursive institutionalism represents the ‘idea’ approach to social change (with its 
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unconscious undertone), finds that people become aware of the rules when – and 
perhaps only when – contradictions appear between them (Schmidt 2008, 315).  
This very general finding suggests that people as subjects are practical beings 
whose lives are in many ways determined by a set of social relations, which, while (in 
Marx’s words) mostly imperceptible by the senses, still have concrete effects. 
However, as Hall (1986, 43) stresses, this determination is to be understood not as 
‘absolute predictability [but] in terms of setting of limits, the establishment of 
parameters, the defining of the space of operations, the concrete conditions of 
existence, [and] the “givenness” of social practices’. Accordingly, we usually operate 
as fish in water and become aware of this only when bumping into limits that are 
usually beyond our control as individuals. Contradictions open opportunities for 
change, but, since we live in a fundamentally indeterminate world without an end to 
history in sight, these opportunities come with no guarantees. 
4.3 Ideological Institutions of a Capitalist Society 
In this chapter, I have suggested that, rather than understand ideology in terms of 
ideas of which ideology is composed, it would be more fruitful to observe those 
social relations and practices wherein ideological powers operate. My purpose here, 
then, was to challenge and supplement neo-institutionalist theory, especially those 
parts of it addressing ideas as the primary (explanatory) objects of enquiry. Both it 
and classic social theory were challenged and supplemented, especially in relational 
terms, with regard to how to understand the structural ‘remainder’ representing how 
institutions and institutional arrangements may be outside the control of the 
individuals involved. In the process, I have suggested that any theory deriving its 
premises from micro-foundations of whatever sort cannot explain such effects. If 
the macro-level effects are seen only as residue-free aggregates of those micro 
effects, the surplus by which the structures get ‘out of hand’ cannot be explained. 
This is because in aggregate models, only those properties and features that are given 
to micro-agents may be found in the respective macro-structure. Again, we need a 
theory that explains the kinds of emergent phenomena and dynamics that are 
produced by human beings as a collective yet are simultaneously beyond the control 
of any given individual. 
A useful lens is provided by capitalism  in that, in simple terms, individuals may 
end up in nearly any position within the system but the ownership relations with the 
authority that arises go a long way toward determining what kinds of realities the 
 239 
individuals are exposed to when making their life choices. The relations that divide 
people up by their legally codified and other starting positions within this system of 
production distribute them into classes. Because of this functional division, the 
classes that follow said distribution of wealth usually become statistically observable 
for the same reason. 
While there is a division between a small privileged group (who benefit in multiple 
respects from the nature of this system) and the rest (who depend on the 
opportunities it offers), we all are subordinate to some of its principles. Thus, this is 
a system of social relations beyond the control of any given individual. Grasping 
these dynamics requires understanding capitalist competition. Most theorists 
examining capitalism see it as a social system of production and profit-making with 
deep or even inherent inequalities. Beyond that, scholars are divided on the nature 
and the role of capitalist competition. Many institutionalists and sociologists 
associate its principles of operation with human greed and/or desires or see it as 
equivalent to equilibrium-seeking systems governed by institutionalised rules, such 
as those of a market economy (e.g., Hall & Soskice 2001; Nee & Swedberg 2005; 
Boltanski & Chiapello 2005; Hodgson 2015; Streeck 2016). Marxist historians 
(Brenner 1976, 1977; Wood 2017 [1999]), critical political economists (Shaikh 2016), 
and scholars of critical ideology theory (Therborn 1980; Rehmann 2013), on the 
other hand, see capitalism as a dynamic system with inherent contradictions born of 
its own regulative laws, competition chief among them. 
I have characterised capitalist competition as producing emergent, structural 
effects on social reality while creating its regulating dynamics. One empirically 
observable structural effect is the tendency toward equalised profit rates, an 
emergent property that comes about because the requisite investments for the 
functioning of capitalism tend to be directed to the most profitable areas of 
production. This movement of capitals creates a tendency toward crisis in the 
system, since it sets its own laws against itself: its immanent needs for earning profit 
and the competition wherein invested capitals clash forces with individual capitalists 
to cut costs at the expense of purchasing power (unless the markets cannot expand). 
With workers unable to buy the products, they are not sold, and investments dry up. 
A negative cycle forms. 
In my interpretation, this immanent mechanism of capitalism is a result of social 
relations that drive its dynamics. From my perspective, social relations are 
dependencies, with any given phenomenon composed of relations being dependent 
on the participation of all the parties to constitute the phenomenon. Social relations 
are historically changing interrelations that usually are connected to definitions of 
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social phenomena, such as family, firm, or nation-state. For example, family exists 
when a defined set of members place themselves in specifically defined relations and 
act accordingly. A set of rules, some formal and the rest informal, govern these 
relations. The same is true for phenomena that are more difficult to define, such as 
nation-state or capitalism, which have developed historically through people’s 
creation of interdependencies that get institutionalised as rules, regulations, norms, 
and attitudes in which people are socialised. In the wake of historical creation and 
institutionalisation of these interdependencies, succeeding generations are socialised 
in this ready-made world, rendering them dependent on the existing institutional 
arrangements from the outset. These thus become naturalised: the individuals cannot 
perceive the workings of the structure of relations wherein they live like fish in water. 
In capitalism’s relation between workers and capitalists, characterised by Marx 
(2010 [1867], 613) as one wherein labour power is bought for making profits through 
production of commodities, workers must have nominal contractual freedom to sell 
that labour power. The paid work on which they hence largely rely determines the 
type of this social relation. Thus, in capitalist societies, social relations gain a double 
meaning: Firstly, they point to human societies generally organising as sets of 
historically developing interdependencies that congeal as institutions. As these ways 
of organising collective life and production develop, they further the division of 
labour and accelerate the metabolism with nature. In this first sense, social relations 
refer to dependencies historically institutionalised such that these arrangements, 
especially production in this context, may be beyond the control of any given 
individual. Secondly, as life-production in general is organised in a capitalist manner, 
they refer to how asymmetries in amounts of dependency between two people arise 
and how all of us are in some ways dependent on the capricious nature of these out-
of-control relations. The contradictory nature of these relations results from 
interdependencies between ownership and the concomitant production relations 
that meet the competitive relations. As people collectively set themselves in these 
relations and act per their social positions, the above-mentioned effects follow. 
The trickiness of social relations is similar to that of gravitational theory: the 
outcomes from the operation of these relations are observable, but the logic of the 
operation itself must be deduced indirectly. It is just as pointless to stare at a coin in 
your hand in an attempt to comprehend the mystical nature of the economy as it is 
to drop that coin on the floor 100 times in hopes of understanding the nature of 
gravity. However, this kind of reasoning does take place, as people try to get beneath 
the laws of capitalism by following the fetishised appearance forms of economic 
relations, such as money, in Marx’s portrayal of commodity fetishism. 
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Money is a real-abstraction that people use in day-to-day life as a means of 
exchange. Through this, it begins to appear that money itself causes the effects that 
its use seem to produce. In other words, the relations in the background start 
appearing to be properties of the money itself. Because everything in a nominally 
free capitalist market is bought and sold as privately produced commodities, the 
relations between people gain the guise of relations between commodities, and the 
commodities’ movement begins to mediate or control the movement of people. 
From this arises the inversion Rehmann described (2013, 39), which hides from view 
the phenomenon of the products of our own labour being turned against us. Within 
this inversion, laws of capitalism that we face daily get explained via practical 
categories that, while they may be useful for us as individuals, do not reveal those 
laws. Thereby, they form an anchor for the ideological. 
This is where PIT critical ideology theory enters in. It considers ideology a 
relational-practical and hence ‘material’ phenomenon, with this kind of materiality 
also constituting people’s consciousness. This understanding, whereby the focus is 
on the adjective form and attention is paid to sensuous human activity (and, 
accordingly, practice), extends to our metabolism with nature and to all social 
relations. All human (inter)action is material from the beginning, since it is 
fundamentally grounded in our relations with the world (Wood 2016 [1995], Ch. 3). 
One way to understand this would be to try thinking of something ‘immaterial’. One 
soon comes to recognise that all ‘immateriality’ (‘immateriality’ being, of course, a 
matter of extensive debate across all sectors of society) is very much dependent on 
out material environment. It does not exist as such. No ‘immaterial’ mobile-phone 
game works without a phone. 
The ideological refers to hegemonic class-rule that takes place in diverse kinds of 
institutional arrangements aimed at upholding the prevailing order – ‘the stability of 
bourgeois society and its state’ (Rehmann 2013, 4) – which has been historically 
shocked by recurring crises and which continues to distribute wealth and 
opportunities unequally, unless counter-forces intervene. Those in power protect 
their and their groups’ interests by manufacturing seeming consensus from above. 
In PIT, the objective is to explain people’s voluntary subjection to this prevailing 
order: how they give their consent to power structures that benefit some small group 
of people disproportionately more than the rest of us, produce constant uncertainty, 
and are even vulnerable to recurring crisis. My handling in this chapter has focused 
mostly on capitalist structures, with PIT adding to the picture the modern state’s 
complementary role in modern capitalism, including its capacity for direct 
domination. People cannot be dominated by direct means alone, though. The 
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hegemonic mechanisms of control and gaining people’s active or passive approval 
require more subtle actions via various kinds of socialising and discourse-distributing 
apparatuses. 
As PIT considers the ideological to be alienated socialisation, or Vergesellschaftung 
from above, it is worth recapping the three interconnected dimensions of the 
problem of order encompassed by this. Firstly, alienation refers to the inverted 
quality of the appearance forms encountered in capitalist societies. For instance, 
understanding money as a neutral carrier of economic actions hides from view the 
constitutive production-organising social relations in the background that group 
people into classes by distribution of ownership, opportunities, and authority. 
However, it is not the money per se that matters but the kinds of relations and 
practice-forms that coalesce around its various uses. 
In speaking of socialisation, PIT refers to upbringing, to institutions in which we 
learn how societies work, how to be good people and citizens, and how to act 
accordingly. While school may be the primary ideological apparatus, all kinds of state, 
civil, and private organisations are considered socialising (and societalising) ones, 
since the struggle for hearts and minds is constant. The socialisation process 
continues throughout life as we constantly learn new norms, values, rules, and ways 
to think and act. These institutions create the basis for our common sense – the 
(alienated) categories for our spontaneous way to perceive the world. Socialisation 
also reproduces the predominant relations as it naturalises them for members of 
society. In this connection, PIT addresses, in addition, the hegemony ‘from above’ 
aimed at voluntary subjection of people. People are subjects of dominating powers 
even though they might submit to them voluntarily or even demand their actions. It 
underscores the asymmetries in people’s capabilities to exert influence on the public 
atmosphere and on apparatuses that are needed to produce and circulate the 
messages capable of having mass effects. These hegemonic forces encourage 
subjects perceiving these predominant soci(et)al relations as inevitable and fair 
(Rehmann 2013, 106). 
Finally, people as subjects are interpellated to approve this order through 
messages that appeal to their internalised soci(et)al structures – subconscious 
structures that are inscribed in us in the process of socialisation and that respond to 
these messages as they recognise familiarity, in Althusser’s account (2014 [1995], 
261–266). Via internalised values, attitudes, and ways of reasoning, the subconscious 
yields our spontaneous reactions, which might be normative, prejudiced, 
sympathetic, negative, positive, etc., as we recognise, for example, the ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ in the world. Importantly, there is no determinism here. As real beings with 
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real lives, people have lived and shared experiences that may contradict these 
interpellations. People may stand against the modes of vertical socialisation through 
horizontal, common socialising practices. As they spontaneously sense or 
consciously recognise the contradictions between their conditions and the 
interpellations, avenues open for counter-action and movement. 
The process, in general, creates ideological social phenomena. There is no sovereign 
and autonomous agent against evil structures, but there are subject positions and 
socialised, real, living people, capable of acting and deciding even though still 
fundamentally products of social relations. Since people encounter everyday society 
as real, natural, inevitable, and fair (enough), they tend to surrender their direct 
authority in democratic planning of their life voluntarily. Still, there are several 
groups, fields, messages, discourses, and interpellations vying over consensus as to 
how things in society should be organised. The ideology theory of PIT, then, 
suggests a constant power struggle among groups that strive for positions of 
dominance, meaning control over the means of all kinds of social production: 
material, political, and symbolic. The ideological struggle is fought over what 
apparently makes sense and soon overtakes anyone who comes up against 
Rehmann’s ‘force-fields’ and thereby ventures onto the battlefield of people’s 
varying reasons. 
As the aim with my ideology-theoretical investigation has been to supplement 
and complement the theories presented earlier in the dissertation rather than cast 
them aside, I should stress that PIT still takes the ideological and the ensuing 
ideologies to be structural phenomena. In awareness of its unique approach to the 
shared starting point, three questions can be posed for ideational scholarship, which 
grounds itself in social constructionism. Presenting them below should crystallise the 
issues well.  
The first pertains to the material existence of the ideological and, hence, ideas. 
How can one explain the existence of ideas without addressing these conditions? 
According to PIT, the entire complex of material arrangements – ideological 
apparatuses with their praxis-forms – determines the ideas’ production and their 
acceptability in society. Cleaving to individual ideas leads easily to fetishism, wherein 
we attach the effects the ideas seem to cause to them as such. Early 
neo-institutionalism asked a good question in musing on whether ideas or ideologies 
possess significant political life of their own, even in the relative absence of the 
institutions or practices that once gave them support. Orren (1995, 100) partly 
replied to her own question in this regard by speaking of ‘parallel devolution of 
institutions and ideas, of encompassing institutions of control and of meaning, over 
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time’. This question has not lost its traction and deserves institutionalist research 
wherein the relation between the ideas and institutions is taken seriously. 
For example, according to Rehmann (2013, 296), the neo-liberal consensus has 
become more passive and aggressive since ‘the ruling class “has lost consensus”, it 
is no more “leading”, but only “ruling”’. Streeck’s (2016, Ch. 4) idea of ‘consolidation 
state’ and William Davies’ (2016) analysis of ‘punitive neoliberalism’ seem to support 
this finding, with the mechanisms of more direct state domination being traced to 
public debt, which turns governments against their own citizens just to make sure 
that they would never default on their debt obligations. These scholars’ analyses 
address austerity policies as their general framework. Looking at the same context, 
Blyth (2015) found that, as the ideas that support austerity develop, one may find 
their institutional trace and pay attention to the historically changing and evolving 
situations with their operative interconnections with general social conditions (see 
also Helgadóttir 2016). In addition, extensive machinery gets harnessed to distribute 
these ideas108. However, the queer nature of austerity ideas reveals itself in how they 
are supported because of their punitive nature. This is telling of the appeal of ideas, in 
that, again, it is the moral sentiments that may strongly support even punitive actions 
if they feel justified. 
In my interpretation, the contradiction between economic interests and values 
may result from the fact that, while no-one has to be fully aware of ‘how things really 
are’, the movement of commodities still determines some objective preconditions 
for the society. These conditions present themselves as objective through such 
mechanisms as competition mobilising the respective ideas. That said, this 
movement of commodities and its effects is a process open for all kinds of 
interpretations, even within the capitalist class, and leaves potential for contention. 
Also, in addition to interpretations, people may possess values and attitudes that 
have nothing to do with economic interests, even though these are unlikely to call 
their positions into question, especially if they are privileged. 
The second question deals with ideational scholarship’s preoccupation with 
phenomena of consciousness, as pointed out by Rehmann. Here, PIT suggests that 
we should take the unconscious side of human action into account, including how it is 
socially constituted. This connects with how people’s ‘common sense’ operates and 
what kinds of ideological calls have appeal for them, which ties in also with the third 
 
108 Building the European Union and its fiscal rules is an interesting example of this kind of 
interconnected development. For an in-depth account, see Mitchell (2015), while a shorter one, 
wherein Streeck’s notion of consolidation state is utilised in assessing this general development in the 
framework of economic ideas, is provided elsewhere (Herranen 2018). 
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question for idea scholars. As ideational scholarship gives too much credit to 
conscious decision-making and agency, it also disregards how, in addition to reason, 
people’s fears, hopes, dreams, and doubts operate unconsciously. A classic example 
of manipulating people’s fears and spontaneous doubts is presented in Naomi 
Oreskes and Erik M. Conway’s Merchants of Doubt (2010), describing how ‘doubt’ was 
introduced in the United States during the Cold War as a public-opinion formation 
strategy. Later, big private tobacco companies utilised it in the courtroom and 
created an ‘industry’ around it. The tobacco industry’s innovation was not to deny 
the unhealthy effects of tobacco but to create doubt around contemporary scientific 
findings that only ‘suggested’ a causal link between cigarettes and cancer. By casting 
any strict causal link into doubt, the industry was able to remain unscathed against 
claims and accusations for decades. In addition, they financed their own scientific 
projects for many years to produce supportive information that they could use for 
manipulating the same causal link. In addition, anti-Communist and anti-government 
sentiments of some prominent patriotic scholars were utilised to gain credibility for 
their case. At the same time, constant advertising – mass-communication machinery 
– was used to maintain tobacco’s popularity. 
Another strategy that the tobacco industry employed drew on the idea of fairness, 
of presenting ‘both sides of the story’. According to Oreskes and Conway (2010, 16), 
‘[r]epresentatives of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee met staff at Time, 
Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, Business Week, Life, and Reader’s Digest, 
including men and women at the very top of the American media industry’. What 
they gained from this was ‘fair’ treatment presenting both sides: the side that the 
whole scientific community represented, asserting that tobacco causes cancer, and 
the side of the research the tobacco companies financed, which said that we just 
cannot know. At this very moment, many big players in fossil-energy industries 
produce systematic doubt over a causal link between human action and climate 
change. A small group of conservative scientists with a strategy, sufficient resources, 
and machinery at their disposal spread doubt over human-made climate change and 
thus protects the interests of the private fossil-fuel industry. Quite understandably, 
people would not like to believe we are facing catastrophe, so it is no wonder that 
this interpellation appeals to their deepest fears and doubts. As social media develop 
further, these strategies grow more sophisticated and fewer resources are needed for 
producing ‘reasonable doubt’. 
Why do ideologies, and therefore ideas, appeal to people? Because ideological 
apparatuses have leverage – resources and mass – to produce and circulate them. In 
simple terms, these are the ideas that we encounter the most. Moreover, dominating 
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socialising mechanisms operate to produce subjects capable of operating in this kind 
of society. We have been told so many stories about the prevailing order and how it 
is the best, the fairest, and the inevitable one that we take it for granted. This story 
is the one our common sense recognises also from our mundane experiences. The 
older we grow, the more we are appealed to as the ‘reasonable people’ who 
understand how the world works. Ideologies do not just contain common sense; they 
produce common sense as they produce our active, spontaneous relationship with the 
world. This production is a highly practical exercise, wherein the daily routines play 
a much greater role than usually recognised. 
There is room for further work within PIT, also. As it critically complements 
classic social and neo-institutional theory, it still speaks mostly of subjects rather than 
human agents in the sense in which neo-institutionalists address them. The PIT 
discussion of real, living people is apparently based on Klaus Holzkamp’s work in 
critical psychology, though this angle remains somewhat unexplored in PIT’s main 
works of social theory. From the literature that I have presented, it is unclear where 
human reflexivity as a capacity to judge, act, and identify oneself as a unique and 
individual person stems from in this approach. However, one could ask whether this 
is a matter for social theory in the first place. Secondly, PIT provides few tools for 
understanding or utilising the mechanism called horizontal socialisation. I see the 
presentation of this, with its anarchistic tone, as somewhat poorly suited to theory 
that is structural in other respects. Therefore, I suggest considering Parsons’ theory 
of complementary role-expectations for understanding the very concrete interaction 
mechanisms that constitute horizontal socialisation. It explains the astonishing 
regularity and predictability of human conduct – the order – that usually remains 
relatively unseen while we direct our attention to deviance and differences. This tool 
would shed light on those most practical of daily routines that are the concrete, 
material practices reproducing the functional and dominant social institutions 
referred to so many times in this dissertation. This way forward will be elaborated 
upon further in the concluding chapter. 
At the beginning of the chapter, I referred to the agenda Paul Pierson set for 
historical institutionalism to address ideology theory. Pierson supported this target 
by citing the Marxist idea of false consciousness and its potential merits. Indeed, this 
notion related to Marxist conceptions of ideology prevails among neo-
institutionalists (for example, see Hay 2002; Blyth 2008; Streeck 2016; Carstensen & 
Schmidt 2016). As I have pointed out, however, the critical ideology theory of PIT 
has duly considered the notion of false consciousness, rising past it and indicating its 
shortcomings. While not denying the possibility of false consciousness existing, I 
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hope that my presentation of PIT lays out a plausible approach to this issue, as well 
as value for pursuing the wider agenda of getting past the seemingly eternal 
disagreement between system and lifeworld thinking (Ethington & McDonagh 1995, 
85; 87). When we place human beings in their concrete conditions consisting of 
social relations, there is no more need for such divisions. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has examined the problem of order and the social institutions that 
follow in the context of theories addressing the system and lifeworld dimensions of 
society. The problem of order is expressed in the question of how complex societies 
can stay ‘up and running’ while the people who inhabit them might be deeply divided 
in their needs, interests, and desires. I find this problem far from trivial. It should 
concern us all: to what extent is our being determined by social conditions, and how 
profoundly does our social being determine our being in general? These questions 
are intimately connected with the problem of order and the kind of order we live in. 
Theories of institutions form the foundation for tackling these issues, so they served 
as the starting point for my study. Moreover, as I wanted to participate in developing 
an effective, comprehensive theory of institutions, the pinnacle of current research 
– neo-institutionalism – provided a good vantage point since the changes in 
understanding within that particular tradition trickle all the way down to empirical 
efforts undertaken in its name. Via the underpinnings I articulate for a relational-
structural approach to institutions, I strive to contribute to institutional theories and 
theories of social relations both, thereby informing general understanding of the 
nature of our social being. 
In other words, as a social scientist, I find utilitarianism-based responses to the 
problem of order insufficient, so I have focused on the approaches that begin with 
the social institutions: societies consist of institutions that, while integrated, may be, 
and indeed are, simultaneously beset by internal contradictions. The problem of 
order provides a background condition for social institutions, since it suggests a 
concrete issue that institutions (must) address. 
A set of integrated institutions could be generally characterised as social structures 
that consist of multi-layered and multi-dimensional social relations, the ‘stuff’ behind 
collective order. I regard relations as dependencies (per MacBride 2016) and see 
institutions as special cases of more general social structures (for example, see 
Parsons 1991 [1951]; Hodgson 2006; Lawson 2015). With relations defined as 
dependencies, the social institutions based on certain kinds of social relations are 
dependent on the parties involved, and those parties may be dependent on the 
institution as well. Marriage as an institution exists only insofar as the constituent 
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individuals arrange their living in accordance with the relations that organise this 
particular institution that is manifested as rules and norms. These rules and norms 
may be constitutive in nature, beyond the reach of the parties involved. Moreover, 
when creating organisation based on the marital institution, the constituent 
individuals may – however (un)consciously and (un)willingly – do additional things, 
such as uphold asymmetrical gender relations that have subordinating effects on 
people. 
One dimension of social relations consists of immediate integrative and 
co-ordinative practices and the other of a more constitutive layer of relations that 
uphold, for example, cross-generational stability but also create contradictions. I will 
return to these dimensions when rounding out the chapter, but I mention them here 
because one of the main arguments I have defended – which helped to motivate my 
theoretical-premise-clarifying reconstruction endeavour and the social-relational 
approach I built along the way – is that institutional theory needs a relational 
backrest, to enable addressing the system and lifeworld dimensions of social life 
simultaneously and thereby overcoming the problems that have historically divided 
the corresponding perspectives. As I tackled this project, I found support for my 
main hypothesis: when neo-institutionalists aimed at overcoming the system–
lifeworld division, they forgot the ‘social’ denominator of their theoretical equation. 
It is just such a common social denominator behind the institutions that could aid 
in reviving the reconciliation agenda and bridging the gap between distinct 
institutionalist approaches. Thus, I have found the answer to my primary research 
question –‘what is the “social” that unites different institutions?’ – in social relations. 
However, the reader will recall that I asked further questions: What common 
denominators or shared divisions can be found in neo-institutionalism’s institutions? 
What are the institutions under neo-institutionalism, and what kinds of social 
institutions are they? I also posed secondary research questions for the other 
traditions of institutional theory addressed: how do they answer the above questions 
and relate to neo-institutionalism in that sense, and how do they complement and 
relate to each other? A run-through of my most central findings provides answers to 
these questions. 
I created a base for my reconstructions by bringing out some aspects of 
Durkheim’s classic presentations of social scientific theory, method, and 
investigation. Durkheim usefully emphasised the ‘externality’ of the social 
phenomena – they must be studied as ‘things’ because they must exist outside the 
individual consciousness. Otherwise, only individual mental states could exist and be 
the stuff of scientific investigation. Comparing societies to natural phenomena, 
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Durkheim saw them as emergent entities with properties that transcend the 
individual, making sociology a science of institutions. In his main theoretical-
methodological works, he suggested that these institutions consist of ‘associations’ 
between people, social relations. These social institutions are encountered as 
‘external’ even though they are products of the people’s own conduct. 
With these foundations laid, I reconstructed neo-institutionalist approaches that 
represent the system–lifeworld division: historical institutionalism; ideational 
scholarship; and discursive institutionalism, which is a descendent of IS but has 
introduced itself as an independent approach with a somewhat more systemic nature 
(e.g., Schmidt 2008, 2010a). I chose neo-institutionalism as the object for study 
because it represents the spearhead of contemporary institutional social science in 
taking the structural issues seriously and more generally striving for comprehensive 
understanding of societies. From the beginning, it also has had an ambitious 
theoretical agenda of building an umbrella for all social scientists interested in 
institutional phenomena, and it even originally aimed at getting past the system–
lifeworld dichotomy (Ethington & McDonagh 1995). 
The primary aim with the dissertation has been to revitalise and pursue this 
project, which I have termed the reconciliation agenda. My reconstruction work for 
thus supplementing, complementing, and challenging neo-institutionalism began 
with showing how neo-institutionalism has evolved mainly in its own terms, 
reiterating perennial social-theory dichotomies such as material–ideal and structure–
agent. The system–lifeworld division manifests itself in neo-institutionalism as the 
division between ‘material-structural’ historical institutionalists and ‘ideational-
agential’ ideational scholars. I found that special emphasis has been given to 
understanding of structures, with lifeworld theorists holding the view that ‘structural 
sociology’ represents static thinking wherein individuals are considered dopes. They 
attempted to bring in a viable agential approach that appreciates social change, 
uncertainties, and irregularities, one that accounts for people’s ideas about the world 
in particular (e.g., Blyth 1997, 2002b). 
Accordingly, Ethington and McDonagh (1995, 86–87) suggested that new 
institutionalists should concentrate on institutions’ regularised principles of conduct 
rather than only their immediately perceivable features. The ‘idea’ was put forth 
initially as the ‘intangible’ factor for enquiry. While the dominant branch of the new 
institutionalist movement, HI, continued to concentrate on historical continuity, it 
added ideas as a supplement to the otherwise structural theory. In line with the neo-
institutionalist agenda, these scholars wanted to bring historical-institutional 
contingencies into the picture in addressing issues such as power, interests, classes, 
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and political struggles, largely by dealing with historical-social macro-issues and 
phenomena such as path dependencies and gradual change that provide conditions 
for more unique events. Theirs was an attempt to prove that ‘history’ as a major 
operator behind social institutions possesses causal powers that may operate without 
individuals capable of controlling or even being aware of them (Pierson 2004; 
Mahoney et al. 2016; Steinmo 2016). 
This represented an attempt to tackle the social ‘remainder’. After all, if a society 
is more than the sum of its parts, the structural social theory should be capable of 
explaining this ‘out of hand’ and ‘beyond the reach of the naked eye’ nature of social 
institutions. Since structures cannot, however, be metaphysical entities such as 
nebulous aspects of history, the intangible residual of collective action by the real, 
living people who compose them (and that they encounter in social life) is plausibly 
explained only through social relations. Deeper investigation of contemporary HI’s 
theoretical premises revealed that it did adopt a sort of relational approach in its 
structural premises (Hall 2016) but maintained somewhat ambiguous theoretical 
foundations composed of several, partly contradicting fragments. There are some 
commonalities, though. The key social relation in HI, according to such writers as 
Streeck and Thelen (2005) and Hall (2016), is ‘mutual, collectively enforced 
expectations’ that constitute stability within institutions. When people aim at 
fulfilling each other’s expectations in their conduct, they act in a complementary 
manner. This point was emphasised by Parsons so strongly that he termed it the first 
law of social process. Reconstruction of HI’s theory in tandem with Parsons’ social 
system theory revealed several other key similarities also. 
The most important points of convergence between the two theory bases are 
found in the structural conditions and functional necessities. Interestingly, the main 
difference is that HI has applied mainly empirical investigation to arrive at the point 
Parsons reached mostly through theoretical reasoning. Probably because of his 
background in institutional economics, Parsons took ‘scarcity’ as the prevailing social 
condition for his theory, a condition that all societies aiming to maintain functional 
institutional integration and division of labour must face. Thus, the problem of order 
was connected with the background condition of scarcity. Theoretically important 
implications follow: order is a general problem and condition for the theory no more; 
it is now related to scarcity. Therefore, the above-mentioned functional necessities 
are not logical tautologies that just explain themselves from the outcomes of social 
institutions. They are necessities because of the scarcity that prevails. In relation to 
that condition, social functions are the sine qua non for maintaining the order. Streeck 
(2016, 201) has suggested that Parsons ‘negotiated’ the division of labour between 
 252 
sociology and economics. In my interpretation, he did so when formulating this 
condition in his earlier masterwork The Structure of Social Action in Hobbesian terms 
as a motivation for social enquiry in contrast against economic ones. There, he 
introduced the ‘social’ solution to the fundamental problem, reframing an answer 
that was originally a utilitarian one. 
HI’s idea of historical causality also suggests that particular institutional 
conditions must prevail for certain outcomes to occur (Mahoney et al. 2016, 72). In 
other words, certain functional necessities must be met if institutions are to thrive, 
since societies must be able to organise their divisions of labour and similar 
arrangements beyond the individual’s control. Moreover, according to Streeck and 
Thelen (2005, 12), these functions work also as an identifying tool, so institutions 
such as central banks can be defined through their functions and identification 
becomes less dependent on properties assigned to them by individual agents. While 
Parsons had already brought this ‘structural’ aspect together with the ‘functional’ in 
his The Social System, Thelen and Mahoney (2010) presented the notion of scarce 
resources as a novel innovation for HI’s theory base. While this came relatively late 
in HI’s development, that theory does now address concrete conditions of scarcity 
wherein some functional necessities must be met for the sake of institutional 
stability. However, HI still lacks a plausible general explanation as to the concrete 
mechanisms that maintain this stability – i.e., an accounting for how the above-
mentioned ‘mutual, collectively enforced expectations’ actually work. Moreover, it 
remains ambiguous in that a relational approach is suggested on one hand while 
dichotomies such as agent–structure are maintained on the other. 
Parsons’ reign in American academia was winding down in the mid-1960s, and 
he had to face the dissatisfaction of his students, such as Harold Garfinkel (1984 
[1967]), with his treatment of the subjective factor in systemic social analysis (see 
also Heritage 1984, Ch. 1). Novel theoretical approaches that brought social 
phenomenology into consideration of institutional development also challenged his 
system theory (Berger & Luckmann 1991 [1966]). While the 1960s produced 
anti-Parsonian theories with a social constructionist bent, HI would, in turn, have to 
face corresponding charges from the dissatisfied constructionist generation of the 
1990s, who did not settle for adoption of ‘ideas’ as a mere supplement to historical 
institutions. As early new institutionalists such as Ethington and McDonagh called 
for reconciliation between the traditions in institutionalism, so did neo-
institutionalists such as Blyth (1997, 246) push for a theory of ideas ‘in its own right’. 
Once again, the subjectively experienced lifeworld of an agent was brought to centre 
stage to challenge systemic thinking. My reconstruction of this position in neo-
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institutionalism, a tradition I term ideational scholarship, followed this thread to its 
natural conclusions. 
My aim was to identify the nature of ideas as a theoretical and/or methodological 
explanatory category in their own right and to position those ideas for further 
enquiry in relation to critical ideology theory. Contemporary IS’s critique of HI boils 
down to Blyth’s question about where the change agents get their desire to change 
the institutions. This phrasing of the question is tightly bound up with perennial 
dualisms that even some IS scholars themselves identified. According to Blyth, 
(2016, 466), since these desires are left unexplained by the material structures that 
make up historical institutions, an ideational explanation is required. This, of course, 
begs one to ask what exactly ideas are and how they gain their power to perform all 
the tricks they are claimed to be capable of. However justified Blyth’s questions for 
HI and other structural theories are, he places a heavy burden on the shoulders of 
ideas. 
As a theoretical category, they should be able to explain the outcomes they are 
associated with in empirical analysis. Therefore, they should maintain an ontological 
status of their own; i.e., something argued to cause something must possess 
properties that can generate those effects. Otherwise, one is left with just a heuristic 
category that can be placed in any context. According to my investigation, ideas, 
ultimately, as basic units of the world are conceived of as meaningful content of 
cognitive processes (see, for example, Blyth 2002b; Béland 2003, 2005; Béland & 
Cox 2011b; Hay 2006, 2011). I see this as resulting from a premise that somewhat 
linear causal reasoning is required: all things that exist must have a locatable starting 
point at the end of a causal chain. This demand is derived at least partly from 
American academia, where causal reasoning is seen as equivalent to science (see 
Schmidt 2010b, 189). Whereas some IS scholars are finding ways of adding the idea 
of ‘constitutive causality’ to their toolbox (e.g., Gofas & Hay 2010c; Tønder 2010; 
Blyth 2010), my deeper observation pertains to how more fundamental conclusions 
about the social world are drawn. We need causal reasoning, but its application in 
social reasoning reveals an insistence on finding the ultimate operator in any social 
event at the end of a linear causal chain, which in the case of ideas would be the 
‘idea’ between an agent’s ears. Even more problematically, this insistence ends up 
upholding the perennial dualisms just for demarcation purposes, since agents need a 
theoretical placeholder. 
Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism has been an attempt to provide a more 
contextual umbrella for idea scholars. In spite of her attempt to bring discourses 
back into institutional explaining, she mainly recapitulates IS’s theoretical problems. 
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Because of an insistence that only ‘real’ things can have causal effects, Schmidt 
objectifies ideas, and she too derives social explaining from individuals’ 
consciousness, exactly where Durkheim saw a dead end for social explaining. On the 
other hand, in accounts where she develops her theory of ideal power, she places 
idea ‘in between’ agents, without further elaboration on what this should mean (see 
Carstensen & Schmidt 2016). My criticism of Schmidt and of IS theory more 
generally is that ideas cannot explain social institutions, because of their 
individualistic premise. Institutions would be reduced to phenomena of 
consciousness, unable to explain the social remainder (unintended consequences 
etc.). 
In addition, ideas form a category that is unfalsifiable in its generality. As 
Finlayson (2004, 531) brought out in his critique, ‘ideas are not a uniform class of 
things’. Through this observation, IS faces a twofold problem: On one hand, ideas 
are so general a category that isolating their explanatory power from any event is a 
leap of faith since the idea should be the causal-object main operator in any case in 
question. The usual response to this issue is to separate between kinds of ideas. Then, 
on the other hand, if IS claims causal powers for a general category of ideas, it must 
maintain a common denominator, some property that explains ideas’ causal powers, 
whether the idea is ‘of God, an idea of good, an idea of right [or] an idea of what to 
have for lunch’ (ibid.). This is, apparently, too wide a bridge. Eventually, ideas are 
defended for the sake of agency, but IS risks imagining autonomous, sovereign 
individuals with equal starting positions in a world where all differences between 
people are produced through solely cognitive operations. 
The main problem of neo-institutionalism can be summarised as lying in dualisms 
such as agent–structure and material–ideal. As critics have stated, scholars of the IS 
tradition tend to draw a picture of social structures that automatically over-socialises 
people and renders them dopes who are passive ‘bearers’ of classes and values. This 
limits people’s agency too much, since the institutional change should always come 
from the ‘outside’, and I see the problem as stemming precisely from the dualistic 
theoretical underpinnings. This fact need not be seen as discrediting IS scholars’ 
empirical findings and their questions for structural theorists. However, and quite 
paradoxically, while IS justifies its position among the institutionalists by appealing 
to agency, it does not offer any particular theory of agency itself but associates ideas 
with people’s reflexive and communicative capabilities. These capabilities go 
unexplained. They are just assumed. 
Structures, of course, deserve equal handling to ideas. They obviously beg for the 
same question as to what they are. It goes without saying that this question has been 
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posed several times, and some of the recent criticism actually comes from 
contemporary relational theorists, such as Latour. In recent relational theorising, 
relations are seen as an element of micro-modelling or social networks rather more 
than, or even as opposed to, ‘structural’ explanations (Emirbayer 1997; Haslanger 
2016; Dépelteau 2018b). Some accounts even associate structures with ‘individual 
psychological states’, claiming that structural explaining is a ‘trick’ (Watts 2014, 324). 
The central criticism against looking at structures is that they are regarded as ‘things’ 
that just get to work, while their essence remains a mystery, a problem that Sewell 
identified already in his influential American Journal of Sociology piece (1992). 
Sewell quite rightly identifies the patterns of relations as the building blocks of 
structures, but he still ends up objectifying the power resources as things, thereby 
separating between ‘virtual’ and ‘actual’ components of structures: ‘Structure, then, 
should be defined as composed simultaneously of schemas, which are virtual, and of 
resources, which are actual. If structures are dual in this sense, then it must be true 
that schemas are the effects of resources, just as resources are the effects of schemas’ 
(ibid., 13). Then he suggests ‘many distinct structures [divided] between different 
institutional spheres’ (ibid., 16). Thus, he muddies what ought to be explained via 
the description. According to Sewell (ibid., 27), structures are ‘constituted by 
mutually sustaining cultural schemas and sets of resources that empower and 
constrain social action and tend to be reproduced by that action’. While I have 
nothing against this definition – in that it addresses the social conditions in relation 
to resource distribution and most definitely could be useful in empirical investigation 
– it objectifies the thing it should explain and uses the oldest trick in the book by 
identifying ‘many distinct structures’. In my interpretation, this happens when we 
confuse relations with things – in other words, fetishise the explanatory categories, 
just as was done with ‘ideas’. Even Haslanger’s (2016, 126) recent progressive 
account of structures as relations constituted through practices does not get past this 
objectifying tendency. This is because she finds that resources with ‘material’ 
properties have the capability to ‘mediate our relations to each other within a 
structure’ (ibid., 128), and she hence operates with common-sense materialism. 
Another angle of attack was provided by my reconstruction of Parsons’ social 
system theory and Berger and Luckmann’s social constructionism, which addresses 
HI’s lack of a general description of the mechanisms that maintain the institutional 
stability through the ‘expectations’ that were identified as the relational-theory 
category. Parsons built his structural-functional theory on the premise that actors 
form their relations to institutions through their historical experiences, developing a 
system of expectations. These expectations are based on relations with the various 
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objects of which the environment is composed – be they social, cultural, or physical 
– but the primary relation is the social one that operates through the relatively stable 
communicative structure that obtains between individuals and must stretch over 
time. The ‘proof’ of this kind of structure is the possibility for communication, 
meaning more generally that some shared organising standards must prevail for collective 
human action to maintain the order, standards that for Parsons are wholly and 
fundamentally relational. 
Parsons’ elaboration on his social system theory brings out the constituent 
‘values’, which act as a standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation 
in the given situation. This formulation of values is of considerable weight: it 
transcends the individualistic account of (political) values we ‘possess’ and refers to 
collective normative standards that operate as a yardstick for evaluation of acceptable 
and appropriate behaviour. The normative value-standards constitute the element of 
relation between people’s motivations and modes of behaviour that are collectively 
expected from each one of us. I see values accordingly, as shared, relatively stable 
criteria for social practice and, thus, not depending on individuals from the start. 
Here, we have a viable alternative for the contemporary individualistically toned 
political debate about values. 
Moreover, Parsons sees these values as specialised sets of norms with an order of 
precedence whereby actors are informed of which values are more important – more 
institutionalised – than others, or in other words, which values are more 
institutionalised than others (Parsons 1991a [1951], 271–272). As values reflect the 
prevailing scarcity, Parsons saw institutional integration and the co-ordination of 
mechanisms such as division of labour and allocation of resources as halves of the 
same equation. Thus, stability and change too are inherently linked. The stabilising 
mechanism behind the institutional integration and allocation – processes that fulfil 
the functional necessities of complex societies with highly developed division of 
labour – culminates in the complementary role-expectations in accordance with 
which members of society perform. In a world of (produced) differences where not 
everyone can have everything all the time, norms and values provide instruction for 
day-to-day life and justify the differences between people in a socially constructed 
manner, always in relation to prevailing social conditions. One may interpret this 
finding also as indicating that there is nothing ‘natural’ in a general system that shares 
scarcity; rather, the issue is of reorganising the social standards. 
The social constructionism of Berger and Luckmann, in turn, situates itself in a 
twofold relationship with the problem of order. On one hand, in asking about the 
origin of the empirically existing stability of human order, it acknowledges the 
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relatively stable nature of societies, but it also considers the Parsonian functionalist 
solution to be theoretical legerdemain and provides its own explanation for 
institutionalisation of society. My central finding with regard to Berger and 
Luckmann was that they reiterated the Robinson Crusoe story from classical political 
economics, which Marx had already criticised in his Capital for anachronistic 
naturalisation of prevailing social relations. Nonetheless, Berger and Luckmann 
proceeded with their model of reciprocal typification of two sovereign, autonomous, 
and asocial(ised) individuals, to whose mutual conduct the whole social world with 
its institutions can be traced back. While I found their theoretical framework to 
resemble that of Parsons to an astonishing extent, they engaged in problematic linear 
causal reasoning just as their IS successors would. They sought the origin of societies 
so had to find it somewhere. At the end of their causal chain was individual 
consciousness, and, in comparison to Parsons’, their story is told from the experience 
point of view. 
While they may have fallen short of providing a plausible explanation for the 
institutionalisation of society, Berger and Luckmann provide interesting insights into 
the formation of actors’ historical experiences. For Berger and Luckmann, history 
operates through experiences. The ad hoc typifications of actions are transferred 
forward to one’s children and thereby appear objective to a third party, thus 
becoming historical. Third party C experiences A’s and B’s ‘parenthood’ as an 
objective institution since C encounters this interaction as ‘natural’, objectified 
(Berger & Luckmann 1991 [1966], 75–76). Though this theoretical formula leads to 
several interesting findings, I suggest that it addresses the construction of actors’ 
historical experiences more than society, since people face several social structures 
even in mundane life that cannot be derived from their individual-level experiences 
alone. My example of the historical institution of money embodies this nicely. It is 
highly problematic to derive the historical and structural properties of money from 
individual cognitive processes or ideas, since individuals cannot possess and handle 
all the information related to money and consequences of its use. It operates merely 
as an arbitrator of the social relations that possess the properties in question. 
As for social relations in general, I offered an idea inspired by frustration with the 
realist–relativist /constructionist debate: whatever properties any objects in the 
world (or in outer space) may possess, they become treatable only after a relationship 
is established with them. I suggested treating the properties of stars and moon and the 
like as non-contingent. Thus, one need not consider the realist account and debate with 
its insistence on an ontological status of ‘realness’ for objects independent of the 
relation that human beings establish with them. As a social scientist, I see no use for 
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such carryings-on. I find that the category of non-contingent properties, based on 
the general emphasis on contingency of social phenomena, retains the possibility of 
objects having properties while ensuring that they are treatable only in meaningful 
relation with human beings. Things may be real or not, and they may possess 
properties in themselves or not, but they become significant for us only after the 
relationship has been established. The question of ‘realness’ gains immense 
significance only from insistence on ‘real’ things at the end of a causal chain, precisely 
the sort of account that tends to uphold the perennial dualisms. In this regard, I also 
recommended serious consideration of Marx’s concept of materialism as presented 
in his Theses on Feuerbach: it is the sensuous human activity that should be considered 
material, since that activity, with the ensuing practices and relations with nature and 
other people, is what transforms the world. Said activity is objective since it 
constitutes all the relations between any objects that might be significant for us, 
leaving them transformed via our material activity (see also Suchting 1982). 
This materialist understanding is the foundation for the critical ideology theory 
of Projekt Ideologietheorie, for which ideology is an institutional practice-form, the 
ideological rather than a worldview or set of ideas. This takes us nearer the end of 
our journey. With the noteworthy exception of some IS accounts (e.g., Blyth 2011), 
all the traditions examined view collective human behaviour as having a tendency to 
seek equilibrium spontaneously, unless interfered with. Approaching the problem of 
order from a different angle, PIT questions such an automatic tendency. It sees 
capitalist societies as possessing strong disordering tendencies caused by factors 
similar to what Parsons and others described in terms of scarcity but such that the 
entire social production base is plagued by forces that are out of control. 
I follow, for example, Marx and Shaikh in suggesting that the capitalist 
competition as a social force of both control and the out-of-control has its roots in 
the social relations that are beyond individual control, imposing ‘invisible’ force upon 
us just as gravity does. These competitive capitalist relations create emergent 
phenomena as a side-effect of collective profit-making conduct that sets all market 
actors in such relations with each other that, despite their individual desires, they 
must earn profits as capitalist producers and earn a living as labourers. In a tricky 
balance, the same people whose pay gets cut because of this vile competition should 
be able to purchase the products from the market for which they have produced 
them. 
If relations, again, are composed of concrete, material practices, how, then, can 
they be a force that we encounter as seemingly external in relation to ourselves? After 
all, they are a result of our own conduct. Consider heading to work or visiting a local 
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shop. If the production and exchange of the commodities connected with our labour 
or interest are organised on the basis of a private mode, the individual producers and 
labourers act as private, individual units. As such, they obtain their earnings and their 
consumer goods from the market. When entering a shop and purchasing a product, 
you actually satisfy your needs through a rather different set of arrangements, 
involving corporate entities and actual, working units, such as the shop, but also the 
whole production chain. All of the various parties involved must follow some shared 
rules, laws, and regulations. At the same time, they also obey some rules and laws 
that are tailored just for them. The same applies for heading to work. When you 
work as an employee, you share a set of rules and regulations with your employer, 
but, because the company you work for is a different kind of legal entity from you, 
not all are shared. Also, neither managers nor shareholders own the corporation – 
the corporation itself is an owning agent, with shareholders owning shares in the 
corporation, not the corporation itself. 
A company as a legal entity is a kind of ‘super-entity’ for which no-one is actually 
responsible in the last instance. This example illustrates how private events and 
different sets of rules and practices overlap, entwine, and interleave at so many levels 
and in so many layers that their conscious governing is next to impossible, and 
unintended effects invisible to the naked eye spill forth. The production chain is 
capable of producing climate change even though no-one would desire or be aware 
of it; it just emerges as an undesired side-effect of integrated, co-ordinated, 
constituted, and contradictory collective human conduct. This makes structures 
second-order relations, in which we in our private activities set ourselves and, thus, 
participate in bringing about their accumulated effects as emergent results. 
Another curious consequence then arises, the inversion wherein the movement 
of commodities begins to control the movement of people. This movement yields 
even stranger objective thought-forms, which operate as an anchor for the 
ideological. Involving forces such as socialising institutions (apparatuses) and 
ideologists aimed at translating what is observed about this movement into what is 
‘inevitable’ and ‘fair’, these sustain profit-making. Alongside the alienated 
socialisation that Rehmann (2013, 11) describes, a further queer aspect of the 
fetishised nature of the appearance forms we encounter in day-to-day life is evident: 
the whole world gets refracted through commodities such as money and is 
interpreted thus. When we focus on the appearance form of the commodities 
themselves, the social relations behind them, which actually cause the movement, 
start seeming self-evident and help to uphold an order that is based on socially 
produced divisions between people. No-one has to be fully aware of ‘how things 
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really are’, since the social relations that control the production are beyond any 
conscious planning. In a sense, how individuals perceive the world does not matter; 
ideologists need not always be aware of the nature of the social forces they promote. 
The essential point is that the world people encounter is real. People see the world 
as it appears to them and internalise the relations through their very concrete 
practices producing real experiences. For example, most of us must make a living 
from the market, so the movement of commodities is very real for us, especially 
since we cannot control it. We can only set ourselves in these relations. When 
entering a shop or applying for a job, we perform as nominally free individuals whose 
transactions are arbitrated by money, not via direct domination, unless we break the 
law or otherwise threaten the order. On the other hand, we live amid inverted reality, 
where the prevailing relations that organise the commodity production and the 
division of labour that follows are not apparent as such. These relations are hidden 
behind our money-arbitrated practical everyday operations. Hence, the primary 
ideological struggle is fought over the ‘best explanation’ for the prevailing order. 
A critical perspective that PIT suggests in connection with this is that, to some 
extent, ideas and values are produced in order to uphold the status quo. Where the 
cognitive theories discussed above have failed to explain where their ‘ideas’ come 
from (and the origin of Parsons’ ‘values’ also remains a mystery), PIT connects them 
with the prevailing conditions and interest-based explanations of the prevailing 
order. Different groups, with separate sets of interests, form different interpretations 
of this movement of commodities and its relation to social and political systems, and 
they offer these to us. If, as Parsons suggests, the prevailing values that operate as a 
yardstick for collective behaviour are a social product connected with the prevailing 
order, it is perfectly logical to assume that ideological forces vie to control the 
definition of this yardstick to legitimise their interests as ‘normal’ functioning of 
society. Thus, ideological ideas do not appear out of nothing. They are produced as 
those forces present their interests as the common interest of all members of society. 
By this expression in ideal form, people are made into subjects for ideological calls 
– Althusser’s interpellations – in the struggle for hearts and minds. Throughout, 
coercion must be in counter-balanced relation with voluntary consent (see Gramsci 
1971, 12; Thomas 2009, 163–165), so people must give voluntary consent to the 
dominating class, and this is what hegemony is about. 
As subjects, people must be regarded as socialised beings whose personality can 
only be understood as a product of the multiple social relations and practices that 
have moulded us as humans (in relation to some genetic disposition). People are not 
born and raised in a vacuum but become acting units of the social world through a 
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constant process of socialising practices. We are in definite relations with each other, 
even when those relations do not leave a conscious trace in us (again, ‘natural’ and 
‘self-evident’ facts may act upon us without our conscious awareness). When using 
PIT’s three objections to the false consciousness thesis for posing my three questions 
for idea-based explaining, I suggested that the common sense people use for 
evaluating the world is socially constituted and responds spontaneously to 
ideological calls. In this sense, all that ideology has to do is make good sense, as Hall 
put it. Therefore, the question becomes one of what kind of common sense people 
use. If the common sense is ‘manufactured’ in socialising practices, the ideological 
messages must correspond to the relevant experiences. The first factor in this is a 
code that makes the messages translatable – a standard that enables communication. 
Then, since the communication takes place in a context, the messages (ideas, if you 
will) must have some resonance with people’s experiences, so they must be 
sufficiently related to the prevailing conditions. Also, in the case of mass 
communication, messages are produced and circulated through material instruments. 
What is important in all this is that they must be encoded in such form that they get 
translated back into suitable social practices when they reach the receiving end, 
completing the circuit. The ideas themselves cannot do all this heavy lifting as 
isolated units: all ideas, their production and encoding, the circulation, and the 
decoding into social practices hinge on social relations and practices, as much as on 
the ‘code’ of shared organising standards. 
Communication is a material social practice, one that in mass measure needs 
machinery to work. We live in a comprehensively material world composed of social 
relations that are constituted by (communicative) practices. The confusion between 
practices and (ideological) ideas usually is that the ideas are deemed to be what 
matters while the practice is just the means. However, Althusser’s formula is of value 
here for interpreting the ideological nature of society, because of its practical nature 
– ‘Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe.’ It is not just the idea that 
is conveyed from the head of a priest to the head of a subject; it is the whole 
arrangement of practices, rituals, and ideas that matters. 
If we live in a capitalist society dominated by ideological powers, one could ask 
whether it is thoroughly dominated, leaving us just observing the show. One might 
recall Blyth’s reasonable question about whether the hegemonic projects leave any 
‘outside’ in which we can operate. To answer this, I would go back to Parsons, who 
follows Freud in seeing that non-rational and irrational aspects of motivation should 
not be forgotten when one is assessing human behaviour. In this regard, I find 
Parsons’ actors very humane: their motivations need only be sufficiently integrated for 
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the sake of an order. As I have already hinted, structures do not over-socialise people; 
socialising structures are needed because of the variety of people. Only a narrow, 
utilitarian, rational agent would be the kind of dope who would act in the manner of 
an over-socialised machine. Correspondingly, the ‘subjectifying’ theory of PIT 
refused to say anything about ‘the entirety of the subjects’ social practices, thought-
forms, and feelings’ and pointed instead to the specific dimension of a socialisation 
from above’ (Rehmann 2013, 11). 
PIT supplies a framework for thinking about the paradox that most people might 
wish to live in a better world yet, as Parsons’ theory suggests, are somewhat opposed 
to change. In Subsection 4.2.3, I sketched some outlines that PIT provides for a 
theory of contradictions and resistance. There, I suggested that contradictions often 
ignite change, since they interrupt people’s routines and/or comfort. When 
considering why people are not more active in changing their environment in terms 
of the horizontal socialisation described by PIT, even in conditions of highly unequal 
distribution of wealth, glaring injustice, or direct domination, one should turn to 
Parsons’ conceptualisation of normative behaviour. 
Parsons’ claims about the complementary nature of human conduct that enables 
institutional integration might stem from Durkheim’s notion that we, as human 
beings, avoid hurting our fellows’ feelings and also respect collective ways of acting 
and thinking. Accordingly, the horizontal socialisation described by PIT not only 
should operate through the process that Parsons posits but also faces the same 
normative behaviour that takes place through complementary role-expectations. 
Should people rebel via identifying their ‘personal’ or ‘common’ experiences of 
disparity or something similar, Parsons would suggest that this identification is social 
conduct in the first place, since people constantly control each other and use the 
shared values as the yardstick for acceptable and appropriate behaviour, against 
which the experiences are reflected upon. 
In this connection, it may aid our understanding to consider the findings on 
climate denialism and that phenomenon’s links with conservative white males, as 
discussed in Subsection 3.1.6. Recall that, from a Parsonian point of view, the lived 
experiences of the latter group are most in line with the institutionalised order and, 
hence, with standards for appropriate conduct, so their worldview is most 
‘naturalised’ in that this group’s common sense is the closest match for the prevailing 
order. Disturbances to the apparent order therefore produce the harshest 
contradictions for them. Hence, anger and similar reactions arise. If we understand 
norms as the yardsticks for conduct and view people as getting treated differentially 
under these norms when conditions of scarcity prevail, considering conservative 
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white males to be ‘norm conglomerations’ is quite fitting. Clearly, they are the people 
with grave interests tied in with the prevailing social order. These yardsticks, which, 
again, the ideological powers actively strive to influence, operate through 
mechanisms that Parsons described as a sort of mutual recognition by which the 
acceptable behaviour gets identified in any ‘other’. In this sense, the most 
institutionalised norms are accumulated and internalised to conduct among those 
people whose values correspond with the most central and/or average norms of the 
given social context – a middle class, for example. 
When positioning this in a wider, social context within the institutional theory 
laid out here, we may understand more fully how the ideological powers operate so 
as to promote their interests. One might once again consider climate-change 
denialism as a case in point. It is a phenomenon orchestrated from above wherein 
the doubt, once manufactured, trickles down through media and political 
apparatuses, eventually finding its own life that sustains it in the hearts and minds of 
people who then take on the reproduction of the denialism phenomenon themselves 
(Oreskes & Conway 2010). Fossil-fuel corporations seek to provide justification for 
people to stick with comfortable habits with regard to consumption etc. and for 
them to avoid thinking about the inconvenient reality of climate change. The 
mechanism lies in producing what is considered a pillar of the American justice 
system: reasonable doubt. 
In this sense, people seeking change should be able to produce and realise their 
own, alternative values when encountering the dominant values as something 
opposite. The problem is that people tend to conform to the prevailing values since 
deviance invites negative sanctions. For counter-action, people should sense that 
doing or feeling things differently is not wrong; instead, they should have experiences 
of numerous alternatives for normative conduct. Example is a powerful force. This 
should be taken into account in assembling forces for change and against the 
prevailing hegemony, a hegemony that benefits from the status quo (consisting of 
people continuing to do exactly the same thing they were doing yesterday). This 
struggle is not won through reasoning alone, however much many of us wish it were 
so, because the powers that be dictate the rationale used (austerity, for example). 
I now summarise the results of my efforts to present a relational-structural 
approach that could benefit neo-institutionalism and revitalise the reconciliation 
agenda. Having considered all the traditions in light of social relations and thereby 
fulfilled the secondary aim of this work, I conclude that social relations provide a 
framework within which multiple institutional approaches may operate consistently, 
as long as they are considered distinct yet complementary dimensions of social 
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relations. In this respect, agents with ideas are considered not free-floating 
individuals but always dependent on their institutional environments, changing 
and/or stabilising these in relation to their share in integration or co-ordinating 
actions and to their positions of power or dominance from which their resources are 
derived. In this sense, institutions are a result of constituting but also contradictory 
practices, whose organising is based on shared standards that are the subjects of 
usually interest-based struggles between groups and individuals. Moreover, they are 
also (partly) unintended side-products of uncontrolled social relations, such as 
capitalist competition. 
This relational-structural approach to social institutions emphasises the regularity 
that operates as a basis and a reference point for change, along with the unequal 
distribution of resources among people’s various starting positions, which affect 
their desires and abilities to change or maintain the existing institutions. Lastly, my 
approach emphasises the ‘out-of-control’ nature of the ‘structural’ social relations, 
referring to the social remainder and/or dominator discussed throughout this work. 
Yet this approach does not deny actors’ agential capabilities. Nor does it try to 
explain them as such. Be they as they may, people are socialised products of their 
environments; i.e., they are not born and raised in isolation. My research has led me 
to consider the idea of the fully self-conscious, sovereign, and/or autonomous 
individual an ideological product representing contemporary individualistic hubris. 
Accordingly, social analysis may operate from the perspective of agents only as long 
as they are situated in their concrete social relations, from which the conditions for 
their operation are derived. In these conditions, there is no point in denying people’s 
potential to bring change if that should occur, but it surely is a capability in relation to 
something. 
In the table below, I present a summarising typology that differentiates between 
the complementary dimensions of social relations as examined in this project within 
the framework of order. However, because the problem of order is the unifying 
condition across all the dimensions, I suggest that, from the start, instead of speaking 
about equilibrium, social scientists should replace this word with ‘order’. An order 
denotes no implicit assumption of spontaneous collective behaviour, and order can 
be maintained through force. Also, one could thus easily consider hierarchical order 
too – as with ‘order in the court’. 
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Table 3.  A typology of the complementary dimensions of social relations within the framework 
of order 
DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL 
RELATIONS WITHIN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF ORDER 
Stability Change 
Processes  
(‘action’) 
INTEGRATION 
x complementary 
role-expectations 
x social control 
x socialisation 
CO-ORDINATION 
x division of labour 
x markets 
x networks 
Conditions  
(‘structure’ or 
‘institution’) 
CONSTITUTION 
x constitution/law 
x grammar, systems of 
measurement, etc. 
x positions/statuses 
CONTRADICTION 
x class  
x gender 
x market competition 
x race 
The purpose of this typology is to draw together everything stated above about 
relations and thereby provide a framework in which to position social theories for 
evaluation of their explanatory range. It represents a heuristic tool for considering 
the diverse relations encapsulated in any theory situated in social context. 
Accordingly, it clarifies the relations present in classic dichotomies such as agent–
structure and stability–change, through conceptualisation as, by default, relational 
phenomena. This framing suggests, for example, that any change witnessed is always 
observed in relation to some kind of stability, analogously to how movement is 
always observed in relation to some reference point. 
One may think of these dimensions as interdependent and interrelated aspects of 
social life present in most situations, hence the word ‘complementary’. They begin 
from the view that our existence as human beings is comprehensively bound to 
others’. This does not mean that there is no degree of freedom in an individual’s life. 
What it implies is that we are in comprehensive social relations with each other. The 
upper row presents Parsons’ parallel functional necessities that a society must fulfil. 
In keeping with Parsons’ own theoretical formula for the ‘action frame of reference’, 
I prefer to associate these processes with ‘action’ rather than with individualistic ‘agents’. 
The lower row refers to social conditions, which I regard as equivalent to ‘structures’ 
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and ‘institutions’ but only in the sense presented in this dissertation: as a set of 
relatively stable, shared organising standards that depend primarily on social relations 
but may include some physical objects and the like with non-contingent properties, 
just as any other dimension of relation may. Institutions are the empirically perceived 
manifestations of structures that people find external in relation to them. The left-
hand column covers stability, addressed as the main concern in neo-institutionalism, 
and, correspondingly, the right-hand column presents change, the parallel aspect in 
neo-institutionalism’s consideration of the general problem of order. 
If we begin breaking down the table from the upper left, we find the ‘integration’ 
cell, derived from Parsons’ central concern – the institutional integration that is 
realised in complementary role-expectations and operates through processes of 
socialisation and social control. These factors maintain stability via immediate social 
relations, whereas all kinds of apparently co-ordinative processes are the flipside of 
the integrative function. These processes allocate people and resources on the basis 
of the prevailing division of labour, but the various co-ordinative networks addressed 
in the dissertation also can be seen to belong to the ‘co-ordination’ cell. This is 
because these processes all reveal only the immediate connections between people, 
without positioning on the structural dimension (i.e., with regard to the second-order 
relations). One may also consider network theories in general within the context of 
social theory: they are processual theories of immediate co-ordination and 
encountering of people but lack structural variables. When approached from the 
processual point of view, markets too belong here, along with market theories. 
Integration and co-ordination characterise the processual dimensions of the peaceful 
reproduction of our everyday social conditions, as suggested in the third chapter. 
In the lower left is ‘constitution’, which relational vocabulary usually associates 
with constitutive causality (for example, see Díaz-León 2013; MacBride 2016). Here, 
the word denotes the more general phenomena associated also with social 
emergence, since theoretically we cannot derive emergent phenomena from 
processes. Juridical constitution is one of its main empirical manifestations, since it 
represents the kind of intangible rules and regulations that develop historically to the 
point where we usually encounter them ‘as soon as [we] try to resist’ (Durkheim 
(1982 [1895], 51). They are usually followed spontaneously, in the spirit of PIT’s 
notion of unconscious conduct. I consider this category to extend to various 
relatively stable positions also –such as company CEO, public servant, or citizen of 
a given country – since people occupy these without full power to determine their 
content. Elaborated upon in terms of status, it could be characterised as a structurally 
‘located’ position, meaning that an actor is an object of others’ orientation (and of 
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one’s own) (Parsons 1991 [1951], 39). I also find grammar, systems of measurement, 
and the like to represent constitutive relations, structures of the social world. 
Only the lower right cell, of ‘contradiction’, is left. It denotes the prevailing 
contradictory relations in society, such as class, gender, and race, that divide people 
in accordance with some principles that maintain the sorts of differences in society 
that oppress or subordinate some people. Contradictory relations also turn around 
the equilibrium-based formula that is present – at least implicitly – on other 
dimensions. I consider competitive market relations to represent such a 
phenomenon, in light of my study but also because it is presented in public discourse 
as almost a personified force, something that itself forces entire nation-states to their 
knees. It also exemplifies nicely how the social relations may be ‘out of hand’ and 
beyond direct observation. 
One way to interpret this basic setting is to conclude that were it not for 
fundamental stability of people’s everyday operations, the more nuanced actions 
would not be possible, no more than a system tending toward crisis could work 
without a significant amount of system-level predictability. Thus, the functioning of 
capitalist competition requires people’s normative behaviour. These facets may be 
seen as constituent elements for further analysis, on which case studies can be built. 
Still, the general difficulty brought in by structures and structural thinking is that we 
take this world of social relations for granted, because we are so accustomed to it. 
Social structures and, with them, institutions are constantly present in everyday 
encounters working just as gravity does, stealthily moving behind our backs in a 
society where we are fish in water. To overcome this as social scientists and citizens 
alike, we must rise above immediate perception and be prepared to challenge our 
common sense, for the necessary social change requires change in the structural 
social relations. 
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